federalist papers essay 1

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• Introduction
• Federalist Nos. 1-10
• Federalist Nos. 11-20
• Federalist Nos. 21-30
• Federalist Nos. 31-40
• Federalist Nos. 41-50
• Federalist Nos. 51-60
• Federalist Nos. 61-70
• Federalist Nos. 71-80
• Federalist Nos. 81-85
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The Federalist , commonly referred to as the Federalist Papers, is a series of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison between October 1787 and May 1788. The essays were published anonymously, under the pen name "Publius," in various New York state newspapers of the time.

The Federalist Papers were written and published to urge New Yorkers to ratify the proposed United States Constitution, which was drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. In lobbying for adoption of the Constitution over the existing Articles of Confederation, the essays explain particular provisions of the Constitution in detail. For this reason, and because Hamilton and Madison were each members of the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers are often used today to help interpret the intentions of those drafting the Constitution.

The Federalist Papers were published primarily in two New York state newspapers: The New York Packet and The Independent Journal . They were reprinted in other newspapers in New York state and in several cities in other states. A bound edition, with revisions and corrections by Hamilton, was published in 1788 by printers J. and A. McLean. An edition published by printer Jacob Gideon in 1818, with revisions and corrections by Madison, was the first to identify each essay by its author's name. Because of its publishing history, the assignment of authorship, numbering, and exact wording may vary with different editions of The Federalist .

The electronic text of The Federalist used here was compiled for Project Gutenberg by scholars who drew on many available versions of the papers.

One printed edition of the text is The Federalist , edited by Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1961). Cooke's introduction provides background information on the printing history of The Federalist; the information provided above comes in part from his work.

This web-friendly presentation of the original text of the Federalist Papers (also known as The Federalist) was obtained from the e-text archives of Project Gutenberg. Any irregularities with regard to grammar, syntax, spelling, or punctuation are as they exist in the original e-text archives.

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The first amendment, historic document, federalist 1 (1787).

Alexander Hamilton | 1787

On October 27, 1787, Alexander Hamilton published the opening essay of The Federalist Papers — Federalist 1 . The Federalist Papers were a series of 85 essays printed in newspapers to persuade the American people (and especially Hamilton’s fellow New Yorkers) to support ratification of the new Constitution. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay—with all three authors writing under the pen name “Publius.” On September 17, 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had signed the new U.S. Constitution. This new Constitution was the Framers’ proposal for a new national government. But it was only that—a proposal. The Framers left the question of ratification—whether to say “yes” or “no” to the new Constitution—to the American people. In the Framers’ view, only the American people themselves had the authority to tear up the previous framework of government—the Articles of Confederation—and establish a new one. The ratification process itself embodied one of the Constitution’s core principles: popular sovereignty, or the idea that all political power is derived from the consent of “We the People.” In Federalist 1, Hamilton captured this vision well, framing the stakes of the battle over ratification. In this opening essay, Hamilton called on the American people to “deliberate on a new Constitution” and prove to the world that they were capable of choosing a government based on “reflection and choice,” not “accident and force.”

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AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind. This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth. 

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government. 

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution. 

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants. . . . 

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole. This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.  

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The Federalist Papers

By alexander hamilton , james madison , john jay, the federalist papers summary and analysis of essay 1.

Alexander Hamilton begins this brilliant discourse on the Constitution of the United States of America by asking his readers to consider a new Constitution because they have experienced the inefficiencies of the present form of government. He pronounces that the people are in a unique position to answer the most important political question of all: ­ "whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice." If the people are up to the challenge, their actions will have great worldwide significance.

He proceeds to show that many people will oppose the Constitution for a variety of reasons, especially if they benefit from the current form of government. Hamilton, however, is not going to address the motives of those who oppose the Constitution; rather, his intent is to make arguments that favor the Constitution. He addresses imagined critics who would question his willingness to listen to other arguments because he has already made up his mind to support the Constitution. He insists that, while his motives for urging ratification of the Constitution are personal, he remains receptive to the best arguments.

Finally, he outlines the specific issues that he will address in the Federalist Papers: political prosperity and the Constitution; the inadequacy of the present government to preserve the union; the necessity of a strong and energetic government; the Constitution and its relationship to republican principles of government; the similarity of the proposed Constitution to the New York state constitution; and the protection of liberty and property under the proposed government. In addition, he is attempting to effectively answer serious arguments brought against ratification.

Hamilton concludes the first section of The Federalist Papers by telling the people that it might seem unnecessary to plead for a strong union—indeed, it may even seem as though the country were too large to establish a national system of government. However, he says, in the end, the choice the people must face is whether to adopt the Constitution or else see the end of a united government.

Before beginning a more general analysis of Alexander Hamilton 's remarks, it is necessary to provide the background of the political theory of educated men in the United States in this time period. First, most educated men, especially those who were at the heart of governing the new country, were extremely familiar with the republics of Ancient Greece and Rome (for example, see John Adam's book Defense of the Constitution , published at the same time as The Federalist Papers ). From this background, the primary fear was that while a republican government was desirable in order to defend liberty, it could be impossible to enact such a government over a large geographic area, such as the United States, because it had never been accomplished before. The conventional wisdom was that this problem had always been the downfall of republics (for instance, the fall of the Roman Empire). The other major pitfall of republics had been class warfare, something that the Founding Fathers had seen in the recent Shay's Rebellion.

More specifically regarding the text, the introduction to The Federalist Papers contains the outline of Hamilton's "argument," the basic points that he wishes to discuss for ratifying the new Constitution. He also explains his motives and those of his cohorts, clarifying that this will not be a debate between two sides of the argument, but rather a coherent examination of the strengths of and necessity of the new Constitution. In this first article, therefore, the most important part is the outline Hamilton provides, enabling the reader to classify the remaining 84 papers with ease.

It is also interesting to note that the "world-wide" fame that Hamilton anticipated the Constitution would have really came to pass: the United States Constitution that Hamilton defended has become one of the most copied and admired documents in the history of civilization. Indeed, The Federalist Papers itself was published in Spanish in 1811 by the Venezualan Manuel Garcia de Sana, along with copies of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. In addition, The Federalist Papers influenced movements in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and Europe. Not only did Hamilton's predictions come true, but his very words were also influential far beyond the original thirteen colonies.

Hamilton, perhaps more than any of the founders, believed in the future greatness of America; he believed that this nation could be one of power and strength, and he believed that such power and strength, far from corrupting the nation's purpose or the rights of individuals, was necessary to realize the former and protect the latter. The very use of the word "empire" in this paper is very telling. Characteristically, he looks ahead: he "dips into the future and sees the United States as a world power." While this might not seem odd to the modern reader, in 1788, America was extremely vulnerable to European conquest and domination. His vision for America is even more remarkable under these circumstances.

The Federalist Papers Questions and Answers

The Question and Answer section for The Federalist Papers is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.

how are conflictstoo often decided in unstable government? Whose rights are denied when this happens?

In a typical non-democratic government with political instability, the conflicts are often decided by the person highest in power, who abuse powers or who want to seize power. Rival parties fight each other to the detriment of the country.

How Madison viewed human nature?

Madison saw depravity in human nature, but he saw virtue as well. His view of human nature may have owed more to John Locke than to John Calvin. In any case, as Saul K. Padover asserted more than a half-century ago, Madison often appeared to steer...

How arguable and provable is the author of cato 4 claim

What specific claim are you referring to?

Study Guide for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers study guide contains a biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

• About The Federalist Papers
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• The Federalist Papers Video
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Essays for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers essays are academic essays for citation. These papers were written primarily by students and provide critical analysis of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

• A Close Reading of James Madison's The Federalist No. 51 and its Relevancy Within the Sphere of Modern Political Thought
• Lock, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers
• Comparison of Federalist Paper 78 and Brutus XI
• The Paradox of the Republic: A Close Reading of Federalist 10
• Manipulation of Individual Citizen Motivations in the Federalist Papers

Lesson Plan for The Federalist Papers

• About the Author
• Study Objectives
• Common Core Standards
• Introduction to The Federalist Papers
• Relationship to Other Books
• Bringing in Technology
• Notes to the Teacher
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E-Text of The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers e-text contains the full text of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

• FEDERALIST. Nos. 1-5
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 6-10
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 11-15
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 16-20
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 21-25

Wikipedia Entries for The Federalist Papers

• Introduction

The Federalist No. 1: Annotated

Alexander Hamilton’s anonymous essay challenged the voting citizens of New York to hold fast to the truth when deciding to ratify (or not) the US Constitution.

In May 1788, the second volume of what would come to be called The Federalist Papers , a collection of both new and previously printed essays written to sell the ratification of the US Constitution to “The People of  the State of New York,” was published. Originally printed in newspapers in New York and elsewhere, The Federalist Papers are now foundational documents of American history and political thought.

Federalist No. 1, written by Alexander Hamilton using the pseudonym “Publius” , began as a response to two earlier essays written against the ratification (by “Cato” and “Brutus” respectively.) Hamilton proposed a series of writings “to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.” He was joined by James Madison and John Jay , ultimately producing eighty-five essays that are to this day used by scholars and Supreme Court justices alike to make their cases for the intent of the Constitution’s framers and its meanings.

Below is Hamilton’s opening salvo in the debate about the future of America: would it remain a confederation of states (as it had been under the Articles of Confederation ) or a new type of federalism, inspired by the Scottish Enlightenment, Montesquieu, and “Publius”? We have annotated the essay below, with scholarship on Constitutional history, the role The Federalist Papers continues to play in American legal and political life, and the style and rhetoric of the author(s). As always, these linked resources are free to read and download.

General Introduction

For the Independent Journal .

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government , you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world . It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force . If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government .

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears . So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society . This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion . A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty ; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.

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In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars:

• THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY
• THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION
• THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT
• THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
• ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly,
• THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State , and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system , and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole. *   This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

*The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution. [ Editor’s Note: this note appeared in the margins of the original source. ]

[Text taken from the US Library of Congress: https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/full-text ]

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THE FEDERALIST PAPERS

By alexander hamilton, john jay, james madison, federalist no. 1. general introduction, federalist no. 2. concerning dangers from foreign force and influence, federalist no. 3. the same subject continued (concerning dangers from foreign force and influence), federalist no. 4. the same subject continued (concerning dangers from foreign force and influence), federalist no. 5. the same subject continued (concerning dangers from foreign force and influence), federalist no. 6. concerning dangers from dissensions between the states, federalist no. 7. the same subject continued (concerning dangers from dissensions between the states), federalist no. 8. the consequences of hostilities between the states, federalist no. 9. the union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection, federalist no. 10. the same subject continued (the union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection).

FEDERALIST No. 11. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy

FEDERALIST No. 12. The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue

FEDERALIST No. 13. Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

FEDERALIST No. 14. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered

FEDERALIST No. 15. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST No. 16. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)

FEDERALIST No. 17. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)

FEDERALIST No. 18. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)

FEDERALIST No. 19. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)

FEDERALIST No. 20. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)

FEDERALIST No. 21. Other Defects of the Present Confederation

FEDERALIST No. 22. The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)

FEDERALIST No. 23. The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union

FEDERALIST No. 24. The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

FEDERALIST No. 25. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)

FEDERALIST No. 26. The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered.

FEDERALIST No. 27. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)

FEDERALIST No. 28. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)

FEDERALIST No. 29. Concerning the Militia

FEDERALIST No. 30. Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST No. 31. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

FEDERALIST No. 32. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

FEDERALIST No. 33. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

FEDERALIST No. 34. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

FEDERALIST No. 35. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

FEDERALIST No. 36. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

FEDERALIST No. 37. Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government.

FEDERALIST No. 38. The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed.

FEDERALIST No. 39. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles

FEDERALIST No. 40. On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained.

FEDERALIST No. 41. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution

FEDERALIST No. 42. The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered

FEDERALIST No. 43. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered)

FEDERALIST No. 44. Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States

FEDERALIST No. 45. The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments.

FEDERALIST No. 46. The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared

FEDERALIST No. 47. The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts.

FEDERALIST No. 48. These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other.

FEDERALIST No. 49. Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention.

FEDERALIST No. 50. Periodical Appeals to the People Considered

FEDERALIST No. 51. The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments.

FEDERALIST No. 52. The House of Representatives

FEDERALIST No. 53. The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)

FEDERALIST No. 54. The Apportionment of Members Among the States

FEDERALIST No. 55. The Total Number of the House of Representatives

FEDERALIST No. 56. The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives)

FEDERALIST No. 57. The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation.

FEDERALIST No. 58. Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands.

FEDERALIST No. 59. Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

FEDERALIST No. 60. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)

FEDERALIST No. 61. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)

FEDERALIST No. 62. The Senate

FEDERALIST No. 63. The Senate Continued

FEDERALIST No. 64. The Powers of the Senate

FEDERALIST No. 65. The Powers of the Senate Continued

FEDERALIST No. 66. Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered.

FEDERALIST No. 67. The Executive Department

FEDERALIST No. 68. The Mode of Electing the President

FEDERALIST No. 69. The Real Character of the Executive

FEDERALIST No. 70. The Executive Department Further Considered

FEDERALIST No. 71. The Duration in Office of the Executive

FEDERALIST No. 72. The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered.

FEDERALIST No. 73. The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power

FEDERALIST No. 74. The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive.

FEDERALIST No. 75. The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive

FEDERALIST No. 76. The Appointing Power of the Executive

FEDERALIST No. 77. The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered.

FEDERALIST No. 78. The Judiciary Department

FEDERALIST No. 79. The Judiciary Continued

FEDERALIST No. 80. The Powers of the Judiciary

FEDERALIST No. 81. The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority.

FEDERALIST No. 82. The Judiciary Continued.

FEDERALIST No. 83. The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury

FEDERALIST No. 84. Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.

FEDERALIST No. 85. Concluding Remarks

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October 27, 1787

To the People of the State of New York:

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars:

THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.(1) This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, October 31, 1787

WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident.

Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one federal government, or that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national government.

It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.

It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, wide-spreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence.

This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.

Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states.

A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and well-balanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.

This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more remotely the latter; and being persuaded that ample security for both could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they as with one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.

This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils.

Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good, were indefatigable in their efforts to persuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they did so.

They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful information. That, in the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature deliberation, they really thought prudent and advisable.

These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter them from it. But if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully tried or generally known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the convention, for it is well known that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political information, were also members of this convention, and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience.

It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its Union. To preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people in forming that convention, and it is also the great object of the plan which the convention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union? Or why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS."

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 3, 1787

IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.

The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.

Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government,—especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.

Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner,—whereas, adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.

Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.

So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of the people.

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power.

In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV., endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation?

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 7, 1787

MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little confederacies.

But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war.

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and circumstances.

With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign fish.

With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it.

In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them.

The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.

Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.

From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure.

The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country.

As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatever.

One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies.

What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?

We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen—if one national government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet—let Scotland have its navigation and fleet—let Wales have its navigation and fleet—let Ireland have its navigation and fleet—let those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.

Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent governments—what armies could they raise and pay—what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.

But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people.

But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 10, 1787

QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION."

It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.

The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.

The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.

They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.

From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies.

When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to protect.

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 14, 1787

THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming kind—those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more full investigation.

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion—the jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and safety. There are others which have a more circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous than either of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage or personal gratification.

The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a prostitute,(1) at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the SAMMIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the MEGARENSIANS,(2) another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias,(3) or to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the purchase of popularity,(4) or from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.

The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII., permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,(5) entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe.

The influence which the bigotry of one female,(6) the petulance of another,(7) and the cabals of a third,(8) had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.

To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time. Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.

But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.

Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.

Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.

Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.

Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league,(9) which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.

The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV.

In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.

There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader,(10) protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.

The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations,—the desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation, and sometimes even the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations without their consent.

The last war but between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of the British merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the Spanish main. These unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on the part of the Spaniards toward the subjects of Great Britain which were not more justifiable, because they exceeded the bounds of a just retaliation and were chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty. Many of the English who were taken on the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by the usual progress of a spirit of resentment, the innocent were, after a while, confounded with the guilty in indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of the merchants kindled a violent flame throughout the nation, which soon after broke out in the House of Commons, and was communicated from that body to the ministry. Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war ensued, which in its consequences overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years before had been formed with sanguine expectations of the most beneficial fruits.

From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?

Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare—!

So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect: "NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors."(11) This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY.

1. Aspasia, vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles."

4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.

5. Worn by the popes.

6. Madame de Maintenon.

7. Duchess of Marlborough.

8. Madame de Pompadour.

9. The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and states.

10. The Duke of Marlborough.

11. Vide "Principes des Negociations" par l'Abbé de Mably.

For the Independent Journal. Thursday, November 15, 1787

IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say—precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were removed.

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It is well known that they have heretofore had serious and animated discussion concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were comprised have claimed them as their property, the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of federal compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the justice of participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different principles would be set up by different States for this purpose; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.

In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage.

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well from States not interested as from those which were interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district. Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish their own pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to become disunited.

The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.

The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will answer in the affirmative.

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule would, in the meantime, be postponed by real differences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the States interested would clamour; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and internal contention.

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes—the real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental disorders in the management of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice.

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera(1) must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.(2)

1. Divide and command.

2. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week—on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 20, 1787.

ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under it.(1) Their existence, however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.

The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors. Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural strength, which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are accommodated to this standard.

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human affairs.

It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.

There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.

The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the people.

In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military power.

The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute power of a single man. It is possible, though not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within the kingdom.

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe—our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.

1. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of which contain no guard at all on this subject.

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 21, 1787

A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated.

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their errors.

But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of republican government were too just copies of the originals from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended to in another place.

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence.

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America.

Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.

"It is very probable," (says he(1)) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC."

"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body."

"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences."

"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation."

"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty."

"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large monarchies."

I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.

The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory.

1. "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.

From the Daily Advertiser. Thursday, November 22, 1787.

AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.

The Federalist Papers

Federalist no. 1. general introduction.

• FEDERALIST No. 2. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
• FEDERALIST No. 3. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
• FEDERALIST No. 4. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
• FEDERALIST No. 5. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
• FEDERALIST No. 6. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
• FEDERALIST No. 7. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)
• FEDERALIST No. 8. The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
• FEDERALIST No. 9. The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
• FEDERALIST No. 10. The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
• FEDERALIST No. 11. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
• FEDERALIST No. 12. The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
• FEDERALIST No. 13. Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
• FEDERALIST No. 14. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
• FEDERALIST No. 15. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
• FEDERALIST No. 16. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
• FEDERALIST No. 17. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
• FEDERALIST No. 18. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
• FEDERALIST No. 19. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
• FEDERALIST No. 20. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
• FEDERALIST No. 21. Other Defects of the Present Confederation
• FEDERALIST No. 22. The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
• FEDERALIST No. 23. The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
• FEDERALIST No. 24. The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
• FEDERALIST No. 25. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
• FEDERALIST No. 26. The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered.
• FEDERALIST No. 27. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
• FEDERALIST No. 28. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
• FEDERALIST No. 29. Concerning the Militia
• FEDERALIST No. 30. Concerning the General Power of Taxation
• FEDERALIST No. 31. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
• FEDERALIST No. 32. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
• FEDERALIST No. 33. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
• FEDERALIST No. 34. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
• FEDERALIST No. 35. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
• FEDERALIST No. 36. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
• FEDERALIST No. 37. Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government.
• FEDERALIST No. 38. The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed.
• FEDERALIST No. 39. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
• FEDERALIST No. 40. On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained.
• FEDERALIST No. 41. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
• FEDERALIST No. 42. The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
• FEDERALIST No. 43. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered)
• FEDERALIST No. 44. Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
• FEDERALIST No. 45. The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments.
• FEDERALIST No. 46. The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
• FEDERALIST No. 47. The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts.
• FEDERALIST No. 48. These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other.
• FEDERALIST No. 49. Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention.
• FEDERALIST No. 50. Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
• FEDERALIST No. 51. The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments.
• FEDERALIST No. 52. The House of Representatives
• FEDERALIST No. 53. The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)
• FEDERALIST No. 54. The Apportionment of Members Among the States
• FEDERALIST No. 55. The Total Number of the House of Representatives
• FEDERALIST No. 56. The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives)
• FEDERALIST No. 57. The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation.
• FEDERALIST No. 58. Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands.
• FEDERALIST No. 59. Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
• FEDERALIST No. 60. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
• FEDERALIST No. 61. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
• FEDERALIST No. 62. The Senate
• FEDERALIST No. 63. The Senate Continued
• FEDERALIST No. 64. The Powers of the Senate
• FEDERALIST No. 65. The Powers of the Senate Continued
• FEDERALIST No. 66. Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered.
• FEDERALIST No. 67. The Executive Department
• FEDERALIST No. 68. The Mode of Electing the President
• FEDERALIST No. 69. The Real Character of the Executive
• FEDERALIST No. 70. The Executive Department Further Considered
• FEDERALIST No. 71. The Duration in Office of the Executive
• FEDERALIST No. 72. The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered.
• FEDERALIST No. 73. The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
• FEDERALIST No. 74. The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive.
• FEDERALIST No. 75. The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
• FEDERALIST No. 76. The Appointing Power of the Executive
• FEDERALIST No. 77. The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered.
• FEDERALIST No. 78. The Judiciary Department
• FEDERALIST No. 79. The Judiciary Continued
• FEDERALIST No. 80. The Powers of the Judiciary
• FEDERALIST No. 81. The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority.
• FEDERALIST No. 82. The Judiciary Continued.
• FEDERALIST No. 83. The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
• FEDERALIST No. 84. Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
• FEDERALIST No. 85. Concluding Remarks
• Trebuchet MS

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For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October 27, 1787

To the People of the State of New York:

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars:

THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.(1) This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.

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Introductory note: the federalist, [27 october 1787–28 may 1788], introductory note: the federalist.

[New York, October 27, 1787–May 28, 1788]

The Federalist essays have been printed more frequently than any other work of Hamilton. They have, nevertheless, been reprinted in these volumes because no edition of his writings which omitted his most important contribution to political thought could be considered definitive. The essays written by John Jay and James Madison, however, have not been included. They are available in many editions, and they do not, after all, properly belong in the writings of Alexander Hamilton.

The Federalist , addressed to the “People of the State of New-York,” was occasioned by the objections of many New Yorkers to the Constitution which had been proposed on September 17, 1787, by the Philadelphia Convention. During the last week in September and the first weeks of October, 1787, the pages of New York newspapers were filled with articles denouncing the Constitution. 1 The proposed government also had its defenders, but their articles were characterized by somewhat indignant attacks on those who dared oppose the Constitution rather than by reasoned explanations of the advantages of its provisions. 2

The decision to publish a series of essays defending the Constitution and explaining in detail its provisions was made by Alexander Hamilton. Both the reasons for his decision and the date on which he conceived the project are conjecturable. Having gone to Albany early in October to attend the fall session of the Supreme Court, he was not in New York City during the early weeks of the controversy over the Constitution. 3 He must, nevertheless, have concluded that if it were to be adopted, convincing proof of its merits would have to be placed before the citizens of New York. His decision to write the essays may have been made before he left Albany, for according to tradition he wrote the first number of The Federalist in the cabin of his sloop on the return trip to New York. 4

At some time before the appearance of the first essay, written under the pseudonym “Publius,” Hamilton sought and found collaborators, for the first essay, published in The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser on October 27, 1787, was followed in four days by an essay by John Jay. Neither Hamilton nor Jay left a record of any plans they might have made, but the third collaborator, James Madison, later wrote that “the undertaking was proposed by Alexander Hamilton to James Madison with a request to join him and Mr. Jay in carrying it into effect. William Duer was also included in the original plan; and wrote two or more papers, which though intelligent and sprightly, were not continued, nor did they make a part of the printed collection.” 5 Hamilton also sought the assistance of Gouverneur Morris, who in 1815 remembered that he had been “warmly pressed by Hamilton to assist in writing the Federalist.” 6

In reprinting the text of The Federalist the original manuscripts have been approximated as nearly as possible. As the first printing of each essay, despite typographical errors, was presumably closest to the original, the text published in this edition is that which was first printed. The texts of those essays among the first seventy-seven which were written by Hamilton or are of doubtful authorship are taken from the newspapers in which they first appeared; the texts of essays 78–85 are taken from the first edition of The Federalist , edited by John and Archibald McLean. 7

With the exception of the last eight numbers, all the issues of The Federalist were first printed in the newspapers of New York City. The first essay was published on October 27, 1787, in The Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser , edited by John McLean and Company. Subsequent essays appeared in The Independent Journal and in three other New York newspapers: New-York Packet , edited by Samuel and John Loudon; The Daily Advertiser , edited by Francis Childs; and The New-York Journal, and Daily Patriotic Register , edited by Thomas Greenleaf. 8

The first seven essays, published between October 27 and November 17, 1787, appeared on Saturdays and Wednesdays in The Independent Journal , a semiweekly paper, and a day or two later in both New-York Packet and The Daily Advertiser . At the conclusion of essay 7 the following announcement appeared in The Independent Journal: “In order that the whole subject of these Papers may be as soon as possible laid before the Public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week, on Tuesday in the New-York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.” The intention thus was to publish on Tuesday in New-York Packet , on Wednesday in The Independent Journal , on Thursday in The Daily Advertiser , and on Saturday in The Independent Journal .

The announced plan was not consistently followed. On Thursday, November 22, The Daily Advertiser , according to the proposed schedule, published essay 10, but after its publication no other essay appeared first in that newspaper. To continue the proposed plan of publication—a plan which occasionally was altered by publishing three instead of four essays a week—the third “Publius” essay of the next week appeared on Friday in New-York Packet . After November 30 the essays appeared in the following manner: Tuesday, New-York Packet , Wednesday, The Independent Journal , Friday, New-York Packet , and Saturday, The Independent Journal . The third essay of the week appeared either on Friday in the Packet or on Saturday in The Independent Journal . This pattern of publication was followed through the publication of essay 76 (or essay 77, in the numbering used in this edition of Hamilton’s works) on April 2, 1788. The remaining essays were first printed in the second volume of McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends ’s edition of May 28, 1788, and beginning on June 14 were reprinted, at intervals of several days, first in The Independent Journal and then in New-York Packet .

The first edition, printed by J. and A. McLean 9 and corrected by Hamilton, is the source from which most editions of The Federalist have been taken. On January 1, 1788, McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends , having observed “the avidity” with which the “Publius” essays had been “sought after by politicians and persons of every description,” announced plans for the publication of “The FEDERALIST, A Collection of Essays, written in favour of the New Constitution, By a Citizen of New-York , Corrected by the Author, with Additions and Alterations.” 10 The promised volume, including the first thirty-six essays, was published on March 22, 1788. Hamilton was not altogether pleased with the volume, for he stated in the preface 11 that it contained “violations of method and repetitions of ideas which cannot but displease a critical reader.” Despite such imperfections, he hoped that the essays would “promote the cause of truth, and lead to a right judgment of the true interests of the community.” Interested readers were promised a second volume of essays as soon as the editor could prepare them for publication.

“This Day is published,” The Independent Journal advertised on May 28, 1788, “The FEDERALIST, VOLUME SECOND.” This volume contained the remaining essays, including the final eight which had not yet appeared in the newspapers. As in the first volume, there were editorial revisions which probably were made by Hamilton. The final eight essays, which first appeared in this volume were reprinted in The Independent Journal and in New-York Packet between June 14, 1788, and August 16, 1788.

In addition to the McLean edition, during Hamilton’s lifetime there were two French editions 12 and two American editions of The Federalist . The second American edition, printed by John Tiebout in 1799, was not a new printing but a reissue of the remaining copies of the McLean edition with new title pages. The third American edition, published in 1802, not only was a new printing; it also contained revisions presumably approved by Hamilton. It is this, the Hopkins description begins The Federalist On The New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, Pacificus, on The Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, at Washington’s Head, 1802). description ends edition, which must be taken as Hamilton’s final version of The Federalist . 13

George F. Hopkins announced his plan for a new edition of The Federalist in the January 13, 1802, issue of New-York Evening Post . “Proposals, By G. F. Hopkins, 118 Pearl Street,” read the advertisement in the Post , “For Publishing by Subscription, in Two handsome Octavo Volumes, THE FEDERALIST, ON THE CONSTITUTION, BY PUBLIUS Written in 1788. TO WHICH IS ADDED, PACIFICUS, ON THE PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY. Written in 1793. The whole Revised and Corrected. With new passages and notes .” Hopkins proposed not only to issue a revised text but to give the author of each essay; by naming Hamilton, Madison, and Jay as the authors of The Federalist , he publicly broke the poorly kept secrecy surrounding its authorship. Almost a year passed before Hopkins, on December 8, 1802, offered to the public “in a dress which it is believed will meet with general approbation” the new edition.

Although it is certain that Hamilton did not himself revise the text published in the Hopkins edition, available evidence indicates that he approved the alterations which were made. In 1847 J. C. Hamilton wrote to Hopkins requesting information on the extent to which Hamilton had made or approved the revisions. Hopkins replied that the changes had been made by a “respectable professional gentleman” who, after completing his work, had “put the volumes into the hands of your father, who examined the numerous corrections, most of which he sanctioned, and the work was put to press.” The editor, who was not named by Hopkins, was identified by J. C. Hamilton as John Wells, an eminent New York lawyer. The Hopkins edition, Hamilton’s son emphatically stated, was “ revised and corrected by John Wells … and supervised by Hamilton.” 14 Henry B. Dawson in his 1864 edition of The Federalist contested J. C. Hamilton’s conclusion and argued that the changes were made by William Coleman, editor of New-York Evening Post , and that they were made without Hamilton’s authorization or approval. According to Dawson, Hopkins declared on two different occasions in later years—once to James A. Hamilton and once to John W. Francis—that Hamilton refused to have any changes made in the essays. 15 Although it is impossible to resolve the contradictory statements on Hamilton’s participation in the revisions included in the 1802 edition of The Federalist , J. C. Hamilton presents the more convincing evidence. He, after all, quoted a statement by Hopkins description begins The Federalist On The New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, Pacificus, on The Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, at Washington’s Head, 1802). description ends , while Dawson related only a conversation.

The McLean and Hopkins editions thus constitute Hamilton’s revision of the text of The Federalist . Hamilton made some minor changes in essays written by Jay and Madison—changes which in the McLean edition they presumably authorized. Jay never revised the essays he wrote, and it was not until 1818 that Madison authorized the publication of an edition which included his own corrections of his essays. This edition was published by Jacob Gideon, 16 a printer in Washington, D.C.

It is, then, from the newspapers of the day, the McLean edition of 1788, and the Hopkins edition of 1802 that a definitive text of Hamilton’s contribution to The Federalist must be reconstructed. In the present edition, as stated above, the texts of essays 1–77 have been taken from the newspapers in which they first appeared; the texts of essays 78–85 are from volume two of the McLean edition. All changes which Hamilton later made or approved in the texts of the essays he wrote have been indicated in notes. Thus in essays 1–77 all changes made in the McLean and Hopkins editions in Hamilton’s essays are given. In essays 78–85 all the changes which appeared in the Hopkins edition are noted. The edition in which a revision was made is indicated by a short title, either by the name “McLean” or “Hopkins.” To this rule there are, however, three exceptions: 1. When an obvious typographical error appears in the text taken from the newspaper, it has been corrected without annotation. 2. When in McLean there is a correction of a printer’s error which, if left unchanged, would make the text meaningless or inaccurate, that correction has been incorporated in the text; the word or words in the newspaper for which changes have been substituted are then indicated in the notes. 3. Obvious printer’s errors in punctuation have been corrected; a period at the end of a question, for example, has been changed to a question mark. When a dash is used at the end of a sentence, a period has been substituted.

Because of changes made in the McLean edition, the numbering of certain essays presents an editorial problem. When McLean, with Hamilton’s assistance, published the first edition of The Federalist , it was decided that the essay published in the newspaper as 35 should follow essay 28, presumably because the subject matter of 35 was a continuation of the subject treated in 28. It also was concluded, probably because of its unusual length, that the essay which appeared in the newspapers as essay 31 should be divided and published as two essays. When these changes were made, the original numbering of essays 29–36 was changed in the following way:

Essays 36–78 in the McLean edition thus were one number higher than the number given the corresponding essay in the newspaper.

Because McLean changed the numbers of some of the essays, later editors have questioned whether there were 84 or 85 essays. This is understandable, for there were only 84 essays printed in the newspapers, the essays 32 and 33 by McLean having appeared in the press as a single essay. The last essay printed in The Independent Journal accordingly was numbered 84. The last eight essays published in New-York Packet , on the other hand, were given the numbers used in the second volume of McLean’s edition. The last number of The Federalist printed by New-York Packet in April had been numbered “76”; the following essay, published in June, was numbered “78.” By omitting the number “77,” the editor of New-York Packet , like McLean, numbered the last of the essays “85.”

Later editions of The Federalist , except for that published by Henry B. Dawson, have followed the numbering of the McLean edition. Since no possible purpose would be served and some confusion might result by restoring the newspaper numbering, the essays in the present edition have been given the numbers used by McLean in 1788, and the newspaper number has been placed in brackets.

Almost a century and a half of controversy has centered on the authorship of certain numbers of The Federalist . Similar to most other eighteenth-century newspaper contributors, the authors of The Federalist chose to write anonymously. When The Federalist essays appeared in the press, many New Yorkers probably suspected that Hamilton, if not the sole author of the “Publius” essays, was the major contributor. Friends of Hamilton and Madison, and perhaps those of Jay, certainly knew that this was a joint enterprise and who the authors were. 17 The number of essays written by each author, if only because the question probably never arose, aroused no curiosity. The Federalist , after all, was written for the immediate purpose of persuading the citizens of New York that it was to their interest to adopt the Constitution; certainly not the authors, and probably few readers, realized that the essays which in the winter of 1788 appeared so frequently in the New York press under the signature of “Publius” would become a classic interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. In 1802, George F. Hopkins proposed to publish a new edition of The Federalist in which the authors would be identified; but because of Hamilton’s “decided disapprobation” 18 no identification of the authors was made in that edition. It was not until three years after Hamilton’s death that The Port Folio , a Philadelphia weekly, published a list of the authors of the essays, thus opening a controversy which still remains unsettled. 19

The evidence on the authorship of several of the essays is contradictory because both Hamilton and Madison made, or allegedly made, several lists in which they claimed authorship of the same essays. It is neither necessary nor instructive to discuss the minor discrepancies found in the claims by the two men in their respective lists. 20 The whole problem is simplified by keeping in mind that of the eighty-five essays the authorship of only fifteen is disputed. Despite contrary claims in several of the least credible lists published during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, it has long been accepted that Hamilton wrote essays 1, 6–9, 11–13, 15–17, 21–36, 59–61, and 65–85; that Madison was the author of essays 10, 14, 37–48; and that Jay contributed essays 2–5 and 64. 21 The authorship of only essays 18–20, 49–58, and 62–63 is therefore debatable.

The number of disputed essays can be reduced by examining the reliability of the several Madison and Hamilton lists. There are four reputed Madison lists: 1. An article, signed “Corrector,” which appeared in the National Intelligencer on March 20, 1817, and which, according to the anonymous author, was copied from “a penciled memorandum in the hand of Madison.” 22 2. A statement of authorship, supposedly endorsed by Madison, made by Richard Rush, a member of Madison’s cabinet, in his copy of The Federalist . 23 3. An article in the City of Washington Gazette , December 15, 1817, claiming to set forth a list “furnished by Madison himself.” 24 4. The edition of The Federalist published by Jacob Gideon in 1818, which based its attribution of authorship on Madison’s own “copy of the work which that gentleman had preserved for himself.” 25 There is no evidence that Madison approved the first three lists; the fourth, the Gideon edition, was not only based on Madison’s copy, but it was endorsed by him as correct.

Hamilton’s claims to authorship are more complicated. Despite statements by his partisans, there are only three Hamilton lists that merit the serious attention of the historian who applies any known tests for evaluating historical evidence. They are the so-called “Benson list,” the list allegedly preserved by Hamilton in his own copy of The Federalist , and the “Kent list.”

The Benson list, according to a story first related by William Coleman in March, 1817, was left by Hamilton, shortly before his death, between the pages of a book in the library of his long-time friend, Judge Egbert Benson. Arriving at Benson’s office, Hamilton was told by Robert Benson, Jr., Egbert’s nephew and clerk, that the Judge and Rufus King had gone to Massachusetts for a few days. As Hamilton conversed with the law clerk, he idly handled one of the volumes on the shelves in the office. After Hamilton’s death which occurred two days later, Benson remembered the incident and, looking in the book Hamilton had picked up, he found a scrap of paper, unsigned but in Hamilton’s hand, listing the essays he had written. 26 Judge Benson, according to the traditional account, pasted it on the inside cover of his copy of The Federalist but somewhat later, fearing that he might lose such a valuable document, deposited it in the New York Society Library. The memorandum was presumably stolen in 1818. 27

The existence of the Benson list was corroborated by two witnesses, Robert Benson and William Coleman. Coleman, editor of New-York Evening Post , is the less credible authority; he may have seen the Benson list, but it is significant that he never definitely stated that he did. The most emphatic statement that he made, elicited by the demands for proof made by an antagonist in a newspaper controversy over the authorship of The Federalist , was as follows:

“I, therefore, for the entire satisfaction of the public, now state, that the memorandum referred to is in General Hamilton’s own hand writing, was left by him with his friend judge BENSON, the week before his death, and was, by the latter, deposited in the city library, where it now is, and may be seen, pasted in one of the volumes of The Federalist .” 28

The statement of Robert Benson, the law clerk to whom Hamilton spoke on the day before his encounter with Burr, is more convincing, but it was made many years after the event, and it is far from being conclusive. “I was then a student in the office,” Benson recalled “and well known to the General” who called and enquired for Judge Benson.

“I replied that he had left the city with Mr. King. The General in his usual manner then went to the book case and took down a book which he opened and soon replaced, and left the office. Some time after the General’s death, a memorandum in his handwriting was found in a volume of Pliny’s letters, I think , which, I believe , was the book he took down, and which memorandum was afterwards wafered by the Judge in the inside cover of the first volume of the Federalist, and where it remained for several years. He subsequently removed it, and, as I understand , gave it to some public library.… The marks of the wafers still remain in the volume, and above them in Judge Benson’s handwriting is, what is presumed, and I believe to be , a copy of the General’s memorandum above referred to.” 29

The Benson list is suspect, then, because the claim for its authenticity is based on the evidence of two men neither of whom stated that he actually saw it. If there had not already been too much fruitless speculation on Hamilton’s thoughts and intentions, it would be interesting to explain why Hamilton chose such a roundabout method to make certain that future generations would recognize his contribution to such a celebrated book. Perhaps he knew that Robert Benson would search all the volumes in his uncle’s office on the suspicion that Hamilton, however uncharacteristically, had concealed a note on some important subject; or perhaps he thought that Benson frequently read Pliny’s Letters and thus could be sure the note would be found. One can speculate endlessly on the motives for Hamilton’s extraordinary behavior, but the significant fact is that the Benson list is inadequate as historical evidence.

Evidence of the existence of Hamilton’s own copy of The Federalist in which he supposedly listed the essays he wrote comes from a notice which appeared on November 14, 1807, in The Port Folio . “The Executors of the last will of General Hamilton,” the Philadelphia weekly announced, “have deposited in the Publick Library of New-York a copy of ‘ The Federalist ,’ which belonged to the General in his lifetime, in which he has designated in his own handwriting, the parts of that celebrated work written by himself, as well as those contributed by Mr. JAY and Mr. MADISON.” No one has seen Hamilton’s copy in the last 150 years; whether it existed or what happened to it, if it did exist, cannot now be known. 30

While the numbers claimed by Hamilton in the Benson list and in his own copy of The Federalist are the same, the list by Chancellor James Kent disagrees in several particulars from the other two. The Kent list, in the Chancellor’s own writing, was found on the inside cover of his copy of The Federalist , now in the Columbia University Libraries. Because of differences in the ink and pen he used, Kent’s statement may be divided into three parts, each of which was written at a different time. In the following copy of Kent’s notes the three parts are indicated by Roman numerals:

The numbers which were written over the numbers Kent first wrote are not in Kent’s writing. However familiar one is with the handwriting of another, it is difficult to determine if a single numeral is in his writing. But despite the impossibility of positive identification, a close comparison of numerals made by Hamilton with the numerals which were added to the Kent list strongly indicates that the changes are in the writing of Hamilton. The Kent list thus becomes the only evidence in Hamilton’s writing which now exists. See also James Kent to William Coleman, May 12, 1817 ( ALS , Columbia University Libraries).

Certain reasonable deductions can be made from the evidence presented by Kent’s notes. The ink clearly reveals that the three notes were made at different times. The information in part I of the notes was obtained from someone other than Hamilton, for otherwise Kent would not have written in part II “that Mr. Hamilton told me.” The information in part II must have been given to Kent in a conversation, for it is evident that Kent was not sure that he remembered what Hamilton had said or that Hamilton could remember, without reference to a copy of The Federalist , which essays he had written.

Part III—because it refers to Hamilton as “general” (a rank which he attained in 1798), and because the conversation alluded to took place in Albany—must have been made between 1800, the year in which Hamilton resumed his law practice after completing his duties as inspector general of the Army, and his death in 1804. The third section of Kent’s memorandum also indicates that Hamilton corrected and approved the Kent list. It constitutes, therefore, the most reliable evidence available on Hamilton’s claims of authorship. It should be noted, however, that Kent later doubted the accuracy of Hamilton’s memory, for on the page opposite his memorandum he pasted a copy of the article from the City of Washington Gazette , which stated that Madison had written essays 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 37–58, 62–63, and that Jay was the author of essays 2, 3, 4, 5, 64. Underneath this clipping Kent wrote:

“I have no doubt Mr. Jay wrote No 64 on the Treaty Power—He made a Speech on that Subject in the NY Convention, & I am told he says he wrote it. I suspect therefore from internal Ev. the above to be the correct List, & not the one on the opposite page.” 31

A comparison of the Kent list (for those essays claimed by Hamilton) with the Gideon edition (for those essays claimed by Madison) makes it clear that there is room for doubt only over the authorship of essays 18, 19, 20, 50, 51, 52, 54–58, and 62–63. About three of these—18, 19, and 20—there should be no dispute, for there is a statement by Madison which Hamilton’s claim does not really controvert. On the margin of his copy of The Federalist opposite number 18 Madison wrote:

“The subject matter of this and the two following numbers happened to be taken up by both Mr. H and Mr. M. What had been prepared by Mr. H who had entered more briefly into the subject, was left with Mr. M on its appearing that the latter was engaged in it, with larger materials, and with a view to a more precise delineation; and from the pen of the latter, the several papers went to the Press.”

The problem of determining the authorship of these three essays is merely one of deciding on the comparative contributions of the two men. Although there are several sentences which are very similar to remarks Hamilton recorded in the outline for his speech of June 18, 1787, on the Constitution, most of the material was undoubtedly supplied by Madison who without doubt wrote these essays. Essay 20, for example, is virtually a copy of notes which Madison had taken in preparation for the Constitutional Convention. 32 On the other hand, Hamilton, however slight his contribution, did contribute to these essays. The authorship of 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, and 63 is more difficult to determine, 33 but Madison’s claim as represented by the Gideon edition appears more convincing than Hamilton’s claim as represented by the Kent list.

Internal evidence has proved to be of little assistance in determining the authorship of The Federalist . The ablest studies in this field are those by Edward G. Bourne 34 and J. C. Hamilton. 35 Bourne attributes all disputed essays to Madison; J. C. Hamilton asserts that they were written by his father. Bourne and J. C. Hamilton attempt to prove their respective cases by printing excerpts from the disputed essays parallel to similar, and sometimes identical, passages from other writings by each man. Bourne presents very convincing evidence for Madison’s authorship of numbers 49, 51, 53, 62, 63, and a fair case for Madison having written numbers 50 and 52; his case for 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58 is particularly weak as he offers no evidence from Madison’s other writings and relies on the argument that, as essays 48–58 are a group, the author who wrote the earlier essays must also have written the later ones in the group. J. C. Hamilton, on the other hand, produces some evidence that Hamilton wrote essays 55–58, and he offers contrived and unconvincing arguments in support of Hamilton’s authorship of the remaining disputed essays. The significant point, however, is that each man was able to find evidence that his candidate wrote all the disputed essays. The contradictory conclusions of these two men—one of whom studied intensively the previous writings of Madison and the other whose life-long study of his father gave him a knowledge of Hamilton’s writings which never has been excelled—point up the difficulties of deciding this dispute on the basis of internal evidence.

The problems posed by internal evidence are made even more difficult by the fact that both Hamilton and Madison defended the Constitution with similar arguments and by the fact that they both had a remarkably similar prose style. To attempt to find in any of the disputed essays words which either man used and which the other never employed is futile, if only because the enormous amount which each wrote allows the assiduous searcher to discover almost any word in the earlier or subsequent writings of both. 36 The search for parallel statements in the disputed essays and in earlier writings is also an unrewarding enterprise. Madison doubtless did not approve of the ideas expressed in Hamilton’s famous speech on June 18, 1787, to the Convention; but before 1787 both men agreed on the weaknesses of the Confederation and the necessity of a stronger central government. 37 The similarity of their thinking is particularly apparent to one who examines their collaboration when they were both members of the Continental Congress in 1783. Their later political differences prove little about what they wrote in 1787–88.

If one were to rely on internal evidence, it would be impossible to assign all the disputed essays to either Hamilton or Madison. While such evidence indicates that Madison surely wrote numbers 49–54 and probably 62–63, it also suggests that Hamilton wrote 55–58. In this edition of Hamilton’s writings, however, greater weight is given to the claims made by the disputants than to internal evidence. Madison’s claims were maturely considered and emphatically stated; Hamilton, on the other hand, showed little interest in the question, and he died before it had become a matter of acrimonious controversy. But the fact remains that Hamilton’s claims have never been unequivocally refuted, and the possibility remains that he could have written essays 50–52, 54–58, 62–63. As a consequence, these essays have been printed in this edition of Hamilton’s writings. Madison’s adherents may, however, derive some consolation from the fact that in the notes to each of these essays it is stated that Madison’s claims to authorship are superior to those of Hamilton.

1 .  The most important of these was by “Cato,” presumably George Clinton. The first “Cato” letter was published in The New-York Journal, and Weekly Register on September 27, 1787.

2 .  See, for example, the two articles by “Caesar” ( September 28 and October 15, 1787 ), which erroneously have been attributed to H.

3 .  An anonymous newspaper article, signed “Aristides” and published in The [New York] Daily Advertiser on October 6, stated that H’s absence from the city prevented him from defending himself against newspaper attacks. An entry in H’s Cash Book dated November 4 (see “Cash Book,” March 1, 1782–1791 ) indicates that he attended the October session of the Supreme Court in Albany.

4 .  The story was first related in Hamilton, History description begins John C. Hamilton, Life of Alexander Hamilton, a History of the Republic of the United States of America (Boston, 1879). description ends III, 369, and has been repeated in most works on The Federalist .

5 .  A memorandum by Madison entitled “The Federalist,” quoted in J. C. Hamilton, ed., The Federalist: a Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Also, The Continentalist and Other Papers by Hamilton (Philadelphia, 1865), I, lxxxv.

The essays by William Duer, signed “Philo-Publius,” are published at the end of the second volume of J. C. Hamilton’s edition of The Federalist .

6 .  Morris to W. H. Wells, February 24, 1815, in Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris description begins Jared Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris (Boston, 1832). description ends , III, 339.

7 .  Drafts of only two essays, 5 and 64, both of which were written by John Jay, have been found. The draft of essay 5 is in the John Jay Papers, Columbia University Libraries. The draft of essay 64 is in the New-York Historical Society, New York City. The draft of essay 3 is now owned by Mr. Ruddy Ruggles of Chicago.

8 .  Most writers have stated that all the essays first appeared in The Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser or New-York Packet . Others (J. C. Hamilton and Henry B. Dawson, for example) were aware that they appeared first in different newspapers, but they did not determine accurately the newspaper in which each essay first appeared.

The Independent Journal and New-York Packet carried the entire series of essays, while The Daily Advertiser ceased to print them after essay 51. The New-York Journal carried only essays 23 through 39. At no time, however, did an essay appear in The New-York Journal without appearing in at least one of the three other papers at the same time. On January 1, 1788, Thomas Greenleaf, editor of the Journal and supporter of George Clinton, printed a letter signed “45 Subscribers” which complained about Greenleaf’s publication of “Publius,” which was already appearing in three newspapers. Shortly after this, on January 30, 1788, Greenleaf discontinued publication of the essays with number 39 (numbered by him 37).

9 .  The full title is The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed Upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, No. 41, Hanover-Square. MDCCLXXXVIII). This is referred to hereafter as the “McLean edition.”

10 .  The Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser January 1, 1788.

11 .  There is no question that H was the author of the preface and that he corrected the essays. Not only was this stated by McLean’s advertisement, but Madison, writing years later, said that the essays “were edited as soon as possible in two small vols. the preface to the 1st. vol. drawn up by Mr. H., bearing date N. York Mar. 1788” ( Hunt, Writings of Madison description begins Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison (New York, 1902). description ends , VIII, 411).

12 .  The first French edition, published in two volumes in 1792, listed the authors as “MM. Hamilton, Madisson et Gay, Citoyens de l’Etat de New-York.” The second edition, published in 1795 and also in two volumes, named “MM. Hamilton, Madisson et Jay” as the authors. For a description of these editions, see The Fœderalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favor of the New Constitution, as Agreed upon by the Fœderal Convention, September 17, 1787. Reprinted from the Original Text . With an Historical Introduction and Notes by Henry B. Dawson. In Two Volumes (Morrisania, New York, 1864), I, lxiv–lxvi.

13 .  The FEDERALIST, On the New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, PACIFICUS, On the Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, At Washington’s Head, 1802). Cited hereafter as the “Hopkins edition.”

14 .  J. C. Hamilton, The Federalist description begins John C. Hamilton, ed., The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Also, The Continentalist and Other Papers by Hamilton (Philadelphia, 1865). description ends , I, xci, xcii.

15 .  Henry B. Dawson, The Fœderalist , I, lxx–lxxi.

16 .  The Federalist, on The New Constitution, written in the year 1788, By Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay with An Appendix, containing The Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius, on the Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793; Also the Original Articles of Confederation, and The Constitution of the United States, with the Amendments Made Thereto. A New Edition. The Numbers Written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself (City of Washington: Printed and Published by Jacob Gideon, Jun., 1818). Cited hereafter as the “Gideon edition.”

17 .  Three days after the publication of the first essay, Hamilton sent George Washington a copy of it. Hamilton wrote that the essay was “the first of a series of papers to be written in its [the Constitution’s] defense.” Washington, of course, knew that H was the author, for H customarily sent to Washington anonymous newspaper articles which he wrote. On December 2, 1787, Madison wrote to Edmund Randolph:

“The enclosed paper contains two numbers of the Federalist. This paper was begun about three weeks ago, and proposes to go through the subject. I have not been able to collect all the numbers, since my return to Philad, or I would have sent them to you. I have been the less anxious, as I understand the printer means to make a pamphlet of them, when I can give them to you in a more convenient form. You will probably discover marks of different pens. I am not at liberty to give you any other key, than, that I am in myself for a few numbers; and that one, besides myself was a member of the Convention.” ( Hunt, Writings of Madison description begins Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison (New York, 1902). description ends , V, 60–61.)

18 .  The first edition of The Federalist which attributed specific essays to individual authors appeared as the second and third volumes of a three-volume edition of H’s writings published in 1810 ( The Federalist, on the new constitution; written in 1788, by Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Madison … A new edition, with the names and portraits of the several writers . In Two Volumes [New York, published by Williams & Whiting, 1810]).

19 .  The letter in The Port Folio of November 14, 1807, reads as follows:

“Mr. OLDSCHOOL,

“The Executors of the last will of General HAMILTON have deposited in the Publick Library of New-York a copy of ‘ The Federalist ,’ which belonged to the General in his lifetime, in which he has designated, in his own hand-writing, the parts of that celebrated work written by himself, as well as those contributed by Mr. JAY and Mr. MADISON. As it may not be uninteresting to many of your readers, I shall subjoin a copy of the General’s memorandum for publication in ‘The Port Folio.’   M.

“Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 54 Mr. JAY. Nos. 10, 14, 37, to 48 inclusive, Mr. MADISON. Nos. 18, 19, 20, Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. MADDISON jointly—all the rest by Mr. HAMILTON.”

20 .  There are several lists other than those subsequently discussed in the text. On the flyleaf of volume 1 of his copy of The Federalist , Thomas Jefferson wrote the following: “No. 2. 3. 4. 5. 64 by Mr. Jay. No. 10. 14. 17. 18. 19. 21. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 62. 63. by Mr. Madison. The rest of the work by Alexander Hamilton.” Jefferson’s copy of The Federalist , now in the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress, came to him indirectly from H’s wife, Elizabeth. It bears the inscription: “For Mrs. Church from her Sister . Elizabeth Hamilton.” The words, “For Mrs. Church from her Sister ,” are in the handwriting of Elizabeth Hamilton. Angelica Schuyler Church, despite her admiration for her brother-in-law, had long been a friend of Jefferson and must have sent her copy of The Federalist to him. It is not known from whom Jefferson got his information on the authorship of the essays, but presumably it was from Madison. It will be noted that there is only one minor difference between Jefferson’s attribution of the essays and that made by Madison: Jefferson attributed essay 17 to Madison. A facsimile is printed in E. Millicent Sowerby, Catalog of the Library of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, D.C., 1953), III, 228.

On the title page of George Washington’s copy of The Federalist there is an assignment of authorship which reads as follows: “Jay author—1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 54. Madison—10, 14, 37–48 exclusive of last. 18, 19, 20, productive of Jay, AH and Madison. All rest by Gen’l Hamilton.” This memorandum is in an unidentified handwriting. Except for two differences it conforms to the Benson list. Without more information on the source of the list, its reliability is highly suspect (Washington’s copy of The Federalist is in the National Archives).

Henry Cabot Lodge in his edition of The Federalist ( HCLW description begins Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1904). description ends , XI, xxvii), placed in evidence lists of authors which he found in copies of The Federalist owned by Fisher Ames and George Cabot. Both correspond to the Benson list.

21 .  Jay’s authorship of these essays is incontestable. H supposedly stated in the Benson list that he wrote 64 and that Jay was the author of 54. The draft of 64, in the writing of Jay, is in the New-York Historical Society, New York City. Both H and Madison agreed that Jay wrote 2, 3, 4, and 5.

That Jay contributed only five essays was due to an attack of rheumatism which lasted through the winter of 1787. It was not due, as his earlier biographers stated, to an injury which he received in the “Doctors’ Riot” in New York. The riot did not occur until April, 1788, by which time most of the “Publius” essays had been written (Frank Monaghan, John Jay [New York, 1935], 290).

22 .  “I take upon me to state from indubitable authority,” Corrector wrote “that Mr. Madison wrote Nos. 10, 14, 18, 19, 20, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, and 64. Mr. Jay wrote Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5; and Mr. Hamilton the residue” ([Washington] National Intelligencer , March 20, 1817).

23 .  Benjamin Rush, the oldest son of Richard, sent Henry B. Dawson the following description of the notes in the edition of The Federalist owned by his father: “On a fly-leaf of the second volume there is the following memorandum in my father’s handwriting. I copy it exactly as it appears: ‘The initials, J.M. J.J. and A.H. throughout the work, are in Mr. Madison’s hand, and designate the author of each number. By these it will be seen, that although the printed designations are generally correct, they are not always so’” (Benjamin Rush to Dawson, August 29, 1863, New-York Historical Society, New York City).

Madison’s attribution of authorship, according to Benjamin Rush, was exactly the same as that which the Virginian authorized in the Gideon edition.

24 .  The anonymous author of the article in the City of Washington Gazette stated that Madison wrote essays 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 37–58, 62–63, that Jay was the author of essays 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64, and that H wrote the rest.

25 .  Gideon, p. 3. In this edition, essays 10, 14, 18–20, 37–58, 62–63 are assigned to Madison; 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64 to Jay; and the remainder to H. Madison’s copy of The Federalist , with corrections in his handwriting, is in the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress.

26 .  The memorandum by H, as printed by William Coleman, reads as follows: “Nos. 2. 3. 4. 5. 54, Mr. Jay; Nos. 10, 14, 37 to 48 inclusive, Mr. Madison; Nos. 18, 19, 20, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Madison jointly; all the rest by Mr. Hamilton” ( New-York Evening Post , March 25, 1817).

27 .  According to Coleman the memorandum was deposited by Egbert Benson in “the city library,” as the New York Society Library was then sometimes known. The remainder of the story related in this paragraph is taken from J. C. Hamilton’s account of a “ Copy of a statement in my possession made for me by Egbert Benson, Esq., a nephew of Judge Benson.” It is quoted in Hamilton, The Federalist description begins John C. Hamilton, ed., The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Also, The Continentalist and Other Papers by Hamilton (Philadelphia, 1865). description ends , I, xcvi–xcvii.

28 .  New-York Evening Post , January 23, 1818.

The volume from which the memorandum was stolen may have been at one time in the New York Society Library; however, it is no longer there. That library has no McLean edition of The Federalist that bears any marks which indicate that a piece of paper once had been pasted on the inside cover.

29 .  Hamilton, The Federalist description begins John C. Hamilton, ed., The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Also, The Continentalist and Other Papers by Hamilton (Philadelphia, 1865). description ends , I, xcvi–xcvii. The italics have been inserted.

J. C. Hamilton did not get this statement from Robert Benson. It was, as has been stated, from the “ Copy of a statement in my possession made for me by Egbert Benson, Esq., a nephew of Judge Benson” ( ibid. , xcvii).

30 .  For the attribution of authorship which H made in his copy of The Federalist , see note 20.

H’s copy is now in neither the New York Society Library, the New-York Historical Society, nor the New York Public Library, and those libraries have no record of ever having owned it. G. W. Cole, ed., A Catalogue of Books Relating to the Discovery and Early History of North and South America, The E. D. Church Library (New York, 1907), V, Number 1230, lists an item purporting to be H’s copy of The Federalist with notes in his writing. According to the librarian of the Huntington Library, San Marino, California, which acquired the Church library, the notes were not in the writing of H. The book, which is no longer in the Huntington Library, was sold to an unknown purchaser.

J. C. Hamilton, probably unintentionally, contradicts the statement that the names of the authors in his father’s copy of The Federalist were in H’s handwriting. He stated that his father dictated to him the authors of the essays which he then copied into H’s copy ( The Federalist description begins John C. Hamilton, ed., The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Also, The Continentalist and Other Papers by Hamilton (Philadelphia, 1865). description ends , I, xcvi–xcvii).

31 .  Not too much reliance should be placed on Kent’s endorsement of the Madison list in the City of Washington Gazette . According to that list, Madison wrote not only all the disputed essays but also essay 17. As Madison’s most ardent defenders assign this essay to H, it seems that Kent’s statement indicated nothing more than his suspicion that H may have made errors in his assignment of authors of the essays.

While Kent’s statement shows that he doubted the accuracy of the attribution of essays made by H, it raises several questions that cannot satisfactorily be answered. The clipping from the City of Washington Gazette was dated December 15, 1817, and the notes on the opposite page of the flyleaf, as stated in the text, could not have been written later than 1804. How, then, could Kent have written that he doubted that Jay wrote essay 64 when the essay was attributed to Jay on a page which was in front of Kent as he wrote? The only possible answer is that Kent, when writing in 1817 or later, failed to look carefully at the changes which had been made in his earlier memorandum and had his uncorrected list in mind. Whatever the explanation for his later statement, it is at least certain that he did not change the earlier list after he saw the article in the City of Washington Gazette .

32 .  “Notes of Ancient and Modern Confederacies, preparatory to the federal Convention of 1787” ( Madison, Letters description begins James Madison, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (Philadelphia, 1867). description ends , I, 293–315).

33 .  A favorite argument of those who support Madison’s claim to essays 49–58 of The Federalist is that since those essays constitute a unit, one man must have written all of them. The essays deal with: 1. the necessity of the departments of government having checks on each other, and 2. the House of Representatives. Madison’s defenders, in their desire to prove his authorship, forget that essays 59, 60, and 61, essays which they attribute to H, also deal with the House of Representatives. There are, furthermore, several obvious breaks in continuity among the essays from 48 to 58, at which a change of authors could have taken place. Essay 51, for example, ends the discussion of the necessity that “these departments shall be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others,” and essay 52 begins the discussion of the House of Representatives. A change could also have occurred after essay 54 or essay 57. This is not to say that changes in authorship did occur; it is to indicate that the “unit” argument will not stand up under scrutiny.

34 .  “The Authorship of the Federalist,” The American Historical Review , II (April, 1897), 443–60.

35 .  The fact that only Bourne and J. C. Hamilton are cited does not mean that other studies of the authorship of The Federalist have been ignored or overlooked. It means rather that other authors, while sometimes introducing new arguments, have relied heavily on the research of Bourne and J. C. Hamilton. To cite all those who have agreed with Bourne or Hamilton would be redundant; to summarize all the arguments of the numerous students of The Federalist —based for the most part on Bourne and Hamilton’s original research—is a task best left to the historiographer of that work.

There have been, of course, other able studies of the authorship of the disputed essays. Among the defenders of H’s claim, Henry Cabot Lodge (“The Authorship of the Federalist,” HCLW description begins Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1904). description ends , XI, xv–xlv) and Paul L. Ford (“The Authorship of The Federalist,” The American Historical Review , II [July, 1897], 675–82) have been the most able advocates. The most convincing exponent of Madison’s claim since Bourne is Douglass Adair (“The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers,” The William and Mary Quarterly , 3rd. ser., Vol. I, Numbers 2 and 3 [April and July, 1944], 97–122, 235–64). In two essays which brilliantly summarize the century-old controversy over the authorship of the disputed essays, Adair amplifies the research of Bourne and attempts to assign the disputed essays on the basis of the political philosophy which they reveal.

36 .  See, for example, S. A. Bailey, “Notes on Authorship of Disputed Numbers of the Federalist,” Case and Comment , XXII (1915), 674–75. Bailey credits Madison with sole authorship of the disputed essays on the basis of the use of the word “while” by H and “whilst” by Madison. Although the evidence for Bailey’s conclusion is convincing—and there is far more evidence than he produces—his argument is destroyed by H’s occasional use of “whilst.” In essay 51, for example, H, who himself edited the essays for publication by McLean, substituted “whilst” for “and.” In essay 81, certainly written by H, the word “whilst” is used. Edward G. Bourne (see note 35), to give another example, offers as evidence for Madison’s authorship of essay 56 his use of the word “monitory,” which, according to Bourne, was “almost a favorite word with Madison.” Yet in essay 26, H, in revising the essays for publication in the McLean edition, changed “cautionary” to “monitory.” Similarly, to assign authorship on the basis of differences in the spelling of certain words in different essays—for example, “color” or “colour,” “federal” or “fœderal”—would be hazardous. The editors of the various newspapers in which the essays appeared obviously changed the spelling of certain words to conform to their individual preferences.

37 .  Similarity between a statement in one of the disputed essays and an earlier remark in the writings of either Madison or H is perhaps valid evidence. It does not seem relevant, however, to attempt to prove authorship by reference to the later writings of either of the men. As both presumably read all the essays, they might later have borrowed a statement from a number of The Federalist written by the other without being aware of its source.

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