definition of human rights research

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• Introduction

Origins in ancient Greece and Rome

• Natural law transformed into natural rights
• “Nonsense upon stilts”: the critics of natural rights
• The persistence of the notion
• The nature of human rights: commonly accepted postulates
• Liberté : civil and political rights
• Égalité : economic, social, and cultural rights
• Fraternité : solidarity or group rights
• Liberté versus égalité
• The relevance of custom and tradition: the universalist-relativist debate
• Inherent risks in the debate
• Developments before World War II
• The UN Commission on Human Rights and its instruments
• The UN Human Rights Council and its instruments
• Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
• The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Its Optional Protocols
• Other UN human rights conventions and declarations
• Human rights and the Helsinki process
• Human rights in Europe
• Human rights in the Americas
• Human rights in Africa
• Human rights in the Arab world
• Human rights in Asia
• International human rights in domestic courts
• Human rights in the early 21st century

human rights

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• U. S. Department of State - Human Rights
• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Human Rights
• The History Learning Site - Human Rights
• Cornell University Law School - Human rights
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Human Rights
• Social Sciences Libretexts - Human Rights
• human rights - Children's Encyclopedia (Ages 8-11)
• human rights - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up)
• Table Of Contents

Recent News

human rights , rights that belong to an individual or group of individuals simply for being human, or as a consequence of inherent human vulnerability, or because they are requisite to the possibility of a just society. Whatever their theoretical justification, human rights refer to a wide continuum of values or capabilities thought to enhance human agency or protect human interests and declared to be universal in character, in some sense equally claimed for all human beings, present and future.

It is a common observation that human beings everywhere require the realization of diverse values or capabilities to ensure their individual and collective well-being. It also is a common observation that this requirement—whether conceived or expressed as a moral or a legal demand—is often painfully frustrated by social as well as natural forces, resulting in exploitation, oppression, persecution, and other forms of deprivation. Deeply rooted in these twin observations are the beginnings of what today are called “human rights” and the national and international legal processes associated with them.

Historical development

The expression human rights is relatively new, having come into everyday parlance only since World War II , the founding of the United Nations in 1945, and the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. It replaced the phrase natural rights, which fell into disfavour in the 19th century in part because the concept of natural law (to which it was intimately linked) had become controversial with the rise of legal positivism . Legal positivism rejected the theory, long espoused by the Roman Catholic Church , that law must be moral to be law. The term human rights also replaced the later phrase the rights of Man, which was not universally understood to include the rights of women.

Most students of human rights trace the origins of the concept of human rights to ancient Greece and Rome , where it was closely tied to the doctrines of the Stoics , who held that human conduct should be judged according to, and brought into harmony with, the law of nature . A classic example of this view is given in Sophocles ’ play Antigone , in which the title character, upon being reproached by King Creon for defying his command not to bury her slain brother, asserted that she acted in accordance with the immutable laws of the gods.

In part because Stoicism played a key role in its formation and spread, Roman law similarly allowed for the existence of a natural law and with it—pursuant to the jus gentium (“law of nations”)—certain universal rights that extended beyond the rights of citizenship. According to the Roman jurist Ulpian , for example, natural law was that which nature, not the state, assures to all human beings, Roman citizens or not.

It was not until after the Middle Ages , however, that natural law became associated with natural rights. In Greco-Roman and medieval times, doctrines of natural law concerned mainly the duties, rather than the rights, of “Man.” Moreover, as evidenced in the writings of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas , these doctrines recognized the legitimacy of slavery and serfdom and, in so doing, excluded perhaps the most important ideas of human rights as they are understood today—freedom (or liberty) and equality .

The conception of human rights as natural rights (as opposed to a classical natural order of obligation) was made possible by certain basic societal changes, which took place gradually beginning with the decline of European feudalism from about the 13th century and continuing through the Renaissance to the Peace of Westphalia (1648). During this period, resistance to religious intolerance and political and economic bondage; the evident failure of rulers to meet their obligations under natural law; and the unprecedented commitment to individual expression and worldly experience that was characteristic of the Renaissance all combined to shift the conception of natural law from duties to rights. The teachings of Aquinas and Hugo Grotius on the European continent, the Magna Carta (1215) and its companion Charter of the Forests (1217), the Petition of Right (1628), and the English Bill of Rights (1689) in England were signs of this change. Each testified to the increasingly popular view that human beings are endowed with certain eternal and inalienable rights that never were renounced when humankind “contracted” to enter the social order from the natural order and never were diminished by the claim of the “ divine right of kings .”

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• v.9(10); 2012 Oct

Human Rights Research and Ethics Review: Protecting Individuals or Protecting the State?

Joseph j. amon.

1 Health and Human Rights Division, Human Rights Watch, New York, New York, United States of America

2 Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America

Stefan D. Baral

3 Center for Public Health and Human Rights, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America

Chris Beyrer

4 Berman Institute of Bioethics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America

Wrote the first draft of the manuscript: JJA. Contributed to the writing of the manuscript: JJA SDB CB NK. ICMJE criteria for authorship read and met: JJA SDB CB NK. Agree with manuscript results and conclusions: JJA SDB CB NK.

Joseph Amon and colleagues discuss the challenges of conducting human rights research in settings where local research ethics committees may favor the interests of the state over the interests of research participants.

Summary Points

• Recently there has been a dramatic expansion in research conducted in low- and middle-income countries, as well as research ethics committees (RECs) in these countries.
• RECs in low- and middle-income countries have little experience overseeing human rights research and may be subject to government control or influence that may favor the interests of the state over the interests of individual research participants.
• Many human rights investigators are trained in disciplines with ethical codes and professional norms, but do not typically engage RECs nor see human rights documentation as research, and they tend to view REC approval as counterproductive to the protection of research participants.
• Case studies of human rights research can provide important lessons on navigating conflicts of interest posed by some local (i.e., in country) RECs.
• Expanding the use of community engagement and developing strong ethical operating principles can help ensure that individuals and researchers are protected in human rights research and investigations.

Human rights violations play an important role as determinants of, or structural barriers to, health [1] – [6] . Research, investigation, and documentation focused on human rights have led to the development of rights-based interventions [7] , [8] and the promotion of human rights in the core strategies of international health organizations [9] , [10] .

At the same time, health and human rights investigations raise complex ethical and methodological challenges [11] . Key questions have emerged about the roles of ethical review and research ethics committees (RECs) when criminalized or marginalized populations are part of research or program efforts [12] , [13] . Human rights researchers may also follow ethical codes and professional norms such as those of journalists or lawyers, for example, but these do not typically engage RECs and may in fact define their work differently than biomedical or epidemiologic definitions of “research” [14] – [16] . Furthermore, members of local (i.e., in country) RECs may have conflicts of interest when state actors have a role in or supervision over RECs and can exert their influence to limit the scope of or impede investigations into human rights abuses.

In some circumstances, interests other than ensuring the sound protection of research participants may come to dominate the decisions that RECs make, including whether they agree to review the research and/or allow the research to be conducted at all. Researchers aware of these decision-making processes may “self censor” the focus of their research or choose to conduct research elsewhere. As increasing amounts of research are conducted on the impact of human rights on health, more attention is needed on the roles of RECs and researchers to ensure genuine protection of the individuals involved in human rights investigations.

Here we present examples of how human rights researchers can address complex ethical challenges by building the capacity of community-based organizations representing vulnerable populations and by adopting ethical operating principles. We illustrate our policy proposals using case studies of research involving men who have sex with men (MSM) in Africa, ethnic minorities in Myanmar, and individuals in compulsory drug treatment centers in Asia.

Human Participant Protections

The protection of participants in health-related research has evolved into a well-articulated international framework supported by normative documents, conventions, and, in growing numbers of jurisdictions, laws. Key among these are the World Medical Association's 1964 Declaration of Helsinki [17] , the US Department of Health and Human Services Belmont Report and regulations for the protection of research participants [18] , [19] , the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences international ethical guidelines [20] , and the International Conference of Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use ( http://www.ich.org/ ). All of these guidelines require prior review of research by an REC before research can be implemented. More recently, the World Health Organization published standards for such committees outlining key requirements for their structure, governance, and review standards [21] .

Over the last ten years, there has been extraordinary growth in the numbers of RECs in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). As new committees in LMICs have emerged, many countries have adopted a structure whereby local committees, affiliated with specific research institutions or organizations, are supported by a national committee. The national committee is in charge of creating policies, providing oversight, and, in some cases, performing an additional, final review.

Unfortunately, the methodology and intent of human rights research has not been fully considered in existing standards and guidelines on the ethical conduct of research. Similarly, RECs have traditionally been orientated to biomedical and epidemiologic research and have rarely considered human rights research. While principles such as autonomy, beneficence, non-malevolence, and justice are common to ethical codes in diverse disciplines [14] – [16] , [18] , [22] , the definition of “research” and the requirement for REC review are not universal across different types of research.

Defining “Research”

The definition of research and the difference between health research (typically requiring ethics review) and monitoring, evaluation, or practice (typically exempt from review) are not straightforward [23] . For individuals engaged in rights research and RECs considering their jurisdiction over such research, the determination of whether a human rights investigation constitutes research can be contentious and may reflect differences in disciplinary training and professional norms.

Health and human rights investigations can often be considered “non-research” under the US Department of Health and Human Services and international definitions that define research as developing “generalizable knowledge” [19] , [20] . Documentation of particular human rights abuses, factors that contribute to particular cases of human rights abuse, or human rights protections in particular situations are not usually considered “generalizable.” While broader surveys determining the prevalence of abuses may be considered research, in some cases they may be considered monitoring, which, again, is commonly exempt from review. In addition, individuals who provide testimony or evidence of human rights abuses are not traditional research participants. Instead, these individuals have an important motivation for engagement in human rights investigations, that is, for seeing such investigations as perhaps their only means of achieving justice for themselves and their communities. Thus, their view of the balance of “risk” versus “benefit” may be substantially different from the view held by biomedical researchers or REC members.

Conducting Research on MSM and HIV in Africa

Recently identified HIV outbreaks among MSM in several African countries have revealed many neglected or hidden human rights abuses. These abuses include discrimination in access to HIV prevention and treatment, lack of access to justice, police abuse, arbitrary arrest and detention, and ill-treatment and torture. In nearly all African countries in which research has been conducted, HIV infection rates have been markedly higher among MSM than among other men of reproductive age [24] – [29] . These epidemics are occurring among largely hidden, stigmatized, and—in many countries—criminalized MSM communities, challenging research and service provision [30] .

In some countries, police have specifically targeted outreach workers providing information and condoms to MSM [31] , [32] , and health-care workers have been complicit in efforts to “prove” homosexuality with forced anal exams [33] – [35] . In Uganda, conducting research on MSM, including investigations of possible human rights abuses, has become difficult or impossible. Reasons for this difficulty include proposed legislation to make sodomy a capital offense and to criminalize the failure to report individuals suspected of engaging in homosexual behaviors, and targeted violence against individuals identified as MSM, including murder [36] , [37] .

Nevertheless, MSM health service providers and gay service and rights organizations and activists in many African countries have been enthusiastic partners in HIV-related programs, including research, even though governments have been reluctant to support research on MSM. In several cases, governments have actively opposed research that would lend credence to the reality that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons exist in their countries, and to the fact that MSM are at elevated risk for HIV infection [37] , [38] .

At one site of a multi-country study being conducted by two of the authors of this article (S. D. B. and C. B.), the head of the only university-based REC informed the research team that, since homosexuality was criminalized in the country, no research protocols related to MSM would be accepted for review. The REC chair told the researchers that the role of the REC included the protection of social and cultural values of the country. While RECs may legitimately reference social and cultural values in considering what constitutes risk to individual human participants, the REC in this case defined its role well beyond protection of human welfare to instead reinforce a political position of the state.

In response, researchers engaged community-based organizations serving MSM in the country to gauge the level of support for the study, and trained community leaders on research ethics [39] . The study protocol was then reviewed by community leaders, who suggested protocol changes based on further community consultation. At the same time, the protocols were also reviewed by a REC in the US that was informed that the in-country REC had refused to review the protocol. After approval by the US REC, the researchers decided that the final decision to proceed should be made by the community-based organizations in country based upon their assessment of the risks and benefits of the research. Community members also participated in validating research findings, and members of the community presented the results to their peers and in domestic and international forums.

Investigating Health and Human Rights in Myanmar

In democratic societies where government legitimacy has broad acceptance, and where ministries of health are seen as working to advance the health and well-being of the population, researchers rarely question whether academic or state entities have the right to form and oversee RECs. In contrast, in repressive societies, and where an REC is seen as not representative of, or legitimately protecting the interests of, a particular vulnerable group (e.g., prisoners, women, or an ethnic or religious minority), RECs may be understood as agents of the state: prioritizing the protection of state interests over those of research participants.

In the case of Myanmar, decades of civil and ethnic conflict have left large areas of the country under contested political control. Several major ethnic nationalities, including the Karen, Kachin, Chin, Shan, Mon, and Wa, have been in open armed conflict with the ruling military-backed regime or have cease-fire agreements that allow them considerable autonomy. Most of these ethnic groups do not have formal relationships with the ruling government.

In working with ethnic populations in border zones since 1992, we (as well as collaborators from the University of California, Los Angeles, and other entities) have struggled with the question of who most legitimately represents these populations and specifically who should safeguard their rights and interests if researchers or investigators want to collect data. For individuals with no formal communication with the regime they are fighting, the concept that this regime could make decisions for their health and well-being is both absurd and offensive. However, popular support for the government in exile is strong among most of Myamnar's ethnic national organizations, and this exiled government has a well-established health and welfare committee. Consequently, we have helped to establish and build the capacity of an REC composed of Myanmar physicians and nurses in exile, community health workers, community members, and faith-based leaders. This group has now had several years of experience functioning as an REC and reviewing proposals, and their authority has been accepted by RECs at US institutions [40] – [42] .

Documenting Abuses in Compulsory Drug Treatment Centers

Between July 2007 and September 2011, Human Rights Watch conducted investigations of compulsory detention of drug users in China [43] , [44] , Cambodia [45] , Viet Nam [46] , and the Lao People's Democratic Republic [47] . In these countries, drug use is legal but drug users are subject to extrajudicial administrative detention for the purpose of compulsory treatment of drug dependency. The investigations conducted by Human Rights Watch included interviews with individuals recently detained in drug detention centers; key informant interviews with non-government organizations, funding entities, and, in some cases, government officials; review of relevant government laws and policies; and review of international donor policies and programs in drug detention centers. The investigators found that individuals in drug detention centers were routinely held without clinical determination of drug dependency or due process, and once detained were denied evidence-based drug treatment as well as other basic health services. Drug users were often forced to perform arduous physical exercise, military drills, or forced labor, and were subject to physical and sexual abuse.

While research on drug addiction, HIV virology, HIV prevalence, and HIV prevention has been routinely conducted inside detention centers with the approval of government-affiliated RECs and the authorization of the government-controlled detention centers, the specific ethical concerns of conducting research in institutions that violate due process protections have not been addressed. At a minimum, researchers should be expected to accurately characterize the research setting and status of participants. Yet, researchers have often ignored the conditions within and lack of judicial oversight of such centers, presenting them as legitimate treatment facilities [48] , [49] . Researchers rarely report on the availability of evidence-based drug dependency treatment [48] , [50] – [55] and have obscured the status of research participants (e.g., referring to detainees as “patients” [48] or vaguely alluding to their “complex legal needs” [55] ). Published papers also often omit mention of the challenges of conducting independent research [48] , [50] – [55] . One study acknowledged using detention center staff to witness consent [55] , potentially increasing the risk of coercion. Researchers who do not have full, independent, or ongoing access to detention centers may be unable to assess negative consequences for research participants, and detainees who do not have access to legal counsel or the right to free speech may be unable to file a complaint alleging abusive research.

In response to these challenges, we chose to conduct research with individuals in the community who had been recently released from detention centers. However, human rights monitoring by independent international organizations is not allowed in China, Viet Nam, or the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and we did not feel that local RECs would approve research related to torture and ill-treatment. Therefore, a decision was made to proceed without local REC approval in order to protect both research participants and researchers, who we feared could be targeted by the state for proposing research that is viewed as sensitive to state security or disruptive of government goals of “social harmony.” In place of local REC approval, and because we felt that there was no defined community of recently released drug users to formally consult with (and that community engagement in the context of ongoing persecution would not be safe regardless), researchers developed and followed specific ethical operating principles. In contrast to the typical approach of RECs, where review is limited to the research protocol, every step of the research, from the protocol review to implementation to dissemination of results to scientific, diplomatic, and media audiences included internal ethics review by technical and legal experts.

Mitigating Risks in Human Rights Investigations

To address the possible conflicts investigators may face in protecting participants in the course of health and human rights investigations, local RECs are needed that can be considered truly independent. In addition, two distinct and complementary strategies—community-based review and the development of strong ethical operating principles—can help protect investigators and participants in health-related human rights research.

In the context of governments that persecute specific populations, actively limit free speech, and routinely punish criticism of the state, RECs are unlikely to be independent. Under these circumstances, using local RECs to safeguard the rights and interests of research participants may be counterproductive, putting both investigators and participants at risk. In these settings, researchers may need to actively engage communities and follow clear ethical operating principles in place of local REC review.

Community-based review and participatory research have a long history and were developed to address community members' concerns about neglect by and communities' mistrust of researchers, health-care systems, and government [56] , [57] . Conducted correctly, community-based participatory research (including financial and technical support for community engagement and leadership) creates bridges between policy-makers, scientists, and communities; facilitates reciprocal learning; assists in the development of culturally appropriate measurement instruments and interventions; and establishes a level of trust that enhances both the quantity and the quality of data collected and programs delivered [39] , [57] – [61] . While there is a well-established body of literature on engagement of marginalized populations in high-income settings and on some vulnerable populations in LMICs [57] , [58] , the issues faced by criminalized and violently stigmatized populations have less often been addressed.

One challenge of community-based review is that in many settings the “community” is not homogenous, organized, or able to participate in extensive consultation and review of proposed research. Research with migrants, prisoners, drug users, and criminalized populations is often conducted without a representative advocacy group. In other settings, it may not be clear who legitimately speaks for marginalized populations. In all settings, community-based review can be time-consuming and resource intensive.

In conducting human rights research, particularly in settings where safety may be of particular concern, a critical first step is to have standing procedures on investigator and participant protection. All Human Rights Watch staff who conduct interviews, for example, undergo security training and training on participants' protection and data safety. Researchers can also receive specialized training on how to sensitively interview people in such a way as to minimize risk of re-traumatization, including training on interviewing victims of sexual violence, children, persons in extreme pain, prisoners, and the mentally disabled. All researchers must participate in a security meeting prior to a research mission that establishes chains of communication so that security emergencies can be identified and handled once the mission is in progress. Post-mission meetings are held if security concerns arise, and the security of participants stemming from contact with researchers is monitored. Prior to publication of any findings from research (in the form of reports, journal articles, press releases, opinion pieces, photography, or other media), legal review is required and provides further assessment of research participant protection.

For individuals who experience human rights abuses, the consequences of reporting that abuse are often uncertain. Yet even when the risk of retaliation is judged to be high, many individuals may be willing to take such a risk in order to press for justice, despite the fact that justice may take years or even decades to be served. Individuals who are a part of communities that are systematically discriminated against, stigmatized, or criminalized may experience high levels of ongoing harm, and see participation in a human rights investigation as one of few means of challenging those abuses or demanding redress.

In the decade to come, RECs in LMICs will likely acquire increasing jurisdiction, resources, and authority over local research. These changes will offer a promise of greater protection for research participants who in the past have faced abuses with little opportunity for redress. But RECs may have little experience in evaluating the inherent risks faced by individuals vulnerable to human rights abuses as well as the risks and benefits from participation in a human rights investigation. RECs, which primarily review pre-research protocols, may also be poorly suited to the review of dynamic investigations using open-ended research methodologies where the risk to participants is less a result of research processes (e.g., questionnaires) than from post-research products (e.g., reports, legal processes, and media coverage).

The use of RECs to limit health and human rights research for political, cultural, or other considerations is a misuse of the legitimate functions of RECs. Careful attention must be paid when local committees assert that their views represent local cultural norms, or that human rights are an illegitimate focus of research as they express foreign values. A critical distinction for researchers is understanding the difference between respecting cultural traditions that are “matters of etiquette, ritual, or religion,” with little or no relation to ethics, from those cultural traditions with ethical (or human rights) implications, such as female genital mutilation or infanticide [62] . Cultural practices or government policies that either deliberately or incidentally serve to suppress or threaten the rights of certain people cannot be respected. RECs, charged specifically with upholding the rights and protection of individuals, should not use culture or “values” as a means to deny human rights.

Increasing attention to human rights as a determinant of health will result in increasing requests to RECs to review research that investigates the role and complicity of state actors, government laws and policies, and social or cultural norms as they relate to health. Stronger, independent RECs trained in human rights may be better equipped to more adequately review this research. When RECs are unable to do so, or where research on human rights or criminalized or marginalized populations is expressly prohibited, researchers may need to rely upon alternative strategies, including engaging communities and following ethical operating principles, to ensure that research participants are protected and that research is ethically conducted. While such innovations do not eliminate all risks, and may be costly in terms of time and resources, the alternatives, which may include acceding to censorship or not conducting investigations at all, are unacceptable limits.

Abbreviations

Funding Statement

The authors received no specific funding for this article.

Human research protections

Research with human participants has proven invaluable in advancing knowledge in the biomedical, behavioral, and social sciences. Such research is strictly regulated, with laws at the federal, state, and local levels. Further, professional societies have developed discipline-specific standards, policies, and guidelines for ensuring that the rights and welfare of research participants is protected.

In the early 1970s, following widely publicized cases of research abuse, The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research was created to study issues surrounding the protection of humans in research. In 1979 the Commission issued a report entitled Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (commonly called the Belmont Report), which provided the ethical framework on which current federal regulations for the protection of human participants in research are based.

Legislation and regulations

Legislation and regulations that affect the conduct of research with human participants:

• Department of Health and Human Services - 45CFR46
• Food and Drug Administration - 21CFR50 and 21CFR56
• The privacy rule
• Mandatory reporters: Summary of state laws (PDF, 493KB)
• NIH policy and compliance: Human subjects research

Resources that provide additional guidance on various human research protection issues:

Institutional review boards (IRBs)

• IRB guidebook
• Expedited review categories
• IRBs and psychological science (APA report)
• Recommendations of the 2007 APA Presidential Task Force on IRBs and psychological science (PDF, 36KB)
• Protecting personal health information in research: Understanding the HIPAA privacy rule (PDF, 3.59MB)
• HIPAA frequently asked questions

Research on the internet

• Psychological research online: Opportunities and challenges

Federal offices

U.S. federal agency offices charged with regulating research with human participants:

• Office for Human Research Protections (DHHS)
• Policy and compliance: Human subjects research (NIH)

Training resources

• Ethical and policy issues in research involving human participants (PDF, 2MB) (NBAC report)
• National Library of Medicine bibliography
• Protecting participants and facilitating social and behavioral sciences research (NRC report)
• Research involving persons with mental disorders that might affect decision-making capacity (NBAC report)
• Resources for research ethics education: Human subjects
• Responsible research: A systems approach to protecting research participants (IOM report)
• University of Minnesota consent module

APA resources

• Guidelines for ethical conduct of behavioral projects involving human participants by high school students
• Researchers and regulators hammer out guidelines for research risk ( Monitor on Psychology , 2005)
• Ethics in research with human participants (APA book)
• Committee on Human Research (CHR)
• Conducting research

Contact APA

• Recognizing Problems
• Accountability
• Research & Advocacy
• Policy Decisions
• Introducing “Human Rights Advocacy and the History of Human Rights Standards”
• What Is International Human Rights Policy?
• Your Questions
• USING THE SITE
• Instructors
• Researchers
• A Basic Approach to Human Rights Research

Since the 1960s and the origins of the modern human rights movement, human rights organizations have produced their own research.  In-depth and well-documented reports, replete with testimonial evidence and analysis of government policy and practice , are the stock-in-trade product of human rights organizations. They serve as the basis of lobbying and campaign efforts, and they provide the underpinnings of organizational reputation and credibility.

Human rights organizations invented the genre of human rights research.  It typically resembles evidence gathered for a legal argument rather than analysis in the tradition of social science. Human rights organizations do not seek to describe general social conditions; rather, the main objective of human rights reporting is to document patterns of human rights violations and expose the perpetrators, institutions and policies that facilitate abuse.

Amnesty International created prototypes for human rights reporting in the 1960s, gathering detailed information on the situation of individual prisoners of conscience and the circumstances of their incarceration.  Prisoners of conscience are people who have been jailed because of their political, religious or other conscientiously-held beliefs or factors of their identity and who have not advocated violence.  Within a year of its founding, AI had documented the “cases” of some 1200 prisoners .  In 1962 it authorized its first in-country research mission (to Ghana), and in 1965 it released its first thematic report (on prison conditions in Portugal, South Africa, and Romania).

International human rights organizations today produce as many as 100 detailed reports per year, in addition to annual reports on the human rights practices of countries and news releases published on a daily basis. Mike McClintock describes  the origins of human rights research methodology and its evolution through the 1980s.  Since that time there have been important developments in this methodology–including technological advances,  forensic analysis , and sensitivity to the handling of personal information–but the basic approach described by McClintock continues to inform research reports issued by Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, the Fédération International des Droits de l’Homme and numerous other human rights organizations in addition to Amnesty International.  The methodology developed by human rights organizations also provides guidance for human rights monitoring under the aegis of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights .

Human rights reports typically refer to existing legal standards or, where existing standards are lacking, they point to human rights norms and the need for new laws and policy. Increasingly, human rights organizations eschew a “victims” approach in favor of more inclusive involvement of those who have suffered abuse. The Irish section of Amnesty International, for example, has created an “ experts by experience ” group to advance its work on human rights and mental health.

For more information:

Mike McClintock, who has worked in the human rights field for more than 30 years at organizations like Human Rights First, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, describes the core tenants of human rights research methodology in his narrative, The Standard Approach to Human Rights Research .

International Standards and Guidelines (from IGOs and NGOs)

• United Nations, “ Istanbul Protocol:  Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ,” 1999.
• Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, Professional Training . Series No. 7, 2001. (Note: Provides practical guidance principally for the conduct of human rights monitoring in United Nations field operations.)
• International Bar Association: Human Rights Institute, Guidelines on International Human Rights Fact-Finding Visits and Reports (“Lund-London Guidelines”), 1 June 2009.  (Note:  The International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute in conjunction with the Raoul Wallenberg Institute , launched this set of human rights fact-finding guidelines during a conference at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, on 1 June 2009. The guidelines are the result of several years’ work and wide consultation. They arose out of concern that, despite there being no agreed international standards for human rights fact-finding reporting, such reports are frequently referred to by courts and tribunals as evidence of the facts alleged in them, as well as by governments, NGOs and other interested people. The guidelines aim to fill this gap by setting an agreed international standard of good practice in the conduct of fact-finding visits and in the compilation of reports. More information is available on the website http://www.factfindingguidelines.org .)
• International Commission of Jurists, Trial Observation Manual-Practitioners’ Guide No. 5 , 2009. (Note: Intended as a practical tool for ICJ trial observers. The manual incorporates insights from similar guides developed by the UN and other NGOs and specifically addresses instances where the independence or impartiality of judges and lawyers is threatened or fair standards are not guaranteed. It includes analysis of international standards on the right to remedy of victims of human rights violations and combating impunity.)
• International Law Association. “The Belgrade International Rules of Procedure for International Human Rights Fact-Finding Missions,” in  American Journal of International Law 75, No. 1 (1981): 163-165.
• Human Rights Watch.  “ Our Research Methodology .”

Scholarship

On human rights research and reporting, generally.

• Franck, Thomas M. and H. Scott Fairley. “Procedural Due Process in Human Rights Fact-Finding by International Agencies.” The American Journal of International Law 74, no. 2 (1980): 308-345.
• Groome, Dermot. The Handbook of Human Rights Investigation . Human Rights Press, 2000.
• Larson, Egon. A Flame in Barbed Wire:  The Story of Amnesty International .  New York:  F. Mueller, 1978.  (Note: Includes description of research missions carried out in AI’s early years.)
• McClintock, Michael.  “Establishing Accountability for State Violence.”  In Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century:  A Global Challenge , edited by Kathleen Mahoney.  Martinus Nijhoff, 1993.
• McClintock, Michael.  “ Tensions Between Assistance and Protection:  A Human Rights Perspective .”  In Humanitarian Action:  A Transatlantic Agenda for Operations and Research , edited by Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss.  Occasional Paper #39, Watson Institute, Brown University, 2000.
• Orentlicher, Diane F. “Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-Finding.” Harvard Human Rights Journal 3 (1990): 83-135.
• Weissbrodt, David and James McCarthy. “Fact-finding by International Non-governmental Human Rights Organizations.” Virginia Journal of International Law , 22 (1981).
• Weissbrodt, David.  “Book Review.  Human Rights Missions: A Study of the Fact-Finding Practice of Non-Governmental Organizations by Hans Thoolen and Berth Verstappen.”   Human Rights Quarterly , Vol. 10, No. 1 (Feb., 1988):  134-137. (Note: Introduces volume by Thoolen and Verstappen and also provides brief literature review on human rights research methodology.)

On specific methodologies

• Amnesty International, Freedom from Torture, and University of York: Center for Applied Human Rights. “ Active Participation in Human Rights ,” Conference Report, 2011. (Note: See Annex 1 for an overview of conceptual challenges in incorporating rights holder perspectives and priorities in human rights research and reporting.)
• OSCE.   Preventing and Responding to Hate Crimes:  A Resource Guide for NGOs in the OSCE Region ,”  Includes section on data collection, monitoring and reporting.  2009.
• Stover, Eric. The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in the Hague .  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. (Note: Addresses the use of victim and survivor testimony.)
• Weissbrodt, David.  “International Trial Observers.”  Stanford Journal of International Law 18 (1982):  27-121.

Case Studies and Examples

• Dublin City University, “ Hear My Voice:  The Experience of Discrimination of People with Mental Health Problems in Ireland ,” 2010.  (Commissioned by AI-Ireland, investigation of the experience of discrimination by people with mental health problems, experts by experience.  Illustrates use of “active participation” methodology.)
• Geiger, MD., H. Jack and Robert M. Cook-Deegan, MD. “The Role of Physicians in Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises: Case Studies from the Field Missions of Physicians for Human Rights, 1988 to 1993.” Journal of the American Medical Association 270, no. 5 (1993): 616-620.
• “ I Remember Being Shown Some Very Severe Signs of Torture ,” Former staff researchers of Amnesty International reminisce about gathering information in Pinochet’s Chile (blogpost, August 14, 2013).
• Recognizing Human Rights Problems
• Enforced Disappearances
• Invoking Standards of International Humanitarian Law
• Interdependence and Indivisibility of Economic and Political Rights
• Establishing Accountability for Human Rights Abuse
• Government Obligations
• Armed Insurgent Groups and Other Non-State Actors
• Individual Criminal Accountability
• Corporate Accountability
• Women’s Rights: Due Diligence, Private Actors, and Domestic Violence
• Methods of Research and Advocacy
• Forensic Evidence and Human Rights Reporting
• Research in Conflict Zones and Military Forensics
• Making international Human Rights Policy Decisions
• The UN and Human Rights Policy
• The Human Rights Movement – Advocacy for Policy Change
• The Future: Frontiers in Human Rights Policy

Human Rights Glossary

Inter-governmental organization (igo).

IGO – Inter-governmental organization. Organizations whose members are nation states—such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization of American States.

See more human rights glossary terms…

Human Rights Policy Resources

• Core Human Rights Treaties and Monitoring Bodies
• UN Special Procedures
• UN Treaty Collection
• Universal Human Rights Instruments

Human Rights: From Practice to Policy

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Article contents

What helps protect human rights: human rights theory and evidence.

• Jessica Anderson Jessica Anderson Department of Political Science, University of Missouri
•  and  Amanda Murdie Amanda Murdie Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.513
• Published online: 24 May 2017

Empirical international relations (IR) theory developed three generalized statements regarding why human rights abuses occur. First, human rights abuses are a way for an unrestrained state, especially the executive branch and its agents, to try to control individuals and hold on to power. Second, respect for human rights is an international norm, and international socialization and pressure about this norm can, in certain situations, affect behavior. Third, the codification of human rights norms into international treaties may influence behavior but, similar to our understanding of the effect of other treaties on state behavior, states only bind themselves weakly, and certain conditions are necessary for treaties to affect human rights.

• Human rights
• norm life cycle
• human rights treaties
• international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs)
• empirical international relations theory

Introduction

Amnesty International, a leading organization specializing in advocacy to end human rights abuses, recently released accounts of horrendous abuses to political prisoners in Vietnam (Amnesty International, 2016 ). Peaceful demonstrators and outspoken minorities had been imprisoned, tortured, and “disappeared” for their beliefs and the supposed threat that they posed to the regime. Even though Vietnam ratified the United Nation’s Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 2015 , dozens of individuals are still imprisoned and tortured there for the peaceful expression of their political beliefs.

Since the end of World War II, much attention has been paid to stopping abuses like those that occurred in Vietnam. Global and regional human rights treaties have been ratified, and concerns about human rights abuses have sparked many foreign policy actions. A vibrant and connected network of human rights advocates and organizations has fought tirelessly for the abused and have expanded our understanding of what human rights means and what protections should be expected. Despite all of this, most countries in the world still have evidence of abuses within their borders.

This article examines why human rights abuse occurs and what can be done to help protect human rights. In the last 30 years, there has been an explosion of human rights–related scholarship in leading international relations (IR) journals (Murdie, 2015 ). This literature has drawn on many theoretical traditions and paradigms and has enriched both the general IR literature and more human rights–specific scholarship.

We do not attempt to review all the international relations literature on human rights abuses; other scholars have recently produced very thorough reviews of the extant literature (Davenport, 2007 ; Goodman, Jinks, & Woods, 2012 ; Hafner-Burton & Ron, 2009 ; Hafner-Burton, 2012 , 2014 Landman, 2005 ; Morgan, 2009 ; ). Instead, this article attempts to review some of the human rights empirical literature in international relations and situate this literature into a set of general theoretical statements about why human rights abuses occur. We hope that this exercise will help in improving and expanding empirical IR theory related to this topic.

In general, IR scholars have made three large-scale theoretical statements:

Human rights abuses are a way for an unrestrained state, especially the executive branch and its agents, to try to control individuals and hold on to power.

Respect for human rights is an international norm, and international socialization and pressure about this norm can affect behavior in certain situations.

The codification of human rights norms into international treaties may influence behavior but, similar to our understanding of the effect of other treaties on state behavior, states only bind themselves weakly, and certain conditions are necessary for treaties to affect human rights.

After defining human rights in more detail, we outline the empirical literature that supports these theoretical statements. To note, however, human rights research is not confined to IR or political science; rather, it is also examined through the fields of sociology, anthropology, economics, history, psychology, and law (Morgan, 2009 ). Thus, the study of human rights is an interdisciplinary study in a way that most fields within international relations are not. Within political science, human rights research reaches across the boundary between international relations and comparative politics. Full understanding of human rights situations requires understanding the domestic factors and characteristics of bureaucracies more commonly discussed in research within the comparative politics subfield. At the same time, attempts to limit or prevent human rights often involve the international community in the drafting of treaties, the foreign policy between states, and the flow of global norms about human rights practices. Thus, understanding why human rights abuses occur requires understanding the elements of both comparative politics and international relations. We see this as an advantage in the study of human rights. IR scholars can utilize theories from comparative politics and disciplines outside of political science to create a more complete understanding of human rights situations and produce research that speaks to a broad audience of scholars and individuals outside the academic world.

What Are Human Rights?

Much of our current understanding of human rights is based on international law, especially on the conception of rights included within the United Nation’s nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948 . This document creates a list of what is now commonly accepted as individual rights, including political rights; civil rights; social, economic, and cultural rights; and more broadly conceptualized rights of development and freedom from poverty, which also fit under the umbrella term of human rights (Landman, 2006 ).

The Emphasis on Physical Integrity Rights

The UDHR specifies the rights of individuals in 30 separate articles, addressing a range of rights from the “right to life, liberty, and security of person” (art. 3) to “the right to rest and leisure” (art. 23). Our collective understanding of which rights are included as human rights has expanded over time. Recently, advocacy related to human rights has included rights related to access to the Internet and sexual minority rights [i.e., lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) rights], among others.

Although the concept of human rights includes a wide range of rights, much of the research on human rights within IR focuses on a very narrow set of rights, often referred to as physical integrity or bodily integrity rights . In addition, most of the focus within international relations has focused specifically on abuses of these rights on citizens of a specific state by governmental actors from this state. Abuses by fellow citizens or nonstate actors, like corporations or rebel movements, have often been ignored. 1 Similarly, abuses by government actors beyond their own state borders have also received little attention in the IR scholarship, despite horrific accounts of abuses by military interveners and peacekeepers, among others.

Physical integrity rights are conceptualized as “freedom from” rights, and they typically include being free from extrajudicial killing, the use of torture, political imprisonment, and disappearance. To respect these rights, governments need only restrain from violating them; hence, they are sometimes called negative rights . On the other hand, in order to respect positive rights , like the right to education or the right to health, the state must provide resources or services. The study of these positive rights has primarily been done by political economists, often without a human rights frame. It is worth noting, however, that there is a growing number of IR studies on rights beyond physical integrity rights, like women’s rights and labor rights (e.g., Detraz & Peksen, 2016 ; Peksen & Blanton, 2017 ). This expansion of the types of rights examined by IR scholars holds great promise for a more encompassing theory of human rights practices and for additional inquiry into why some states may perform well on certain rights, but not on others.

Many human rights scholars rely on a small number of quantitative measures to capture physical integrity rights practices. One of the most prominent is the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 2014 ). This composite measure captures observable state practices regarding the use of torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and political imprisonment during a given year (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010 ). The Political Terror Scale (PTS) is a similar measure that is widely used (Wood & Gibney, 2010 ). Both of these measures are created by using information from yearly reports released by the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International. The use of such measures makes it much easier to conduct empirical analyses across a global sample of states for a long period of time. However, it is important to remember that these measures capture only a small range of human rights practices. Although this is a limitation, current research has allowed scholars to understand many of the reasons why states abuse these physical integrity rights and propose solutions to prevent abuses. Similarly, these measures may not account for the changing standard of accountability over time, leading scholars to conclude (erroneously) that there have been no improvements in state practices over time (Fariss, 2014 ). 2

Human Rights Abuses and the State

One of the most common assumptions in international relations and comparative politics concerns the desire of a regime leader to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003 ; Chiozza & Goemans, 2004 ). A leader makes calculated decisions to remain in power or to ensure that his or her political party does. Human rights abuses are one “tool” that leaders can use to try to hold on to political power. If a regime is threatened, a leader can use his or her control of security forces to violate the human rights of citizens within the state. Abuses are designed to increase the cost that a possible dissident would face for violently (or even nonviolently) challenging the leader, hopefully cutting off dissent before it occurs (Ritter & Conrad, 2016 ). Davenport ( 2007 , p. 7) calls this the “law of coercive responsiveness.” In general, the law leads us to expect to see repression increase as opposition to the regime leadership increases within a state, and to expect to see repression increase as the regime faces threats to its power from abroad, especially in cases involving international war. States engaged in international war must respond to these external threats and any internal threats at the same time, constraining the resources available to the state. This means that even states that otherwise may have granted concessions to citizens will be more likely to respond to their demands with repression while engaged in international conflict due to the need to commit resources to facing international foes (Rasler, 1986 ). In general, this logic explains why there is such a strong empirical link between international and civil war and repression; when a state is threatened militarily, a government will respond with repression in order to control the population, try to extract information from that population that could help it remain in power, or both (Poe & Tate, 1994 ).

Given that the law of coercive responsiveness would lead us to expect an increase in repression whenever a leader is threatened, perhaps the question is not so much why states abuse human rights as it is why some states abuse the human rights of their citizens more than other states. Abuses are a common response by a threatened leader who has the power to control security forces. It is with this thought in mind that we now turn to a variety of state characteristics that are associated with differences in human rights performance and reflect this underlying theoretical logic.

Regime Type

It has long been suggested that democratic regimes are associated with better human rights, and this suggestion has received a great deal of empirical support. There are a number of explanations for why democracies might have greater respect for human rights. First, democracies allow the peaceful turnover of power. The political institutions of a democratic government are composed of citizens, and they are approved by citizens through the process of voting. Elections provide citizens with a legitimate channel through which to remove leaders from power without resorting to political violence (Davenport, 1999 ). When leaders regularly face the possibility of being removed from power by their constituents, they are more beholden to their constituents’ wishes. This will force leaders to show greater respect for human rights because there is a regular risk of being removed from office if citizens are unhappy with their leadership and their use of repression.

However, not all democratic regimes are equal (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005 ). Simply holding an election does not necessarily make a state a democracy. If elections are not free and fair, then they fail to hold leaders accountable or to convey the grievances of the population to the regime’s leadership. Only when elections are free and fair with more than one choice do they force leaders to be accountable to their citizens and potentially limit human rights abuses. Further, there is much research questioning whether elections alone are enough to affect human rights practices (Cingranelli & Filippov, 2010 ; Davenport, 1997 ; Richards, 1999 ; ). Richards and Gelleny ( 2007 ), for example, find that national legislative elections improve human rights only in the year following the election. Presidential elections are associated with less respect for human rights, something that Richard and Gelleny ( 2007 , p. 520) claim is linked to the “rigidity and winner-take-all structure of many presidential systems.”

Elections are only one aspect of democracies that has been potentially linked to better human rights practices. Institutional constraints and channels of regularized communication also matter. Democracy is often conceptualized not only by free elections, but also by constraints on an executive’s power. As Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski ( 2012 ) show, an unconstrained leader may be more likely to use violence around an election. Judicial constraints have been found to limit the use of torture; although these same constraints may make leaders less likely to ratify the CAT (Powell & Staton, 2009 ). Conrad and Moore ( 2010 ), however, conclude that institutions that constrain executives, such as freedom of expression or institutional checks, may not be enough to stop torture when a regime is threatened. Recent work has highlighted how the creation of national human rights ombudsmen or institutional offices can constrain executives by providing a regularzed way for abuses to be publicized and adjudicated (Smith, 2006 ; Welch, 2017 ).

Democracies have more channels for communication and compromise between regime leaders and the opposition than do autocracies, meaning that there are usually more available alternatives to repression that would still limit the possibility of threat to the leadership (Henderson, 1991 ). Political opposition is theorized to develop through grievances from citizens who feel that they are receiving less than they expect and that the government is responsible for their plight (Gurr, 1968 ). In democracies, citizens have more institutionalized channels through which to get their grievances heard by the regime. Citizens in democracies are also much more likely to have their demands met, as leaders in democracies that do not address such grievances are unlikely to stay in office. Citizens in autocracies may demand greater participation in decision-making, greater freedom in criticizing leadership, or pressure for more transparent government, but these calls for reform are unlikely to be met, as that would require autocratic leaders to relinquish power. Further, autocracies draw their power from a very small group of political elites and must provide private goods to these elites in order to stay in power. Democratic leaders have a greater incentive to pursue policies that benefit large segments of society, as they need the political support of a much larger group (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 ). As demands are less likely to be met though concessions in autocracies, political opposition is more likely to be handled with repression (Davis & Ward, 1990 ).

When opposition threatens the power of autocratic leaders, who may not depend at all on winning the votes of members of the opposition, they will likely use repression in an attempt to silence this opposition; this was part of what Davenport ( 2007 , p. 7) calls the “law of coercive responsiveness.” However, as he continues, there is a “puzzle” (p. 8) about whether the abuse will actually limit dissent: even though leaders utilize repression to coerce political opposition into submission, these actions can paradoxically incite further opposition. This reveals an endogenous relationship between protest and repression that is found in many autocratic states. Political opposition feeds into higher degrees of repression, which increases political opposition, leading the cycle to repeat (Pierskalla, 2010 ; Rasler, 1996 ; Ritter, 2014 ; Thoms & Ron, 2007 ). Repression also increases the grievances formed by citizens, possibly causing them to engage in more violent forms of opposition. When repression against citizens is severe, it can lead to terrorism against the state and even full-fledged civil war (Bell, Cingranelli, Murdie, & Caglayan, 2013 ; Thoms & Ron, 2007 ). In response, the government will utilize more severe forms of repression in an attempt to quash the rebellion, continuing until either the opposition is completely eradicated or the government is forced from power.

Another argument for the empirical connection between democracy and better human rights performance centers on the norms and expectations of behavior in democratic regimes. Democratic regimes have strong norms of nonviolence; these norms could influence how leaders in democratic regimes use violence, both domestically and internationally (Hegre, 2001 ; Maoz & Russett, 1993 ; Risse-Kappen, 1995 ). Research also suggests that better human rights practices domestically may create norms of engagement that limit international conflict (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2003 , 2006 ; Peterson & Graham, 2011 ; Sobek, Abouharb, & Ingram, 2006 ; Tomz & Weeks, 2016 ).

Although there are many empirical theories about the relationship between democracy and human rights practices, extant research suggests a few important caveats. First, this relationship is not necessarily linear. Scholars have noted that complete autocracies—those that we would expect to exercise the most political repression—tend to exercise relatively little repression (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004 ; Fein, 1995 ). Fein ( 1995 , p. 170) argues that there is “more murder in the middle,” in that there is a U-shaped relationship between regime type and repression, suggesting that states that are neither strong democracies nor strong autocracies have the greatest likelihood to use repression. Davenport and Armstrong ( 2004 ) point out, however, that it is more of a threshold relationship, with only consolidated democracies limiting repression.

Second, just as not all democracies are equal in their human rights performance, there also are differences between authoritarian regimes. Vreeland ( 2008 ) finds that dictatorships with multiple political parties, indicative of shared power, are more likely to both commit torture and ratify the CAT. Vreeland ( 2008 ) argues that this is due to how shared power emboldens potential dissidents, creating opportunities for torture, but also likely leading to concessions like treaty ratification. Conrad ( 2011 ) finds, however, that effective judiciaries can constrain dictators in their use of torture.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that democracy and human rights, especially the physical integrity rights most typically studied by IR scholars, are conceptually related. Hill ( 2016 ) argues that some definitions of democracy include freedom from repression as a key component, cautioning scholars to be careful about their definition of democracy and that this definition is conceptually distinct from physical integrity rights performance.

State Wealth

Beyond regime type, one of the most consistent findings within the literature on human rights suggests that wealthy states abuse human rights less often than poor states. 3 However, scholars have disagreed on exactly why economic development is associated with better protection of human rights. First, wealthy states might have less need to use repression. As Henderson ( 1991 ) states, we expect to see fewer grievances in wealthy states, since citizens should be more satisfied with their standard of living. As discussed previously, repression is often used as a response to opposition, making it unnecessary when opposition is lacking. Also, wealthier states have a greater ability to grant concessions to citizens in the form of goods and services rather than resorting to repression (Conrad, 2011 ; Davenport, 2007 ). Thus, wealthier states should see less political opposition and also have means of dealing with opposition other than resorting to repression.

Economic development, especially development tied to globalization, is also linked to changes in the way that society is structured within a state, which can affect human rights practices. Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko ( 2001 ) discuss the two main schools that provide expectations about the relation between globalized economic development and human rights practices, referred to as the liberal neoclassical and dependency schools. The liberal neoclassical school suggests that a globalized economy will lead to enhanced wealth across a society, leading to the creation of a middle class. When the middle class develops greater wealth, they are able to devote more time and resources to their demands against the state. This access to greater resources is necessary for a social opposition movement to succeed (Zald & McCarthy, 1987 ). While this increase in the strength of opposition may initially lead to enhanced use of repression, eventually the government will be unable to effectively quash opposition that is well funded and supported throughout society. Thus, grievances in countries that are amassing wealth are more likely to be addressed by governments, and human rights behavior is more likely to improve.

The second main school that links a globalized economy and human rights practices is the dependency school, which argues that poor states often do not evenly distribute the gains from globalization to the general population, instead concentrating increased wealth in the hands of political elites. This allows these elites to expand their use of repression as a response to political opposition, increasing human rights violations. In addition, by increasing the wealth of only the elites, those living in poverty develop stronger grievances about their deprivation, leading to more low-level opposition as a response, followed by more repression (Davenport, 2007 ).

Dependency theory is a particularly powerful tool in explaining the human rights records of states that draw their wealth from natural resources such as oil (DeMeritt & Young, 2013 ). Oil is extremely expensive to extricate, meaning that the ability to control oilfields is limited to those with substantial economic and human resources. This, coupled with the tremendous wealth that can be gained from the sale of oil, provides a unique opportunity for governments in such states to greatly enhance the wealth of a small group of political elites. Research supports dependency theory in oil-rich states, showing that such states have significantly higher levels of human rights abuses than poor states that do not have oil wealth (DeMeritt & Young, 2013 ).

These two schools may seem contradictory, but they can be understood as being complementary to each other. The liberal neoclassical school holds that economic development leads to the formation of a middle class, but this middle class cannot form in states where wealth is isolated in the hands of the elite. Only when wealth is distributed across society and can lead to the development of a middle class will we see opposition movements that are powerful enough to effectively demand changes in human rights practices.

State Capacity

There are many similarities between theories of state wealth and human rights and those of state capacity and human rights. State capacity can be thought of as the centralized power within a state, and weak states are characterized by a lack of centralized power. Englehart ( 2009 ) describes weak states as those with low ability to collect taxes, high corruption, and/or a lack of law and order. Some scholars have captured state capacity with indicators of economic development, implying that wealthy states are more capable than others (Hendrix, 2010 ).

Many scholars have found that capable states are less likely to abuse physical integrity rights (Englehart, 2009 ; Cole, 2015 ; Young, 2009 ). State capacity is necessary to be able to monitor the behavior of security forces and other government agents. Human rights abuses can occur not because they were authorized by the regime leadership, but because state agents are not trained and/or monitored. Without training and monitoring, human rights abuses often occur as part of control or interrogation tactics (Muñoz, 2009 ). A capable state can limit these unauthorized abuses, limiting the overall levels of human rights abuses within the state.

The relationship between the state and its agents can be understood through principal-agent theory, in which the state acts as the principal and holds the authority to command security agents (Englehart, 2009 ). However, agents do not necessarily follow the commands of the principal. Weak states lack the ability to provide oversight of state agents, making them more independent. This can make it difficult for weak states to change human rights practices, even when they have a desire to do so. As Cole ( 2015 ) explains, many states that sign human rights treaties have the desire to improve practices but lack the ability to enforce new standards among state agents. This highlights the idea that human rights abuses are not always state-sanctioned; in fact, they often directly contradict state policy.

State capacity also affects the perceived need to resort to repression. Strong state capacity can prevent political dissatisfaction from erupting into violent political unrest. Weak states (those with an unstable hold on state power) are inherently more threatened by opposition and will thus resort to more resorting to human rights abuses to control the population (Young, 2009 ). Limited state capacity is also tied to the emergence of violent rebel groups (Fearon & Laitin, 2003 ). This makes weak states more susceptible to civil war, and civil war is linked to increases in human rights violations by the state (Poe & Tate, 1994 ).

Human Rights and International Dynamics

In the previous section, we examined how characteristics of the state (namely, its regime type, its economic wealth, and its capacity) matter for its human rights performance. The basic insight from this research is that human rights abuses occur as a mechanism of population control when a regime or its agents are unrestrained by domestic institutions, an organized and developed domestic opposition, or both. However, human rights concerns are not a wholly domestic matter. The rights outlined in the UDHR were the result of international collaboration and joint advocacy efforts. They fit the classic definition of a norm: a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 , p. 889). The protection of human rights norms since the UDHR’s crafting has been heavily influenced by international dynamics and actors. Foreign policy actions of states, transnational organizations of all stripes, and the involvement of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) can pressure and socialize states to adopt human rights norms. However, these actions can also backfire, leading to an often-unintended worsening of human rights conditions. We explore these dynamics next.

Norm Entrepreneurs and Advocacy Actors

The adoption of human rights language and the internalization of human rights ideals are the results of a process of normative development and diffusion. Both in the case of now well-accepted norms (like bodily integrity rights) and in the case of newer and developing norms (like sexual minority rights or the right to development), norm entrepreneurs help in articulating and spreading these human rights ideas. According to Finnemore and Sikkink’s ( 1998 ) theory of the norm life cycle, these entrepreneurs work to get sympathetic regime leaders and other key constituents to adopt a norm as a general expectation of behavior. This larger group then helps in codifying and socializing other state actors about the norm. Finnemore and Sikkink ( 1998 , p. 900) see IGOs as important at this stage; the norm is “institutionalized in international rules.” If a critical mass of supporters is reached, often requiring the support of key states, a tipping point occurs, where the norm cascades and additional state and nonstate actors are socialized to adopt the norm.

It is at this stage in the norm socialization process where international actors often use a host of techniques and tactics to try to pressure governments to change their behavior. Advocates can point out that “legitimate” states do not abuse human rights (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 , p. 902). Material and nonmaterial carrots and sticks can be used to pressure a state to change its behavior. In some situations, this process of socialization can lead to the state “internalizing” the norm, giving it “taken-for-granted” status (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 , p. 904).

Although Finnemore and Sikkink ( 1998 )’s theory of the norm life cycle is often not explicitly mentioned in current empirical work on how international actors influence domestic human rights practices, it aptly applies. International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, are often critical actors at the early stages of the life cycle. They help in spreading or educating local populations about a norm, as well as being crucial to getting the norm on the international agenda. Once key states have adopted the norm and it has been institutionalized, INGOs work to bring abuses to the attention of sympathetic states and advocates. The media attention that INGOs bring to abusive regimes, often termed “shaming and blaming” or “naming and shaming” by scholars, can be key to getting third-party states and INGOs to start pressuring the country to change their human rights practices.

INGOs can also help heighten domestic pressure on the regime. This combination of domestic and international pressure is what Keck and Sikkink ( 1998 ) term a transnational advocacy network . Later work by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink ( 1999 , 2013 ) further laid out the iterative process through which advocates work to socialize states about human rights; this process was named the spiral model . In this model, if international pressure is concentrated on an abusive regime, “tactical concessions” can be made by the abusive regime, leading to some limited and short-term improvements in human rights practices and, perhaps, the adoption of human rights laws (Risse & Sikkink 1999 , p. 12). If pressure continues, these concessions can turn into internalized human rights norms, completing the norm life cycle.

In line with these theoretical arguments, human rights INGOs have been linked to changes in human rights opinions and mobilization (Ausderan, 2014 ; Davis, Murdie, & Steinmetz, 2012 ; McEntire, Leiby, & Krain, 2015 ; Murdie & Bhasin, 2011 ). Their “naming and shaming” activities have also been linked to many forms of international pressure and involvement, including humanitarian intervention (Murdie & Peksen, 2013a ), international sanctions (Murdie & Peksen, 2013b ), drops in foreign direct investment (Barry, Clay, & Flynn, 2013 ), trade (Peterson, Murdie, & Asal, 2017 ), and the bypassing of foreign aid (Dietrich & Murdie, 2017 ). Some studies have found direct links between shaming by human rights INGOs and drops in certain human rights abuses (DeMeritt, 2012 ; Krain, 2012 ; Murdie, 2014 ), although this relationship has also been found to be conditional on domestic and/or international mobilization (Murdie & Davis, 2012 ) and domestic regime type (Hendrix & Wong, 2013 ; Murdie, 2014 ).

Worth mentioning, there are concerns that shaming of one type of abuse by human rights INGOs and IGOs could lead states to change their abusive tactics (DeMeritt, Conrad, & Fariss, 2016 ; Hafner-Burton, 2008 ). Further, there is work that is highly critical of certain behaviors of INGOs, highlighting the negative consequences of their often-overlooked, nonprincipled behavior (Clifford, 2005 ; Cooley & Ron, 2002 ; Murdie, 2014 ). Further work is necessary to understand the conditions when INGOs and other advocates are most likely to be successful and when they are likely to be ineffective or counterproductive to human rights goals.

State and IGO Foreign Policy Actions

There is a growing body of empirical work that looks at whether certain foreign policy actions improve human rights in a targeted state. Although this work does occasionally find that international actions can improve certain human rights practices, there is much work that shows that some international pressure tactics are counterproductive to human rights goals. To the extent that these actions are encouraged or influenced by human rights advocates, this could diminish the overall effects of advocates on human rights practices (Allendoerfer & Murdie, 2015 ).

On the positive side, there is some research that finds that certain types of foreign military interventions can improve certain human rights practices. For example, Krain ( 2005 ) finds that foreign military interventions against the perpetrator can help limit the severity of mass killings. DeMeritt ( 2015 ) concludes that interventions in support of the government can limit the onset of mass killings. Murdie and Davis ( 2010 ) find that only peacekeeping interventions with a strong humanitarian focus can improve human rights in countries after civil wars. However, Peksen ( 2012 ) finds that foreign military interventions do not generally improve human rights.

Another potential positive international action for human rights improvement is the support that international actors provide for transitional justice mechanisms, like the use of truth commissions after civil wars or human rights atrocities. Many studies have found that these mechanisms, especially in certain combinations, can improve some human rights outcomes, even after accounting for the factors that led to the implementation of these mechanisms in the first place (Dancy & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2015 ; Kim & Sikkink, 2010 ; Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010 ; Polizzi, 2016 ).

On the negative side, however, there are many international foreign policy actions that are not associated with improved human rights. Foreign aid is not often associated with improved human rights (Barratt, 2007 ) and repressive regimes are rarely punished for poor human rights records (Esarey & DeMeritt, 2016 ; Nielsen, 2013 ). Economic sanctions can exasperate human rights abuses (Peksen, 2009 ; Wood, 2008 ). Actions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank often harm human rights (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007 ). Most of this work explains the negative or null findings as the unintended consequences of international foreign policy action. These actions can limit the general public’s ability or willingness to pressure their leaders and can make abusive leaders feel threatened, heightening their desire to use repressive practices to stay in power. Another important issue in this research concerns the selection of states to receive international action and the geopolitical concerns that can complicate whether these actions are designed with human rights goals.

In short, there is a well-established theoretical lens through which to examine how international actors influence the adoption and internalization of human rights norms. Although much current empirical work has shown that advocacy actors (particularly human rights INGOs) do influence human rights outcomes in the ways outlined in the extant theoretical literature, there is much work to be done to understand the types of international foreign policy pressure that can stop human rights abuses.

Human Rights Treaties

The previous section on how international pressure is associated with human rights practices ignores an important international pressure source: international human rights law. This was intentional; the international human rights treaty regime is a very specific type of international pressure that does not nicely conform to the theoretical and empirical literature concerning many of the international foreign policy actions discussed earlier in this article. Instead, the study of how the international human rights treaty regime influences human rights practices has drawn heavily on earlier theoretical arguments on international cooperation and compliance ( Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, & Snidal, 2000 ; Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, 1996 ; Morrow, 1994 ; von Stein, 2005 ) and the role of domestic institutions in encouraging compliance with international agreements (Dai, 2005 ).

Although much of the work within this area has focused on the human rights treaties drafted within the United Nations (UN) that followed the UDHR, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the CAT, which we refer to here as UN human rights treaties , there is also a rich literature on regional human rights treaties and courts (Hawkins & Jacoby, 2010 ; Helfer & Voeten, 2014 ; Hillebrecht, 2012 ; Tallberg, 2002 ), as well as a growing literature on the International Criminal Court (Chapman & Chaudoin, 2013 ; Ritter & Wolford, 2012 ). Due to space constraints, the discussion here focuses on the literature concerning UN human rights treaties, where there has recently been a surge of empirical work concerning whether treaty ratification affects human rights practices.

Many early empirical works argued and found that various UN international human rights treaties are not generally associated with unconditional improvements in various human rights practices (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005 ; Hathaway, 2002 ; Keith, 1999 ). As such, there was much early evidence that UN human rights treaties alone were not sufficient to lead to greater respect for human rights. In line with general arguments on the limits of international cooperation, the existing treaty system was created with weak enforcement mechanisms and states are unlikely to voluntarily bind themselves in ways that would limit their ability to control their populations. There are tremendous issues of self-selection as well: states may be ratifying treaties after a war or as part of their transition to democracy. As such, it is difficult to ascertain whether any improvements in human rights practices are causally linked to the treaty or are linked to the underlying conditions that led the state to ratify the treaty in the first place.

Much of the scholarship that followed has (a) taken issues of self-selection seriously, (b) examined the domestic conditions that could make treaties more likely to affect human rights practices (Conrad & Ritter, 2013 ; Hill, 2010 ; Lupu, 2013 ; Neumayer, 2005 ; Simmons, 2009 ), or both. As to the first issue, many studies are using advanced statistical treatment effects or “matching” techniques to account for the underlying self-selection issue. Some of these studies have found that certain treaties cause improvements in certain human rights, and explanations have been given for these unique causal effects. For example, Hill ( 2010 ) finds that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) causes better human rights performance on women’s political rights, something Hill ( 2010 ) explains is due to the nonthreatening nature of women’s political rights to the regime leadership. Lupu ( 2013 ) uses a slightly different method to account for self-selection and finds that CEDAW causes improved women’s political, social, and economic rights.

The newer literature has also found that treaties can be effective in some situations. In line with the spiral model outlined previously, Neumayer ( 2005 ) finds, for example, that treaties are associated with improved human rights in democratic regimes and where there are large numbers of INGOs with members present within the state. Similarly, Simmons ( 2009 ) finds that treaties can be a useful tool for dissidents to use to try to get concessions from a repressive regime. And, as mentioned, Powell and Staton ( 2009 ) highlight the utility of an independent judiciary in leading states where the CAT is ratified to lessen their use of torture. Recent work by Conrad and Ritter ( 2013 ) connects the effectiveness of treaties to the characteristics of the judiciary and the security of the leader.

Although these findings provide a small glimmer of hope for the usefulness of the international human rights regime in certain situations, Fariss ( 2014 ) argues that there may be more reasons to be hopeful. As mentioned, Fariss ( 2014 ) contends that there is a changing standard of accountability for physical integrity rights abuses over time. Using his corrected measure, Fariss ( 2014 , 2017a ) shows a general association between treaty ratification and improved human rights practices. Cingranelli and Filippov ( 2017 ), however, question the empirical validity of this finding, arguing that the Fariss ( 2014 ) results are time dependent. Nonetheless, future work should examine how changing standards of accountability (some changing standards perhaps even aided by the human rights regime) affect the relationship between treaty ratification and human rights practices.

Why do state actors abuse human rights? In this article, we outlined three stylized theoretical statements that are supported in the empirical literature:

Respect for human rights is an international norm, and international socialization and pressure about this norm can, in certain situations, affect behavior.

The codification of human rights norms into international treaties may influence behavior but, like our understanding of the effect of other treaties on state behavior, states only bind themselves weakly and certain conditions are necessary for treaties to affect human rights.

This is an especially great juncture in the study of human rights. First, more detailed and rich data are now available; this data will allow future scholars to examine rights beyond the conventional focus on physical integrity violations by state actors and allow much more nuance in the particularities of the abuse and the abuser (e.g., Conrad, Haglund, & Moore, 2014 ; Cornett, Gibney, & Haschke, 2016 ). In addition, automated events data also hold much promise for near real-time analysis and for more nuanced study of the state-society dynamics that exasperate human rights abuses (Boschee et al., 2015 ; Fariss et al., 2015 ; Quinn, Monroe, Colaresi, Crespin, & Radev, 2010 ). The combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques also will continue to contribute to the breadth and depth of our knowledge on why abuses occur (Hafner-Burton & Ron, 2009 ).

Second, advances in empirical techniques now allow scholars to take self-selection seriously and examine more directly the causal process connecting certain interventions and institutions to changes in human rights outcomes (Allendoerfer & Murdie, 2015 ; Hill, 2010 ; Lupu, 2013 ; Murdie & Peksen, 2013b ). These techniques will help us determine how certain actions could mediate the effects of advocacy, or perhaps lead to unintended consequences that could harm human rights.

Third, a growing number of scholars are focusing on public opinion related to human rights (Ausderan, 2014 ; Bracic, 2016 ; Murdie & Purser, 2017 ; Ron, Golden, Crow, & Pandya, 2017 ; Wallace, 2013 ). Although these studies have not yet been extended to focusing on how public opinion relates to human rights outcomes in a cross-national sample of states, work is this area is critical for building our microfoundations for how human rights improvements occur and the potential role of public opinion in this process.

Finally, there have been recent advances in the practice of human rights promotion and the strategies of human rights advocates. Human rights performance within a country could be influenced by current increases in training on nonviolent resistance, a renewed focus on transitional justice and nonstate actors, and the use of technology to aid in the recording of abuses. Future studies should incorporate these advances into our theoretical understanding of the process by which human rights improve. The efficacy of these tactics should also be tested empirically.

In sum, the existing IR literature on why states abuse human rights has highlighted the nuanced relationships between international and domestic factors and human rights practices. There are few laws in human rights theories, but the works discussed in this article do point to a general theory of why states abuse human rights. The literature draws heavily on theories related to domestic constraints on leaders, on how norms diffuse, and on when international agreements affect state behavior. By drawing on this generalized set of knowledge, as well as current advances in the field, future work holds much potential to contribute to both our scholarly understanding of human rights practices and the growing practice of human rights advocacy outside academia.

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• Smith, A. (2006). The unique position of national human rights institutions: A mixed blessing? Human Rights Quarterly , 28 (4), 904–946.
• Sobek, D. , Abouharb, M. R. , & Ingram, C. G. (2006). The human rights peace: How the respect for human rights at home leads to peace abroad. Journal of Politics , 68 (3), 519–529.
• Tallberg, J. (2002). Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union. International Organization , 56 (3), 609–643.
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1. Recently, principal investigators of the Political Terror Scale (PTS) have introduced a new measure of violence by nonstate actors: the Societal Violence Scale (SVS). As the authors of this scale remark in their explanation of the scale, the role of the state in abuses by nonstate actors is not trivial: “the state is obliged not only to refrain from human rights abuses itself, but also has the duty to prevent abuses by third parties, including private actors, and to take positive measures for the provision of rights to everyone under the state’s jurisdiction” (Cornett, Gibney, & Haschke, 2016 , n.p.).

2. For more discussion about this still controversial idea, see Clark and Sikkink ( 2013 ), Richards ( 2016 ), Fariss ( 2017a , 2017b ), and Cingranelli and Filippov ( 2017 ).

3. It is necessary for economic wealth to be distributed throughout society before we can expect to see a link between economic development and improved human rights practices. As such, a high gross domestic product (GDP), coupled with a low GDP per capita, reflect a society that has not achieved economic advancement throughout the population. When we refer to “wealthy states,” we are discussing states with a high GDP coupled with a relatively high GDP per capita.

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• Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a milestone document in the history of human rights. Drafted by representatives with different legal and cultural backgrounds from all regions of the world, the Declaration was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 ( General Assembly resolution 217 A ) as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations. It sets out, for the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally protected and it has been translated into over 500 languages . The UDHR is widely recognized as having inspired, and paved the way for, the adoption of more than seventy human rights treaties, applied today on a permanent basis at global and regional levels (all containing references to it in their preambles). 

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, therefore,

The General Assembly,

Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

• Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
• No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

• Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
• Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
• Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
• This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
• Everyone has the right to a nationality.
• No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
• Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
• Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
• The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
• Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
• No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

• Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
• No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
• Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
• Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
• The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

• Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
• Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
• Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
• Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

• Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
• Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
• Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
• Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
• Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.
• Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
• Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

• Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.
• In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
• These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

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2023: UDHR turns 75

What is the Declaration of Human Rights? Narrated by Morgan Freeman.

UN digital ambassador Elyx animates the UDHR

To mark the 75th anniversary of the UDHR in December 2023, the United Nations has partnered once again with French digital artist YAK (Yacine Ait Kaci) – whose illustrated character Elyx is the first digital ambassador of the United Nations – on an animated version of the 30 Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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Women Who Shaped the Declaration

Women delegates from various countries played a key role in getting women’s rights included in the Declaration. Hansa Mehta of India (standing above Eleanor Roosevelt) is widely credited with changing the phrase "All men are born free and equal" to "All human beings are born free and equal" in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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Definition of Human Subjects Research

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Human Rights

Human rights are norms that aspire to protect all people everywhere from severe political, legal, and social abuses. Examples of human rights are the right to freedom of religion, the right to a fair trial when charged with a crime, the right not to be tortured, and the right to education. The philosophy of human rights addresses questions about the existence, content, nature, universality, justification, and legal status of human rights. The strong claims often made on behalf of human rights (for example, that they are universal, inalienable, or exist independently of legal enactment as justified moral norms) have frequently provoked skeptical doubts and countering philosophical defenses (on these doubts see Lacroix & Pranchère 2016; Mutua 2002; and Waldron 1987). Reflection on these doubts and the responses that can be made to them has become a sub-field of political and legal philosophy with a very substantial literature (see the extensive Bibliography below). This entry addresses the concept of human rights, the existence and grounds of human rights, the question of which rights are human rights, and relativism about human rights.

1. The General Idea of Human Rights

2.1 how can human rights exist, 2.2 justifications for human rights, 3.1 civil and political rights, 3.2 economic and social rights, 3.3 human rights of women, minorities, and groups, 3.4 new human rights, 4. universal human rights in a world of diverse beliefs and practices, a. books and articles in the philosophy of human rights, b. legal declarations, other internet resources, related entries.

This section attempts to explain the general idea of human rights by identifying four defining features. The goal is to answer the question of what human rights are with a description of the concept rather than with a list of specific rights. Two people can have the same general idea of human rights even though they disagree about which rights are really human rights and even about whether universal human rights are a good idea. The four-part explanation just below attempts to cover all kinds of human rights including both moral and legal human rights as well as old and new human rights (e.g., both Lockean natural rights and contemporary human rights). The explanation anticipates, however, that particular kinds of human rights will have additional features. Starting with this general concept does not commit us to treating all kinds of human rights in a single unified theory (see Buchanan 2013 for an argument that we should not attempt to theorize together universal moral rights and international legal human rights).

Human rights are rights . Lest we miss the obvious, human rights are rights (see Cruft 2012 and the entry on rights ). Rights focus on a freedom, protection, status, immunity, or benefit for the rightholders. Most human rights are claim rights that impose duties or responsibilities on their addressees or dutybearers. The duties associated with human rights often require actions involving respect, protection, facilitation, and provision. Although human rights are usually mandatory in the sense of imposing duties on specified parties, some legal human rights seem to do little more than declare high-priority goals and assign responsibility for their progressive realization. One can argue, of course, that goalish rights are not real rights, but it may be better to recognize that they comprise a weak but useful notion of a right. (See Beitz 2009 for a defense of the view that not all human rights are rights in a strong sense. Also, see Feinberg 1973 for the idea of “manifesto rights” and Nickel 2013 for a discussion of “rightslike goals”.)

Human rights are plural and come in lists . If someone accepted that there are human rights but held that there is only one of them, this might make sense if she meant that there is one abstract underlying right that generates a list of specific rights (see Dworkin 2011 for a view of this sort). But if this person meant that there is just one specific right such as the right to peaceful assembly this would be a highly revisionary view. Some philosophers advocate very short lists of human rights but nevertheless accept plurality (see Ignatieff 2004).

Human rights are universal . All living humans—or perhaps we should say all living persons —have human rights. One does not have to be a particular kind of person or a member of some specific nation or religion to have human rights. Included in the idea of universality is some conception of independent existence. People have human rights independently of whether such rights are present in the practices, morality, or law of their country or culture. This idea of universality needs several qualifications, however. First, some rights, such as the right to vote, are held only by adult citizens or residents and apply only to voting in one’s own country. Second, some rights can be suspended. For example, the human right to freedom of movement may be suspended temporarily during a riot or a wildfire. And third, some human rights treaties focus not on the rights of everyone but rather on the rights of specific groups such as minorities, women, indigenous peoples, and children.

Human rights have high-priority . Maurice Cranston held that human rights are matters of “paramount importance” and their violation “a grave affront to justice” (Cranston 1967: 51, 52). If human rights were not very important norms they would not have the ability to compete with other powerful considerations such as national stability and security, individual and national self-determination, and national and global prosperity. High priority does not mean, however, that human rights are absolute. As James Griffin says, human rights should be understood as “resistant to trade-offs, but not too resistant” (Griffin 2008: 77). Further, there seems to be priority variation among human rights. For example, the right to life is generally thought to have greater importance than the right to privacy; when the two conflict the right to privacy will generally be outweighed.

Let’s now consider four other features or functions that might be added to these four.

Should human rights be defined as inalienable? Inalienability does not mean that rights are absolute or can never be overridden by other considerations. Rather it means that its holder cannot lose it temporarily or permanently by bad conduct or by voluntarily giving it up. It is doubtful that all human rights are inalienable in this sense. One who endorses both human rights and imprisonment as punishment for serious crimes must hold that people’s rights to freedom of movement can be forfeited temporarily or permanently by just convictions of serious crimes. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that human rights are very hard to lose. (For a stronger view of inalienability, see Donnelly 1989 [2020] and Meyers 1985.)

Should human rights be defined as minimal rights? A number of philosophers have proposed the view that human rights are minimal in the sense of not being too numerous (a few dozen rights rather than hundreds or thousands), and not too demanding (see Joshua Cohen 2004 and Ignatieff 2004). Their views suggest that human rights are—or should be—more concerned with avoiding the worst than with achieving the best. Henry Shue suggests that human rights concern the “lower limits on tolerable human conduct” rather than “great aspirations and exalted ideals” (Shue 1996: ix). When human rights are modest standards they leave most legal and policy matters open to democratic decision-making at the national and local levels. This allows human rights to have high priority, to accommodate a great deal of cultural and institutional variation among countries, and to leave open a large space for democratic decision-making at the national level. Still, there is no contradiction in the idea of an extremely expansive list of human rights and hence minimalism is not a defining feature of human rights (for criticism of the view that human rights are minimal standards see Brems 2009; Etinson forthcoming; and Raz 2010). Minimalism is best seen as a normative prescription for what international human rights should be. Moderate forms of minimalism have considerable appeal as recommendations, but not as part of the definition of human rights.

Should human rights be defined as always being or “mirroring” moral rights? Philosophers coming to human rights theory from moral philosophy sometimes assume that human rights must be, at bottom, moral rather than legal rights. There is no contradiction, however, in people saying that they believe in human rights, but only when they are legal rights at the national or international levels. As Louis Henkin observed,

Political forces have mooted the principal philosophical objections, bridging the chasm between natural and positive law by converting natural human rights into positive legal rights. (Henkin 1978: 19)

It has also been suggested that legal human rights can be justified without directly appealing to any corresponding moral human right (see Buchanan 2013).

Should human rights be defined in terms of serving some sort of political function? Instead of seeing human rights as grounded in some sort of independently existing moral reality, a theorist might see them as the norms of a highly useful political practice that humans have constructed. Such a view would see the idea of human rights as playing various political roles at the national and international levels and as serving thereby to protect urgent human and national interests. These political roles might include providing standards for international evaluations of how governments treat their people and specifying when use of economic sanctions or military intervention is permissible. This kind of view may be plausible for the very salient international human rights that have emerged in international law and politics in the last fifty years. But human rights can exist and function in contexts not involving international scrutiny and intervention such as a world with only one state. Imagine, for example, that a massive asteroid strike makes New Zealand the only remaining state in existence. Surely the idea of human rights along with many dimensions of human rights practice could continue in New Zealand, even though there would be no international relations, law, or politics (for an argument of this sort see Tasioulas 2012a). And if in the same scenario a few people were discovered to have survived in Iceland and were living without a government or state, New Zealanders would know that human rights governed how these people should be treated even though they were stateless. How deeply the idea of human rights must be rooted in international law and practice should not be settled by definitional fiat. We can allow, however, that the sorts of political functions that Rawls and Beitz describe are typically served by international human rights today.

2 The Existence and Grounds of Human Rights

The most obvious way in which human rights exist is as norms of national and international law. At the international level, human rights norms exist because of treaties that have turned them into international law. For example, the human right not to be held in slavery or servitude in Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights exists because these treaties establish it. At the national level, human rights norms exist because they have—through legislative enactment, judicial decision, or custom—become part of a country’s law. For example, the right against slavery exists in the United States because the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits slavery and servitude. When rights are embedded in international law, we are apt to speak of them as human rights; but when they are enacted in national law we more frequently describe them as civil or constitutional rights.

Although enactment in national and international law is one of the ways in which human rights exist, many have suggested that this is not the only way. If human rights exist only because of enactment, their availability is contingent on domestic and international political developments. Many people have looked for a way to support the idea that human rights have roots that are deeper and less subject to human decisions than legal enactment. One version of this idea is that people are born with rights, that human rights are somehow innate or inherent in human beings (see Morsink 2009). One way that a normative status could be inherent in humans is by being god-given. The American Declaration of Independence claims that people are “endowed by their Creator” with natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. On this view, god, the supreme lawmaker, enacted some basic human rights.

Rights plausibly attributed to divine decree must be very general and abstract (life, liberty, etc.) so that they can apply across thousands of years of human history, not just to recent centuries. But contemporary human rights are specific and many of them presuppose contemporary institutions (e.g., the right to a fair trial, the right to social security, and the right to education). Even if people are born with god-given natural rights, we need to explain how to get from those general and abstract rights to the specific rights found in contemporary declarations and treaties.

Attributing human rights to god’s commands may give them a secure status at the metaphysical level, but in a very diverse world it does not make them practically secure. Billions of people today do not believe in the god of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. If people do not believe in god, or in the sort of god that prescribes rights, then if you want to base human rights on theological beliefs you must persuade these people to accept a rights-supporting theological view. This is likely to be even harder than persuading them of human rights. Legal enactment at the national and international levels provides a far more secure status for practical purposes.

Human rights could also exist independently of legal enactment by being part of actual human moralities. All human groups seem to have moralities, that is, imperative norms of behavior backed by reasons and values. These moralities contain specific norms (for example, a prohibition on the intentional murder of innocent persons) and specific values (for example, valuing human life). One way in which human rights could exist apart from divine or human enactment is as norms accepted in almost all actual human moralities. If almost all human groups have moralities containing norms that prohibit murder, for example, these norms could constitute the human right to life.

This view is attractive but has serious difficulties. Although worldwide acceptance of human rights has increased in recent decades (see below section 4. Universal Human Rights in a World of Diverse Beliefs and Practices ), worldwide moral unanimity about human rights does not exist. Human rights declarations and treaties are intended to change existing norms, not just describe an existing moral consensus.

Yet another way of explaining the existence of human rights is to say that they exist most basically in true or justified ethical outlooks. On this account, to say that there is a human right against torture is mainly to assert that there are strong reasons for believing that it is always morally wrong to engage in torture and that protections should be provided against its practice. This approach would view the Universal Declaration as attempting to formulate a justified political morality: that is, as not merely trying to identify a preexisting moral consensus, but trying to create a consensus that could be supported by very plausible moral and practical reasons. This approach requires commitment to the objectivity of such reasons. It holds that just as there are reliable ways of finding out how the physical world works, or what makes buildings sturdy and durable, there are reliable ways of finding out what individuals may justifiably demand of each other and of governments. Even if unanimity about human rights is currently lacking, rational agreement is available to humans if they will commit themselves to open-minded and serious moral and political inquiry. If moral reasons exist independently of human construction, they can—when combined with premises about current institutions, problems, and resources—generate moral norms different from those currently accepted or enacted. The Universal Declaration seems to proceed on exactly this assumption (see Morsink 2009).

One problem with this view is that an existence based on good reasons seems a rather thin form of existence for human rights. But perhaps we can view this thinness as a practical rather than a theoretical problem—that is, as something to be remedied by the formulation and enactment of legal norms. The best form of existence for human rights would combine robust legal existence with the sort of moral existence that comes from being supported by strong moral and practical reasons.

Justifications for human rights should identify plausible starting points for defending the key features of human rights and offer an account of the transition from those starting points to a list of specific rights (see Nickel 2007). Further, justifying international human rights is likely to require additional steps (see Buchanan 2013). These requirements make the construction of a good justification a daunting task.

Recent attempts to justify human rights offer a dizzying variety of grounds. These include prudential reasons; linkage arguments (Shue 1996); agency and autonomy (Gewirth 1996; Griffin 2008); basic needs (D. Miller 2012); capabilities and positive freedom (Gould 2004; Nussbaum 2000; and Sen 2004) dignity (Gilabert 2018b; Kateb 2011, Tasioulas 2015); and fairness, status equality, and equal respect (Dworkin 2011; Buchanan 2013).

There is a lot of overlap between these approaches, but also important differences that are likely to make them yield different results. For example, an approach framed in terms of agency and autonomy will be more strongly and directly supportive of fundamental freedoms than one framed in terms of basic human needs. Justifications can be based on just one of these types of reasons or be pluralistic and appeal to several. Seeing so much diversity in philosophical approaches to justification may be discouraging (although great disagreement in approaches is common in philosophy) but its good side is that it suggests that there are at least several plausible ways of justifying human rights.

Philosophical justifications for human rights differ in how much credibility they attribute to contemporary lists of human rights, such as the one found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Some take fidelity to contemporary human rights practice as nearly imperative while others prioritize particular normative frameworks even if they can only justify some of the rights in contemporary lists.

Attempting to discuss all of these approaches would be a task for a large book, not an encyclopedic entry. The discussion here is limited to two approaches: agency/autonomy and dignity.

2.2.1 Agency and Autonomy

Grounding human rights in human agency and autonomy has had strong advocates in recent decades (Griffin 2008; Gould 2004). An important forerunner in this area was Alan Gewirth. In Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Application (1982), Gewirth argued that human rights are indispensable conditions of a life as an agent who survives and acts. Abstractly described, the conditions of such a life are basic freedom and well-being. A prudent rational agent who must have freedom and well-being will assert a “prudential right claim” (1982: 31)to them. But, having demanded that others must respect her freedom and well-being, consistency requires her to recognize and respect the freedom and well-being of all other persons, too. She “logically must accept” (1982: 20) that other people as agents have equal rights to freedom and well-being. These two abstract rights work alone and together to generate a list of more determinate human rights of familiar sorts (Gewirth 1978, 1982, 1996). Gewirth’s argument generated a large critical literature (see Beyleveld 1991 and Boylan 1999).

A more recent attempt to base human rights on agency and autonomy is found in James Griffin’s book, On Human Rights (2008). Griffin does not share Gewirth’s goal of providing a logically inescapable argument for human rights, but his overall view shares key structural features with Gewirth’s. These include basing the justification on the unique value of agency and autonomy, postulating some abstract rights, and making place for a right to well-being within an agency-based approach.

In the current dispute between “moral” (or “orthodox”) and “political” conceptions of human rights, Griffin strongly sides with those who see human rights as fundamentally moral rights (on this debate see Liao & Etinson 2012). Their defining role, in Griffin’s view, is protecting people’s ability to form and pursue conceptions of a worthwhile life—a capacity that Griffin variously refers to as “autonomy”, “normative agency”, and “personhood”. This ability to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of a worthwhile life is taken to be of paramount value, the exclusive source of human dignity, and thereby the basis of human rights. Griffin holds that people value this capacity “especially highly, often more highly than even our happiness” (2008: 32 [§2.3])

“Practicalities” also shape human rights in Griffin’s view. He describes practicalities as “a second ground” (2008: 37–39 [§2.5]) of human rights. They prescribe making the boundaries of rights clear by avoiding “too many complicated bends” (2008: 37 [§2.5]), enlarging rights a little to give them safety margins, and consulting facts about human nature and the nature of society. Accordingly, the justifying generic function that Griffin assigns to human rights is protecting normative agency while taking account of practicalities.

Griffin thinks that he can explain the universality of human rights by recognizing that normative agency is a threshold concept—once one is above the threshold one has the same rights as everyone else. One’s degree of agency above the threshold does not matter. There are no “degrees of being a person” (2008: 67 [§3.5]) among competent adults. Treating agency in this way, however, is a normative policy, not just a fact about concepts. An alternative policy is possible, namely proportioning people’s rights to their level of normative agency. This is what we do with children; their rights grow as they develop greater agency and responsibility. To exclude proportional rights, and to explain the egalitarian dimensions of human rights, including their character as universal and equal rights to be enjoyed without discrimination, some additional ground pertaining to fairness and equality seems to be needed.

This last point raises the question of whether agency-based approaches in general can adequately account for the universality, equality, and anti-discriminatory character of human rights. The idea that human rights are to be respected and protected without discrimination seems to be most centrally a matter of fairness rather than one of agency, freedom, or welfare. Discrimination often harms and hinders its victims, but even when it doesn’t it is still deeply unfair. For example, human rights that explicitly refer to fair wages and equal pay for equal work (ICESCR Articles 3 and 7.i) seem to be much more about fairness than about agency, freedom, or welfare—particularly since human rights to a wage that ensures a decent standard of living are often mentioned separately (ICESCR Article 7.ii).

2.2.2 Dignity

Many human rights declarations and treaties invoke human dignity as the ground of human rights. In recent decades numerous books and articles have been published that advocate dignitarian approaches to justifying human rights (for example, Gilabert 2018b; Kateb 2014; McCrudden 2013 and the many essays therein; Tasioulas 2015; Waldron 2012 and 2015). There have also been many critics, including Den Hartogh 2014; Etinson 2020; Green 2010; Macklin 2003; Rosen 2012; and Sangiovanni 2017.

A well-worked out conception of human dignity is likely to have at least three parts. The first describes the nature of human dignity, specifying for example whether it is a kind of value, status, or virtue (see Rosen 2012). The second explains the grounds of human dignity—that is, why, or in virtue of which shared capacities or features we all have the sort of dignity described in the first step. Finally, and third, there is the question of human dignity’s practical requirements, or what is concretely involved in “respecting” it. (See the entry on dignity for a broader discussion.)

Human dignity is often understood as a special worth or status which all human beings share in contrast to other animals (e.g., Kateb 2011). We can call this the “Special Worth Thesis”. Attempts to provide good explanatory grounds for the Special Worth Thesis identify one or more valuable features that all human persons share and that non-human animals mostly do not possess or have at much lower levels. The valuable features identified will presumably once again need to be “threshold concepts”, so that people can vary in how much of the feature or capacity they have without thereby losing, lessening, or increasing their human dignity in comparison to other persons. Human dignity is, after all, supposed to be a strongly egalitarian idea. Plausible candidates for such grounds might include moral abilities (to understand and follow moral values and norms and to reason and act in terms of them); thought, imagination, and rationality; self-consciousness and reflective capacities; and the use of complicated language and technologies, among others.

One worry about the Special Worth Thesis is its self-glorifying character. In claiming special worth we humans seem to excuse our many faults—including a terrible capacity for evil, routinely evidenced in our behavior towards other humans and towards non-human animals (Rosen 2013). Another closely associated and increasingly prominent worry is that the Special Worth Thesis is speciesist, arbitrarily ranking the interests, status, and/or value of human beings above that/those of non-human animals (Kymlicka 2018; Meyer 2001). In the context of these reasonable concerns, it is worth noting that support for, or a belief in, human dignity need not be prejudicial towards non-human animals; one can affirm the dignity of homo sapiens while also affirming the equal dignity of other species and forms of life (Etinson 2020; Gilabert 2018b). The Special Worth Thesis is optional and only defended by some theorists.

What attitudes, actions, policies, and rights follow from the duty or reason to respect human dignity? And are human rights among them? The answer will at least in part depend on what we think human dignity is. If it is a kind of virtue shared or shareable by all persons then its practical requirements will include things like praising and/or admiring those who possess it, and perhaps developing or cultivating “dignitarian” dispositions in one’s own character. If human dignity is, by contrast, a kind of value or worth (as in Immanuel Kant’s famous understanding of dignity as a worth “beyond all price” Kant 1785/1996: 43), then it is something we have reason to protect, promote, preserve, cherish, restore and perhaps even maximize, if possible. The human right to life, and its material conditions, is an intuitive product of human dignity understood in this way. If, on the other hand, we think of human dignity as a kind of legal (Waldron 2012 and 2015), moral (Gilabert 2018b; Lee & George 2008), or social status (Etinson 2020; Killmister 2020), then duties of “respect” more naturally follow.

These options are not mutually exclusive. In principle, human dignity can refer to all of these things: value, status, and virtue. If human dignity yields human rights, however, this is going to depend on exactly how we understand its practical requirements in light of its nature and grounds. This practical elaboration is the workhorse of a conception of human dignity. It normally results in one or more general maxims or guidelines: e.g., not to humiliate or degrade, never to treat persons merely as a means, to treat others in justifiable ways, to avoid severe cruelty, to respect autonomy, etc. The prospect of grounding human rights in human dignity faces critical challenges at this juncture. As we saw in the preceding discussion of agency-based approaches, the more specific and singular one’s dignitarian maxim is, the less plausible it will be as an exhaustive ground for standard lists of human rights in all their variety. On the other hand, a pluralistic set of grounding maxims will make human dignity a better source of human rights, but it is unclear whether in doing so we are simply explaining its implicit content or bringing in other values and norms to fill in its indeterminate scope. This raises the possibility that values and norms such as promoting human welfare; agency/autonomy; and fairness partially constitute the idea of human dignity rather than being derived from it (see Macklin 2003).

3. Which Rights are Human Rights?

This section discusses the question of which rights belong on lists of human rights. The Universal Declaration’s list, which has been very influential, consists of six families:

• Security rights that protect people against murder, torture, and genocide;
• Due process rights that protect people against arbitrary and excessively harsh punishments and require fair and public trials for those accused of crimes;
• Liberty rights that protect people’s fundamental freedoms in areas such as belief, expression, association, and movement;
• Political rights that protect people’s liberty to participate in politics by assembling, protesting, voting, and serving in public office;
• Equality rights that guarantee equal citizenship, equality before the law, and freedom from discrimination; and
• Economic and social rights that require that governments to forbid slavery and forced labor, enforce safe working conditions, ensure to all the availability of work, education, health services, and a standard of living that is adequate.

A seventh category, minority and group rights, has been created by subsequent treaties. These rights protect women, racial and ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, children, migrant workers, and the disabled. This list of human rights seems normatively diverse: the issues addressed cover include security, liberty, fairness, equality before the law, access to work and good working conditions, unduly cruel treatment, and political participation.

In spite of the ample list above, not every question of social justice or wise governance is a human rights issue. For example, a country could have too many lawyers or inadequate provision for graduate-level education without violating any human rights. Deciding which norms should be counted as human rights is a matter of considerable difficulty. And there is continuing pressure to expand lists of human rights to include new areas. Many political movements would like to see their main concerns categorized as matters of human rights, since this would publicize, promote, and legitimize their concerns at the international level. A possible result of this is “human rights inflation”, the devaluation of human rights caused by producing too much bad human rights currency (see Cranston 1973; Orend 2002; Wellman 1995; Griffin 2008).

One way to avoid rights inflation is to follow Cranston in insisting that human rights only deal with extremely important goods, protections, and freedoms. A supplementary approach is to impose several justificatory tests for specific human rights. For example, it could be required that a proposed human right not only protect some very important good but also respond to one or more common and serious threats to that good (Dershowitz 2004; Donnelly 1989 [2003]; Shue 1996; Talbott 2005), impose burdens on the addressees that are justifiable and no larger than necessary, and be feasible in most of the world’s countries (on feasibility see Gheaus 2022; Gilabert 2009; Nickel 2007; and Richards 2023). This approach restrains rights inflation with several tests, not just one master test.

In deciding which norms should be considered human rights it is possible to make either too little or too much of international documents such as the Universal Declaration and the European Convention. One makes too little of them by proceeding as if drawing up a list of important rights were a new question, never before addressed, and as if there were no practical wisdom to be found in the choices of rights that went into the historic documents. And one makes too much of them by presuming that those documents tell us everything we need to know about human rights. This approach involves a kind of fundamentalism: it holds that when a right is on the official lists of human rights that settles its status as a human right (“If it’s in the book that’s all I need to know”.) But the process of identifying human rights in the United Nations and elsewhere was a political process with plenty of imperfections. There is little reason to take international diplomats as the most authoritative guides to which human rights there are. Further, even if a treaty’s ratification by most countries can settle the question of whether a certain right is a human right within international law, such a treaty cannot settle its weight. The treaty may suggest that the right is supported by weighty considerations, but it cannot make this so. If an international treaty enacted a right to visit national parks without charge as a human right, the ratification of that treaty would make free access to national parks a human right within international law, but it may well fail to persuade us that national park access is important enough to be a genuine human right.

The least controversial family of human rights is civil and political rights. These rights are familiar from historic bills of rights such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) and the U.S. Bill of Rights (1791, with subsequent amendments). Contemporary sources include the first 21 Articles of the Universal Declaration , and treaties such as the European Convention , the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , the American Convention on Human Rights , and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights . Some representative formulations follow:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice. ( American Convention on Human Rights , Article 13.1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. ( European Convention , Article 11) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. (ICCPR Article 17)

Most civil and political rights are not absolute—they can sometimes be overridden by other considerations. For example, the right to freedom of movement can be restricted by public and private property rights, by restraining orders related to domestic violence, and by legal punishments. Further, after a disaster such as a hurricane or earthquake free movement is often appropriately suspended to keep out the curious, permit access of emergency vehicles and equipment, and prevent looting. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights permits most rights to be suspended during times “of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” (ICCPR Article 4). But it excludes some rights from suspension including the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of ex post facto criminal laws, and freedom of thought and religion.

The Universal Declaration included economic and social rights (“ESRs”) that address matters such as education, food, health services, and employment. Their inclusion has been the source of much controversy (see Beetham 1995). The European Convention did not include them (although it was later amended to include the right to education). Instead ESRs were put into a separate treaty, the European Social Charter . When the United Nations began the process of putting the rights of the Universal Declaration into international law, it followed the same pattern by placing ESRs in a treaty separate from the one dealing with civil and political rights. This treaty, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966), treated these standards as rights—albeit rights to be progressively realized.

The ICESCR includes rights to: freedom from slavery and forced labor; adequate income or services to cover food, water, clothing, and shelter; basic health conditions and services; free public education; freedom to work, choose one's occupation, and have adequate opportunities for remunerative employment; fair pay and safe conditions of work; social security; equality for women in the workplace, including equal pay for equal work; freedom to form trade unions and to strike; special protections for mothers and children; adequate rest and leisure; and nondiscrimination in respecting, protecting, and fulfilling these rights. In terms of underlying values and norms, some of these rights are welfare-oriented, others are fairness-oriented, and still others are freedom-oriented (Nickel 2022b).

Article 2.1 of the ICESCR sets out what each of the parties commits itself to do about this list, namely to

take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation…to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.

In contrast, the Civil and Political Covenant commits its signatories to immediate compliance, to

respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory the rights recognized in the present Covenant. (ICCPR Article 2.1)

The contrast between these two levels of commitment has led some people to suspect that ESRs are really just valuable goals. For many countries, noncompliance due to inability would have been certain if these standards had been treated as immediately binding.

ESRs have often been defended with linkage arguments which claim that ESRs provide indispensable support to the realization of civil and political rights. This approach was first developed philosophically by Henry Shue. He argued that security and subsistence are so indispensable to the full realization of other rights that anyone who endorses the realization of any other right must also endorse ESRs (Shue 1980; for analysis and critical assessments of linkage arguments see Nickel 2007, 2016, and 2022a).

Do ESRs protect sufficiently important human interests? Maurice Cranston opposed ESRs by suggesting that they are mainly concerned with matters such as holidays with pay which are not of deep and universal human interest (Cranston 1967, 1973; treatments of objections to ESRs include Beetham 1995; Howard 1983; and Nickel 2007). It is far from the case, however, that most ESRs pertain only to superficial interests. Consider two examples: the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to free public education. The former requires governments to work hard at remedying widespread and serious evils such as severe poverty, starvation and malnutrition, and ignorance. The importance of food and other basic material conditions of life is easy to show. These goods are essential to people’s ability to live, function, and flourish. Without adequate access to these goods, interests in life, health, and liberty are endangered and serious illness and death are probable. The unavailability of educational opportunities typically limits (both absolutely and comparatively) people’s abilities to participate fully and effectively in the political and economic life of their county

Are ESRs too burdensome? Another objection to ESRs is that they are too burdensome on their dutybearers. It is very expensive to guarantee everyone basic education and minimal material conditions. Frequently the claim that ESRs are too burdensome suggests that ESRs are substantially more burdensome or expensive than liberty rights. Suppose, however, that we use as a basis of comparison liberty rights such as freedom of communication, association, and movement. These rights require both respect and protection from governments. And people cannot be adequately protected in their enjoyment of liberties such as these unless they also have security and due process rights. The costs of liberty, as it were, include the costs of law and criminal justice. Once we see this, liberty rights start to look a lot more costly.

Further, we need not generally think of ESRs as simply giving everyone a free supply of the goods they protect. Guarantees of things like food and housing may be intolerably expensive and undermine productivity if everyone simply receives a free supply. A viable system of ESRs can require most people to provide these goods for themselves and their families through work, as long as they are given the necessary opportunities, education, and infrastructure. Government-implemented ESRs provide guarantees of availability (or “secure access”), but under many conditions governments should only have to supply the requisite goods in a small fraction of cases.

Countries that do not accept and implement ESRs must still somehow bear the costs of providing for the needy since these countries are unlikely to find it tolerable to allow sizable parts of the population to starve and be homeless. If government does not supply food, clothing, and shelter to those unable to provide for themselves, then families, friends, and communities will have to shoulder this burden. It is only in the last hundred or so years that government-sponsored ESRs have taken over a substantial part of the burden of providing for the needy. The taxes associated with ESRs are partial replacements for other burdensome duties, namely the duties of families and communities to provide adequate care for the unemployed, sick, disabled, and aged. Deciding whether to implement ESRs is not a matter of deciding whether to bear such burdens, but rather of deciding whether to continue with total reliance on systems of informal provision that distribute assistance in a very spotty way and whose costs fall very unevenly on families, friends, and communities.

Are ESRs feasible worldwide? Another objection to ESRs alleges that they are not feasible in many countries (on feasibility see Gheaus 2013, Gilabert 2009, and Nickel 2007). It is very expensive to provide guarantees of subsistence, measures to protect and restore people’s health, and education. Many governments will be unable to provide these guarantees while meeting other important responsibilities. Rights are not magical sources of supply (Holmes & Sunstein 1999). As we saw earlier, the ESR Covenant dealt with the issue of feasibility by calling for progressive implementation, that is, implementation as financial and other resources permit. Does this view of implementation turn ESRs into high-priority goals? And if so, is that a bad thing?

Standards that outrun the abilities of many of their addressees are good candidates for treatment as goals. Viewing them as largely aspirational rather than as imposing immediate duties avoids problems of inability-based noncompliance. One may worry, however, that this is too much of a demotion for ESRs because goals seem much weaker than rights (see O’Neill 2005 and Tomalty 2014). But goals can be formulated in ways that make them more like rights. They can be assigned addressees (the parties who are to pursue the goal), beneficiaries, scopes that define the objective to be pursued, and a high level of priority (see Langford, Sumner, & Yamin 2013 and Nickel 2013; see also OHCHR and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN ). Strong reasons for the importance of these goals can be provided. And supervisory bodies can monitor levels of progress and pressure low-performing addressees to attend to and work on realizing their goals.

Treating very demanding rights as goals has some advantages. Goals coexist easily with low levels of ability to achieve them. And goals are flexible: addressees with different levels of ability can choose ways of pursuing the goals that suit their circumstances and means. Because of these attractions it may be worth exploring sophisticated ways to transform very demanding human rights into goals. The transformation may be full or partial. It is possible to create right-goal mixtures that contain some mandatory elements (see Brems 2009). A right-goal mixture might include some rights-like goals, some mandatory steps to be taken immediately, and duties to realize the rights-like goals as quickly as possible.

Do ESRs yield a sufficient commitment to equality? Objections to ESRs as human rights have come from both the political right and the political left. A common objection from the left, including liberal egalitarians and socialists, is that ESRs as enumerated in human rights documents and treaties provide too weak of a commitment to material equality (Gilabert 2018a and Moyn 2018). Realizing ESRs requires governments to ensure everyone an adequate minimum of resources in some key areas but does not require strong commitments to equality of opportunity, redistributive taxation, or wealth ceilings (see the entries on equality , distributive justice , and liberal feminism ).

The egalitarian objection cannot be that human rights documents and treaties show no concern for people living in poverty and misery. One of the main purposes of including ESRs in human rights documents and treaties was to promote serious efforts to combat poverty, lack of education, and unhealthy living conditions in countries all around the world (see also Langford, Sumner, & Yamin 2013 on the UN Millennium Development Goals). The objection also cannot be that human rights facilitated the hollowing out of systems of welfare rights in many developed countries that occurred after 1980 (for criticism of this view see Song 2019). Those cuts in welfare programs were often in violation of the requirements of realizing ESRs.

Perhaps it should be conceded that human rights documents and treaties have not said enough about positive measures to promote equal opportunity in education and work. A positive right to equal opportunity, like the one Rawls proposed, would require countries to take serious measures to reduce disparities between the opportunities effectively available to children of high-income and low-income parents (see Rawls 1971 and the entry on equality of opportunity ).

A strongly egalitarian political program is probably best pursued partially within but mostly beyond the human rights framework. One reason for this is that the human rights movement will have better prospects for ongoing acceptance and support if it has widespread political acceptance. To achieve this, the rights it endorses must appeal to people with a variety of political views, ranging from center-left to center-right. Support from the broad political center is less likely to emerge and survive if the human rights platform is perceived as mostly a leftist program.

Equality of rights for historically disadvantaged or subordinated groups is a longstanding concern of the human rights movement. Human rights documents repeatedly emphasize that all people, including women and members of minority ethnic and religious groups, have equal human rights and should be able to enjoy them without discrimination. The right to freedom from discrimination figures prominently in the Universal Declaration and subsequent treaties. The Civil and Political Covenant, for example, commits participating states to respect and protect their people’s rights without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or social status (ICCPR Article 2.1). On minority and group rights see Kymlicka 1995.

A number of standard civil and political rights are especially important to ethnic and religious minorities, including rights to freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom from discrimination. Human rights documents also include rights that refer to minorities explicitly and give them special protections. For example, the Civil and Political Covenant in Article 27 says that persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities

shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. (ICCPR Article 27)

Feminists have often protested that standard lists of human rights do not sufficiently take into account the unique risks faced by women. For example, issues like domestic violence, reproductive choice, and the trafficking of women and girls for sex work did not have a prominent place in early human rights documents and treaties. Lists of human rights have had to be expanded “to include the degradation and violation of women” (Bunch 2006; see also Okin 1998). Violations of women’s human rights often occur in the “private” sphere, i.e., in the home at the hands of other family members. This suggests that governments cannot be seen as the only addressees of human rights and that the right to privacy of home and family needs qualification to allow police to protect women within the home.

The issue of how formulations of human rights should respond to variations in the sorts of risks and dangers that different people face is difficult and arises not just in relation to gender but also in relation to age, race, sexual orientation, profession, political affiliation, religion, and personal interests. Due process rights, for example, are much more useful to young people (and particularly young men) than they are to older people since the latter are far less likely to run afoul of the criminal law.

Since 1964 the United Nations has mainly dealt with the rights of women and minorities through specialized treaties such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007). See also the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). Specialized treaties allow international norms to address unique problems of particular groups such as assistance and care during pregnancy and childbearing in the case of women, custody issues in the case of children, and the loss of historic territories by indigenous peoples.

Minority groups are often targets of violence. Human rights norms call upon governments to refrain from such violence and to provide protections against it. This work is partly done by the right to life, which is a standard individual right. It is also done by the right against genocide which protects groups from attempts to destroy or decimate them. The Genocide Convention was one of the first human rights treaties after World War II. The right against genocide is clearly a group right. It is held by both individuals and groups and provides protection to groups as groups. It is largely negative in the sense that it requires governments and other agencies to refrain from destroying groups; but it also requires that legal and other protections against genocide be created at the national level.

As a group right, can the right against genocide be a human right? More generally, can a group right fit the general idea of human rights as rights of individual persons proposed earlier? Perhaps it can if we broaden our conception of who can hold human rights to include important groups that people form and cherish (see the entry on group rights ). This can be made more palatable, perhaps, by recognizing that the beneficiaries of the right against genocide are individual humans who enjoy greater security against attempts to destroy the group to which they belong (Kymlicka 1989).

Although contemporary lists of human rights are already long, there are doubtless norms that should be counted as human rights but are not generally recognized as such. After all, there are lots of areas in which people’s basic welfare, dignity, and fundamental interests are threatened by the actions and omissions of individuals and governments. New technologies create new problems and require us to rethink old solutions. And new political movements emerge and create demands for their goals and norms as human rights.

Prominent recent proposals of new human rights include Kimberley Brownlee’s advocacy of a right against social deprivation that would address severe unwanted loneliness (Brownlee 2020 and 2022), the proposal of a universal right to internet access that was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2016 (UN Resolution 32/13), and the similar endorsement in 2022 of a right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment (UN Resolution 76/300; see also the entry on environmental ethics ).

The right to a healthy environment provides a good example of how new human rights can slowly emerge. After a right of this sort was added to many national bills of rights, environmental NGOs began to promote it within international organizations. In 2000 the European Union’s Bill of Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union , included in Article 37 an environmental protection norm:

A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development.

In 2012 the UN Human Rights Council created a Special Rapporteur (independent expert) on the Environment, eventually approved the right to “a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment”, and forwarded it to the General Assembly—where 80 percent of the world’s countries voted for it (UN Resolution 76/300). Human rights approaches to climate change have also been developed in recent decades (see Bodansky 2009; Caney 2009; Gardiner 2013; and Vanderheiden 2008).

Worries about the proliferation of human rights have not disappeared. Lawyers and international organizations have proposed standards to limit the introduction of new human rights (for example, Alston 1984 and the UN General Assembly 1986). And human rights treaty-making has slowed. After the approval of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1999, the only human rights treaty approved by the UN is the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In 2007 a declaration (not a treaty) on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was approved by the General Assembly. Prominent philosophers have also advocated smaller lists of human rights (see, for example, Cranston 1967 and 1973; Rawls 1999; and Griffin 2008). Griffin also opposed squeezing new content into existing human rights—which he described as the “ballooning” of rights.

Two familiar philosophical worries about human rights are that they are based on beliefs and attitudes that are culturally relative and that their creation and advocacy involves ethnocentrism. Human rights prescribe universal standards in areas such as security, law enforcement, equality, political participation, and education. The peoples and countries of planet Earth are, however, enormously varied in their practices, traditions, religions, and levels of economic and political development. Putting these two propositions together may be enough to justify the worry that universal human rights do not sufficiently accommodate the diversity of Earth’s peoples. A theoretical expression of this worry is “relativism”, the idea that ethical, political, and legal standards are only true or justified relative to the traditions, beliefs, and conditions of a particular country, culture or region (see the entry on moral relativism ).

During the drafting in 1947 of the Universal Declaration, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (“AAA”) warned of the danger that the Declaration would be “a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in Western Europe and America”. A central concern of the AAA Board in the period right after World War II was to condemn intolerant colonialist attitudes of the day and to advocate cultural and political self-determination. But the Board also made the stronger assertion that “standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive” and thus “what is held to be a human right in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another people” (AAA 1947).

Such assertions have continued to fuel accusations that human rights are instruments of ethnocentrism, arrogance, and cultural imperialism (Renteln 1990). Ethnocentrism is the assumption, usually unconscious, that “one’s own group is the center of everything” and that its beliefs, practices, and norms provide the standards by which other groups are “scaled and rated” (Sumner 1906; see also Etinson 2018a who argues that ethnocentrism is best understood as a kind of cultural bias rather than a belief in cultural superiority). Ethnocentrism can lead to arrogance and intolerance in dealings with other countries, ethical systems, and religions. Finally, cultural imperialism occurs when the economically, technologically, and militarily strongest countries impose their beliefs, values, and institutions on the rest of the world (for a useful discussion of several power-related concerns about human rights, see Gilabert 2018a).

As in the AAA Board’s case, relativists often combine these charges with a prescription, namely that tolerance of varied practices and traditions ought to be instilled and practiced through measures that include extended learning about other cultures. The idea that relativism and exposure to other cultures promote tolerance may be correct from a psychological perspective. People who are sensitive to differences in beliefs, practices, and traditions, and who are suspicious of the grounds for extending norms across borders, may be more inclined to be tolerant of other countries and peoples than those who believe in an objective universal morality. Still, philosophers have been generally critical of attempts to argue from relativism to a prescription of tolerance (see Williams 1972 [1993] and Talbott 2005). If the culture and religion of one country has long fostered intolerant attitudes and practices, and if its citizens and officials act intolerantly towards people from other countries, they are simply following their own traditions and cultural norms. Accordingly, a relativist from a tolerant country will be hard-pressed to find a basis for criticizing the citizens and officials of the intolerant country. To do so the relativist will have to endorse a transcultural principle of tolerance and to advocate as an outsider cultural change in the direction of greater tolerance. Because of this, relativists who are deeply committed to tolerance may find themselves attracted to a qualified commitment to human rights.

Perhaps for these reasons, relativism is not the stance of most anthropologists today. Currently the AAA has a central Committee whose objectives include promoting, protecting, and developing an anthropological perspective on human rights. While still emphasizing the importance of cultural differences, anthropologists now often support the protection of vulnerable cultures, non-discrimination, and the rights and land claims of indigenous peoples (see the AAA’s 2020 Statement on Anthropology and Human Rights).

The conflict between relativists and human rights advocates may be partially based on differences in their underlying philosophical beliefs, particularly in metaethics. Relativists are often subjectivists or noncognitivists and think of morality as entirely socially constructed and transmitted. In contrast, philosophically-inclined human rights advocates are more likely to adhere to or presuppose cognitivism, moral realism, and intuitionism.

As the AAA’s 1947 Statement shows, the accommodation of diversity has been a concern facing the contemporary human rights regime since its inception. As part of a 1946–47 UNESCO inquiry into the theoretical basis of human rights, the French philosopher, Jacques Maritain, famously suggested that universal agreement on human rights was possible so long as questions of underlying justification were ignored: “Yes… we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us why” (Maritain 1949: 9). The International Bill of Human Rights appears to violate this embargo when it asserts, in the Preamble to both major Covenants, that “these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”. Nonetheless, Maritain’s idea has strong echoes in contemporary philosophical work (see Taylor 1999), including John Rawls’ idea that human rights can have a minimal public or “political” justification which may be accepted from various “comprehensive” religious, moral, and philosophical points of view (Rawls 1999; Beitz 2009). Indeed, some have argued that international human rights law’s justificatory appeal to human dignity should be understood in precisely this ecumenical way (McCrudden 2008).

Other important methods of accommodating diversity include the abstract formulation of human rights norms, which allows for diverse, context-sensitive modes of social and institutional implementation (see Etinson 2013). As discussed in section 1 , a modest understanding of the aims of human rights would leave more room for democratic decision-making at the domestic level, and for cultural and political variation across countries (see also the European Court of Human Rights’ notion of a “margin of appreciation”, discussed in Letsas 2006). And it is worth noting that, within limits, state parties to international human rights treaties are entitled to submit “reservations” that alter the legal effect of treaty provisions as they pertain to that state. This provides a further avenue for legal variation and accommodation.

In the 1990s, Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and others argued that international human rights as found in United Nations declarations and treaties were insensitive to distinctive “Asian values”, such as prizing families and community (in contrast to strong individualism); putting social harmony over personal freedom; respect for political leaders and institutions; and emphasizing responsibility, hard work, and thriftiness as means of social progress (on the Asian Values debate see Bauer & Bell [eds] 1999; Bell 2000; and Sen 1997). Proponents of the Asian values idea did not wish to abolish all human rights; they rather wanted to deemphasize some families of human rights, particularly the fundamental freedoms and rights of democratic participation (and in some cases the rights of women). They also wanted Western governments and NGOs to stop criticizing them for human rights violations in these areas.

At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, countries including Singapore, Malaysia, China, and Iran advocated accommodations within human rights practice for cultural and economic differences. Western representatives tended to view the position of these countries as excuses for repression and authoritarianism. The Conference responded by approving the Vienna Declaration . It included in Article 5 the assertion that countries should not pick and choose among human rights:

All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In recent decades widespread acceptance of human rights has occurred in most parts of the world. Three quarters of the world’s countries have ratified the major human rights treaties, and many countries in Africa, the Americas, and Europe participate in regional human rights regimes that have international courts (see the Georgetown University Human Rights Law Research Guide in the Other Internet Resources below). Ratification does not, of course, guarantee compliance. Further, all of the world’s countries now use similar political institutions (law, courts, legislatures, executives, militaries, bureaucracies, police, prisons, taxation, and public schools) and these institutions carry with them characteristic problems and abuses (Donnelly 1989 [2020]). Finally, globalization has diminished the differences among peoples. Today’s world is not the one that early anthropologists and missionaries found. National and cultural boundaries are breached not just by international trade but also by millions of travelers and migrants, electronic communications, international law covering many areas, and the efforts of international governmental and non-governmental organizations. International influences and organizations are everywhere and countries borrow freely and regularly from each other’s inventions and practices.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• The International (UN) Human Rights System , Georgetown Law Library Human Rights Law Research Guide
• International Human Rights Law , United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
• Human Rights entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

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For the 2024 update, Adam Etinson has joined James Nickel in authoring and revising this entry.

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Tim Walz Signed Law Protecting Pedophiles from Discrimination?

The claim was shared by the republican national committee's official research account on x., published aug. 8, 2024.

About this rating

The bill in question was an amendment to the state's civil rights law that edited the definition of "sexual orientation" to remove the inclusion of identities "not traditionally associated with one’s biological male or female traits." Several legal scholars noted that the law did not protect pedophiles from discrimination.

On Aug. 6, 2024, RNC Research , an account operated by the Republican National Committee, posted a claim to X alleging that Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz, Vice President Kamala Harris' vice-presidential running mate, signed a bill into law that specifically protected pedophiles from discrimination. The claim quickly spread , and it was picked up by conservative news outlets like the Daily Wire .

The claim was not new. The piece of legislation in question, H.F. 1655 , was an amendment to a larger bill called the Take Pride Act , which enshrined the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals in Minnesota's human rights law. It was passed in May 2023 and was criticized then on the same grounds.

However, when Snopes researched the amendment by using publicly available documentation from the Minnesota state legislature, we discovered that the claim was false. The bill was real, and Walz did sign it into law, but it did not protect pedophiles from discrimination. When the claim was shared on X, the context that would have made this clear was omitted.

What the Bill Actually Did

The Take Pride Act included provisions that outlawed discriminating against people based on "gender identity" and "sexual orientation." In order for the law to be enforceable, the bill's authors included definitions of those two terms. For the purposes of this claim, only the definition of "sexual orientation" is relevant. This is how that definition read when Walz signed the Take Pride Act into law in May 2023:

Subd. 44.   Sexual orientation. "Sexual orientation" means to whom someone is, or is perceived of as being, emotionally, physically, or sexually attracted to based on sex or gender identity. A person may be attracted to men, women, both, neither, or to people who are genderqueer, androgynous, or have other gender identities.

However, it took the state legislature time to create this definition, and the exact wording of the definition was edited significantly from its original text. Take, for instance, this previous version (emphasis ours):

Subd. 44. Sexual orientation. "Sexual orientation" means having or being perceived as having an emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to another person without regard to the sex of that person or having or being perceived as having an orientation for such attachment , or having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness. "Sexual orientation" does not include a physical or sexual attachment to children by an adult .

The bill that the RNCResearch X account and other conservative commentators referred to was written by Rep. Leigh Finke , the first transgender person elected to the Minnesota Legislature. Finke's amendment changed the definition of sexual orientation to the following:

Subd. 44. Sexual orientation. "Sexual orientation" means having or being perceived as having an emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to another person without regard to the sex of that person or having or being perceived as having an orientation for such attachment.

Finke's amendment removed the last half of the definition, which included the line referring to "a physical or sexual attachment to children by an adult."

Sexual orientation is defined based on people's attachment to people dependent on the sex of that person, not the age of that person. As such, the line about "a physical or sexual attachment to children by an adult" was irrelevant to the definition. 

The Minnesota House Research Department created a summary of the amendment that concisely explained this point. That summary said the amendment "removes language from the existing definition of 'sexual orientation' that included having or being perceived as having an identity not traditionally associated with one's biological male or female traits."

No Protection for Pedophiles

In a previous fact-check on the same topic from PolitiFact , published in May 2023 when Walz signed the Take Pride Act, legal experts confirmed that the law would not protect pedophiles from discrimination in any way. 

"No court in the country has or would ever say that a law protecting people from discrimination based on their sexual orientation extends to protecting pedophilia," Brian Soucek, a law professor at the University of California, Davis, told PolitiFact.

Essentially, while the amendment in question removed a reference to "a physical or sexual attachment to children by an adult," it did so in order to remove unnecessary text. Walz did sign the Take Pride Act into law, but had nothing to do with protecting pedophiles.

"About." LEIGH for 66a, https://www.leighformn.com/about. Accessed 8 Aug. 2024.

Davis, Mary. Minnesota Human Rights Act; Sexual Orientation Discrimination. Bill Summary, H.F. 1655, Minnesota House Research Department, 8 Mar. 2023, https://www.house.mn.gov/hrd/bs/93/HF1655.pdf.

HF 1655 as Introduced - 93rd Legislature (2023 - 2024). https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/text.php?number=HF1655&version=0&session=ls93&session_year=2023&session_number=0. Accessed 8 Aug. 2024.

Sec. 363A.03 MN Statutes. https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/363A.03. Accessed 8 Aug. 2024.

"The Judiciary and Public Safety Bill Advances Civil Rights." MN Department of Human Rights, https://mn.gov/mdhr/news-community/newsroom/civilrightsupdates.jsp?id=1061-579395.

Tim Walz Signed Bill Stripping Anti-Pedophile Language From Minnesota's Human Rights Act. 7 Aug. 2024, https://www.dailywire.com/news/tim-walz-signed-bill-stripping-anti-pedophile-language-from-minnesotas-human-rights-act.

Tuquero, Loreben. "Minnesota Bill Won't Shield Child Sex Offenders." @politifact, https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2023/may/03/tweets/minnesota-bill-does-not-create-a-protected-class-f/. Accessed 8 Aug. 2024.

By Jack Izzo

Jack Izzo is a Chicago-based journalist and two-time "Jeopardy!" alumnus.

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