benchmark assignment training and development

Available Tools:

Resource Library Arrow with stem
Benchmarks on Demand Arrow with stem
Certification Arrow with stem
Training - Self Paced and In Person Arrow with stem
Research Agenda Arrow with stem
Peer to Peer Arrow with stem
Blog Arrow with stem

Check out our most frequently asked questions or feel free to contact us online or call us at 1-800-776-9676 or +1-713-681-4020

Training and Development Key Benchmarks

benchmark assignment training and development

Prepared using data from APQC’s Open Standards Benchmarking® in Develop, Train, and Counsel Employees , these articles provide human capital management key performance indicators (KPIs) for organizations in various industries. Organizations can use this information to benchmark and continuously improve their processes.

Metrics provided include:

total cost to perform the process group Develop and counsel employees
cycle time in days for the formal performance review process from start to finish
number of learning days per employee, and more.

Included in this Collection

Training and development key benchmarks: cross-industry, training and development key benchmarks: aerospace industry, training and development key benchmarks: automotive industry, training and development key benchmarks: consumer products/packaged goods industry, training and development key benchmarks: distribution/transportation industry, training and development key benchmarks: electronics industry, training and development key benchmarks: financial services/banking industry, training and development key benchmarks: government industry, training and development key benchmarks: healthcare industry, training and development key benchmarks: insurance industry, training and development key benchmarks: media and entertainment industry, training and development key benchmarks: mining industry, training and development key benchmarks: petroleum/chemical industry, training and development key benchmarks: pharmaceutical industry, training and development key benchmarks: retail and wholesale industry, training and development key benchmarks: services industry, training and development key benchmarks: telecommunications industry, training and development key benchmarks: utility industry.

HRM-635 Topic 5 Benchmark Assignment - Training and Development

Training and development prompts a change within an organization. The goal of training is to identify areas for improvement and develop materials and opportunities to educate employees in order to support growth. For this assignment, you are required to develop a small training exercise. Review your needs assessment and previous observations conducted on your work environment to help identify one area for improvement that would benefit a part of your organization. This training exercise does not need to be implemented, but should include at least one deliverable that you could use during the training exercise. As you are reviewing your organization, consider employee engagement, systems, procedures, communication, and the culture within the organization. These are suggestions for possible areas that could benefit from a training exercise. The training must include the following:

What goal is the organization trying to accomplish?
What processes or procedures will change after the training?
Describe the strategies or actions involved in the training exercise to meet established goals. What is the expected performance or applications after the training? How will the strategies drive successful business results and improve employee performance?
How will the organization provide support to the employees receiving training? To new employees? Does this support consider strengths and weaknesses within the organization?

You are required to develop a written description (1,000 words) including one visual for your training exercise. Be sure to take time to analyze your work surroundings and identify a need for further training and development. Prepare this assignment according to the guidelines found in the APA Style Guide, located in the Student Success Center. An abstract is not required. This assignment uses a rubric. Please review the rubric prior to beginning the assignment to become familiar with the expectations for successful completion. You are required to submit this assignment to LopesWrite. Please refer to the directions in the Student Success Center.

Buy tutorial to view it

Provide details on what you need help with along with a budget and time limit. Questions are posted anonymously and can be made 100% private.

Studypool matches you to the best tutor to help you with your question. Our tutors are highly qualified and vetted.

Your matched tutor provides personalized help according to your question details. Payment is made only after you have completed your 1-on-1 session and are satisfied with your session.

Benchmark Assignment - Training and Development

User Generated

Description

Attached below are documents that leads up to this assignment.

For this assignment, you are required to develop a small training exercise. Review your needs assessment and previous observations conducted on your work environment to help identify one area for improvement that would benefit a part of your organization. This training exercise does not need to be implemented, but should include at least one deliverable that you could use during the training exercise. As you are reviewing your organization, consider employee engagement, systems, procedures, communication, and the culture within the organization. These are suggestions for possible areas that could benefit from a training exercise. The training must include the following:

What goal is the organization trying to accomplish?
What processes or procedures will change after the training?
Describe the strategies or actions involved in the training exercise to meet established goals. What is the expected performance or applications after the training? How will the strategies drive successful business results and improve employee performance?
How will the organization provide support to the employees receiving training? To new employees? Does this support consider strengths and weaknesses within the organization?

Prepare this assignment according to the guidelines found in the APA Style Guide, located in the Student Success Center. An abstract is not required.

Unformatted Attachment Preview

Explanation & Answer

24/7 Study Help

Stuck on a study question? Our verified tutors can answer all questions, from basic math to advanced rocket science !

The Secret Garden

by Frances Hodgson Burnett

Z for Zachariah

by Robert C. O’Brien

The Unwinding of the Miracle

by Julie Yip-Williams

The Scarlet Letter

by Nathaniel Hawthorne

Fear - Trump in the White House

by Bob Woodward

by Yuval Noah Harari

Little Fires Everywhere

by Celeste Ng

by John Hersey

Salt To The Sea

by Ruta Sepetys

working on a study question?

Studypool is powered by Microtutoring TM

Studypool is not sponsored or endorsed by any college or university.

Ongoing Conversations

Access over 35 million study documents through the notebank

Get on-demand Q&A study help from verified tutors

Read 1000s of rich book guides covering popular titles

Already have an account? Login

Don't have an account? Sign Up

Benchmark Assignment- Training and Development

May 30, 2024 | Uncategorized

1. What goal is the organization trying to accomplish?

2. What processes or procedures will change after the training?

3. Describe the strategies or actions involved in the training exercise to meet established goals. What is the expected performance or applications after the training? How will the strategies drive successful business results and improve employee performance?

4. How will the organization provide support to the employees receiving training? To new employees? Does this support consider strengths and weaknesses within the organization?

BenchmarkAssignment_week5.docx

Our Reputation Precedes us

Click the links below to view our reviews

ResellerRatings

Website Reviews

Guaranteed A/B Grade

Do you get weary writing papers? we can take care of all your Homework/Assignments, Quiz, Finals, Midterms, Discussion/Responses…you name it!

Bath and Body Works SEC-10K Report AND SEC-10K PowerPoint Presentation

Aug 18, 2024 |

Accounting Careers

Unit 5: Investment Proposal

Aug 9, 2024 |

Ready to use our Paper Writing Service ?

Submit a ‘Write My Essay’ request and you’ll get a quote for your upcoming paper

Sign-up required | 🇺🇸 | 100% confidential

Advanced nursing writing services

Assignment: Benchmark Training and Development

Benchmark Assignment – Training and Development Assessment Description Training and development prompts change within an organization. The goal of training is to identify areas for improvement and to develop growth opportunities that support the employees in their professional career. For this assignment, you are required to develop a small training exercise in the form of a PowerPoint presentation. Review previous needs assessments and training observations conducted at your workplace to help identify one area for improvement that would benefit your organization. This training exercise does not need to be implemented but should include at least one deliverable that you could use during the training exercise. As you are reviewing your organization, consider employee engagement, systems and procedures, communication, resources, succession planning, and the culture within the organization. These are suggestions for possible areas that could benefit from a training exercise .

ORDER A CUSTOMIZED, PLAGIARISM-FREE Assignment: Benchmark Training and Development HERE

Good news for our new customers . we can help you in completing this assignment and pay after delivery. our top -rated medical writers will comprehensively review instructions , synthesis external evidence sources(scholarly) and customize a quality assignment for you. we will also attach a copy of plagiarism report alongside, ai report alongside the assignment. feel free to chat us.

Create an 8-10 slide PowerPoint presentation of your training exercise, with speaker notes, and include the following: • What are the overall goals for the training or the benefit to the selected organization? • What are two specific objectives for the training exercise? • What processes or procedures will change after the training has been completed? • Describe the strategies or actions involved in the training exercise to meet the established goals and objectives. What is the expected employee performance or application after the training? How will the strategies drive successful business results and improve employee performance? • How will the organization provide support to the current employees receiving this training? To new employees? How will the effectiveness of the training exercise be measured to confirm the anticipated improvement of employee performance? While APA style format is not required for the body of this assignment, solid academic writing is expected, and in-text citations and references should be presented using documentation guidelines, which can be found in the APA Style Guide, located in the Student Success Center. This assignment uses a rubric. Review the rubric prior to beginning the assignment to become familiar with the expectations for successful completion.

Benchmark Information: This benchmark assignment assesses the following programmatic competency: MBA-Strat HR Mgmt 5.2 Recommend strategies for utilizing the workforce to enhance an organization’s human capital talent in order to drive successful business results.

Benchmark Assignment – Training and Development – Rubric

Goal for the Training

Objectives for the Training

Processes and Procedures Implemented After Training

Strategies in the Training to Meet Goals and Drive Successful Business Results (B)

Support and Training Effectiveness

Presentation of Content

Language Use and Audience Awareness

Mechanics of Writing (includes spelling, punctuation, grammar, language use)

Documentation of Sources

Total 150 points

For Individuals
For Businesses
For Universities
For Governments

Skills Planning: Navigating the Future for Corporate Success

Why are more companies adopting a skills-based strategy for hiring and training? Explore how skills planning enhances corporate success and why employees benefit from adopting this approach.

[Featured Image] A human resources leader smiles after completing a comprehensive skills planning strategy session with an approach that benefits employees and the company.

Skills planning goes beyond being a corporate buzzword. It’s a strategic approach that aligns employee talents with business goals. Skills planning and skills-first approaches help you build a workforce with critical skills, increase your organization’s productivity, create an environment dedicated to continual improvement, upskill current employees, and develop a culture of learning. What’s more, data from Deloitte reveals that 73 percent of employees believe skills-based practices can improve their work experiences, and 90 percent of executives are actively planning to incorporate a skills-based approach [ 1 ].

This article explores the essence of skills planning, including what it is, how it benefits organizations, and strategies for implementing it.

Leaders at 3,800+ companies develop their talent with Coursera

How to embrace skills planning within your workplace

The skills that you cultivate within your employees directly impact your organization’s ability to innovate, stay competitive, and adapt to market changes. By foreseeing skill gaps and addressing them proactively, you can more effectively evolve alongside technological advancements and market trends.

To focus on skills planning within your business, assessing the skills and competencies required for your organization to thrive is critical. Once you have determined these key focus areas, you can develop a plan to cultivate these skills within your workforce through hiring and upskilling. Skills planning should involve current and future skills, creating a pathway for ongoing success.

One way to do this is by understanding the relationship between individual employee skills and how they contribute to broader organizational objectives. You want to match the right skills with the right tasks, driving your company forward by allowing employees to work in dynamic positions. This alignment ensures that every team member works within a role that utilizes their strengths, increasing productivity while providing a chance for natural employee growth.

Read more: Performance Management Best Practices

How skills planning benefits organizations

Implementing skills planning in your workplace strategy offers various benefits, including improved employee satisfaction and retention . Over time, you may see changes in how your employees value your organization, the composition of your workplace, and collaboration dynamics. Let’s explore each benefit in more depth.

Increased employee retention and satisfaction

When employees believe their employer supports their professional development , their likelihood of staying with the company increases. According to Deloitte’s 2022 global skills-based organization survey, nearly three-quarters of employees felt skills-based practices could improve the employee experience. Meanwhile, 66 percent of workers believed they would be more likely to remain at their organization if skills-based practices were in place [ 1 ].

Diversified workforce

By opening job postings based on skills, the candidate pool widens, allowing people with less traditional educational and experience pathways to apply and showcase their talent. For example, several groups, such as the Ingka Group and ManpowerGroup, orient hiring practices and job postings for accessibility to people of all backgrounds, including refugee and forcibly displaced populations. Hiring teams in these organizations assess candidates based on skills rather than qualifications and integrate training and development programs as needed to upskill employees and offer internal opportunities for growth.

Utilized employee skills

Use skills planning to deconstruct jobs into a set of tasks. Rather than having static teams that work on the same project types, you can consider which employees best match different aspects of projects or initiatives as they arise. Doing so also opens opportunities for gig workers and freelancers, allowing you to hire people with specific expertise for a project or task.

Several organizations, including Mastercard and Unilever, have seen success operating with this framework. During the COVID-19 pandemic, executives at Mastercard began experimenting with manually matching employees to opportunities on projects within the company. This “gig-like” placement of employees was so successful that the company shortly scaled up its initiative and formally introduced it into the organization’s framework.

Employee retainment and growth

By allowing employees to shift within their roles and build new skills, you can offer career growth and development opportunities while enhancing organizational productivity. Many employees may have skills that their current positions underutilize but could fill gaps in other project areas.

Adopting an employee-driven approach to skills planning allows employees to share their skill sets and volunteer for opportunities to contribute positively. This provides a natural pathway for employees to grow within the organization, take on more responsibility, and continue building skills and experience.

Read more: Top Strategies for Retaining Talent Today

Strategies for effective skills planning

When you implement a skill-first framework within your workplace, you can take several steps to improve its adoption and begin implementing changes that maximize the benefits for your employees and organization.

Identify current skills gaps and future skills needs

Before operationalizing a skills-first approach in your workplace, you need to know which skills you need to cultivate now and anticipate skills you will likely rely on. This dual focus helps you understand immediate training needs and implement pathways to prepare employees for future responsibilities.

Ongoing data collection offers an incredibly effective way to analyze and anticipate company needs. Looking at labor-market data externally to track rises and dips in industry demand can provide insight into economic changes. In contrast, internal data on employee learning and performance progress can help you design training plans to improve performance on specific projects. To streamline the data collection process, many companies benefit from technological solutions, such as artificial intelligence platforms that automatically analyze and synthesize large volumes of information.

Design job descriptions around skills

If you know that employees need specific skills to succeed in a job position, focusing hiring practices around practical knowledge rather than formal qualifications helps to ensure you’re hiring candidates who can effectively meet your expectations.

IBM leads the charge in corporate skills planning. As the talent shortage in the United States continues to increase, IBM endorses a skills-first approach in its workforce development. When hiring, the leaders at IBM design job descriptions to focus on the skills the candidates need, leaving the required credentials to a minimum.

Build targeted training programs

Skill development should be a priority for employee engagement and retention, mainly as you design a modern workplace environment. The expansion and integration of technology rapidly change the skills employees need to succeed and remain competitive, which is why it’s so critical that companies offer in-house professional development opportunities.

When building targeted training programs, you can design pathways for skills that transition between your organization's current and projected future needs. This targeted approach to reskilling helps you enhance your workforce, gain more accurate insights into persistent skills needs, and make decisions about hiring and additional training.

Make strategic decisions based on your insights

What you learn from your skills assessment and skills-based strategy development can guide future planning and restructuring within the company. You can make hiring decisions to fill skills gaps, upskill employees for specific growth opportunities, and integrate targeted technological enhancements to meet your short and long-term organizational goals.

Drive strategic skills planning and meet critical business objectives with data-led insights with the Skills Compass Report.

Overcoming challenges in skills planning.

Focusing on skills development and planning skill-development pathways can set your organization up for ongoing success. Skills planning can also present some challenges you might face along the way. Anticipating potential obstacles can help you prepare strategies ahead of time to reduce adverse effects.

Personalizing employee training plans can be challenging. Even if you anticipate your organization's downstream skills needs, individual employees might need to develop a clear career path to help guide the skills development best suited for their goals. In other cases, you might find some organizational resistance to change and uncertainty about handling changing structures. In these cases, maintaining patience, flexibility, and prioritizing personalization can help keep you on track.

Implementing new programs requires cross-team collaboration. To fully redesign how your organization works, you’ll need to collaborate with experts in workforce transformation, integrate new digital tools, and provide development opportunities. This can feel challenging as you begin, but seeking out and partnering with experts in these areas can help you effectively make this transition. You can start with minor changes, such as redesigning job postings and planning for known challenges, and gradually implement more extensive changes.

The role of technology in skills planning

Technology plays a significant part in supporting the entire skills planning process, from data analytics, which can pinpoint the areas to focus on, to AI, which offers more personalized learning options, and online platforms that provide improved access. Data analytics tools enable organizations to sift through large amounts of employee performance data to identify skills gaps and predict future training needs. Data analysis helps support improved, informed decision-making about skill development efforts, ensuring you’re always ahead of industry demands.

Learning management systems (LMS) provide a platform for efficient skills development. They deliver, track, and manage training programs and can personalize training pathways for different employee goals while keeping track of progress. Collecting ongoing feedback throughout the training process allows you to learn what works and what doesn’t, making it easier to adjust your programs as workforce needs evolve.

Why skills-based training fosters a culture of lifelong learning

When a company culture values continuous skill development, learning is integral to everyday work. It drives employees to embrace curiosity, innovation, and a willingness to learn new things. This environment motivates employees to expand their skill sets and benefits them by promoting personal development, expanding opportunities, and fostering a growth mindset.

Read more: How to Encourage Positive Organizational Culture

Realize the full potential of skills planning on Coursera.

The Coursera learning platform is a global classroom that can fit perfectly into your corporate strategy. Companies can weave course offerings on Coursera into their skills planning, ensuring that every employee has the opportunity to grow, adapt, and excel at their own pace. You can leverage the flexible learning environment to offer custom learning paths for your employees, matching their unique skills to learning paths aligned with strategic objectives.

Learn more with Coursera

Skills planning drives corporate success through strategic hiring and training practices and increases employee engagement and retention. With the Organizational Leadership Specialization offered by Northwestern University on Coursera, you can continue learning tips on effectively designing and leading a modern workforce. Coursera for Business provides access to this and more, with learning opportunities designed to meet your skills planning objectives.

Benchmark your talent with global skill insights

See how millions of learners in 100 countries are strengthening critical skills.

Article sources

Deloitte. “ The Skills-Based Organization: A New Operating Model for Work and the Workforce , http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/articles/us175310_consulting-the-skills-based-org-report/DI_The-skills-based-organization-report.pdf.” Accessed July 15, 2024.

This content has been made available for informational purposes only. Learners are advised to conduct additional research to ensure that courses and other credentials pursued meet their personal, professional, and financial goals.

Training Industry

Why learning strategies don’t work: 5 points of failure.

In today’s fast-paced and ever-evolving business landscape, the effectiveness of learning strategies is critical to organizational success. Yet, many executives and learning leaders find themselves frustrated by the inefficacy of their learning initiatives. The big question is, “Why don’t most learning strategies work?” Let’s take a look at five common points of failure that undermine these efforts. Understanding and addressing these failures can transform learning strategies from a source of frustration to a driver of organizational excellence.

1. Failure to Adequately Understand or Fully Address Stakeholder Needs, Goals or Intentions

One primary reason learning strategies falter is the failure to align with stakeholder needs, goals and intentions . Stakeholders include not just top executives, but also managers, employees and even clients or customers. When the learning strategy does not resonate with the diverse interests and expectations of these groups, it is bound to fall short.

Effective learning strategies begin with a comprehensive stakeholder analysis . This involves engaging with all relevant parties to understand their perspectives, challenges and aspirations. For instance, top executives might prioritize strategic alignment and business outcomes, while employees might seek skill development and career progression. By creating a learning strategy that balances these needs, organizations can ensure broader buy-in and increased effectiveness.

2. Failure to Get the Most Out of the Organization’s Learning Ecosystem

Many organizations remain stuck in old ways, relying on outdated learning approaches and technologies that no longer serve the needs of a modern workforce. The learning ecosystem encompasses all the resources, technologies, processes and cultural elements that support learning and development (L&D). All too often, it is seen as separate from the learning strategy and isn’t considered an integral component.

To avoid this pitfall, organizations must adopt a more dynamic and integrated approach to learning. This includes leveraging cutting-edge technologies such as AI-driven learning platforms, mobile learning apps and social learning tools. The learning ecosystem should help foster a culture of continuous learning where employees are encouraged to seek out new knowledge and skills on an ongoing basis . By fully utilizing the learning ecosystem, organizations can create a more engaging and effective learning experience.

3. Failure to Understand the Job Performance or Requirements of Key Roles

Another critical failure point in learning strategies is the lack of understanding of the specific job performance requirements, or the unique challenges facing individuals in key roles. These gaps often lead to generic learning programs that do not address the actual needs of employees.

To overcome this, organizations need to conduct thorough role-focused job analyses and performance assessments . This involves identifying the core competencies, knowledge and skills required for each role and how they are applied to the daily challenges and tasks employees face. Customizing learning programs to address these specific requirements ensures that the training is relevant and impactful. Furthermore, involving employees in the design of these programs can provide valuable insights and increase their relevance and acceptance.

4. Failure to Measure Outcomes and Results

A significant reason why learning strategies fail is the lack of effective measurement of outcomes and results . Without clear metrics and evaluation processes, it is impossible to determine whether the learning initiatives are achieving their intended goals. Measurement has always been difficult in the context of L&D; new AI capabilities may offer solutions to this challenge.

Regardless, organizations need to establish robust measurement frameworks that track both short-term and long-term lagging outcomes. This includes not only assessing immediate learning gains but also measuring how these translate into improved job performance and business results. Key performance indicators (KPIs) or objectives and key results (OKRs) such as increased productivity, higher employee engagement and reduced turnover rates can provide tangible evidence of the impact of learning programs. Regularly reviewing and refining these metrics can help ensure that the learning strategy remains aligned with organizational goals.

Measurement frameworks include the metric, mechanisms to collect data, frequency or timing of the measurements, decision-making processes and baselines for comparison.

5. Failure to Understand and Adapt to the Organization’s Political Context

Lastly, learning strategies often fail because they do not consider the organization’s political context. This includes understanding the power dynamics, organizational culture and informal networks influencing decision-making and behavior.

Successful learning strategies require a keen awareness of these company-specific political factors . This means engaging with key influencers and decision-makers early in the process and navigating the organizational landscape skillfully. It also involves aligning learning initiatives with broader strategic goals and demonstrating how they contribute to organizational success. By doing so, learning leaders can build the necessary rapport, support and momentum for their learning strategies.

The success of learning strategies hinges on addressing these five critical points of failure. By understanding and addressing stakeholder needs, leveraging the full potential of the learning ecosystem, tailoring programs to job performance requirements, measuring outcomes effectively, and navigating the organization’s political context, executives and leaders can transform their learning strategies into powerful tools for organizational growth and success .

The journey to effective learning is not without its challenges, but by taking a proactive and holistic approach, organizations can create a culture of continuous improvement and innovation. It is time for leaders to move beyond the status quo and embrace learning strategies that truly drive performance and deliver results. The future of your organization depends on it.

#aligning with stakeholders
#learning culture
#learning strategy

Brian Blecke

Brian Blecke is a performance consultant and learning strategist with more than 25 years’ experience. As a founding partner of Actio Learning , he uses a diverse set of tools, models and experiences to help his clients align learning outcomes to business goals, design innovative learning solutions, and create measurable performance improvement.

This topic is proudly sponsored by

Privacy Overview

Training Library

Heat pump system design & installation.

Online Paid

‹ Back to Library

This is a series of nine professional development training courses for HVAC engineers, contractors, project managers, and building owners. Learn to design and install heat pump systems with confidence. Rigorous assessments have been developed to make sure you know the correct approach to designing and installing heat pump systems.

This is a bundle of 9 courses:

Heat Pump System Fundamentals
Air-to-Water Heat Pump Fundamentals
Geothermal Heat Pump Fundamentals
Air-to-Water Heat Pump Applications
Geothermal Heat Pump Applications
Hydronic Distribution Systems for Heat Pumps
Small-Scale Chilled Water Cooling
Forced Air Distribution for Heat Pump Systems
Heat Pump Standards & Regulations in the USA and Canada – Self Study

This is a series of professional development training courses for HVAC engineers, contractors, project managers, and building owners. Learn to design and install heat pump systems with confidence. Rigorous assessments have been developed to make sure you know the correct approach to designing and installing heat pump systems.

This course satisfies the contractor training requirement set by the NYS Clean Heat program. You can submit this certificate of completion with your application to access the money for your customers.

More Recent Training Courses

How to Start Your Registered Apprenticeship Program – Self Study

Boosting contractor capacity to meet home performance demand, finally fossil-fuel-free: air-to-water heat pump & ventilation retrofit – self study.

Challenges in detecting ecological interactions using sedimentary ancient DNA data

Find this author on Google Scholar
Find this author on PubMed
Search for this author on this site
ORCID record for Fiona Margaret Callahan
For correspondence: [email protected]
Info/History
Supplementary material
Preview PDF

With increasing availability of ancient and modern environmental DNA technology, whole-community species occurrence and abundance data over time and space is becoming more available. Sedimentary ancient DNA data can be used to infer associations between species, which can generate hypotheses about biotic interactions, a key part of ecosystem function and biodiversity science. Here, we have developed a realistic simulation to evaluate five common methods from different fields for this type of inference. We find that across all methods tested, false discovery rates of inter-species associations are high under realistic simulation conditions. Additionally, we find that with sample sizes that are currently realistic for this type of data, models are typically unable to detect interactions better than random assignment of associations. We also find that at larger sample sizes, information about species abundance improves performance of these models. Different methods perform differentially well depending on the number of taxa in the dataset. Some methods (SPIEC-EASI, SparCC) assume that there are large numbers of taxa in the dataset, and we find that SPIEC-EASI is highly sensitive to this assumption while SparCC is not. We find that for small numbers of species, no method consistently outperforms logistic and linear regression, indicating a need for further testing and methods development.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

View the discussion thread.

Supplementary Material

Thank you for your interest in spreading the word about bioRxiv.

NOTE: Your email address is requested solely to identify you as the sender of this article.

Citation Manager Formats

EndNote (tagged)
EndNote 8 (xml)
RefWorks Tagged
Ref Manager
Tweet Widget
Facebook Like
Google Plus One

Subject Area

Animal Behavior and Cognition (5526)
Biochemistry (12575)
Bioengineering (9438)
Bioinformatics (30840)
Biophysics (15864)
Cancer Biology (12928)
Cell Biology (18528)
Clinical Trials (138)
Developmental Biology (10005)
Ecology (14976)
Epidemiology (2067)
Evolutionary Biology (19166)
Genetics (12747)
Genomics (17553)
Immunology (12685)
Microbiology (29740)
Molecular Biology (12379)
Neuroscience (64756)
Paleontology (479)
Pathology (2002)
Pharmacology and Toxicology (3459)
Physiology (5332)
Plant Biology (11091)
Scientific Communication and Education (1728)
Synthetic Biology (3064)
Systems Biology (7689)
Zoology (1730)

College Football
Football/Soccer
Motorsports
Pro Wrestling
Boston Bruins
Buffalo Sabres
Detroit Red Wings
Florida Panthers
Montreal Canadiens
Ottawa Senators
Toronto Maple Leafs
Tampa Bay Lightning
Carolina Hurricanes
Columbus Blue Jackets
New Jersey Devils
New York Islanders
New York Rangers
Philadelphia Flyers
Pittsburgh Penguins
Washington Capitals
Anaheim Ducks
Calgary Flames
Edmonton Oilers
Los Angeles Kings
San Jose Sharks
Seattle Kraken
Vancouver Canucks
Vegas Golden Knights
Chicago Blackhawks
Colorado Avalanche
Dallas Stars
Minnesota Wild
Nashville Predators
St. Louis Blues
Winnipeg Jets
Predictions
NHL Prospects Last Word On Hockey has been providing extensive coverage of NHL prospects for a decade. Having been featured in some of the top publications, our in-house prospect analysis is considered amongst the most extensive available. Our writers across Canada, the United States, and Europe are constantly updating notes to provide the best coverage possible.

Sports. Honestly. Since 2011

Chicago blackhawks’ success: the power of mental performance and sports psychology.

August 18, 2024

Ava Swanson

In the fast-paced world of professional hockey, mental health is more than just a passing topic; it’s critical for player development and team cohesion. As the Chicago Blackhawks’ transformative offseason nears its end, the focus shifts to how players are strengthening their mental resilience. With resources and strategic support from the coaching staff, the emphasis on sports psychology is set to enhance both individual and team dynamics. By leveraging new mental performance tools and tailored support from coaches and management these efforts are expected to create ripple effects that influence the Blackhawks’ rebuilding process and pave the way for future success.

Mental health in hockey manifests in various ways that can affect their on-ice expertise. For some, the importance of mental health became clear during the challenges of COVID-19. The pandemic impacted daily life and presented new difficulties for professional athletes. Former Blackhawks captain Jonathan Toews shared his health struggles during this time, as he faced crucial decisions about what was best for himself and his future.

“Tazer’s” Home Forever

In October 2021, Toews was placed on the COVID list –a concerning time for the team as they had just gotten him back after he missed the previous season due to chronic immune response syndrome. In a video posted to his X account, Toews shared how his condition affected him:

“I couldn’t quite recover and my immune system was reacting to everything that I did. Any kind of stress, anything that I would do throughout the day, there was always kind of that stress response. So it took some time and that was the frustrating part…but thankfully got a great support team of people that helped me through it and learned a lot about the stress I put in my body over the years.”

Though Toews wasn’t always vocal about what was going on, he knew his health and recovery were more important–even after being placed on injured reserve following a concussion in February 2022.

By March 2023, Toews acknowledged the importance of prioritizing his well-being, telling NBC Sports Chicago,

“I’ve gotten to the point where my health is more important,” Toews said. “I know I could, as I’ve kind of shown these last few years, even though I have my own personal standards and am not happy with the way I’ve performed. I feel like I have much more to give with my experience in the game and knowing how to play the game, but when day after day you’re pushing through pain, it’s just like, to what end?”

A few weeks later, Jonathan Toews played his last game with the Chicago Blackhawks, the team where he spent his entire NHL career.

“Showtime” in New York

In hockey, mental health can be significantly impacted by an injury that disrupts your season. Transitioning from on-ice gameplay to the hours of rehab can be challenging. Regaining a routine through recovery is crucial, as it affects both your physical and mental well-being.

Beloved hockey fans know the name Patrick Kane , also known as “Showtime,” for his incredible seasons with the Blackhawks organization. Despite his trade to New York , Kane has always been clear that he wants to play for as long as possible, regardless of injuries. However, during his single season with the New York Rangers, Kane faced challenges due to an injury that required hip resurfacing.

In an interview with ESPN’s NHL reporter Emily Kaplan, Kane discussed his recovery and what it means to return to the game. Despite the surgery and hours of rehab, Kane expressed his desire to come back because of the “sour taste in [his] mouth after last year…this was because of an injury, it’s just kind of one part of my body that didn’t feel good.” Kane even mentioned that when he’s feeling healthy he considers himself one of the top players in the league.

Describing the pain he felt in his hip over the last few years, Kane said,

“Anytime I took a hit on the right side of the hip, the joint would compress, and I would basically feel bone on bone. Your leg shuts down for 45 seconds, and you just feel pain.”

After putting in countless hours of rehab and focusing on his overall well-being, Patrick Kane remained in the league…just now on a Blackhawks rival team.

Goaltender and Advocate

Las Vegas Golden Knights goaltender Robin Lehner , who spent the 2019-2020 season with the Blackhawks, has openly shared his struggles with mental health. Lehner revealed he dealt with suicidal thoughts, addiction, and was later diagnosed with bipolar disorder, ADHD, PTSD, and trauma.

In an article he wrote for The Athletic , Lehner reflected on his 2018 season with the Buffalo Sabres, where he experienced severe depression and increased drinking. He wrote, “I was self-treating myself because I could not be inside my own head by myself.”

Lehner emphasized the importance of a conversation with his lawyer that made him realize he needed to go to rehab. He wrote, “I contacted ‘the program’ supported by the NHL and the NHLPA. I told them I needed help, but I never let on to the severity of the situation. No one knew.”

He described detox to be very rough, and even after achieving sobriety, his next challenging was returning to hockey. He hesitated to reveal his bipolar diagnosis due to the stigma. However, when the New York Islanders called, he felt accepted and grateful that a team was willing to take a chance on him.

After just one season, the Blackhawks brought Lehner on board. He used his platform to advocate for mental health by featuring the hashtag #samehere on his helmet. For Lehner this meant:

“I’ve faced challenges in life too. Those challenges have affected my mental health. It’s a sign that we hope will unite the world to once and for all, normalized how universal this topic is.

Mental Health in Hockey

To educate players and reduce the stigma around mental health in hockey, the NHLPA partnered with Opening Minds and Mental Health. This collaboration aimed to strengthen members’ knowledge and skills. The program, called “First Line,” provides an educational and supportive environment designed to increase awareness of various mental health issues. It also fosters peer-to-peer support and encourages players to become advocates for mental health.

How Hockey Players are Training Their Minds

Sports psychology, while not new, is often considered a niche within psychology. For hockey players, mastering the game involves more than just physical skill. It requires building and maintaining self-assurance under pressure and stress. Key strategies include visualization, imagery, and effective team dynamics and communication. According to Sporting Bounce , sports psychologists and coaches use these tools to tailor strategies that enhance both individual and team performance. Important aspects of this training include on- and off-ice team building exercises, group discussions, and goal setting. These elements help players develop mental toughness, stay focused under pressure, and recover from setbacks.

Psychology Meets Hockey: Blackhawks’ Approach to Mental Resilience

In 2016, the Chicago Blackhawks partnered with O2X Human Performance to enhance player development at all levels of the organization. This collaboration focuses on mental health in hockey, covering performance development, mental readiness, sleep and fatigue management, recovery protocols, accountability, debriefing, communication, and resilience.

For some players, the desire to win games is inherent. However, veterans often shift their focus to changing their mindsets. Centre Jason Dickinson , known for stabilizing Chicago’s rebuild despite being labelled a “late bloomer,” offers a different perspective. The Hockey News quoted Dickinson saying,

“When I hear that term, it sounds like your abilities started later, and I don’t think my abilities changed. I think my mindset changed. My mental strength changed. That’s the biggest thing.”

Small, yet significant changes like these push players to become more effective on the ice. They foster maturity in their mental strength and among teammates.

So, how do players gain control of mental health in hockey? Through the support of behavioral sport and performance psychologists or certified mental performance consultants (CMPC). Andrew Joy, who worked with the Blackhawks leading up to their 2015 Stanley Cup win, shared with NBC Sports Chicago that his off-ice experience was crucial. He felt it was just as important as the on-ice efforts. Since then, he has expanded his work beyond the Blackhawks, continuing to impact young athletes across the sport.

Privacy is essential as mental health in hockey remains a key focus for the organization. With a dedicated team of mental performance staff and supportive coaching, the Chicago Blackhawks are eager to unlock the potential of their players. In the mental game of resilience, time is a tricky factor. However, as the Blackhawks continue to rebuild, their commitment to mental performance tools and personalized support will be crucial in driving progress and laying the foundation for future success.

Main Photo: David Banks-USA TODAY Sports

Best Dallas Stars by Sweater Number: 51 to 60

This is the sixth addition to our series on the “Best Dallas Stars by Sweater Number.” Here are the Best Dallas Stars by Sweater Number

Best Calgary Flames By Jersey Number: 71-80

We’re nearly through all the numbers in our series looking at the Best Calgary Flames in franchise history based on the jersey number they wore.

NHL Rumours: Future of Former Toronto Maple Leafs Captain

It’s time for another round of NHL rumours. We may be in August, but we’ve had some big NHL news over the past week. The

The Future of the ”C” in St. Louis

The St. Louis Blues are in a retooling period and are getting younger. As the franchise transitions to the next era of Blues hockey, who

Send Us A Message

Programs submenu

Regions submenu, topics submenu, gaza's looming polio threat—gaza: the human toll, weapons in space: a virtual book talk with dr. aaron bateman.

Abshire-Inamori Leadership Academy
Aerospace Security Project
Africa Program
Americas Program
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative
Asia Program
Australia Chair
Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy
Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy
Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies
China Power Project
Chinese Business and Economics
Defending Democratic Institutions
Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Defense 360
Defense Budget Analysis
Diversity and Leadership in International Affairs Project
Economics Program
Emeritus Chair in Strategy
Energy Security and Climate Change Program
Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
Freeman Chair in China Studies
Futures Lab
Geoeconomic Council of Advisers
Global Food and Water Security Program
Global Health Policy Center
Hess Center for New Frontiers
Human Rights Initiative
Humanitarian Agenda
Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program
International Security Program
Japan Chair
Kissinger Chair
Korea Chair
Langone Chair in American Leadership
Middle East Program
Missile Defense Project
Project on Critical Minerals Security
Project on Fragility and Mobility
Project on Nuclear Issues
Project on Prosperity and Development
Project on Trade and Technology
Renewing American Innovation
Scholl Chair in International Business
Smart Women, Smart Power
Southeast Asia Program
Stephenson Ocean Security Project
Strategic Technologies Program
Sustainable Development and Resilience Initiative
Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies
Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program
All Regions
Australia, New Zealand & Pacific
Middle East
Russia and Eurasia
American Innovation
Civic Education
Climate Change
Cybersecurity
Defense Budget and Acquisition
Defense and Security
Energy and Sustainability
Food Security
Gender and International Security
Geopolitics
Global Health
Human Rights
Humanitarian Assistance
Intelligence
International Development
Maritime Issues and Oceans
Missile Defense
Nuclear Issues
Transnational Threats
Water Security

Seizing the Initiative in Ukraine: Waging War in a Defense Dominant World

Photo: Yevhenii Zavhorodnii/Global Images Ukraine/Getty Images

Brief by Seth G. Jones , Riley McCabe , and Alexander Palmer

Published October 12, 2023

Available Downloads

Download the Brief 1789kb

Ukrainian forces retain the initiative in the war but advanced an average of only 90 meters per day on the southern front during the peak of their summer offensive, according to new CSIS analysis. Russia’s extensive fortifications—which include minefields, trench networks, and support from artillery, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft—have slowed Ukrainian advances. In particular, Russia has expanded the size of its minefields from 120 meters to 500 meters in some areas, making Ukraine the most heavily mined country in the world today. Ukrainian military progress is still possible, but the United States and other Western countries need to provide sustained military aid and other assistance.

Introduction

The war in Ukraine has become a test of political will and industrial capacity between two competing blocks: allied countries aiding Ukraine, such as the United States and numerous countries in Europe and Asia; and axis countries aiding Russia, such as China, North Korea, and Iran. Despite Ukraine’s efforts to liberate territory illegally seized by Russia, offensive operations have been slow. Some policymakers have erroneously argued that poor Ukrainian strategy has contributed to the slow pace of operations. According to proponents of this view, the Ukrainian military mistakenly focused on conducting operations along multiple fronts rather than on a single front in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[1]

To better understand military operations in Ukraine, this analysis asks three questions. What is the state of the offense-defense balance in the Ukraine war? What factors have impacted Ukrainian offensive operations? What are the policy implications for the United States and other Western countries?

Ukrainian operations raise the age-old question in warfare about whether it is easier for militaries to seize territory or defend it. This phenomenon is called the “offense-defense balance,” and it refers to the relative strength between the offense and defense in warfare.[2] The main idea is that there are several factors, such as geography, force employment, strategy, and technology, that can influence whether the offense or defense has the advantage. [3] When the offense has the advantage, it is generally easier for an attacking state to destroy its opponent’s military and seize territory than it is to defend one’s own territory. When the defense has the advantage, it is generally easier to hold territory than it is to move forward and seize it.[4]

This analysis utilizes several sources of information. To understand historical rates of advance, this assessment compiles data on offensive campaigns from World War I through Ukraine’s 2023 offensive.[5] It also examines open-source data on fortifications, unit positions, and the attrition of military equipment. In addition, it uses satellite imagery and drone footage of the battlefield in eastern and southern Ukraine to understand the challenges of offensive operations. Finally, the authors conducted interviews with Ukrainian, U.S., and European military officials.

The analysis comes to three main conclusions. First, defense has the advantage in the war. This reality should not come as a major surprise. Carl von Clausewitz wrote in On War that “defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack” and that “the superiority of the defensive (if rightly understood) is very great, far greater than appears at first sight.”[6] Ukrainian forces averaged approximately 90 meters of advance per day during their recent push on the southern front between early June and late August 2023.

Second, the reason for the slow pace of advance was not poor Ukrainian strategic choices, as some have argued.[7] Instead, it was likely caused by a Ukrainian change in force employment, especially the deliberate adoption of small-unit tactics, and the lack of key technology such as fighter aircraft for suppression of enemy air defense and close air support. In addition, Russia constructed substantial defensive fortifications, including minefields, and utilized attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) against advancing Ukrainian forces.

Third, Ukraine still retains the initiative in the war, and the United States and other Western countries should provide long-term aid packages that help Ukraine strengthen its defense and prevent or deter a Russian counterattack in the future. They should also provide additional aid to help Ukraine on offense to maximize the possibility that it can retake as much territory as possible from Russia. After all, one of the United States’ most significant adversaries, Russia, has been reduced to a second- or third-rate military power without a single U.S. military casualty. As many as 120,000 Russian soldiers have been killed, as well as over 300,000 wounded, and Ukrainian soldiers have destroyed a massive number of Russian weapons systems, from main battle tanks and fighter aircraft to submarines and landing ships.[8] U.S. aid to Ukraine should continue even with U.S. support to Israel likely to grow following the October 2023 Hamas attack, since Russia, Iran, and their partners represent a significant threat to U.S. interests.

The rest of this brief is divided into three sections. The first examines the state of the war and the strength of the defensive advantage in Ukraine. The second section explores the factors contributing to the defensive advantage. The third outlines several policy implications for the United States and other Western countries.

Defense Dominance

In early June 2023, Ukraine began a counteroffensive to retake territory illegally occupied by Russian forces in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts. Ukraine retains the operational initiative, but its relatively slow pace of advance and the trade-offs it has made to preserve personnel and equipment indicate that the defense has significant advantages.

This section examines Ukraine’s efforts across three main fronts in summer 2023. First, Ukrainian offensive operations were primarily concentrated along the southern front, in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast and western portions of the Donetsk Oblast. Second, Ukraine was on the offensive in various locations along the eastern front in the Donetsk Oblast. Third Ukraine conducted raids across the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast, although it did not conduct larger military operation in the region. In addition, Russia and Ukraine were engaged in attacks using missiles, UASs, and special operations forces beyond the front lines in such areas as Crimea.

Southern Front: Beginning in June 2023, Ukraine pursued two main lines of attack on the southern front: one toward the city of Melitopol and other toward the city of Berdiansk. Both cities are transit routes and logistical hubs for Russian forces throughout southern Ukraine and Crimea, the disruption of which represents significant strategic value to Ukraine. However, Ukraine’s progress on the southern front was slow, though deliberate.

Ukraine’s most significant advance was around the town of Robotyne, in the direction of Melitopol. Ukraine advanced a total of roughly 7.6 kilometers from early June to late August 2023—an average of approximately 90 meters per day.[9] This advance was slow even when compared with historical offensives in which the attacker did not draw major benefit from surprise or from air superiority. The Ukrainian offensive did, however, continue to move forward, unlike many historical examples in which the attackers were thrown back.

Ukraine also moved slower than in its previous offensives against Russia, in which it faced less organized defenses. In its 2023 counteroffensive, Ukraine faced a system of fortified defenses —extensively prepared trench lines, minefields, and other fieldworks.[10] During its 2022 counteroffensive in the Kherson Oblast, Ukraine advanced 590 meters a day on average through prepared defenses —systems that include fortifications but that nevertheless were limited by time and resource constraints. Around the same time, Ukraine advanced rapidly in a counteroffensive in the Kharkiv Oblast, moving forward 7.5 kilometers a day on average and overcoming hasty defenses —systems constructed either in contact or when contact is imminent with opposing forces, and that therefore depend on enhancing the natural terrain.

Figure 1 shows the average rate of advance for selected combined arms offensives, such as Galicia, the Somme, Gorzia, and Belleau Wood during World War I; Leningrad and Kursk-Oboyan during World War II; Deversoir (Chinese Farm) during the Yom Kippur War; and Ukraine in 2022 and 2023. Cases were selected from a universe of offensive campaigns lasting more than one day in which the attacker advanced, did not achieve substantial or complete surprise, and did not benefit from air superiority. In addition, cases were selected to ensure variation in geography, technology, time period, attacking and defending forces, and average advance. A much larger number of cases were also consulted, though not included in Figure 1.[11]

Seth G. Jones

Riley McCabe

Alexander Palmer

Programs & projects.

Mapping the War in Ukraine

Slow progress on the southern front does not mean that Ukraine is failing or will fail in its objectives. It merely indicates that seizing terrain is difficult, probably more so than in its previous offensives. It is possible that Ukraine’s rate of advance may accelerate if it can overcome Russia’s defensive positions near the current front lines or if the Russian military experiences operational or strategic collapse. Such changes in fortune are not unprecedented in modern warfare. The Allied breakout from Normandy in Operation Cobra followed 17 days of grinding combat in which General Omar Bradley’s First Army suffered more than 40,000 casualties to advance 11 kilometers, an advance rate of approximately 650 meters per day.[12] It succeeded despite the exhaustion of several of the infantry divisions tasked with the initial penetration, eventually breaking through German lines and advancing another 11 kilometers in the three days following the initial assault. The success was achieved due to German defensive failings and Allied airpower and demonstrates that slow advances are not incapable of becoming rapid breakthroughs.[13] While Ukraine lacks the offensive advantages the Allies enjoyed in Normandy, the Russian military has also not demonstrated the operational competence of the German Wehrmacht in World War II. The example suggests that an accelerated advance remains possible, if unlikely.

Despite the slow progress, Ukraine advanced past the first of three lines of Russian fortifications in some areas along the southern front, as shown in Figure 3. It is possible that a Ukrainian breakthrough of the second line could accelerate the rate of advance, but Russia can probably still limit the strategic impact of a second breakthrough. Russia maintains a third defensive system consisting of a constellation of disconnected fortifications surrounding key cities in the region, as shown in Figure 2.

Attrition ratios also suggest that the cost of seizing terrain has increased. As shown in Figure 4, Ukraine suffered greater attrition in its summer 2023 counteroffensive than in its previous offensives. According to open-source data, Russia lost only 2.0 fighting vehicles (defined as a tank, armored fighting vehicle, or infantry fighting vehicle) for each Ukrainian fighting vehicle destroyed, captured, abandoned, or seriously damaged in its current offensive. This ratio is less favorable to Ukraine than the 3.9 Russian vehicles lost per Ukrainian vehicle during its summer 2022 counteroffensive and 6.7 Russian vehicles lost per Ukrainian vehicle during the counteroffensive that drove Russia back from Kyiv in early 2022.[14] While loss ratios and rates of advance are crude metrics for measuring Ukrainian progress, they together suggest that taking territory has been more difficult in the 2023 offensive than in Ukraine’s previous operations.

Elsewhere along the southern front, Ukraine made limited advances south of the city of Velyka Novosilka in the direction of Berdiansk. Ukrainian forces liberated several towns in their advance south of Velyka Novosilka, engaging in significant fighting. However, Ukraine’s gains in the area represented only approximately 10 kilometers of advance from early June to late August 2023.

Eastern Front: Unlike on the southern front, where Ukrainian offensive operations over the summer represented a new phase in the war, fighting on the eastern front has been continuous in some areas for over a year. Ukraine made marginal gains over the summer in a handful of pockets along the eastern front, particularly in the Donetsk Oblast. One example is around Bakhmut, where Russia has pressed since August 2022 for small territorial gains at high costs to personnel.[15] Beginning in May 2023, however, Ukraine conducted a series of flanking counterattacks, retaking pieces of territory southwest and northwest of the city.

Despite these successes, Ukraine has yet to approach key Russian positions beyond the current frontlines. These include the cities of Donetsk, Makiivka, and Horlivka, as well as the network of Russian fortifications that stretch between them. As CSIS assessed in June 2023, a Ukrainian attempt to push through these cities is unlikely because of the difficulties and likelihood of high casualties in urban warfare.[16] For now, sustained Ukrainian operations on the eastern front have fixed large numbers of Russian forces that otherwise would have been available to reinforce Russian defensive efforts to the south.[17]

Unlike most other locations in Ukraine, Russian forces were involved in limited offensive operations in multiple areas along the eastern front over the summer. In addition to pushing back against Ukrainian gains in the Donetsk Oblast, Russia increased its presence near and attacks against the northern city of Kupiansk, which Ukraine liberated in September 2022.[18]

Dnipro Front: Throughout the summer, Ukraine conducted limited crossings of the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast to perform reconnaissance and raid Russian positions.[19] These crossings vary in size, but they typically involved small groups of Ukrainian soldiers using speedboats to discretely cross the river and execute their missions quickly before returning across to Ukrainian-controlled territory.

It is possible that Ukraine plans to establish and sustain bridgeheads across the river from which to launch larger military operations in the near future. Ukrainian military leaders stated their intent to set the conditions for future larger crossings, including by destroying Russian artillery that could target large river-crossing forces and clearing mines that could slow landing forces.[20] However, even with proper preparation, amphibious assaults are one of the most complex and demanding operations a military can attempt. Any attempt to cross the Dnipro with a large number of forces would likely be discovered and contested by Russian forces in the first line of fortifications that spans from the Dnipro Delta across from the city of Kherson and up the Dnipro River northward. Moreover, even a successful crossing would require complicated logistical support and need to overcome a large number of fieldworks Russia has constructed along the major roads in the region, as shown in Figure 6. For now, Ukraine more likely intends its attacks to fix Russian forces in Kherson, preventing them from redeploying to the southern or eastern fronts.

Beyond the Frontlines: In addition to the fighting on the three fronts, the war has been marked in recent months by intensified missile barrages and escalating naval engagements. Since May, Russia has renewed its long-range UAS and missile attacks in Ukraine. Targets include a mix of critical infrastructure, command and control installations, and other military and civilian targets throughout Ukraine.[21] For its part, Ukraine continues to conduct missile and UAS strikes against Russian military assets, headquarters, and strategic infrastructure in occupied territory.[22] Ukraine has also conducted UAS attacks inside Russia. These attacks have been concentrated in the Bryansk and Belgorod regions near the western border with Ukraine, in Crimea, and in Moscow.[23] On July 30, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that Russian territory was fair game: “Gradually, the war is returning to the territory of Russia—to its symbolic centers and military bases, and this is an inevitable, natural, and absolutely fair process.”[24]

With the termination of a grain export deal in mid-July, tensions escalated in the Black Sea region. Ukraine struck Russian targets—including diesel-electric submarines, air defense systems, amphibious landing ships, radar installations, and infrastructure, such as dry docks—in and around Crimea using UK-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles, UASs, special operations forces, and other weapons systems and forces.[25] On July 17, Ukrainian UASs damaged the Kerch Strait Bridge used by Russia to move supplies and troops into Crimea.[26] On August 24, Ukrainian special operation forces also reportedly conducted a nighttime raid against Russian positions in Crimea.[27] In response to Ukrainian attacks, Russia withdrew the bulk of its Black Sea Fleet, such as attack submarines and frigates, from Sevastopol to other ports in Russia and Crimea.[28]

Over the summer, Russia also conducted a series of attacks against Ukrainian Danube ports that serve as hubs for the export of grain and other food commodities.[29] According to Romanian officials, Russian UASs were flown near and occasionally inside Romanian air space to strike Ukrainian ports, such as Izmail and Reni, just a few hundred yards from Romanian territory. On several occasions, Romanian officials collected fragments from Russian UASs inside of Romanian territory.[30]

Debating Battlefield Performance

Battlefield success hinges on a complex interaction of several factors, including force employment, strategy, technology, leadership, weather, and combat motivation.[31] While Ukraine retains the initiative in the war, Ukraine’s military advance has been relatively slow. Why? This section examines four possible hypotheses: Ukrainian strategy, Russian defenses, Ukrainian technology, and Ukrainian force employment.

Ukrainian Strategy: Some policymakers and analysts contend that poor Ukrainian strategy contributed to the slow pace of Ukrainian operations, though there is little evidence to support this argument.[32] According to proponents, the Ukrainian military focused too much on conducting operations along multiple fronts, rather than concentrating forces on a single front in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The military objective in the south—and indeed a major objective of Ukrainian military operations more broadly—appeared to be pushing south to the Sea of Azov, cutting Russian occupation forces in two, severing the land corridor between Russia and occupied Crimea, and retaking such cities as Melitopol.

Instead of focusing on a southeast axis, however, Ukrainian commanders divided troops and firepower between the east and the south. Some U.S. military officials advised Ukraine to concentrate its forces in the south and drive toward Melitopol to punch through Russian defenses. Likewise, some criticized the Ukrainian military for moving forward on multiple axes within Zaporizhzhia Oblast itself rather than focusing on one main axis.[33] The argument about how and where Ukraine should concentrate its offensive efforts is, in part, a debate about force ratios.[34] Proponents of focusing solely on the south argue that massing Ukrainian forces along a single axis in Zaporizhzhia would have allowed Ukraine to achieve the favorable force ratio necessary to generate a significant breakthrough.

But this argument is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, Russian military leaders came to the same conclusion and prepared accordingly. They anticipated that Ukrainian forces would likely focus on the southern front and sent forces to fortify Melitopol and Tokmak, as well as other areas in Zaporizhzhia. Second, well-designed mechanized campaigns almost always progress on multiple axes, not just one. Advancing along a single axis allows the defender to fully concentrate on stopping that advance. In this case, the Russians would almost certainly have moved forces from other parts of the theater as rapidly as possible to stop the Ukrainian drive toward Melitopol. Instead, Ukrainian advances in Bakhmut and other eastern areas pinned down Russian forces since Russia was not prepared to lose Bakhmut.

Actual force ratios across the long front lines in Ukraine are impossible to determine using open sources, but there is little reason to believe that Ukraine’s multifront approach was a mistake. To achieve favorable force ratios despite its smaller military, Ukraine would have had to move forces to the decisive point before the Russian defenders could react and surge their own forces to that area.[35] But Russia anticipated that Ukraine would attack in Zaporizhzhia, prepared its most extensive networks of fortifications in the region as shown in Figure 7, and almost certainly planned to redeploy forces to reinforce against a Ukrainian advance there.[36]

As a result, Ukraine likely could not have achieved more favorable force ratios even by massing its forces along one or two axes in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. While a more favorable force ratio is always desirable, evidence suggests that a higher concentration of Ukraine’s efforts along the southern front likely would have been met by a higher concentration of Russian forces in heavily fortified terrain.

Russian Defenses: Another possible explanation for Ukraine’s limited progress is that Russian forces constructed and used defensive fortifications effectively. There is some evidence to support this argument. In advance of Ukraine’s offensive, Russia built the most extensive defensive works in Europe since World War II, with expansive fortifications in eastern and southern Ukraine.[37] These defenses consist of a network of trenches, anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, razor wire, earthen berms, and dragon’s teeth, as shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Multilayered Defense North of Mykhailivka, Ukraine

Ukraine’s slow advance can be attributed, in part, to Russia’s successes using fortifications to defend against Ukrainian assaults. Across the entire front, Russian troops primarily fought from infantry trench systems. Russian forces in some areas, such as the 7th Guards Air Assault Division, were so thoroughly dug in that Ukrainian forces discovered carpets and pictures on the walls of captured Russian positions.[38]

Russia employed a variety of fortifications to slow the advance of Ukrainian vehicles. However, not all fortifications are created equal. One former Ukrainian commander belittled the effectiveness of Russian dragon’s teeth defenses in September 2023.[39] Based on satellite imagery and other information, CSIS analysis in June 2023 similarly questioned the potential effectiveness of Russia’s dragon’s teeth given the varied quality in their installation and make.[40]

But Russia’s extensive use of mines effectively slowed Ukrainian advances. Ukraine is now the most mined country in the world after Russia expanded the size of minefields from 120 meters to 500 meters.[41] The increased size and frequency of minefields complicated Ukrainian planning and limited the effectiveness of Ukraine’s equipment. For example, when the Ukrainian 47th Assault Brigade and 33rd Mechanized Brigade attempted to cross a minefield north of Robotyne on June 8, 2023, mine-clearing efforts were insufficient. Slowed or disabled by mines, Ukrainian vehicles came under fire from Russian attack helicopters, and Ukrainian soldiers were forced to abandon their equipment and retreat.[42] The incident reportedly resulted in the loss or abandonment of at least 25 tanks and fighting vehicles, although some were later recovered.[43] Drone footage and satellite imagery show a cluster of 11 vehicles damaged and abandoned in one location from the failed advance, as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Damaged and Abandoned Vehicle from an Attempted Ukrainian Advance North of Robotyne, June 2023

Source: Screenshot of video release by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Minefields disrupted Ukraine’s offensive momentum and imposed constraints on Ukraine’s rate of advance. Russian minelaying increased the demand on Ukrainian reconnaissance and engineers and complicates military planning.[44] As a result, Ukrainian operations in mined areas had to be slow and deliberate or risk trapping equipment and personnel on exposed ground.

The terrain in Ukraine increased the effectiveness of Russian defenses. Rows of flat, open farm fields separated by tree lines characterize the southern front. Without air superiority, Ukrainian ground forces had to advance by crossing these fields with little natural cover to conceal their movement. In addition to laying mines, Russia targeted advancing Ukrainian troops and vehicles with artillery fire, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. Using thick summer foliage to their advantage, Russia concealed tanks, anti-tank units, and infantry units in the tree lines that border the fields to ambush Ukrainian forces.[45]

In urban areas, Russia used infrastructure to its advantage. Buildings and other structures provide cover to defending forces and enable ambushes. Russia also methodically destroyed roads and created obstacles in urban areas to disrupt the advance of Ukrainian vehicles and channel them into dangerous areas. For example, a Ukrainian assault in late July on the town of Staromaiorske along the southern front was reportedly slowed by a combination of such defenses. [46]

Ukraine’s advance was further complicated by the proliferation of sensors and rapid precision strike capabilities on the battlefield, especially long-range precision fires and UASs. Russia deployed significant numbers of small UASs in contested areas, and some Ukrainian sources reported losing 10,000 UASs every month, which demonstrated the sheer number of these systems being employed on the battlefield.[47] The ubiquity of these systems makes it impossible to establish that sensor saturation and advanced strike capabilities provide a distinct defensive advantage, but there are good reasons to believe this is the case. Sensor saturation creates a “transparent battlefield” in which forces can be found and targeted more easily than in past decades.[48]

The advancement of precision fires and the proliferation of lethal UASs shorten the time it takes to strike enemy forces once they are located. In many cases, a UAS may act as both the sensor and the strike capability. Loitering munitions, for example, can circle battlefields until a target is acquired and approved for an immediate strike. On a transparent battlefield onto which an adversary can rapidly strike detected forces, attackers must distribute further, move more deliberately, make greater use of cover, and more tightly coordinate movement with suppressive fire in order to survive their advance. In contrast, defenders can take advantage of prepared fighting positions that are less exposed both to enemy detection and enemy fire.

Ukrainian Technology: A third possibility is that offense was weakened by insufficient technology, especially weapons systems that would facilitate a breakthrough. There is some evidence to support this argument. Ukraine received significant military assistance from the West, which aided combat operations. Examples include artillery, main battle tanks, armored carriers, ground support vehicles, air defense systems, air-to-ground missiles, manned aircraft, UASs, coastal defense systems, and radar and communications. U.S.-supplied cluster munitions, which can cause devastation over a broader area than ordinary shells, were also helpful for Ukrainian forces. Ukraine used cluster munitions to target Russian troops running across open ground, either to flee or to provide reinforcements. However, Ukraine’s lack of fighter aircraft, disadvantage in fires, and limited enablers made it more difficult to break through Russian lines.[49]

Ukrainian Force Employment: Some have argued that the speed of Ukrainian advances was impacted by its military doctrine and tactical implementation, a combination known as “force employment.”[50] There is some evidence to support this argument.

Choices in how militaries use the soldiers and equipment at their disposal can permit attackers to advance despite the extreme lethality of defenders’ firepower or permit defenders to limit the gains of numerically overwhelming attackers.[51] Effective force employment requires tight coordination between infantry, armor, artillery, and airpower at several organizational levels, as well as high levels of autonomy, initiative, and tactical prowess at lower echelons.

Ukraine changed how it used its forces to reduce its losses while accepting an advance rate much slower than its leaders may have initially desired. There is little doubt that Ukraine’s initial force employment resulted in high rates of attrition. But it remains unclear why Ukraine’s initial force employment resulted in such high losses without generating sizable advances. Training, force structure, organizational culture, or lack of airpower all may have played roles, and the interaction between Russian defenses and Zaporizhzhia’s terrain may have forestalled a mechanized breakthrough independent of those factors.

While granular data on Ukraine’s force employment is scarce, open-source information suggests a shift in tactics after its unsuccessful first assaults. Accounts based on interviews with combatants suggest a change in how Ukraine coordinated its infantry, armor, and artillery.[52] Ukrainian operations in June 2023 appear to have been organized around larger maneuver units than later Ukrainian operations in the summer, which employed smaller infantry units supported by artillery and small numbers of tanks. Analysis by the Royal United Services Institute demonstrates that Ukraine can effectively integrate multiple combat branches at lower echelons.[53]

Ukraine also emphasized destroying Russian artillery as part of its changing offensive strategy. Open-source data shows that Ukraine greatly increased its destruction of Russian artillery systems in late June and early July following its initial failures to advance, as shown in Figure 10.[54] This is consistent with some reporting on Ukraine’s changed operational approach.[55] This appears to mark a shift toward destroying enemy artillery before advancing and away from the combined arms approach of advancing while simultaneously suppressing the enemy using artillery fire.

These changes were associated with a significant decrease in Ukrainian losses. U.S. and European officials reported that Ukraine lost as much as 20 percent of the weapons sent to the battlefield in the first two weeks of the offensive, a rate that prompted Ukrainian commanders to reevaluate their tactics.[56] After adopting an operational approach centered around small-unit probes and attrition by artillery and UAS strikes, Ukrainian equipment loss rates were cut in half, with approximately 10 percent of equipment lost in the next phase of operations.[57] In a war of attrition, such a decrease in loss rates was probably seen by Ukrainians as worth the slow pace of advance.

The key question of whether Ukraine’s initial mechanized assaults would have succeeded if executed with greater skill is unanswerable, despite remarks made by some military officials, political figures, and security analysts.[58] Effective coordination between branches of arms might have allowed Ukraine to break through Russian lines. It is also plausible that Ukraine’s lack of air superiority on a sensor-saturated battlefield would have limited the benefits of such coordination. Previous analysis of World War II breakthroughs suggests that skillful implementation of combined arms tactics have mattered for successful offensive operations, but also that preponderance of firepower, operational maneuverability, speed, surprise, and air dominance have also influenced the likelihood of a breakthrough and exploitation.[59] There is little reason to believe that more effective combined arms tactics would have been sufficient to achieve the breakthrough that Ukraine and its backers initially hoped for in the summer of 2023 without the advantages of surprise and air superiority.

Policy Implications

Opposition to providing further aid to Ukraine is building among some members of U.S. Congress, as highlighted in the September 2023 stopgap spending bill that did not include additional money for Ukraine. Some argue that the United States should concentrate exclusively on countering China in the Indo-Pacific and defending Taiwan. These officials contend that U.S. resources are finite, that weapons exports to Ukraine come at Taiwan’s expense, and that sustained focus on war in Europe benefits China.[60] Some also argue that the United States should prioritize aid to Israel over Ukraine.[61] Others maintain that every dollar spent on Ukraine is a waste of taxpayer money that could be better used on domestic priorities, such as improving healthcare, cracking down on illegal immigration, or combating the spread of fentanyl.[62]

But these arguments are misguided. Continuing aid to Ukraine is essential to prevent authoritarian leaders, such as Vladimir Putin, from achieving their revanchist aims. In fact, Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran have deepened their military, economic, and diplomatic ties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

U.S. allies and enemies alike see Ukraine as a test of Western resolve. The Ukrainian military still has the initiative in the war and continues to advance forward.[63] Ukraine’s supporters can meaningfully impact two of the factors outlined in the previous section: Ukrainian force employment and technology. The fundamental challenge is that both take time. A war that continues to favor the defense is also likely to be protracted, since Ukrainian advances will likely continue to be slow.

The United States and its Western allies need to be prepared to support a long war and to develop a long-term aid plan. They have already provided extensive training and intelligence to improve Ukraine’s force employment, including combined arms maneuver, air defense, special operations activities, intelligence, and the operation and maintenance of more than 20 military systems.[64] This support needs to continue and adapt as the war evolves.

In addition, Ukraine needs more and better technology in two respects. The first is long-term assistance that will help Ukraine strengthen its defense and prevent or deter a Russian counterattack in the future. Examples include mines, anti-tank guided missiles, air defense systems, stockpiles of munitions, counter-UAS systems, and area-effect weapons, such as artillery.

The second type of assistance is aid that helps Ukraine on offense in the current campaign and maximizes the possibility that it can break through well-fortified areas and retake as much territory as possible from Russia. Examples include a steady supply of munitions; attack aircraft, such as F-16s; long-range missiles, such as MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS); and UASs that can conduct intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike missions.

Based on current trends, continuing aid to Ukraine may cost roughly $14.5 billion per year. Figure 11 highlights what this might look like through the end of 2024. This aid has a highly favorable risk-reward ratio. One of the United States’ most significant adversaries, Russia, is suffering extraordinary attrition. As many 120,000 Russian soldiers have died, and perhaps three times that number have been wounded, along with several dozen Russian general officers. Ukrainian soldiers have destroyed substantial numbers of Russian military equipment, such as main battle tanks, armored and infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, artillery, surface-to-air missile systems, fighter aircraft, helicopters, UASs, submarines, landing ships, and a guided missile cruiser.[65] And the United States has lost zero soldiers in the war.

The war is now, in part, a contest between the defense industrial bases of the two sides: Russia and its partners, such as China and Iran; and Ukraine and its partners, including the United States and other Western countries. A decision by the United States to significantly reduce military aid would shift the military balance-of-power in favor of Russia and increase the possibility that Russia will ultimately win the war by seizing additional Ukrainian territory in a grinding war of attrition. Too much is at stake. As UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher said to President George H.W. Bush in the leadup to the First Gulf War, after Iraq had invaded Kuwait, “This is no time to go wobbly.”[66]

Seth G. Jones is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Riley McCabe is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS. Alexander Palmer is a research associate with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.

The authors wish to thank Eliot Cohen, Daniel Byman, and Phillips O’Brien for their helpful comments. They also wish to thank Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Jennifer Jun for assistance with satellite imagery, as well as Delaney Duff for research assistance.

This brief is made possible through general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief.

Please consult the PDF for references.

CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

Election 2024
Entertainment
Newsletters
Photography
AP Buyline Personal Finance
AP Buyline Shopping
Press Releases
Israel-Hamas War
Russia-Ukraine War
Global elections
Asia Pacific
Latin America
Middle East
Delegate Tracker
AP & Elections
2024 Paris Olympic Games
Auto Racing
Movie reviews
Book reviews
Financial Markets
Business Highlights
Financial wellness
Artificial Intelligence
Social Media

EXPLAINER: What’s behind the conflict in eastern Ukraine?

FILE - In this March 5, 2021, file photo, a Ukrainian serviceman keeps ready a machine gun in his shelter near the front-line town of Krasnohorivka, eastern Ukraine. Tensions are rising over the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup near its border with the region. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File)

FILE - In this Nov. 9, 2019, file photo, Russia-backed separatist rebels’ unit walk to take their position at the new line of contact outside Petrivske, Ukraine. Tensions are rising over the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup near its border with the region. (AP Photo/Alexei Alexandrov, File)

FILE - In this April 9, 2021, file photo, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits the war-hit Donbas region, eastern Ukraine. Tensions are rising over the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup near its border with the region. Zelenskyy was elected president of Ukraine by a landslide in April 2019 on promises to end the fighting and root out the country’s endemic corruption. (Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via AP, File)

FILE - In this April 9, 2021, file photo, a woman visits her home in the separatist-controlled territory to collect her belongings after a recent shelling near a frontline outside Donetsk, eastern Ukraine. Tensions are rising over the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup near its border with the region. (AP Photo, File)

FILE - In this July 14, 2020, file photo, a Ukrainian soldier pays her final respects at the coffin of serviceman Taras Matviiv, honored with the Hero of Ukraine highest state award after being killed while fighting against pro-Russian rebels, during his funeral in Independence Square, Kyiv, Ukraine. Tensions have risen in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup on its side of the border. (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky, File)

FILE - In this June 6, 2014, file photo, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and then Ukrainian president-elect Petro Poroshenko, center, talk as they take part in the 70th anniversary of D-Day in Benouville in Normandy, France. After a series of Ukraine’s military defeats, France and Germany helped broker a peace deal that was signed in February 2015 in the Belarusian capital of Minsk. (Regis Duvignau/Pool Photo via AP, File)

FILE - In this Dec. 9, 2019, file photo, Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy arrive for a working session at the Elysee Palace, Paris, France. The leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany reaffirmed their commitment to a 2015 peace deal for eastern Ukraine. (Ian Langsdon/Pool Photo via AP, File)

FILE - In this Dec. 9, 2019, file photo, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, left, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, attend a joint news conference at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France. The leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany reaffirmed their commitment to a 2015 peace deal for eastern Ukraine. (Ludovic Marin/Pool Photo via AP, File)

FILE - In this Feb. 5, 2015, file photo, relatives of a pro-Russian rebel fighter killed during fighting against Ukrainian government forces, mourn during his funeral in Vuhlehirsk, Donetsk region, eastern Ukraine, after the separatists recently burst through government lines in Vuhlehirsk. Tensions have risen in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup on its side of the border. Ukraine and the West have become increasingly worried about the presence of more Russian troops and urged Moscow to pull them back. (AP Photo/Vadim Braydov, File)

FILE - In this Aug. 1, 2014, file photo, Australian and Dutch investigators examine a piece of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 plane, near the village of Hrabove, Donetsk region, eastern Ukraine. Tensions are rising over the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup near its border with the region. Amid the hostilities, a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet traveling from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down on July 17, 2014, over eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board. (AP Photo/Dmitry Lovetsky, File)

FILE - In this Sept. 5, 2019, file photo, volunteers with the right-wing paramilitary Azov National Corps light flares during a rally at the appeals court, as they protest against release Volodymyr Tsemakh, former commander of Russian-backed separatist forces in eastern Ukraine, in Kiev, Ukraine. Tensions are rising over the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup near its border with the region. (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky, File)

FILE - In this April 12, 2021, file photo, Ukrainian soldier watches through a periscope at fighting positions on the line of separation from pro-Russian rebels near Donetsk, Ukraine. Ukraine and the West have become increasingly worried about the presence of more Russian troops and urged Moscow to pull them back. (AP Photo/File)

FILE - In this Dec. 29, 2019, file photo, Ukrainian soldiers guard an area near Odradivka, eastern Ukraine. Tensions are rising over the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup near its border with the region. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File)

Copy Link copied

MOSCOW (AP) — Tensions are rising over the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup near its border with the region.

Ukraine and the West have become worried about the Russian troops’ concentration and have urged Moscow to pull them back. Russia has argued that it’s free to deploy its forces on its territory and sternly warned the government in Kyiv against using force to reclaim control of the rebel-held territory east where more than 14,000 people have died in seven years of fighting.

Here’s a look at some of the issues involving the conflict in eastern Ukraine:

WHAT ARE THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT?

Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union until its 1991 collapse, and since then Russia has sought to keep the neighbor in its orbit. The separatist conflict in Ukraine’s eastern industrial heartland, known as the Donbas, short for Donetsk Basin, erupted in April 2014. That came a few weeks after Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula following the ouster of a Moscow-friendly president by a popular uprising in the capital of Kyiv.

Armed rebels in the mostly Russian-speaking eastern region seized government buildings and proclaimed “people’s republics” in the Donetsk and the Luhansk regions, and the Ukrainian military and volunteer battalions moved to put down the unrest.

Ukraine and the West said Russia sent troops and weapons to the east to support the separatists. Moscow has denied those claims and insisted that Russians fighting alongside the rebels went there on their own.

Amid the hostilities, a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet traveling from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down on July 17, 2014 , over eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board. Dutch prosecutors allege it was shot by a Russian Buk missile from an area controlled by the Russia-backed separatists. Russia denied any involvement.

The United States and the European Union imposed sanctions on Moscow for its annexation of Crimea, which wasn’t recognized by most of the world, and its support for the separatists. The restrictions have halted the transfer of Western technology and blocked Russia’s access to global capital markets. Russia retaliated by banning most Western food imports.

The Kremlin has repeatedly vowed that no Western sanctions will ever force it to change its course on Ukraine.

HAVE THERE BEEN EFFORTS AT A PEACE DEAL?

After a series of Ukraine’s military defeats, France and Germany helped broker a peace deal that was signed in February 2015 in the Belarusian capital of Minsk.

The agreement was a diplomatic coup for Russia, obliging Ukraine to grant broad autonomy to the rebel regions and declare an amnesty for the rebels. It stipulated that Ukraine would regain full control of its border with Russia in the rebel-held territories only after they elect local leaders and legislatures. Many in Ukraine saw the deal as a betrayal of national interests and opposed it.

The Minsk agreement helped end large-scale hostilities, but sporadic skirmishes have continued and efforts at a political settlement have stalled.

Ukrainian officials have repeatedly pushed for revising the Minsk deal, calls that Russia has rejected.

HOW IS THE PEACE DEAL FARING?

While the separatists have asked Russia to incorporate the rebel territories, Moscow has ignored the demand — apparently figuring that those eastern regions would eventually help draw Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit and thwart Kyiv’s aspirations to join NATO and the EU. Russia has granted its citizenship to more than 600,000 people in the rebel-controlled regions.

Political novice Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected president of Ukraine by a landslide in April 2019 on promises to end the fighting and root out the country’s endemic corruption. He pushed successfully for a series of prisoner exchanges and sought to secure a lasting truce by pulling back troops and heavy weapons from the line of contact.

In December 2019, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany met in Paris and reaffirmed their commitment to the 2015 peace deal, but no progress has been reached on a political settlement.

WHY HAVE TENSIONS ESCALATED NOW?

The lack of a lasting resolution to the conflict has fomented new tensions. Ukrainian authorities say cease-fire violations have become more frequent in recent weeks, with nearly 30 troops killed this year.

They accused Russia of fueling tensions by deploying 41,000 troops near the border with eastern Ukraine and 42,000 to Crimea, where Russia maintains a large naval base.

The U.S. and NATO say the Russian troops’ concentration is the largest since 2014. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said the buildup in the past three weeks was part of readiness drills in response to what he described as threats from NATO .

Russia also has cast it as a necessary security precaution amid what it described as Ukraine’s provocations along the line of control. Kremlin officials have strongly warned Kyiv against trying to use force to retake the east, saying Russia could be forced to intervene to protect civilians if they face a threat of massacre.

WHAT’S THE U.S. ROLE?

The United States has provided political, financial and military assistance to Ukraine, conducted joint military drills and regularly sent its ships into the Black Sea in a show of support.

In a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, new U.S. President Joe Biden voiced concern over the Russian buildup near Ukraine and “called on Russia to de-escalate tensions.” The White House said Biden “emphasized the United States’ unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

The Biden administration on Thursday raised the pressure on Russia, announcing an array of new sanctions , including a ban for U.S. financial institutions to buy Russian government bonds directly from Russian state institutions. Washington also ordered the expulsion of 10 Russian diplomats and targeted six Russian companies and 32 individuals with sanctions for trying to interfere in last year’s U.S. presidential election, the massive SolarWinds hack and other activities.

Russia warned that it will respond with a series of retaliatory moves.

Search form

Publications
Get Involved
Planned Giving

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Fredrick W. Kagan

February 6, 2024, 9:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on February 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Correction : This article was updated on February 7, 2024, to correct the statement regarding US monthly production numbers of 155mm artillery shells. We erroneously reported that US production would reach 60,000 shells per month in October 2024 only if the proposed congressional supplemental appropriations bill passes, whereas the US will reach 60,000 shells per month in October 2024 with or without additional funding and is on track to increase production to 80,000 shells per month using current funding. Additional funding, however, would be needed to reach the target production rate of 100,000 shells per month by October 2025. We apologize for the error.

America’s European and Asian allies have significantly ramped up their efforts to support Ukraine. European Council President Charles Michel stated on February 6 that the European Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement on the creation of a new single dedicated instrument – the Ukraine Facility – to pool the EU’s recently announced support package of 50 billion euros (about $54 billion) for Ukraine for 2024-2027.[1] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the EU aims to start payments to the Ukraine Facility in March 2024.[2] German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall stated on February 5 that it plans to send tens of thousands of 155mm artillery shells, dozens of Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 25 Leopard 1A5 tanks, and an unspecified number of Skynex air defense systems to Ukraine in 2024.[3] South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) stated on February 6 that it plans to sign a contract with ammunition producer Poongsan in 2024 to mass produce 155mm shells that have an extended range of 60 kilometers.[4] South Korea reportedly began indirectly supplying artillery shells to Ukraine in early 2023, and these shells may go to European allies for indirect transfer to Ukraine.[5]

The EU and its member states have made available 138 billion euros (about $148.5 billion) - including its recently announced support package of 50 billion euros (about $54 billion) - to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. [6] In comparison, the US has appropriated $113 billion to Ukraine since the full-scale invasion, of which over $75 billion was directly allocated to Ukraine for humanitarian, financial, and military support. [7] The US government allocated the other $38 billion to security assistance-related funding, which the US government spent largely in the US and on US companies or personnel. [8]

As European partners continue to increase their support for Ukraine, US aid provision in the near to medium-term remains vital to help Ukraine build its defense industrial base (DIB). ISW continues to assess that the US will not need to send large security assistance packages to Ukraine indefinitely if Ukraine successfully continues to actively pursue measures aimed at domestically producing its own weapons, building bilateral and international defense industrial partnerships, and creating industrial joint ventures with Western enterprises aimed at co-producing defense materials.[9] The US will need to continue supporting Ukraine for several years as Ukraine builds its own DIB, but Ukraine’s international security requirements will decrease in the long run as it builds out its own capabilities to become self-sufficient. The ultimate success of Ukraine's efforts to build its DIB, however, depends on Ukraine’s ability to liberate strategically vital areas currently occupied by Russian forces. US and partner military aid to Ukraine in the near term therefore continues to be crucial as the US remains the main source of sufficiently large quantities of essential military equipment, such as M1 Abrams tanks, armored personnel carriers, advanced air defense systems such as Patriots, and long-range strike systems - equipment which previous US aid packages prioritized. [10]

The US Army plans to significantly increase US domestic production of 155mm artillery shells and shell components for Ukraine in 2024 and 2025, and more so should the proposed congressional supplemental appropriations bill pass. US Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology Doug Bush stated on February 5 that the US Army aims to double the US monthly production of 155mm artillery shells from 28,000 shells per month in October 2023 to about 60,000 shells per month in October 2024.[11] Bush stated that the US Army is on track to increase production capacity to 80,000 shells per month using current funding but that additional funding must be appropriated by Congress for it to reach the target production rate of 100,000 shells per month by October 2025. Bush stated that the construction of a new factory in Texas, which will “have an entirely new way” of using technology to make artillery shells, will contribute to the Army’s increased production goals. Bush noted that US shell production in part depends on US domestic production of explosive materials. Bush stated that the proposed supplemental bill includes $600 million for increasing the production of explosives at the Holsten Army Ammunition Plant in Tennessee from five million pounds of explosives a year to 13 million pounds.[12] The proposed bill would also include $93 million to reestablish the production of M6 propellant (used to fire artillery shells but no longer in production in the US) at the Radford Army Ammunition Plant in Virginia, and $650 million would go to constructing a facility (likely also at the Radford Army Ammunition Plant) to domestically produce TNT, which the US currently does not produce. Bush stated that the proposed bill also includes $14 million to construct and recommission a black powder explosive production line in Louisiana. Such investments in US manufacturing are necessary to help support US strategic readiness by rebuilding America’s atrophied defense industrial base, separate and apart from the need to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia.

Russian authorities are reportedly paying Iran roughly $4.5 billion per year to import Iranian Shahed drones to use in Ukraine. A group of hackers from a hacking organization called the Prana Network claimed to have hacked into the servers of purported Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) front company Sahara Thunder on February 4 and published the costs per drone that Russia purchases from Iran.[13] The leaked documents suggest that Russia pays $193,000 per Shahed-136 drone in batches of 6,000 drones, which would total about $1.1 billion for all 6,000 Shahed-136 drones.[14] Russia reportedly pays $1.4 million per unit for one type of Shahed-238 drone and plans to purchase 677 of these upgraded Shahed drones per year, which would total about $947 million.[15] Another type of Shahed-238 reportedly cost about $900,000 per drone, and Russia reportedly plans to purchase 2,310 per year for just under $2.1 billion.[16] The documents claimed that the reconnaissance and attack Shahed-107 drones cost $460,000 each and that Russia plans to purchase 2,310, which would total about $1.5 billion.[17] A Russian milblogger justified the high cost due to the risk that Iran assumes by selling these drones to Russia and noted that the documents indicate that Russia plans to further localize production of Shaheds in Russia, which will reduce acquisition costs over time.[18] ISW is unable to confirm the authenticity of the purported leaked documents, but a milblogger’s claim that the documents refer to Iran as a ”friendly country” and refer to the Shahed drones in code as ”boats” is consistent with previously observed language about Iran and Iranian drone production in Russia.[19] Russian forces routinely use Shahed drones, which serve as both loitering munitions and as decoys to distract Ukrainian air defenses, and the massive expenditure on such systems is noteworthy.

Russia is reportedly unfreezing North Korean assets and helping North Korea evade international sanctions in exchange for missiles and artillery ammunition for Russia to use in Ukraine. The New York Times ( NYT ) reported on February 6 that unnamed “US-allied” intelligence officials told the NYT that Russia unfroze $9 million of $30 million worth of North Korean assets in an unspecified Russian financial institution, which the intelligence officials assess North Korea will use to buy crude oil.[20] The intelligence official stated that a North Korean front company recently opened a new account at a Russian bank in Russian-occupied South Ossetia that North Korea may use to evade UN sanctions. An unnamed senior US government official told the NYT that Russia is likely unfreezing North Korean assets and helping North Korea evade international sanctions in exchange for North Korean weapons transfers to Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un in Russia in September 2023 and met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in January 2024.[21] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia from September to November 2023, and US officials have stated that Russian forces have launched at least nine North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russia may be open to financial, technological, and defense cooperation with North Korea in return for the provision of artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles to use in Ukraine.[23] North Korea would also benefit from this cooperation by collecting technical data from its weapons’ performance in Ukraine to use in North Korean research and development among other things.

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev emphasized on February 6 that Russia needs to protect its strategic facilities as Russian authorities continue to voice concerns about external and internal threats to Russian infrastructure. [24] Patrushev held a meeting on Russian national security issues in the Ural Federal Okrug on February 6 and emphasized that Russia needs to increase efforts to prevent and respond to natural and man-made emergencies in the okrug, including strengthening counterterrorism protections of “critical and potentially dangerous facilities” and “hazardous production facilities,” both of which very likely include Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises, non-defense industrial enterprises, ports, and other logistics objects. Patrushev emphasized increasing onsite security, Russia’s investigative capacity, and awareness of threats to these facilities.[25] Patrushev stated that Russian authorities prevented 23 “terrorist attacks” against objects in the Urals in 2023 but that criminals conducted nine attacks.[26] Patrushev claimed that Ukrainian actors increasingly seek to recruit saboteurs in Russia to conduct these attacks.[27] Other Russian authorities continued to warn of prospective Ukrainian attacks against Russian infrastructure; the Russian Administration of Baltic Sea Ports announced on February 6 that it has introduced a high alert regime for Vyborg, Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Vysotsk in Leningrad Oblast due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes against port infrastructure.[28]

The Kremlin continues to set informational conditions for possible hybrid provocations against the Baltic states and Georgia. The Russian Foreign Ministry summoned the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian charges d’affaires to Moscow on February 6 due to an alleged “lack of a proper response” to repeated Russian requests for Baltic authorities to “provide security” to Russian nationals voting in the upcoming March 2024 Russian presidential election from abroad in Baltic capitals.[29] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized that any disruptions at Russian polling stations in Baltic nations will cause “serious protest among Russians“ living in Baltic countries because such disruptions would violate the constitutional rights of Russian nationals to vote in Russian elections. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly claimed on February 5 that Western governments have launched “Russophobic” influence campaigns aimed at Russian embassies, consulates, and similar assets abroad and warned that Western provocations abroad increase when polling stations open for Russians to vote in foreign countries.[30] Lavrov’s and Zakharova’s statements are likely aimed at setting informational conditions to frame essentially any action on the part of foreign authorities, including Baltic states, regarding the Russian presidential election as a direct attack on Russian nationals living in Baltic states. The Kremlin frequently invokes the concept of “compatriots abroad” to claim special privileges for Russian nationals living outside of Russia and to set informational conditions for provocations in the countries where Russian “compatriots” live.[31] The weaponization of the Russian presidential election will allow the Kremlin to stage informational provocations against Baltic governments, which fits into the Kremlin’s wider hybrid influence playbook. Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili also stated on February 6 that Russia has launched a “new hybrid war against Georgia, for which it is using all forms and weapons,” referencing Russian naval basing projects in the port of Ochamchire, Russian-occupied Abkhazia, and other provocations in the Georgian territories that Russia has occupied since 2008.[32] Hybrid influence campaigns such as information operations surrounding Russian elections in the Baltics and provocations in occupied regions of Georgia destabilize Russia’s neighbors.

Russian-Israeli relations are likely to continue to decline against the backdrop of Russia’s increasingly anti-Israel stance on the Israel-Hamas war. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) publicly criticized and summoned new Israeli Ambassador to Russia Simona Halperin over an interview she gave with Russian outlet Kommersant published on February 4.[33] Halperin stated that it took Russia “some time” to publicly condemn the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, expressed her dissatisfaction at Russian government officials meeting with Hamas officials in January 2024 and questioned why Russia has not included Hamas on its list of terrorist organizations banned in Russia.[34] The Russian MFA claimed that Halperin gave “distorted interpretations and unacceptable assessments” of Russian foreign and domestic policy.[35] The Russian MFA’s public criticism and subsequent summoning of Halperin are indicative of the continued deterioration of Russian-Israeli relations, amid Russia’s increasingly anti-Israel position on the Israel-Hamas war.[36]

Key Takeaways:

America’s European and Asian allies have significantly ramped up their efforts to support Ukraine. As European partners continue to increase their support for Ukraine, US aid provision in the near to medium-term remains vital to help Ukraine build its defense industrial base (DIB).
The US Army plans to significantly increase US domestic production of 155mm artillery shells and shell components for Ukraine in 2024 and 2025, should the proposed Congressional supplemental appropriations bill pass.
Russian authorities are reportedly paying Iran roughly $4.5 billion per year to import Iranian Shahed drones to use in Ukraine.
Russia is reportedly unfreezing North Korean assets and helping North Korea evade international sanctions in exchange for missiles and artillery ammunition for Russia to use in Ukraine.
Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev emphasized on February 6 that Russia needs to protect its strategic facilities as Russian authorities continue to voice concerns about external and internal threats to Russian infrastructure.
The Kremlin continues to set informational conditions for possible hybrid provocations against the Baltic states and Georgia.
Russian-Israeli relations are likely continuing to decline against the backdrop of Russia’s increasingly anti-Israel stance on the Israel-Hamas war.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
Russian authorities are reportedly paying roughly $4.5 billion per year to import Iranian Shahed drones to use in Ukraine.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and to seek international recognition of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on February 6, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Synkivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[37] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka.[38]

Russian forces reportedly recently advanced near Kreminna, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area on February 6. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Terny and Yampolivka.[39] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area, Bilohorivka, and Hryhorivka.[40] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance north of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on February 3 confirms that Russian forces captured Vesele (northwest of Bakhmut).[42] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 18 that Russian forces captured Vesele, and this is the first time ISW has observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims.[43] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Vesele.[44]

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on February 6, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces made small advances towards Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of Russian advances in either of these areas.[45] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Bohdanivka, Ivanivske, and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka.[46] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) and the “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Bohdanivka; elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Bakhmut; and elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Klishchiivka.[47]

Russian and Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 6. Geolocated footage published on February 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained limited tactical positions in a residential area in southern Avdiivka.[48] Additional geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Avdiivka.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Avdiivka along Sapronov and Lesya Ukrainka streets, nearby where geolocated footage indicates a Russian advance in northern Avdiivka, and in the quarry area on the northern outskirts of Avdiivka.[50] Several Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer towards Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), and reached the southeastern outskirts of the settlement, although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence to confirm these claims.[51] Avdiivka Military Administration Head Vitaly Barabash noted that Ukrainian forces are clashing with small Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups within Avdiivka, but emphasized that there are still no large-scale urban street battles ongoing.[52] Barabash and the spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in Avdiivka both emphasized that the situation in the area is very difficult and that Russian forces are trying to capture the town for political and informational reasons before the Russian presidential elections in March 2024.[53] The Ukrainian brigade spokesperson also stated that Russian forces are equipping their armored vehicles with electronic warfare (EW) systems to protect against Ukrainian drones.[54] ISW recently observed Russian milbloggers repeatedly criticize Russian authorities for failing to equip Russian forces with EW systems after a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast, so Russian forces near Avdiivka may be trying to apply lessons learned to improve Russian force protection.[55] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutikva; near Avdiivka itself; south of Avdiivka near Vesele; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Tonenke, Stepove, and Nevelske.[56] Elements of the Russian 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) reportedly continue to operate near Avdiivka.[57]

Geolocated footage further confirms that Russian forces advanced southwest of Donetsk City during an ultimately failed mechanized assault in the area in late January. Geolocated footage published on February 3 confirms that Russian forces advanced east and south of Novomykhailivka during recent renewed mechanized attacks south of the settlement. [58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the eastern outskirts of Novomykhailivka - claims consistent with available geolocated evidence. [59] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Pobieda and southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Novomykhailivka. [60] A Russian milblogger claimed that prepared Ukrainian defenses near Heorhiivka, the lowland comprising Heorhiivka, and nearby Ukrainian artillery firing positions will complicate any Russian advances through the settlement towards Kurakhove (13km west of Marinka).[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 6, but there were no confirmed changes in this area of the frontline. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances near Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[62] Russian sources claimed that positional engagements continued near Urozhaine and Staromayorske (both south of Velyka Novosilka).[63] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger complained that Ukrainian mines and drones hinder Russian armored vehicle operations so that Russian forces can only conduct infantry attacks with artillery and drone support.[64] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Urozhaine.[65]

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 6, but there were no confirmed changes in this area of the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and west of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[66] Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Verbove.[67] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]

Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on February 6.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating in the Kherson direction are prioritizing locating and striking Ukrainian drone operators, which is consistent with routine Russian milblogger claims that Ukranian first-person view (FPV) drones pose a significant threat to Russian forces in east bank Kherson Oblast.[70]

Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) reported on February 6 that Ukrainian SOF units successfully detonated explosives on a Black Sea gas or oil rig that Russian forces illegally seized and used to stage attacks with Iranian-provided Mohajer-6 reconnaissance drones and guide Shahed drone strikes.[71] Ukrainian SOF reported that Russian forces also deployed a ”Neva-B” object detection radar system on the rig, which allowed Russian forces to better surveil the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Ukrainian SOF reported that Russian forces also used the mining platform as a radar station to monitor surface vessels in the northwestern part of the Black Sea.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues expanding higher military education in Russia in support of medium-term force generation efforts. The Russian MoD announced on February 6 that it is building a new branch of the Suvorov Military School in Ulyanovsk and that the school will begin accepting students as soon as September 2024.[72] The Russian Higher School of Economics announced on February 2 that it is creating the Institute of Military Economics and Strategy and that retired Admiral Sergei Avakyants, who commanded the Pacific Fleet from 2010 to April 2023, will lead the institute.[73] The Kremlin demoted Avakyants in April 2023 amid a surprise readiness check, possibly due to the poor performance of Pacific Fleet naval infantry in Ukraine.[74]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

See topline text.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree on February 6 ordering the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and General Staff of the Armed Forces to develop a separate branch of unmanned systems forces within the Ukrainian military and submit relevant proposals to the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council.[75]

Reuters reported on February 6 that Turkey’s leading drone maker Baykar started building a drone factory near Kyiv that will manufacture Bayraktar-TB2 or TB3 model drones.[76] Baykar CEO Haluk Bayraktar told Reuters that the factory’s construction will take about 12 months after which Baykar will install internal machinery and equipment. Bayraktar stated that the factory would employ about 500 people and produce about 120 drones per year. Baykar announced that it would open a drone production facility and service center in Ukraine in September 2023.[77]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and to seek international recognition of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Center Elections Committee (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova, Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin, Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik, and representatives from occupied Kherson Oblast, Zaporizhia Oblast, and Crimea met on February 6 to discuss the establishment of Russian MFA representative offices in occupied Ukraine.[78] The Russian MFA also emphasized its role in facilitating the work of international observers in occupied Ukraine during the March 2024 presidential election.[79] Russian authorities likely intend to frame the presence of international observers at polling stations in occupied Ukraine as international legitimization of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine.

A Russian official escalated claims of the alleged use of pro-Nazi rhetoric against Lithuania likely to further set information conditions for possible future campaigns against the Baltic states. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Lithuania of the “glorification of Nazi collaborators” in relation to an ongoing Russian complaint that Lithuania and other Baltic states are removing or relocating Soviet-era monuments within their territories.[80] Russian Ambassador to Bulgaria Mitrofanova made a similar accusation that Bulgaria is trying to ”erase everything positive about Russia” in Bulgaria by taking down Soviet-era monuments and editing textbooks, allegedly at the behest of the West.[81]

Russian officials continue efforts to accuse the West of being escalatory and conflict-seeking in order to justify Russia’s continued war against Ukraine and deter further military assistance to Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attempted to portray the United States and the collective West as refusing to deescalate perceived aggression against Russia in order to develop Western defense industrial base (DIB) capacities in support of Ukraine’s defense.[82] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva Gennady Gatilov falsely equated current Western efforts to mobilize DIB capabilities with nuclear escalation and the deterioration of global security.[83] Russian officials have routinely attempted to spoil US and other Western policy discussions about the provision of additional military aid to Ukraine to achieve Russia’s goal of wearing Ukrainian forces down until Ukraine capitulates.

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Dmitry Krutoy stated on February 6 that Belarusian and Russian interior ministers have discussed the creation of a unified list of “extremists” and “extremist sources.”[84] Krutoy stated that he believes that Belarus and Russia will create a unified list in the near future.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.consilium dot europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/06/ukraine-facility-council-and-parliament-agree-on-new-support-mechanism-for-ukraine/

[2] https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1754759839031455791

[3] https://www.rheinmetall dot com/en/media/stories/2023/rheinmetall-a-powerful-partner-at-ukraine-side

[4] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20240206002400315?section=news

[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/

[6] https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa dot eu/eu-assistance-ukraine_en ; https://www.eeas.europa dot eu/delegations/united-states-america/eu-assistance-ukraine-us-dollars_en?s=253#:~:text=Collective%20EU%20and%20EU%20Member,Ukraine's%20success%20on%20the%20battlefield

[7] https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts ; https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/10/for-as-long-as-it-takes-putting-us-aid-to-ukraine-into-perspective/#:~:text=As%20of%20Zelensky%27s%20latest%20visit,went%20to%20various%20other%20expenses ; https://www.csis.org/analysis/past-present-and-future-us-assistance-ukraine-deep-dive-data

[8] https://www.csis.org/analysis/past-present-and-future-us-assistance-ukraine-deep-dive-data ; https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/10/for-as-long-as-it-takes-putting-us-aid-to-ukraine-into-perspective/#:~:text=As%20of%20Zelensky%27s%20latest%20visit,went%20to%20various%20other%20expenses.

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723 ; https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040#:~:text=FY2022%20and%20FY2023%20security%20assistance,Drawdown%20Authority%20(PDA%3B%2022%20U.S.C

[11] https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2024/02/army-aims-double-155mm-shell-production-october/393943/?oref=d1-homepage-top-story

[12] https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/02/06/us-army-hunts-for-explosives-to-meet-increased-munitions-output-goals/

[13] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/; https://defence-blog.com/hackers-uncover-foreign-suppliers-in-russias-arsenal/

[14] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/; https://defence-blog.com/hackers-uncover-foreign-suppliers-in-russias-arsenal/

[15] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/; https://defence-blog.com/hackers-uncover-foreign-suppliers-in-russias-arsenal/

[16] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/; https://defence-blog.com/hackers-uncover-foreign-suppliers-in-russias-arsenal/

[17] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/; https://defence-blog.com/hackers-uncover-foreign-suppliers-in-russias-arsenal/

[18] https://t.me/milinfolive/115816 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/115795 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/115811

[19] https://t.me/milinfolive/115802; https://t.me/vchkogpu/45583

[20] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/06/world/asia/north-korea-russia-missiles-bank.html

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-russia-clash-un-over-north-korea-patriot-missiles-ukraine-2024-02-06/; https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-02-06/us-russia-clash-at-un-over-north-korea-patriot-missiles-in-ukraine

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102323

[24] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/ural/main/patrushev-prizval-usilit-zashchitu-vazhnyh-i-potencialno-opasnyh-obektov-na-urale; https://t.me/tass_agency/230520; https://t.me/tass_live/5124 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/230443

[25] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/ural/main/patrushev-prizval-usilit-zashchitu-vazhnyh-i-potencialno-opasnyh-obektov-na-urale; https://t.me/tass_agency/230520; https://t.me/tass_live/5124 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/230443

[26] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/ural/main/patrushev-prizval-usilit-zashchitu-vazhnyh-i-potencialno-opasnyh-obektov-na-urale; https://t.me/tass_agency/230520; https://t.me/tass_live/5124 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/230443

[27] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/ural/main/patrushev-prizval-usilit-zashchitu-vazhnyh-i-potencialno-opasnyh-obektov-na-urale; https://t.me/tass_agency/230520; https://t.me/tass_live/5124 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/230443

[28] https://www.pasp dot ru/d/26909/d/rasporyazhenie_%E2%84%96_6_24-r_ot_02.02.2024_o_vvedenii_rezhima_povyshennoy_gotovnosti.pdf; https://suspilne dot media/677810-u-rosijskih-portah-rezim-pidvisenoi-gotovnosti-cerez-zagrozu-bpla/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/234743

[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/230568 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/34726

[30] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34694

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023

[32] https://suspilne dot media/678470-rosia-ne-zmogla-zlamati-ukrainu-ta-pocala-novu-gibridnu-vijnu-proti-gruzii-prezidentka-zurabisvili/; https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/32807324.html

[33] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34730 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6492853

[34] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6492853

[35] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34730

[36] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023

[37] https://t.me/multi_XAM/1295 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111942 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7071

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YMDG127XWhCBN4qtJ48ATtEsYEshwS3hiB9yJVc9REmjL6sfdKnmyyuQvrfbu1bol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027z2tWVqrQnafJdnTGC7wNZyBziFtMy4hnyhU5a6TupvNngVndG9wKogx39NoG9Esl ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/06/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zbilshyly-kilkist-shturmiv-oleg-synyegubov/ ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35390 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35391 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35388 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1295

[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61645 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/25945

[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/35390 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35391 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35392 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35388 ; https://t.me/rybar/56773 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34045 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09jvk8ouk1bAFPKqyoNPycrRaUEYPbx7C6k9CC3kX6XMTs51Tm7cg9SmgRaiHTA57l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YMDG127XWhCBN4qtJ48ATtEsYEshwS3hiB9yJVc9REmjL6sfdKnmyyuQvrfbu1bol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027z2tWVqrQnafJdnTGC7wNZyBziFtMy4hnyhU5a6TupvNngVndG9wKogx39NoG9Esl ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/06/protyvnyk-posylyv-artylerijskyj-tysk-na-nevske-ta-bilogorivku/

[41] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/12573

[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4297; https://t.me/OGSHB_109/539

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2024

[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/35401

[45] https://t.me/rybar/56773; https://t.me/rybar/56776

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09jvk8ouk1bAFPKqyoNPycrRaUEYPbx7C6k9CC3kX6XMTs51Tm7cg9SmgRaiHTA57l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YMDG127XWhCBN4qtJ48ATtEsYEshwS3hiB9yJVc9REmjL6sfdKnmyyuQvrfbu1bol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027z2tWVqrQnafJdnTGC7wNZyBziFtMy4hnyhU5a6TupvNngVndG9wKogx39NoG9Esl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35390 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35393 ; https://t.me/rybar/56773 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34045 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7045 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7058

[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/34073 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61605 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61637 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7528

[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4295?single; https://t.me/mayorthunder/686; https://t.me/V_VP1952;

[49] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/7891; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1754761783812751739; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1754794230000619644

[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61600; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111915; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7067

[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61608; https://t.me/wargonzo/18014; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111910; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111875; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7521

[52] lii https://suspilne dot media/677778-zelenskij-doruciv-onoviti-bronuvanna-vid-mobilizacii-golova-minveteraniv-pisla-u-vidstavku-713-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707229779&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[53] https://suspilne dot media/677778-zelenskij-doruciv-onoviti-bronuvanna-vid-mobilizacii-golova-minveteraniv-pisla-u-vidstavku-713-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707229779&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/677778-zelenskij-doruciv-onoviti-bronuvanna-vid-mobilizacii-golova-minveteraniv-pisla-u-vidstavku-713-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707220042&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[54] https://suspilne dot media/677778-zelenskij-doruciv-onoviti-bronuvanna-vid-mobilizacii-golova-minveteraniv-pisla-u-vidstavku-713-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707220042&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[55] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020124

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09jvk8ouk1bAFPKqyoNPycrRaUEYPbx7C6k9CC3kX6XMTs51Tm7cg9SmgRaiHTA57l ;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YMDG127XWhCBN4qtJ48ATtEsYEshwS3hiB9yJVc9REmjL6sfdKnmyyuQvrfbu1bol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027z2tWVqrQnafJdnTGC7wNZyBziFtMy4hnyhU5a6TupvNngVndG9wKogx39NoG9Esl ; https://t.me/rybar/56773 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34045 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18014 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7043 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111875

[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/34085

[58] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1754802062313816087?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1753767973423129039?s=20

[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/6909; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111918 ; https://t.me/rybar/56791 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34045 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34043

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09jvk8ouk1bAFPKqyoNPycrRaUEYPbx7C6k9CC3kX6XMTs51Tm7cg9SmgRaiHTA57l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YMDG127XWhCBN4qtJ48ATtEsYEshwS3hiB9yJVc9REmjL6sfdKnmyyuQvrfbu1bol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027z2tWVqrQnafJdnTGC7wNZyBziFtMy4hnyhU5a6TupvNngVndG9wKogx39NoG9Esl ; https://t.me/rybar/56773 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18014

[61] https://t.me/rybar/56781

[62] https://t.me/vrogov/14181 ; https://t.me/rybar/56774

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/35390 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35394 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35386 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/6912 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/6912 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18014

[64] https://t.me/rybar/56774

[65] https://t.me/vrogov/14175

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09jvk8ouk1bAFPKqyoNPycrRaUEYPbx7C6k9CC3kX6XMTs51Tm7cg9SmgRaiHTA57l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YMDG127XWhCBN4qtJ48ATtEsYEshwS3hiB9yJVc9REmjL6sfdKnmyyuQvrfbu1bol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027z2tWVqrQnafJdnTGC7wNZyBziFtMy4hnyhU5a6TupvNngVndG9wKogx39NoG9Esl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34045 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18014 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7044 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7064

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61642

[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/34052 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34049 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34050

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09jvk8ouk1bAFPKqyoNPycrRaUEYPbx7C6k9CC3kX6XMTs51Tm7cg9SmgRaiHTA57l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YMDG127XWhCBN4qtJ48ATtEsYEshwS3hiB9yJVc9REmjL6sfdKnmyyuQvrfbu1bol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027z2tWVqrQnafJdnTGC7wNZyBziFtMy4hnyhU5a6TupvNngVndG9wKogx39NoG9Esl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34045 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18014 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7068 ; https://t.me/SvodkiFrontov/44 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/32904

[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/34045 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024

[71] https://t.me/ukr_sof/932

[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/35398

[73] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/02/06/v-vysshey-shkole-ekonomiki-sozdali-institut-voennoy-ekonomiki-i-strategii-ego-vozglavil-byvshiy-komanduyuschiy-tihookeanskim-flotom; https://www.mskagency dot ru/materials/3359529; https://www.hse dot ru/news/edu/893253360.html

[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2023

[75] https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/512024-49625; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/06/u-skladi-zsu-stvoryat-syly-bezpilotnyh-system/; https://suspilne dot media/678492-zelenskij-pidpisav-ukaz-pro-stvorenna-sil-bezpilotnih-sistem-u-strukturi-zsu/

[76] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/turkeys-drone-maker-baykar-begins-build-plant-ukraine-2024-02-06/

[77] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base

[78] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34701 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/34699 ; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/2104; https://t.me/pushilindenis/4264

[79] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34699

[80] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34721

[81] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34727

[82] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34720

[83] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34711

[84] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/krutoj-belarus-i-rossija-vedut-rabotu-nad-objedineniem-spiskov-ekstremistov-i-ekstremistskih-resursov-613829-2024 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/02/06/rossiya-i-belarus-planiruyut-ob-edinit-svoi-spiski-ekstremistov-utverzhdaet-belorusskiy-posol

IMAGES

PowerPoint Benchmark Assignment
Benchmark Training for Schools 1st + 8th November
Benchmark Assignment.docx
BENCHMARK ASSIGNMENT.docx
Benchmark Assighment.docx
Benchmark Training & Development

COMMENTS

HRM 635 Benchmark assignment
Jothy Poulose Grand Canyon University HRM 635-O500 - Acquiring, Developing, and Leveraging Human Capital May 4 th , 2022 Dr. Camacho Benchmark Assignment - Training and Development Goal for the Training To deliver professional and personal development to the newly hired employee through a guided and supportive preceptor program. .
Training and Development (T&D)
Training and Development. Temporary assignments used to prepare employees for advancement. (Revised: 10/2021) Definition. Training and Development (T&D) assignments are temporary assignments to provide an employee with training and experience to move to a different occupational field. A T&D assignment is a formal agreement between the employee ...
Benchmark Assignment
In this article, we will make sense of what preparation needs examination is, give a layout for leading this investigation, and give a preparation needs investigation model. This guide will be helpful for L&D experts, coaches, and specialists the same. 3. Primary goals Mangement. Primary goals of Training and Development IDENTIFY THE BUSINESS ...
Training and Development Key Benchmarks
Training and Development Key Benchmarks. Prepared using data from APQC's Open Standards Benchmarking® in Develop, Train, and Counsel Employees, these articles provide human capital management key performance indicators (KPIs) for organizations in various industries. Organizations can use this information to benchmark and continuously improve ...
How to Benchmark Your Training and Development Program
2. Choose your benchmarks. Be the first to add your personal experience. 3. Collect and analyze data. Be the first to add your personal experience. 4. Identify and prioritize gaps. Be the first to ...
Benchmark Assignment
Page 1 of 11. Business document from Grand Canyon University, 11 pages, Benchmark Assignment - Training & Development Kimberly Price Grand Canyon University HRM 635-0500 Acquiring, Developing, and Leveraging Human Capital April 21, 2024 Dr. Robert M. Rupe fGoals for Trainings in Organization fBenefit Trainings of the Organiza.
Benchmark Assignment- Training and Development.pptx
Introduction • A successful training and development program can have a number of advantages for both the workers and management. • The creation of an effective program is essential for employee retention, competency, and maintaining a healthy balance between work and personal life. • Healthcare organizations recognize the value of retaining competency level, assured nurses who can adapt ...
Hrm 635 week 5 benchmark assignment training and development
Hrm 635 week 5 benchmark assignment training and development. Published on Jun 2, 2017. DonaldCooper. Follow this publisher. More from. DonaldCooper. Mgt 455 week 5 chapter 7 and s7 problem set.
HRM-635 Topic 5 Benchmark Assignment
HRM-635 Topic 5 Benchmark Assignment - Training and Development. Training and development prompts a change within an organization. The goal of training is to identify areas for improvement and develop materials and opportunities to educate employees in order to support growth. For this assignment, you are required to develop a small training ...
Human Resources Manual
Training and Development assignments are a key element of the State's upward mobility programs for employees in lower paying jobs. However, Training and Development assignments are not restricted to lower paying classifications. The SPB and the California Department of Human Resources (CalHR) encourage the use of Training and Development ...
Summary Benchmark Assighment.docx HRM-635 Benchmark Assignment ...
Summary Benchmark Assighment.docx HRM-635 Benchmark Assignment - Training and Development HRM-635 Benchmark Assignment - Training and Development Business Accomplishments The main purpose of the business is to progress and create reasonable, eminence, and u $7.49 Add to cart
Elm 200-Benchmark
T5 Personal and Social Development Scenarios; T6-Benchmark Strategies for All Students; T3 Typical And Atypical Development ... & Lew, S. (2018). Building Disciplinary Language and Literacy in Elementary Teacher Training. Reading Teacher, 72 (3), 325-341. ... ELM-200-T1-Theories of Cognitive Development Table; Test Drive Assignment ...
Benchmark Assignment
Attached below are documents that leads up to this assignment. Training and development prompts a change within an organization. The goal of training is to identify areas for improvement and develop materials and opportunities to educate employees in order to support growth.For this assignment, you are required to develop a small training exercise. Review your needs assessment and previous ...
Benchmark Assignment- Training and Development
Benchmark Assignment- Training and Development Training and development prompts a change within an organization. The goal of training is to identify ar Benchmark Assignment- Training and Development - Paper Help Center
Assignment: Benchmark Training and Development
Assignment: Benchmark Training and Development. Benchmark Assignment - Training and Development Assessment Description Training and development prompts change within an organization. The goal of training is to identify areas for improvement and to develop growth opportunities that support the employees in their professional career.
Benchmark Assignment
TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT EXERCISE 4 The training workforce will help create the right image within the organization, with customers and business partners. After training, the employees' efficiencies should benefit the organization in operational cost-saving and financially. The new technologies and techniques the professionals will learn for getting work done will improve the operational metrics.
Skills Planning: Navigating the Future for Corporate Success
Skills planning goes beyond being a corporate buzzword. It's a strategic approach that aligns employee talents with business goals. Skills planning and skills-first approaches help you build a workforce with critical skills, increase your organization's productivity, create an environment dedicated to continual improvement, upskill current employees, and develop a culture of learning.
5 Reasons Learning Strategies Fail
Brian Blecke is a performance consultant and learning strategist with more than 25 years' experience. As a founding partner of Actio Learning, he uses a diverse set of tools, models and experiences to help his clients align learning outcomes to business goals, design innovative learning solutions, and create measurable performance improvement.
Heat Pump System Design & Installation
This is a series of nine professional development training courses for HVAC engineers, contractors, project managers, and building owners. Learn to design and install heat pump systems with confidence. Rigorous assessments have been developed to make sure you know the correct approach to designing and installing heat pump systems.
Challenges in detecting ecological interactions using ...
With increasing availability of ancient and modern environmental DNA technology, whole-community species occurrence and abundance data over time and space is becoming more available. Sedimentary ancient DNA data can be used to infer associations between species, which can generate hypotheses about biotic interactions, a key part of ecosystem function and biodiversity science.
Mental Health in Hockey: Resilience and Blackhawks' Performance
In 2016, the Chicago Blackhawks partnered with O2X Human Performance to enhance player development at all levels of the organization. This collaboration focuses on mental health in hockey, covering performance development, mental readiness, sleep and fatigue management, recovery protocols, accountability, debriefing, communication, and resilience.
Benchmark Assignment
3 Benchmark Assignment - Training and Development The company sent out a training needs assessment survey to every department as a strategy to gather data and provide support to the employees while considering the strengths and weaknesses within the organization. By the same token, filing to take advantage of the survey data, represents taking on a problem without using all the tools at your ...
Seizing the Initiative in Ukraine: Waging War in a Defense ...
The Issue: Ukrainian forces retain the initiative in the war but advanced an average of only 90 meters per day on the southern front during the peak of their summer offensive, according to new CSIS analysis. Russia's extensive fortifications—which include minefields, trench networks, and support from artillery, attack helicopters, and fixed ...
EXPLAINER: What's behind the conflict in eastern Ukraine?
Tensions are rising over the conflict in eastern Ukraine, with growing violations of a cease-fire and a massive Russian military buildup near its border with the region. Zelenskyy was elected president of Ukraine by a landslide in April 2019 on promises to end the fighting and root out the country's endemic corruption.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 30, 2024
Download the PDF. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 30, 2024. Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros. March 30, 2024, 6:55pm ET. Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Benchmark Assignment Training and Development.docx
3 Benchmark Assignment - Training and Development data, represents taking on a problem without using all the tools at your disposal to solve it. Missing an opportunity to increasing Work-life balance, teaching people how to attain a higher level of achievement and enjoyment every day, both on and off the job. To achieve work-place safety protecting the health and safety of workers in the ...
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, 2024
Download the PDF. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, 2024. Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Fredrick W. Kagan. February 6, 2024, 9:30pm ET. Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in ...
Benchmark Assignment
Benchmark Assignment - Training and Development Details: Training and development prompts a change within an organization. The goal of training is to identify areas for improvement and develop materials and opportunities to educate employees in order to support growth. For this assignment, you are required to develop a small training exercise. Review your needs assessment and previous ...