Most prolific authors in greenwashing
Rank | Name of author | Country of author | University/Institution | Number of publications |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Lyon, T.P. | USA | University of Michigan | 5 |
2 | Chen, Y.S. | China | China three Gorges University | 4 |
3 | Font, X. | UK | University of Surrey | 4 |
4 | Siano, A. | Italy | University of Salerno | 4 |
5 | Testa, F. | Italy | Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna | 4 |
6 | Vollero, A. | Italy | University of Salerno | 4 |
7 | Braga, S.S. | Brazil | Universidade Estadual Paulista | 3 |
8 | Correa, C.M. | Brazil | Universidade Estadual Paulista | 3 |
9 | Da Silva, D. | Brazil | Universidade Estadual de Campinas | 3 |
10 | Du X.Q. | China | Xiaomen University | 3 |
11 | Iraldo, F. | Italy | Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna | 3 |
Most frequently cited publications in greenwashing
R | Title | Authors | Year | Journal | TC | (C/Y) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | The drivers of greenwashing | Delmas and Burbano | 2011 | California management review | 363 | 40.3 |
2 | Greenwash: Corporate environmental disclosure under threat of audit | Lyon and Maxwell | 2011 | Journal of economics and management strategy | 293 | 32.6 |
3 | Greenwash and green trust: The Mediation effects of green consumer Confusion and green perceived Risk | Chen and chang | 2013 | Journal of business Ethics | 198 | 28.3 |
4 | Social accountability and corporate greenwashing | Laufer | 2003 | Journal of business Ethics | 457 | 26.9 |
5 | Corporate social responsibility in the banking industry: Motives and financial performance | Wu and Shen | 2013 | Journal of banking and Finance | 188 | 26.9 |
6 | How sustainability ratings might deter “greenwashing”: A closer look at ethical corporate communication | Parguel, Benoit-Moreau and Larceneux | 2011 | Journal of business Ethics | 217 | 24.1 |
7 | A research note on standalone corporate social responsibility reports: Signaling or greenwashing | Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil and LaGore | 2013 | Critical perspectives on accounting | 161 | 23.0 |
8 | Perceived greenwashing: The interactive effects of green advertisement and corporate environmental performance on consumer reactions | Nyilasy, Gangadharbatla and Paladino | 2014 | Journal of business Ethics | 134 | 22.3 |
9 | Legitimizing negative aspects in GRI-Oriented sustainability reporting: A Qualitative analysis of corporate disclosure strategies | Hahn and Luelfs | 2014 | Journal of business Ethics | 132 | 22.0 |
10 | Corporate social responsibility: The disclosure-performance gap | Font, Walmsley, Cogotti, McCombes and Hausler | 2012 | Tourism management | 145 | 18.1 |
… | … | … | … | … | … | … |
12 | Consumer's perception of individual and combined sustainable food labels: a UK pilot investigation | Sirieix | 013 | International journal of consumer studies | 102 | 14.6 |
Reference | Objective | |
---|---|---|
1 | Impact of the definition of climate-smart agriculture by the global Alliance | |
2 | Presence of environmental policy integration in the common agriculture policy (CAP) of the EU | |
3 | Adoption of sustainable practices by the companies of the coffee industry | |
4 | (2011) | Green ads' distribution and greenwashing characteristics and practices |
5 | (2017) | Impact of voluntary certification programs for small farms on sustainability |
6 | Impact of an industry green label on the perceptions of consumers | |
7 | (2007) | Relationship between the size of a farm and the adoption of green practices |
8 | Assumptions made by corporations about the economic, environmental and social dimensions of agricultural sustainability | |
9 | How consumers deal with the CSR information delivered to them through the corporate websites of food producers and retailers | |
10 | (2019) | Interaction between external CSR labels and internal CSR claims |
11 | (2017) | How retailers can attract consumers' visual attention and increase sales of eco-friendly products displaying relevant information |
12 | (2018) | Some positive environmental claims can, in fact, be greenwashing when they concern a product considered to be harmful, as tobacco |
13 | (2019) | Some positive environmental claims can, in fact, be greenwashing when they concern a product considered to be harmful, as tobacco |
14 | (2019) | Mediation effects of green scepticism and moderating effects of information and knowledge in the relationship between greenwashing and green purchase intentions |
15 | Quality and approach of reporting, considering how German grocery retailers report negative aspects and which communicative legitimation strategies they apply | |
16 | Analysis of the relationship of environmental concern and the evaluation of organic food | |
17 | (2013) | Perceptions of sustainable labels vs. other labels such as nutrition ones |
18 | Semiotics of food packaging | |
19 | Certainty or not (greenwashing) of the claims of some organic food and non-food products |
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Peter Pears and Tim Baines are Partners and Oliver Williams is a Trainee Solicitor at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on a Mayer Brown memorandum by Mr. Pears, Mr. Baines, Mr. Williams, Henninger S. Bullock , Luiz Gustavo Bezerra , and Wei Na Sim . Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here ) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita ; How Much Do Investors Care about Social Responsibility? (discussed on the Forum here ) by Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel, and Tamar Kricheli-Katz; Does Enlightened Shareholder Value add Value (discussed on the Forum here ) by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita; and Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value (discussed on the Forum here ) by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales.
The risk of an accusation of “greenwashing” is now an important concern for many companies. Greenwashing is an ill-defined concept but, nevertheless, is increasingly a source of litigation and regulatory scrutiny – with more of both expected. It carries with it reputational, regulatory and litigation risks for which companies should be prepared. Whilst the risks are always context specific – varying by jurisdiction, industry and product – there are common themes. Here, we take an in-depth look at those themes and make suggestions for how organisations can think about mitigating greenwashing risk.
There is no harmonised definition of greenwashing. Broadly, it is about claiming or creating the perception that activities, products and services are more environmentally friendly or sustainable than they actually are. Precisely what constitutes greenwashing will vary according to the type of product and service, as well as between different sectors, regulators and jurisdictions. It may also vary depending on the person making the claim – one person’s treasured sustainability claim can be another person’s greenwashing trash. For some, greenwashing is seen as a purely environmental concern, whereas many also use the term to cover social and governance issues.
This lack of clarity is significant, as it makes it difficult for organisations to establish what actually amounts to greenwashing and what they should prepare for. It is especially significant given that allegations can have substantial financial and reputational impacts.
In lieu of definitional precision, we think it is helpful to look at real-world examples. We have reviewed a wide range of greenwashing claims and controversies globally and see some common sources of dispute – see ‘‘Common themes in Greenwashing controversies’’ opposite.
“Is that correct?” – A statement about environmental or ESG credentials or activities is misleading or simply not correct. “Is that the full story?” – A statement does not tell the whole story of a product or service, or relates to one part of the product or service but misleads people about the other parts or the overall impact on the environment. Sometimes, the caveats or conditions to an environmental or ESG statement are not adequately disclosed. “Your science isn’t right…..” – A statement about environmental or ESG credentials is based on flawed or incomplete evidence. ….or maybe your maths” – A statement about environmental or ESG credentials is based on flawed calculations or assumptions. “Your offsetting looks off” – Net zero targets contain a wealth of assumptions and uncertainties, particularly around the use of carbon offsets. These can be vulnerable to challenge. “A label paints a thousand words….but not necessarily the ones you intended” – A sustainable label, name, tag or rating in relation to a product or service is misleading about environmental credentials. “Your regulator would like to see you” – A regulatory statement or classification is incorrect or misleading in relation to environmental or ESG credentials.
According to the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment’s ‘Global trends in climate change litigation: 2022 snapshot’ , a minimum of 20 greenwashing cases have been filed before courts in the US, Australia, France and the Netherlands since 2016, whilst 27 cases have been filed before non-judicial oversight bodies over the same period.
An obvious point, but one worth making. Socioenvironmental issues, particularly climate change, are at the forefront of public consciousness. Consumers, investors and civil society are, therefore, placing closer attention to the environmental and sustainability credentials of organisations, with the risk that they will react negatively if the underlying information is not being sufficiently, or accurately, disclosed.
Environmental and sustainability statements are increasingly a common feature of corporate disclosure and the marketing of services and products. Companies are now making, and will increasingly be required to make, detailed environmental and sustainability disclosures and aiming to demonstrate progress year on year. We have covered the details of many these new requirements in depth elsewhere (please read our articles on the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive here, the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive here, the UK Sustainability Disclosure Requirements here, and the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s ESG Disclosure Proposal here, and regulatory developments in Singapore here and Hong Kong here). A COMPLEX AND
There is no harmonised approach to tackling sustainability challenges. Whilst general objectives may be clear, determining the correct manner and pace by which an institution should tackle the various societal and environmental problems posed is complex and subject to debate and challenge. Such disagreement has set the scene for greenwashing allegations with looming greenhouse gas related targets and pledges likely to accelerate the trend. INCREASED AVENUES FOR REGULATORY
In recent years, there has been a rapid uptake in ESG-related legislation by legislators across the globe imposing a wide variety of obligations and duties on organisations. This has increased the number of avenues open to regulators and prospective litigants to take action and bring claims against organisations in respect of their ESG-related disclosures (please read our articles on ESG-related litigation here, here and here). INCONSISTENT DEFINITIONS The lack of a harmonised definition of what constitutes ‘green’ or ‘sustainable’ means that it can be difficult for organisations to establish whether or not they are ‘greenwashing’. What is considered to be a ‘greenwashed’ claim will vary between regulators in different jurisdictions, further adding to the complexity for organisations attempting to publicly state their environmental credentials. For example, the US Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has not updated its influential “Green Guides” since 2012, and announced in December 2022 that it was considering amending that guidance to address claims related to carbon offsets, energy-use claims, and claims that products are “recyclable,” “organic,” “sustainable,” “compostable,” “degradable,” and “ozone-friendly” (please read our article on the FTC’s December 2022 announcement here).
ESG-related data can be difficult to measure and obtain, given that it is often comprised of a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. Combined with a lack of sophisticated benchmarks as to what ‘market standards’ are, it can be difficult for organisations to ensure that socio-environmental claims are properly validated, or validated in a way that is fit for purpose from all perspectives. Products and services are, therefore, open to being marketed as ‘sustainable’ in a way that some stakeholders may argue is inappropriate.
Organisations may have a lack of (or lack of consistent) ESG-related knowledge and capabilities. This presents difficulties for organisations when they are attempting to make, and validate, socioenvironmental claims, as expertise on ESG ‘market standards’ and regulatory compliance can be difficult to obtain. There is also a significant cost element of getting appropriate ESG-related advice from consultants and advisors in multiple jurisdictions.
We see greenwashing as posing three fundamental, overlapping risks:
Consumers, investors and civil society are increasingly scrutinising organisations’ sustainability profiles. According to Simon-Kutcher & Partners’ Global Sustainability Study 2021 , more than a one third of the UK population are willing to pay more for sustainable products and services, and those willing to pay more would accept up to a 25 per cent premium. Conversely, the impact of allegations of greenwashing on an organisation’s brand can result in a loss of consumer trust or potential divestment by investors. For example, Shift Insight’s 2020 Report found that 48 per cent of survey respondents claimed they would buy the products and services of brands associated with greenwashing “as little as possible”.
Similarly, there are many instances of companies and financial institutions facing public criticism on account of their sustainability disclosures, products, services and, in relation to financial services, their involvement in financing transactions. The risk of reputational damage in this area is difficult to control. In some cases, the basis of the criticism may be unfounded or short of what would be required to bring the matter to litigation. Therein lies the difficulty – the standards required to bring a company’s reputation into the public eye are not necessarily the same as bringing a successful action in a court. Nevertheless, the risk of reputational damage from negative social media and press coverage remains.
In the UK, regulatory bodies including the Advertising Standards Agency (“ASA”) and the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”), are focussed on greenwashing. The ASA published Advertising Guidance on misleading environmental claims and social responsibility in June 2022, whilst the CMA published a Green Claims Code in September 2021 (for further information on the Green Claims Code, read our blog post here). The Advertising Guidance and Green Claims Code set out key principles for advertisers and traders to follow when making socio-environmental claims, whilst also implying that enforcement in this area – flowing from underlying UK consumer protections laws, such as the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and the Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 – will soon follow. The UK Financial Conduct Authority (the “FCA”) has warned that it will “challenge firms where we see potential greenwashing, clarify our expectations and take appropriate action to prevent consumers being mislead”, whilst the CMA have announced that it intends to investigate the accuracy of environmental claims made by businesses in the fast-moving consumer goods sector (read our blog post on the CMA’s announcement here). Amongst other initiatives, the FCA also recently proposed the introduction of a new “anti-greenwashing” rule applicable to all FCA regulated firms (see our briefing here).
In Europe, the EU’s Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth references tackling greenwashing as a key priority. The EU aims to do so through legislation such as the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (“SFDR”), Taxonomy Regulation (the “EU Taxonomy”) and Benchmark Regulation. The EU Taxonomy establishes a unified EU classification system aimed at determining whether economic activities can be labelled as environmentally sustainable. The SFDR aims to standardise the language and labels of sustainable investment products by categorising them in respect of how ‘sustainable’ they are and by imposing disclosure requirements in relation to those categories. The Benchmark Regulation, on the other hand, creates definitions for investment benchmarks that attempt to demonstrate alignment with the Paris Agreement or low carbon objectives (for further information on the SFDR, the EU Taxonomy and the Benchmark Regulation, read our blog posts here , here , here and here ).
In Europe, “tackling” greenwashing was cited last year as the number one priority of the European Securities and Markets Authority in its Sustainable Finance Roadmap 2022-2024 (see our earlier briefing here). Putting this into action, the European Supervisory Authorities have recently published a Call for Evidence in relation to potential greenwashing practices in the EU financial sector (ESAs Call for evidence on Greenwashing (europa.eu)) and recently set out their progress reports on 1 June 2023. In addition, the European Commission has published its proposal for a Directive on the substantiation and communication of explicit environmental claims (for further information on this ‘Green Claims Proposal’, read our briefing here).
In the US, in March 2021, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) launched its Enforcement Task Force focused on Climate and ESG issues , with the aim of developing initiatives to identify ESG-related misconduct that is consistent with increased investor reliance on climate and ESG-related disclosure and investment. The SEC has stated that the Task Force will initially focus on greenwashing by identifying material gaps or misstatements in investor disclosure materials, whilst also analysing disclosure and compliance issues relating to fund managers’ ESG strategies. The SEC have stated that the Task Force will use sophisticated data analysis to mine and assess public information to identify potential greenwashing.
In the US, the FTC also announced in December 2022 that it was considering making amendments to its influential Green Guides — the advisory document that communicates standards for certain types of environmental claims, with commentary and advice on how companies should approach issues related to substantiation. The current version of the Green Guides, last updated in 2012, provides guidance for general environmental claims (such as “eco-friendly”) and several specific claims, including claims related to certifications and seals of approval. The FTC’s 2022 release did not propose any changes, but rather sought comment from the public regarding whether the FTC should provide additional guidance on a number of specific claims, including “sustainable,” “organic,” and claims regarding carbon offsets.
In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (“ HKMA ”) released a research report in November 2022, entitled “ Greenwashing in the Corporate Green Bond Markets ”, showing evidence that about one-third of global corporate green bond issuers are reaping the benefits of issuing green bonds without cutting down their greenhouse gas (“ GHG ”) emissions. The HKMA noted that this type of ‘greenwashing’ behaviour can impede progress on combating climate change and could lead to financial instability if the market loses confidence in green bonds and other green asset classes (for further information on the HKMA report, read our blog post here ).
Singapore has also recognised the threat that greenwashing poses to the green finance sector and the government is implementing a taxonomy based on consistent set of global standards and establishing requirements for disclosures and reporting to combat greenwashing. In particular, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“ MAS ”) established the Green Finance Industry Taskforce (“ GFIT ”) to develop a taxonomy for Singapore-based financial institutions to provide a common framework for classification of economic activities upon which financial products and services can be built (the “ Singapore Taxonomy ”). A key purpose of developing the Singapore Taxonomy is to encourage the flow of capital to support the low carbon transition needed to avoid catastrophic climate change, as well as the environmental objectives of Singapore. The MAS is also actively participating in regional efforts to develop a taxonomy for ASEAN countries which are serviced by Singapore-based financial institutions, These efforts take international goals into account while, at the same time, factoring in the ASEAN region’s specific “context and circumstances”. See our blog posts on GFIT’s first and second consultation papers on Singapore’s proposed green taxonomy for financial institutions here and here .
In Brazil, the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (the “CVM”) recently approved guidelines to discuss and build a Brazilian taxonomy addressing sustainable finance issues and to take oversight action to inhibit greenwashing on the Brazilian stock market. The Brazilian Congress and the CVM are also discussing whether the Brazilian regulatory framework should evolve to better accommodate greenwashing concerns. Currently, greenwashing is predominantly governed by the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code 1990, which prohibits the use of misleading and/or abusive claims in advertisements. However, bills of law have been proposed with the aim of requiring companies to explain green claims within their product labels and marketing materials.
Regulatory enforcement action has already begun. In the UK, the CMA has launched investigations into retailers focussing on (among other things) whether the statements made regarding the environment credentials of the retailers’ products are too vague and whether the criteria adopted to decide which products are included in eco-friendly collections are lower than consumers may reasonably expect. The CMA has warned that it may issue sanctions following the conclusion of its investigations, which could result in the retailers being forced to give undertakings to change the way they operate.
Moreover, the ASA has banned a number of advertisements made by companies in the oil & gas, aviation and food sectors for misleading the public on the socio-environmental credentials of their products. The ASA has warned these companies that the advertisements “must not appear again in the form complained of”, otherwise they may face sanctions (for further information on the recent ASA action, read our blog post here ).
The SEC’s Enforcement Task Force has also taken enforcement action against multinationals regarding the alleged deliberate manipulation of audits, fraudulent declarations and misleading material statements in respect of ESG-related disclosures and regulatory filings. As well as taking-up a significant amount of organisational resource to deal with the regulators, the actions have had adversely affected the share prices of the relevant organisations (for further information on the SEC’s enforcement action, please read our blog post here ).
While there has been no notable greenwashing enforcement action to date in Asia, as regulators in Hong Kong and Singapore begin to implement globally consistent sustainability reporting requirement for listed companies and across the financial services industry, regulatory enforcement actions are expected to develop over time in these jurisdictions.
In addition to the risk of enforcement action by regulators, civil litigation against organisations accused of greenwashing – in particular, climate-related greenwashing – is becoming increasingly common.
The rise can be broadly attributed to the following key factors:
As noted in the Grantham Research Institute’s 2022 snapshot , the recent wave of greenwashing-related litigation can be divided into three types of case, namely cases challenging misrepresentation, omissions, misleading evidence and mislabelling in respect of organisations’ claims regarding “(1) corporate and governmental commitments, (2) product attributes, and (3) disclosure of climate investments, financial risks and harm caused by companies”.
In terms of corporate and governmental commitments, organisations have faced claims alleging that their GHG reductions plans – usually ‘net zero’ or ‘carbon neutral’ targets – are not sufficiently clear or credible. For instance, in a recent claim against a multinational energy company, the claimants alleged that the company’s net zero plan failed to account for expected production and emissions growth from long term fossil fuel exploration opportunities, whilst also failing to represent accurate modelled reductions in respect of the company’s scope 1, 2 and 3 GHG. For more on this area, see section “A case study – the challenge of net zero and offsets” below.
Financial institutions, in particular, are increasingly being challenged by civil litigation. As key actors in financing the energy transition, their activities have been subject to particular scrutiny. Recent actions have included cases focussing on the inadequacy of corporate disclosure and failure to comply with recently developed human rights and environmental due diligence obligations.
With regards to product attributes, claims have been brought against retailers, for example, on the grounds that the publicised environmental credentials of their products – through the use of the likes of ‘environmental scorecards’ and ‘sustainable attribute criteria’ – were misleading, alleging that such publications contained falsified information that did not align with the underlying data. Moreover, energy companies have also faced claims alleging that the affirmative misrepresentation of the environmental benefits of fossil fuel-based products has violated consumer protection laws.
These different ‘categories’ of greenwashing cases serve to show that there are a number of grounds that prospective claimants may pursue alleged ‘greenwashers’. Regardless of the ‘category’ of greenwashing, any such litigation poses a variety of challenges to the defendant organisation, as it requires an expenditure of organisational resource (often for an uncertain duration, with an uncertain outcome) and may well result in a court order to pay damages, both of which can have significant financial and reputational repercussions.
However, it is important to note that there are jurisdictional nuances to litigation risk. The risk of third party litigation and/or representative action relating to greenwashing is likely to be less significant in jurisdictions such as Hong Kong and Singapore. This is due, in part, to cost and the fact that class action proceedings of this nature are restrictive and uncommon. Further, contingency fees are generally not allowed for court litigation in these jurisdictions.
Net zero policies and targets and the use of carbon offsets present particular challenges in the context of greenwashing. It is an area where many claims, targets and aspirations are made, but one where there is little by way of formal regulation to guide businesses.
This has resulted in a landscape where it is difficult to verify whether the use of carbon offsets actually represents genuine carbon reductions, as exemplified by the Guardian recently claiming that over 90% of Verra-certificated rainforest offset credits are “phantom credits”, a claim that Verra has stringently denied . (for more information on the integrity challenge in carbon offsets, read our briefing here ).
Several disparate, but interrelated, developments illustrate the challenges of navigating net zero commitments, carbon markets, and carbon disclosures:
A UN report, “ Integrity Matters: Net Zero Commitments by Businesses, Financial Institutions, Cities and Regions ”, published in November 2022 gives rise to a number of new hurdles that businesses must cross in implementing net zero commitments, and sets out recommendations for use of voluntary carbon credits. Some of the recommendations have, however, been criticised as having a lack of clarity, including on how to determine a non-state entity’s “fair share” of emissions.
The Science Based Targets Initiative , requires that “A company is only considered to have reached net-zero when it has achieved its long-term science-based target. Most companies are required to have long-term targets with emission reductions of at least 90-95% by 2050. At that point, a company must use carbon removals to neutralize any limited emissions that cannot yet be eliminated.” Note that carbon removal credits are different to carbon avoidance credits – an area misunderstood by many.
The Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (“ICVCM”) has been established to set and enforce definitive global threshold standards, drawing on the best science and expertise available, so high-quality carbon credits can efficiently mobilise finance towards urgent mitigation and climate resilient development. As part of the above, the ICVCM’s Core Carbon Principles (“CCPs”) and Assessment Framework (“AF”) will set new threshold standards for high-quality carbon credits, provide guidance on how to apply the CCPs, and define which carbon-crediting programs and methodology types are CCP-eligible. These initiatives are developing in tandem and will add a further layer of due diligence that needs to be carried out.
Meanwhile, Verra, a non-profit organisation that sets standards for voluntary carbon markets, has expressed its view that the ICVCM should drastically revise its process for developing the CCPs and AF for the voluntary carbon market. This indicates that there is no firm view, and is unlikely to be a firm view, on what represents an acceptable offset for some time.
In order to “promote the deployment of high quality carbon removals whilst minimising the risk of greenwashing”, the European Commission has proposed a regulation to facilitate the deployment of carbon removals by establishing a voluntary EU certification framework.
To do this, it proposes to set out:
Putting all of these pieces of the ‘net zero jigsaw’ (and the many others that already exist) is no mean feat. Care will need to be taken about clearly identifying how net zero targets will be disclosed and met, the use of offsets and removal credits, and the kinds of offsets and removal credits that will be used.
How to navigate greenwashing risk.
In our view, mitigating greenwashing risk lies in existing principles of good practice with respect to governance, disclosure and due diligence, in combination with an understanding of the sustainability profile of the product, activity or transaction at hand.
Although the exact practices and procedures that organisations adopt will, and should, differ between products and services, sector and jurisdiction, organisations may wish to consider the following ‘good practice’ steps.
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Program on corporate governance advisory board.
An analysis of 515 companies in 35 countries reveals a troubling trend.
Recent research reveals a troubling trend: apex firms in Business Groups often promote sustainability without substantial action. Analyzing data from 515 companies in 35 countries, the authors found that apex firms, especially those sharing a brand with affiliates, engaged less in sustainability initiatives than their lower-tier counterparts. This potential “greenwashing” might be tolerated due to the unique BG structure, where apex firms play communicators and affiliates act as implementers. Despite market tolerance, such discrepancies could harm long-term reputations. For genuine sustainability, firms must ensure accurate communication, inspire affiliates with shared values, diffuse best practices groupwide, and stay attuned to evolving stakeholder expectations. Sustainability is not just a symbolic gesture but a commitment requiring consistent, substantive action.
Sustainability has rapidly become an indispensable part of corporate governance. But as companies commit to green practices, a worrying trend is also surfacing: Some corporations are painting themselves as green while failing to back their claims with concrete actions. Numerous examples abound: The UK Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) has recently banned a number of ads from prominent companies, including HSBC for being “misleading” about efforts to tackle climate change. The ASA also banned the ads of Ryanair for the company’s unsubstantiated claim of being Europe’s lowest emissions airline.
Lisa Hupp/USFWS
For a limited time, all gifts are being matched to stop Big Oil from blocking a new once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to protect the Arctic.
How this misleading marketing practice impacts consumers and communities and stands in the way of real environmental progress.
Aaron McConomy/Colagene, Creative Clinic for NRDC
In 2009, Volkswagen launched a wide-reaching marketing campaign to promote its “clean diesel” cars. Across print and televised ads, including in one prime-time Super Bowl commercial, the automaker touted a drastic reduction in the tailpipe emissions of its new VW and Audi models. “Green has never felt so right,” the Audi commercial bragged .
But a few years later, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discovered that Volkswagen had installed software allowing it to cheat emissions tests for 11 million of its vehicles. The automaker’s so-called clean diesel cars actually produced nitrogen oxide emissions up to 40 times the legal limit. The resulting “Dieselgate” scandal marked one of the most notorious examples to date of deceptive environmental marketing—a phenomenon known as greenwashing—and ultimately cost Volkswagen nearly $40 billion.
But greenwashing is often far less sensational—and far harder to spot. We regularly encounter misleading sustainability claims on packaging for our everyday household items but also in, say, so-called sustainability initiatives promoted by major corporations. Given how urgent the climate, biodiversity, and public health crises have become, sorting sustainability fact from fiction is more important now than ever. Let’s get into what greenwashing can look like and what can be done about it.
Ana Fernandez/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
Greenwashing is the act of making false or misleading statements about the environmental benefits of a product or practice. It can be a way for companies to continue or expand their polluting as well as related harmful behaviors, all while gaming the system or profiting off well-intentioned, sustainably minded consumers. The term was actually coined back in 1986 in an essay by environmentalist and then student Jay Westerveld. While visiting a hotel in Fiji, Westerveld noticed that it asked guests to reuse towels for the planet’s sake—a request that would also conveniently save the hotel money. Meanwhile, the hotel, located near sensitive island ecosystems, was in the middle of an expansion.
In the decades since, a number of high-profile greenwashing examples have made front-page news. In the 1980s, Chevron launched its infamous People Do campaign, touting its work protecting wildlife, even while the company continued to spill oil in sensitive ecosystems and drive climate change. And in the early 2000s, fossil fuel company BP coined the term “carbon footprint” when it launched a calculator for individuals to assess their personal emissions, avoiding the fact that its own emissions were among the highest on the planet.
But as environmentalism has gone mainstream—meaning more consumers are willing to pay for sustainable products, and the financial sector has turned its attention to environmental risk—greenwashing has gotten more sophisticated. “[Companies are] better at how they message it, so it doesn’t come across quite so badly. “says Todd Larsen, the executive co-director for consumer and corporate engagement at Green America, one of the first organizations to put together vetted lists of green businesses and products. “It’s more in the general marketplace now.”
Greenwashing can still look like an overt, and potentially even illegal, lie. But as Larsen notes, most greenwashing is subtler and includes more insidious forms of manipulation, like these common strategies:
Poland Spring bottled water
Mike Mozart CC BY 4.0
Just scan the aisle of bottled water brands and you’ll notice a trend: packaging featuring scenic naturescapes and pristine rivers, lakes, and springs. In reality, the companies that manufacture bottled water are some of the world’s biggest contributors of plastic waste, and they often drain ecologically essential water resources in the process of sourcing. BlueTriton Brands—the company formerly known as Nestlé Waters—is behind a third of U.S. bottled-water brands , including Poland Spring.
More recently, BlueTriton faced litigation over its attempts to market its bottled water as sustainable, despite its “significant and ongoing contributions to plastic pollution and its depletion of natural water resources,” the lawsuit asserts. (Never mind that just making the plastic for a liter bottle of water takes three to four more liters of water.) In a motion to dismiss the case , BlueTriton’s attorneys defended the company by saying its “representation of itself as ‘a guardian of sustainable resources’ and ‘a company who, at its core, cares about water,’ is ‘vague and hyperbolic’” and therefore qualifies as “non-actionable puffery.” That’s about as close to a definition of greenwashing as you can get.
Clearcut area of Canada’s boreal forest, which has been continuously damaged by companies like P&G to produce toilet paper
River Jordan for NRDC
You should be especially skeptical of greenwashing tied to sectors known for their environmentally harmful practices—such as logging and the various industries it feeds. Exhibit A: tissue product manufacturers and toilet paper brands like Charmin. Procter & Gamble, the company that makes Charmin, created a catchy marketing slogan —“Protect, Grow, and Restore” forests. But the slogan only serves as smoke and mirrors for unsuspecting buyers who don’t know its supply chain includes pulp sourced from irreplaceable primary forests, which are key allies in our fight against climate change. Sometimes these buzzwords are even concealing downright poisonous business ventures, like the practice of “ chemical recycling .” The phrase implies materials are turned into new plastic when it generally means plastic is burned to make fuel. That process can emit more greenhouse gases than fossil fuel–fired power plants.
Even labels that promote a specific benefit, like “BPA-free,” should be approached with caution. That’s because, as public health advocates note, the chemical industry leans on a laundry list of “ regrettable substitutions ,” i.e., similarly toxic chemicals that have become routine replacements for better-known offenders. “The problem is that we don’t start from the precautionary principle in the United States,” Larsen says, “which would say don’t use a chemical or something that can harm you until you’ve proven it’s safe. Our regulatory framework is that you can use anything you want until it’s proven that it can harm you—and that proof is very arduous.”
Seventh Generation’s cardboard laundry detergent container, which has a plastic pouch inside that many people are unlikely to separate for recycling
Lindsey Nicholson/UCG/Universal Images Group via Getty Images
When the company Ozinga Bros recently proposed building a massive “underground storage facility” below Chicago’s residential Southeast Side neighborhood, it laid the greenwashing on thick, says Gina Ramirez , NRDC’s Midwest outreach manager.
The company touted the possibility that its Invert mining project would eventually house green businesses, like solar panels or vertical gardens. However, Ramirez knew it’d more likely become a place for toxic industry to congregate in her already overburdened neighborhood. Ozinga Bros hoped to bolster its green reputation by planting trees , putting an environmental activist on its staff, and even building a community center that was quite literally decked out in green. But when it came to discussing the mine, they failed to provide studies on the expected impact to air quality or transportation. “You’ll see tree plantings, recycling, promises for green infrastructure,” Ramirez says, “but then the means to get that supposed green infrastructure is really hazardous to your health—like blowing up dynamite to mine for 17 years and bringing thousands of additional diesel trucks into the neighborhood.”
A worker riding their bicycle to the BP oil refinery in Gelsenkirchen, Germany
Martin Meissner/Associated Press
You’ve probably noticed that thousands of companies have publicly rolled out net-zero pledges , including fossil fuel companies like ExxonMobile and BP that have no intention of stopping further pollution-producing development. That’s because it’s possible to finagle the math to imply emissions reductions on paper while continuing business as usual or even increasing climate pollution.
The way that works is that companies can rely heavily on what are called “carbon offsets” to zero out their own emissions. These are commitments to take an action that reduces carbon emissions elsewhere, like paying to conserve carbon-rich land that otherwise would’ve been developed. But not only are the climate benefits of offsets not guaranteed —a “conserved” forest could be lost to an unexpected wildfire, for instance—there simply isn’t enough land available to allow everyone that plans to rely on offsets to do so. Without first changing polluting practices, these net-zero pledges are a form of greenwashing.
Because going green sells. In 2021, 85 percent of global consumers said they considered the environment more when shopping than they did just five years prior, and at least a third said they are willing to spend more money for green products. This is particularly true for a new generation of socially conscious consumers. One recent study found that Gen Z considers climate change the single-greatest issue we face. “Purpose and impact are more in the minds of young people today,” says Andreas Rasche, greenwashing expert and professor at the Copenhagen Business School. Young people are both less willing to work for companies they perceive as misaligned with their values—and less willing to support them as consumers.
But, Racshe explains, it’s not just “the bad apples or the straightforward, rogue people trying to deceive others.” In his work, he often sees well-intentioned sustainability practices not living up to their promise because of mismanagement, poor internal communication, and a lack of sustainability expertise on staff.
Over time, greenwashing erodes consumer faith, which makes us more likely to dismiss environmental claims altogether—even the ones that are legitimate.
But there are far worse impacts too. Companies making these greenwashed products or running these greenwashed businesses and facilities have a history of setting up in low-income communities, communities of color, or both. For example, this trend held true for seven of the eight facilities NRDC researched during our investigation of chemical recycling . And the burning of that plastic, by the way, emits toxic chemicals linked to health problems like cancer and birth defects.
A furnace being delivered by barge to Gulf Coast Growth Ventures’ plastic manufacturing complex, a joint venture between ExxonMobil and SABIC, Corpus Christi, Texas
Eddie Seal/Bloomberg via Getty Images
Greenwashing gives some companies an unfair advantage. They are able to keep up with their polluting practices while simultaneously benefiting from the illusion of environmental stewardship. They can also make it harder for those who are doing the right thing to stand out in the marketplace. All of that has ongoing ripple effects for the environment. Take the Invert mine plans in Chicago. NRDC’s Ramirez pointed out that the drilling, explosions, and excavations would go on for years and kick up all kinds of pollutants. It’s worth noting that this includes pollution from prior polluters, as this neighborhood has long been treated like a dumping ground by toxic industries . The impact to the air alone is staggering but there will also be increased noise pollution and emissions. In other words, when it comes to greenwashing, public health and the environment stand to suffer.
The best short-term means of tackling greenwashing is to build awareness. You’re doing that by just reading this piece. Plus, we’ve got an action-oriented guide to help you cut through most murky greenwashing waters. Consumer activism and consumer advocacy groups have also helped lead the way via third-party certifications, as have environmental advocacy groups demanding corporate accountability. But for long-term strategies, the government has to take steps to reduce the burden on consumers.
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission is in charge of regulating unfair or deceptive marketing claims, including ones related to the environment, but the agency has gone after greenwashing violators fewer than 100 times since the early 1990s and seemingly only in the most egregious cases. There are other innovative ways forward that the United States could learn from. The European Union, for example, recently launched a taxonomy system that publicly ranks companies on their sustainability efforts according to a standardized set of criteria, creating more transparency for investors and policymakers. “It takes quite a bit of the ambiguity out of the debate,” says Rasche.
Ultimately, setting more protective environmental regulations at the outset can do a lot of the legwork. Federal agencies like the EPA and U.S. Food & Drug Administration must take the lead on restricting dangerous chemicals. And the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission can hold greenwashing companies accountable for claims that mislead investors. Lawmakers at the state and local levels have a role to play too. In the case of Chicago’s Southeast Side, advocates are pushing for both a city ordinance and a state law to make it more difficult for companies to further target environmental justice communities like theirs. Activists exposing greenwashing schemes like this have shown us over and over again that what’s best for big business rarely matches what’s best for communities. And increasingly, their message is clear: Valuing profits over people will not be tolerated.
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This paper aims to define a theoretical background for investigating greenwashing from a business economic perspective. We consider possible research questions in the relevant field of study, which is business economics studies. The first research step proposes a path that will orient scholars to the multifaceted perspectives of greenwashing. The second step analyzes the main theories that can support researchers and might motivate the possible greenwashing strategies. The third step highlights the potential link between greenwashing, reputational and relational capital, and a broad concept of value that includes the social dimension. Finally, we propose a conceptual framework that highlights some emerging research issues and anticipates the effects of greenwashing. Considering that self-regulation is not effective in reducing the gap between substantive and symbolic behaviors, the main practical implication of this study lies in addressing the need for stronger regulation and effective legal enforcement, not only to improve mandatory environmental disclosure but also to develop an audit process of such disclosure. Our analysis offers a number of suggestions for future research. Considering the centrality of disclosure in the theoretical framework we defined for greenwashing, future research could adopt the legitimacy theory perspective to focus on the role of mandatory environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) disclosure as well. Further, our conceptual framework highlights a possible research issue that investigates how a social value destruction resulting from inconsistent environmental strategies, may impact shareholders’ economic value.
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
Companies are aware that environmental risks are a threat to their competitiveness and survival. For this reason, they should consider those risks, in order to define their position in the field of social responsibility and also to contribute to their value creation processes (Seele & Schultz, 2022 ). Further, the need to operate in an inconstant environmental context, which is a consequence of the recent economic-financial crisis, the pandemic, and the current war, shapes the effort toward reaching environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) objectives. These recent occurrences push the researcher to investigate the role sustainability assumes as a possible resilience tool, in a process oriented to create economic and social value (Lee & Raschke, 2023 ).
The above considerations shed light on the essential role of corporate voluntary disclosure in legitimizing companies’ behaviors on the one hand, and emphasizes the need for developing a mandatory body of ESG information, on the other (Mahoney et al., 2013 ; Perera et al., 2019 ).
Greenwashing is a phenomenon arising from companies’ need to “resolve” the trade-off between the increasing importance of environmental compliance and their real and supportable efforts toward this objective. The word “greenwashing” is derived from the combination of “green” and “brainwashing” (Mitchell & Ramey, 2011 ), where brainwashing is applied to an environmental context. Greenwashing is a disclosure-based strategy (Lee & Raschke, 2023 ; Seele & Schultz, 2022 ; Seele & Gatti, 2017 ; Cooper et al., 2018 ) that may depend on some external conditions, incentives, or pressures that characterize the institutional context in which the strategies of deceptively disclosing “green” activities occur (Zharfpeykan, 2021 ; Velte, 2022 ; Marquis et al., 2016 ; Seele & Schultz, 2022 ; Li et al., 2023 ). This highlights that the institutional setting is a crucial determinant of companies’ environmental responsibility effectiveness (Li et al., 2023 ; Marquis et al., 2016 ).
Academics have not yet uniquely defined the role of environmental sustainability. In fact, scholars (e.g., Bini et al., 2018 ) speculate whether it is the most important challenge in the current socio-economic context or whether it is a “matter” that ought to be managed to maintain the company’s competitive advantage or to improve its financial performance. However, recent studies show ambiguous results regarding the effects of ESG practices on financial performance (Lee & Raschke, 2023 ; Li et al., 2023 ). Regarding environmental sustainability the argument is that financial performance can be supported by making restricted efforts via the use of misleading communication, since stakeholders cannot identify companies’ actual behavior, nor recognize asymmetric information (Berrone et al., 2017 ; Wang et al., 2018 ; Zharfpeykan, 2021 ).
Our literature review sheds light on some research issues to be deeply investigated to comply with the needs of scholars seeking a strong and reliable theoretical foundation for defining greenwashing (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015 ; De Jong et al., 2020 ; Gatti et al., 2021 ). It also highlights calls from authorities and regulators who need a definition that could be useful for the controlling authorities to “understand greenwashing” (e.g., ESA, 2022 ).
Despite the widespread use of non-academic definitions of greenwashing (e.g., Oxford English Dictionary; Greenpeace, 2021 ; TerraChoice, 2007 ), there is also the need to organize a theoretical path that will be useful for understanding the multifaceted perspectives of greenwashing (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015 ), also due to the interdisciplinary impact that greenwashing generates. In fact, greenwashing might generate impacts felt in several fields of study such as sociology, psychology, and law (i.e., legality, rulings, corruption) and ones that reflect on, among others, the role of corporate disclosure, financial performance and value, or strategy and marketing.
Our work aims to provide an inclusive outlook on the different interpretations of the greenwashing concept, by proposing a comprehensive view of greenwashing-related features. It also considers motivations of greenwashing by adapting certain theories developed in a socio-political context, as well as those related to voluntary disclosure, referring also to greenwashing strategies (Uyar et al., 2020 ; Mahoney et al., 2013 ; Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ). Our research ultimately defines a conceptual framework by analyzing potential links between greenwashing, reputational and relational capital, and a broad concept of value that includes its social dimension.
Our conceptual framework could become a background for future empirical testing of the research questions arising from the analysis of greenwashing in a business economic perspective. For the analysis, we adopted a qualitative research method. Starting from these pointers, this paper aims also to clarify a number of emerging and relevant issues from a qualitative research perspective and to develop a theoretical background for investigating the determinants and the potential effects of greenwashing in business economics studies, also articulating possible research questions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 , we illustrate the methodology we adopted to develop our research. Next, we illustrate the institutional background’s main features and its possible role as a greenwashing driver (Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ) in Sect. 3 . In Sect. 4 we propose a path for orienting scholars to the multifaceted perspectives of greenwashing. In fact, scholars have emphasized the need for a review of the greenwashing concept (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015 ; De Jong et al., 2020 ; Gatti et al., 2021 ). To foster a broader visualization of the greenwashing concept in an academic framework, we propose a visualization organized according to the most acknowledged features of the concept. Subsequently, in Sect. 5 , we analyze the main theories that might support researchers and motivate the possible greenwashing strategies. Then, in Sect. 6 , we highlight the potential link between greenwashing, reputational and relational capital, and a broad concept of value that includes the social dimension. Also, we propose a conceptual framework that can highlight various emerging research issues and that anticipates the greenwashing effects, also suggesting an agenda for future research. Finally, Sects. 7 and 8 give the discussion and the conclusions, respectively.
Our research aims to design a conceptual framework for developing research in the CSR field (Kurpierz & Smith, 2020 ), with a specific focus on environmental issues. The environmental dimension of CSR could be susceptible to a particular phenomenon identified as greenwashing.
To develop our conceptual framework, we defined a four-step research design adopting a qualitative research method and starting from a literature analysis.
Our literature review started with an analysis of a set of papers extracted from the Scopus database. We focused on relevant articles published between 2000 and 2023 because research on greenwashing from business administration and management perspectives before 1990 is scant, and between 1990 and 2000 we found only three papers which were not directly relevant to our work. We searched for articles written in English to avoid inconsistencies related to the language.
Since greenwashing is a multifaceted concept, our search used keywords that would identify all the definitions of this kind of strategy. Starting from the reading of the relevant literature, we recognized that the following terms were widely used: “greenwashing”; “green-washing”; “greenwash”; “green-wash”; “green strategies”; “green washers”. To include all the uses of these terms, we chose the root-words “green” and “wash” in the title, the abstract, and the keywords.
The application of the above criteria resulted in a first extraction of about 335 articles. Using this full set, we started selecting by excluding the papers that are not incorporated in the list of Chartered ABS Journals and those not pertinent to greenwashing from management and from business administration perspectives. These further criteria left us with a set of 59 articles. Nine of these articles, although they were broadly relevant to the topic, were not useful for the purpose of our study because they did not include the issues we aimed to consider in our review. Therefore, the final number of papers was 50.
Specifically, we set up the literature analysis to collect, among the other information, definitions of greenwashing in recent research, to individuate the relevant pillars (milestones), the research questions these papers investigated, the theories they drew on, and the emerging issues regarding the relation between greenwashing and value drivers.
To finalize the literature review, we carefully read all pertinent papers to determine which components should be examined, and we eventually settled on the list of four given in Table 1 below. Aiming to classify the papers according to the component(s) they analysed, we found several intersections because some papers included more than one issue. For instance, four papers included all the clusters, while other articles included one, two, or three of them, as Table 1 shows.
Our analysis of greenwashing literature shows several possible aspects that should be investigated or that are still unclear.
A primary question concerns the conceptualization of this phenomenon. On the one hand, scholars mention that research on symbolic corporate environmentalism and greenwashing is currently still scant (Martín-de Castro et al., 2017 ; Testa et al., 2018b ) and that there is evident risk of investigating greenwashing in an overly simplistic way (De Jong et al., 2020 ; Gatti et al., 2021 ) or without a strong and reliable theoretical foundation (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015 ). Also, most of the extant studies observe greenwashing in its relation to stakeholders and their perceptions (Torelli et al., 2019). For this reason, research regarding the companies’ perspective needs greater attention (Gatti et al., 2021 ). At the same time, the European supervisory authorities need for appropriate definition of greenwashing that can be used in the EU regulatory framework.
The literature analysis was instrumental in delineating the scope of our theoretical investigation. Our review gave insight regarding the direction in which greenwashing should be oriented and organized within a strong theoretical framework (Fig. 1 ) with the following components: (1) the institutional background related to the issue of greenwashing and possible links to corporate governance; (2) the greenwashing concept that we realize by categorizing the several definitions of greenwashing into “orienting pillars” on which we build in defining a construct for a comprehensive and organized view on the most pertinent greenwashing features; (3) the conceptual organization and recognition of the main theories capable of explaining greenwashing and motivating greenwashers’ behavior (Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ), thus supporting research devoted to this issue; (4) the definition of a potential link between greenwashing, reputational capital and relational capital, and a broad concept of value that includes its social dimension. In fact, the effects of greenwashing strategies should be matched with the expansion of the boundaries of the concept of value. Our aim overall, therefore, is to draw a connecting line that will link greenwashing and value, thereby proposing our framework as a tool for developing future research.
Research design
Greenwashing strategies and their intensity could be better understood by considering underlying matters regarding two important issues, namely the institutional context (external factors related to a given country and its social actors) and the corporate governance (a company-related factor) (Velte, 2022 ).
Greenwashing is a disclosure-based strategy (Lee & Raschke, 2023 ; Seele & Schultz, 2022 ; Seele & Gatti, 2017 ; Cooper et al., 2018 ) that might depend on certain external conditions, incentives, or pressures that characterize the institutional context in which these strategies are used (Zharfpeykan, 2021 ; Velte, 2022 ; Marquis et al., 2016 ; Seele & Schultz, 2022 ; Li et al., 2023 ) or that are shared within the global context. Mostly, companies aim to conform to the institutional context to which they belong, which is composed of a social system, legislation, and the norms and rules that govern firms’ activities (Guo et al., 2017 ). In fact, firms fear the reputational damage they might suffer from a transgression of global environmental norms and, consequently, they deceptively moderate their disclosure intending to address the reputational threat (Marquis et al., 2016 ).
Very many international institutions aim to promote sustainable development. Focusing on the foremost international agreements, which have been defined in the second decade of the 2000s, a set of “milestones” of the logic underlying the ESG commitment can be identified (Table 2 ).
The first milestone was stipulated in 2015 in an agreement signed by all 193 countries of the United Nations, i.e., the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” which defines the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to be achieved by 2030. One of the sustainable development targets the United Nations identified refers to reporting, specifically encouraging companies to disclose information that demonstrates their commitment to sustainability.
Also in 2015, 195 members of the “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” signed the Paris Agreement, which took effect in 2016 and aimed to strengthen the global response to the risk of climate change.
Further, in 2018, the European Commission drafted the EU Sustainable Finance Action Plan of which the main objective was to incentivize the financing of sustainable activities, to include sustainability in risk management systems, and to foster increasing transparency in reporting these issues. Therefore, this Action Plan helped to implement the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda. Particularly, one of its actions resulted in the creation of EU brands for so-called “green” financial products, to signal investment opportunities that are aligned with environmental criteria which investors should therefore consider. This generated a classification system for sustainable activities, known as the “EU Taxonomy” which, among other things, had some effects on reporting quality. To achieve a better basis of comparison than before, the taxonomy redefined environmental reporting according to a logic of accountability, which is as broad and standardized as possible. It, therefore, represents a deterrent to greenwashing and defines a model for evaluating corporate strategies according to a perspective oriented toward sustainability.
In 2019, the European Commission announced the European Green Deal, which defined some measures, including actions aimed at reducing CO 2 emissions responsible for climate change by the year 2030, and at eliminating those emissions by the end of 2050. Together with the 2030 Agenda, the European Green Deal has promoted a strong push to facilitate reliable reporting on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
Although requirements regarding mandatory disclosure have been increased in recent years, the literature claims that mandatory environmental disclosure is still scant (Mahoney et al., 2013 ). In fact, mandated reporting requirements appear to constrain the propensity to divulge misleading information (Perera et al., 2019 ).
Among the few cases of mandatory reporting requirements, the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) realized by the Financial Stability Board in 2015 deserves attention. In the absence of conventional international climate-related reporting standards, this group aims to create a set of voluntary disclosure indicators regarding climate-related risks (Brooks & Schopohl, 2020 ). The TCFD drives companies to give answers regarding risks and opportunities related to climate change (Dye et al., 2021 ; Seele & Shultz, 2022 ). Although originally issued as a voluntary information set, in 2021 the TCFD regulations became mandatory for the UK’s financial services sector (Reilly, 2021 ).
Focusing on the European context, the current regulatory setting related to sustainability disclosure is based on several regulations, of which the first is Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, which took effect in 2017, and which is mandatory only for specific categories of companies. This Directive introduced the requirement for some large companies to include a non-financial disclosure in the management report, concerning the ESG factors, which are considered relevant regarding the activities and the company characteristics.
Next, in 2019, Regulation n. 2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council was issued. It represents a new Sustainability-related Financial Disclosure Regulation, which came into force in the second quarter of 2021, requiring mandatory disclosure by fund managers on how they integrate sustainability in investment processes and contain potentially adverse impacts of investments on achieving sustainability goals. This regulation also introduced the distinction between “products” that simply promote environmental or social characteristics (Article 8) and “products” that aim to ensure sustainable investments (Article 9).
The EU directive 2022/2464, in force since January 2023, took on a crucial role regarding corporate sustainability reporting (CSRD) that substitutes the Non-Financial Reporting Directive with “sustainability information”. Significantly, this innovation underlines that information on sustainability cannot be qualified as non-financial and it invites companies to consider the impact sustainability considerations have on their financial plan; thus, financial disclosure and ESG disclosure processes are suitably aligned. Also, this Directive eliminates the likelihood of disclosing CSR separately from the financial report. Separate reporting is directed at different groups of stakeholders, while integrated reporting addresses investors. If the company includes sustainability information in the integrated report it signals that they consider it useful for stakeholders, shareholders (Velte, 2022 ), and for civil society actors. Additionally, in this way sustainability information will be subject to assurance and double materiality analysis.
Before the 2022 EU Directive, various standard-setting institutions, such as the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), already promoted the development of sustainability disclosure by providing a set of sustainability accounting standards (Bini et al., 2018 ; Yu et al., 2020 ; Dye et al., 2021 ; Lashitew, 2021 ; Laufer, 2003 ). Even so, until now specific mandatory requirements and their enforcement are still lacking. For this reason, stakeholders have not been able to fully assess the quality and the truthfulness of companies’ environmental claims.
By gradually applying the CSRD to a broader set of companies, enforcing the effectiveness of the sustainability report standards could be facilitated. In fact, the CSRD has designated the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) to issue the Sustainability Reporting Standards, which will become mandatory for EU companies in the next few years.
Despite such recent improvements, scholars find that environmental disclosure is not widely audited (Yu et al., 2020 ; DeSimone et al., 2021 ). Further, voluntary disclosure can be done strategically to communicate misleading environmental claims (Zharfpeykan, 2021 ). This could give rise to information asymmetries and, consequently, foster greenwashing strategies (Gugerty, 2009 ).
Several sources, such as annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports (i.e., sustainability reports, environmental reports, etc.), the mass-media, or websites (Dye et al., 2021 ; Mahoney et al., 2013 ) transmit voluntary disclosure regarding environmental commitment. In fact, as Mahoney et al. ( 2013 ) found, in the absence of mandatory environmental disclosure, the amount of information voluntarily disclosed depends also on the pressure stakeholders exert on the companies (Lee & Raschke, 2023 ). However, when mandatory requirements are scant or weak, stakeholders are not able to estimate whether a firm is really committed to environmental issues. In their recent study, Li et al. ( 2023 ) strongly emphasize the relevance of regulations and of the so-called social scrutinizers, also in weakening the positive relationship between greenwashing and financial performance.
Since the regulatory environment is a fundamental determinant of greenwashing (Li et al., 2023 ; Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ), the lack of mandatory requirements allows companies to report only useful information that is considered good in sustainability terms. Consequently, the quality of environmental disclosure is very variable across different companies and properly understanding whether information is trustworthy or not, is not fostered among stakeholders. This creates a favorable context for accomplishing greenwashing legitimization strategies, since stakeholders rely on the signaling power of disclosure (Yu et al., 2020 ). In fact, as Khan et al. ( 2021a , b) state, disclosure regarding sustainability has recently been criticized for being “opportunistic, “green washing”, implausible, cosmetic, lacking in stakeholder inclusivity, lacking in “authentic effort” and failing to meet users’ expectations” (p. 339), and largely unreliable. Since voluntary disclosure on environmental issues is a strategic tool for companies to answer to stakeholders’ pressure and to achieve legitimation, it could be lacking in reliability (Lashitew, 2021 ).
Greenwashing is related to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), defined in the literature as “a model of extended corporate governance whereby those who run a firm (entrepreneurs, directors and managers) have responsibilities that range from fulfillment of their fiduciary duties towards the owners to fulfillment of analogous fiduciary duties towards all the firm’s stakeholders” (Sacconi, 2006 , p. 262). This perspective on businesses’ social responsibility incorporates sustainability into a broader view of corporate governance (DeSimone et al., 2021 ), which includes the influence managers exert, as well as how the relationship between owners and managers affects their firms’ sustainability behaviors (Fiandrino et al., 2019 ; Jain & Jamali, 2016 ). This view further includes the mechanisms that regulate the fiduciary relationships which engage stakeholders and influence companies’ reputation (Li et al., 2023 ), even in terms of environmental sustainability (Fiandrino et al., 2019 ).
The link between corporate governance, management, and greenwashing, as we explain more elaborately below, can be observed through several lenses, such as the role of disclosure-based strategies, the governance control mechanisms, and the accusation element. Further, it should be noted that greenwashing strategies and their intensity, among other things, can depend on firm-related factors, external stakeholders’ pressures or awareness, or institution-related and country-related factors (Velte, 2022 ).
The literature sheds light on possible institutional features, as well as specific corporate governance attributes capable of impacting on the disclosure quality, and therefore also on reporting-related strategies, such as greenwashing. Velte ( 2022 ) observes some context-related issues that enlighten us on the stakeholders’ influence and involvement in corporates decisions. In fact, he states that operating within a civil regime means that a stakeholder’s perspective is adopted. Further, the degree of stakeholders’ influence on firms’ compliance and on their boards of directors can strengthen the investors’ protection rules (Jamali et al., 2008 ). In addition, the institutional context can be characterized according to the level of scrutiny and the kind of pressure certain social actors such as NGOs, consumers, investors, environmental groups (Kim & Lyon, 2011 ; Marquis et al., 2016 ; Testa et al., 2018a a; Seele & Schultz, 2022 ) exert. Such actors can impose their own supervision by introducing their own mandated disclosure requirements or monitoring actions, which the regulatory environment will carry out (Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ).
That greenwashing is a pertinent matter is evident from observing how regulators pay attention to it. In fact, European regulators have already signaled a willingness to take enforcement action in cases of greenwashing. For instance, in 2022 the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) established that the national regulators should enforce actions devoted to countering greenwashing. Also, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) published a Call for Evidence on greenwashing to find a clear definition of the phenomenon through developing a deeper understanding of its key-features, its drivers, and the related risks, as well as to shed light on possible practical manifestations of greenwashing. This commitment of the European Supervisory Authorities contributes to new insight on the fact that greenwashing has become a complex and not well-defined phenomenon. The conceptual framework we propose in this complex scenario aims to disambiguate some issues in the path that scholars tread in developing research devoted to sustainability, with a particular focus on greenwashing as an environmental matter.
We recognize the role of corporate governance in a greenwashing analysis by observing several research directions such as greenwashing in disclosure-based strategies, governance control mechanisms, and an accusation element.
Corporate governance drivers, such as the boards of directors, the executive committee, and owners with specific attributes (Ho, 2005 ), are recognized as strong determinants of the reporting quality that, in turn, constrains the risk that companies incur in greenwashing strategies (Velte, 2022 ). For example, both stakeholders and shareholders can foster an improvement of the reporting quality, but at the same time greenwashing can arise from an opportunistic manager’s intent. In fact, both internal and external determinants act in driving or limiting greenwashing. On the one hand, governance bodies such as the board of directors, as well as external stakeholders can constitute a fostering factor for executives who have to implement disclosure strategies. On the other hand, corporate governance mechanisms act as controlling instruments to improve the disclosure quality and therefore to constrain the strategies that build information asymmetries (Velte & Stawinoga, 2017 ).
The link between greenwashing and governance from a control perspective is also clarified by professional accountants and auditors who hold that implementing an ESG governance is a way of constraining greenwashing: “Embed ESG criteria in existing risk management procedures and controls. Consider introducing a bespoke ESG policy. ESG governance can assist the business to follow and have evidence of robust processes to make accurate public statements and claims about how ‘green’ or sustainable their products and services are” (KPMG, 2022 ).
The above considerations suggest a need to observe corporate governance’s role as a firm-level determinant of greenwashing because, due to the control mechanisms that the board of directors can implement, governance can be a possible incentive to disclose legitimation strategies and a possible limit to the disclosure tendency.
Further, greenwashing is a strategy that arises through stakeholder involvement. Specifically, greenwashing results when external interlocutors formulate an accusation (Sutantoputra, 2022 ) or attribute blame (Pizzetti et al., 2021 ). Such accusations, in certain cases, can act as a limiting element, for example, in vigilant environmental NGOs (Berrone et al., 2017 ). In fact Seele and Gatti ( 2017 , p. 239) state that greenwashing is a phenomenon “constituted in the eye of the beholder, depending on an external accusation.” In other words, greenwashing emerges from a path that involves reporting, controls, and strategies, and is a consequence of some form of control. Reporting-related strategies, such as greenwashing, are also strictly linked to the control external interlocutors exercise (Li et al., 2023 ).
In the broader context of CSR, the greenwashing concept relates specifically to the environmental responsibility of a firm (Pearson, 2010 ). Greenwashing arises as firms are increasingly being requested to commit to environmental issues, and is fostered by the difficulties stakeholders encounter in directly evaluating a firm’s environmental performance (Berrone et al., 2017 ; Pizzetti et al., 2021 ). Due to these difficulties, firms can afford to communicate non-transparent information about their environmental performance.
As research on greenwashing is growing, several greenwashing-related issues will be developed. However, different scholars portray different meanings of greenwashing (Walker & Wan, 2012 ; Seele & Gatti, 2017 ; Zharfpeykan, 2021 ) and, currently, there is no generally accepted understanding of the concept (Torelli et al., 2020 ; Wu et al., 2020 ). There are several definitions of greenwashing that are grounded in different perspectives, which is due also to greenwashing being multifaceted (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015 ) so that an interdisciplinary perspective is fostered (Seele & Gatti, 2017 ; Torelli et al., 2020 ; Zharfpeykan, 2021 ).
The above features of the greenwashing phenomenon suggest a lack of homogeneity, which leads to the first step in developing our framework. We propose a conceptual scheme to orient scholars and authorities toward understanding the multifaceted features of greenwashing.
The origins of the concept greenwashing can be traced back to a study by the environmentalist and biologist Jay Westervelt, published in 1986 (De Freitas Netto et al., 2020 ), at a time when the first environmental controversies began to arise. In his essay, Westervelt accused firms operating in the hospitality sector of encouraging the reuse of towels, ostensibly to promote green policies; however, at the time he noticed that hospitality sector firms, in fact, did not promote serious environmental policies (Pearson, 2010 ; Seele & Gatti, 2017 ).
Greenwashing is considered “an umbrella term for a range of corporate behaviors that induce investors and others to hold an overly positive view of the firm’s performance” (Cooper et al., 2018 , p. 227). Academics have, therefore, adopted various perspectives in defining the phenomenon of greenwashing (Torelli et al., 2020 ; Yu et al., 2020 ). Despite the differences in interpretation, the literature largely considers the definitions that scholars have formulated to be consistent with each other (Zharfpeykan, 2021 ).
We propose a conceptualization that polarizes the several definitions of greenwashing into some “orienting pillars.” Our literature analysis reveals that among the several definitions of greenwashing a number of recurring features can be recognized. In other words, most of the existing and recent definitions can be traced back to ones that identified the basic pillars. We aim to organize these basic pillars to define a construct that affords a wider and organized view on the possible features of greenwashing. All the conceptualizations of greenwashing have a common root in their use of disclosure as a tool to realize these strategies.
The first perspective we put in evidence, refers to omissions in reporting on the reality. The literature recognizes this as “selective” disclosure. In reporting a company’s activity, two possible kinds of behavior represent selective disclosure (Crifo & Sinclaire-Desgagné, 2013 ), namely to withhold information on negative environmental performances and/or to enhance the positive environmental performances disproportionately (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011 ; Guo et al., 2017 , Torelli et al., 2020 ; Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ; Du, 2015 ; Marquis et al., 2016 ). Lyon and Maxwell’s ( 2011 ) definition is among the most widely recognized ones, describing greenwashing as “the selective disclosure of positive information about a company’s environmental or social performance, without fully disclosing the negative information on these dimensions, so as to create an overly positive corporate image” (p. 9). In other words, Lyon and Maxwell’s perspective considers greenwashing as an asymmetric communication that aims to report a company’s environmental successes, while hiding poor commitment or negative behavior (Ferrón-Vílchez et al., 2020 ). This perspective includes a stream of research that considers this kind of greenwashing as “cheap talk” (Cooper et al., 2018 ), incomplete disclosure (Martinez et al., 2020 ), and an intrinsic feature (Lee & Raschke, 2023 ). Also, this research stream sees omissions as a manipulation strategy (Cho et al., 2022 ) which paves the way for the second perspective of a greenwashing definition. In fact, quite close to the concept of selective disclosure, is the one of misleading disclosure (Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ; Du, 2015 ; Pope & Wæraas, 2016 ; Seele et al., 2017; Guix et al., 2022 ; Lee & Raschke, 2023 ). Laufer ( 2003 ) described CSR disclosure, to which disclosures regarding environmental performance and initiatives belong, as devious and insincere. This suggests that greenwashing results not only from “omissions” but also from “lies” in the form of false green reporting (Seele & Gatti, 2017 ) that shows an untruthful image of a company’s green behavior (Mitchell & Ramey, 2011 ). Consistent with this perspective, prior literature associates greenwashing with fraud, assuming that misleading claims are intentionally finalized to generate a damaging image/experience for readers (Kurpierz & Smith, 2020 ).
A third perspective focuses on the gap between what companies report and what they do. This happens when companies ‘don’t walk the talk’ (Berrone et al., 2017 ). This approach regards greenwashing as a lack of substance concerning what has been accomplished (Siano et al., 2017 ). Consistent with this view, Walker and Wan ( 2012 , p. 231) define greenwashing as “ symbolic information emanating from within an organization without substantive actions. Or, in other words, discrepancy between the green talk and green walk .” Walker and Wan’s ( 2012 ) concept of greenwashing diverges from “green highlighting” because, while the former stems from a gap between actions and reporting (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015 ), the latter is backed by substantive acts, although they select only the good performances for the report. However, both these strategies can produce stakeholder reactions, potentially resulting in reputational damage or in increased reputational risk (Gatzert, 2015 ). Prior literature proposed perspectives that highlight the relationship between the different pillars generating a construct, which involves more than a specific greenwashing feature.
Starting from the common concept of deception, Gatti et al. ( 2021 ) identified four possible ways of pursuing greenwashing strategies, which involve the abovementioned fundamental greenwashing features. Greenwashing can arise at the action level or at the communication level. The fundamental features of “selective-disclosure” and the “misleading-disclosure” arise when the respective strategy is pursued through communication. The first when deception is passive, the second when deception is active.
The action level of greenwashing suggests an additional consideration, asking whether greenwashing is a disclosure-based strategy at all. The symbolic form of greenwashing, introduced above, becomes manifest in active deception regarding greenwashing, which Gatti et al. ( 2021 , p. 229) identify as happening when “(t)he company manipulates business practices to support its environmental communications.” Although such typology belongs to the action level, we see the manipulation of the business practices as a way of fostering positive but inconsistent reporting, thus including disclosure as an ultimate tool for greenwashing strategies. The action-level, associated with a passive form of deception, generates an additional feature of greenwashing, namely attention diversion. Attention diversion occurs when companies carry out green initiatives intended to be disclosed, while aiming to conceal other critical issues.
The literature recognizes that the extent of greenwashing, as well as its results, reflects some characteristics of the institutional background within which companies operate (Berrone et al., 2017 ; Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ). With this in mind, we complete our conceptual vision of greenwashing by giving the perspectives some important actors in the social environment, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have adopted. Since these actors actively scrutinize and monitor companies (Lee & Raschke, 2023 ), greenwashing might not be a successful strategy for them if they operate in the presence of vigilant environmental NGOs. These organizations might constrain the effects companies hope to achieve through greenwashing (Berrone et al., 2017 ). Two of the most important environmental NGOs, Greenpeace and TerraChoice, in their definition of greenwashing, emphasize a relational aspect that involves the customers and the products. Greenpeace defines greenwashing as “a public relation tactic that’s used to make a company or product appear environmentally friendly without meaningfully reducing its environmental impact” (Greenpeace, 2021 ), while TerraChoice defines greenwashing as “the act of misleading consumers regarding the environmental practices of a company or the environmental performance and positive communication about environmental performance” (TerraChoice, 2007 ). The perspectives these two NGOs definitions take offer a vision of greenwashing that is consistent with both the misleading and the symbolic pillars.
The background of greenwashing perspectives that we have represented sheds light on an important question to be addressed in future research: Can green communication also involve unethical or illegal behavior? (Siano et al., 2017 ). Indeed, considering greenwashing as the result of a selective or deceptive form of communication opens this concept to the possibility of including criminal or irresponsible environmental behavior, while adopting an interpretation of greenwashing as mere symbolic disclosure highlights the question of the inconsistency of companies’ reporting.
These considerations open up a further possible interpretation of greenwashing that places it between “decoupling” and “attention deflection” (Siano et al., 2017 ). Consistent with the concept of symbolic environmental disclosure, decoupling (Siano et al., 2017 ; Walker & Wan, 2012 ; Guo et al., 2017 ; Pizzetti et al., 2021 ) occurs when companies communicate good environmental actions to satisfy stakeholders’ needs and expectations without having adequate, structured, and organized activities, even to achieve their own objectives (Meyer & Rowan, 1977 ; Bromley & Powell, 2012 ). Attention deflection , on the other hand, aims to conceal irregular or unethical environmental behaviors (Marquis & Toffel, 2012 ) while reporting about symbolic “green behaviors.” Decoupling and deflection are both strategies that give communication a predominant role over action.
The background of the greenwashing definitions suggests some common attributes of these kinds of strategies. First, the literature has emphasized that greenwashing exists if this kind of environmental reporting is intentional (Torelli et al., 2020 ; Ferrón-Vílchez et al., 2020 ; Gatti et al., 2021 ). Further, a number of scholars (e.g., Seele and Gatti, 2017 ) pointed out that greenwashing should, by definition, be linked to an explicit accusation coming from the media, the stakeholders, and society. Then, an accusation would be a crucial determinant of greenwashing.
In that sense, greenwashing depends on both a company-related factor, identified by the level of misleading information that the firm provides, and on a relational factor, represented by the accusation that results from the stakeholders’ perception of the misleading intention.
The analysis of greenwashing conceptualization that we have developed leads to a structuring of this theorization that aims to provide a concept that allows us to define an inclusive and complete overall vision of a multifaceted umbrella concept (Cooper et al., 2018 ; Roulet & Touboul, 2015 ).
To frame the concept of greenwashing, scholars have identified several cornerstones of its definition (e.g., Bowen, 2014 ; Seele and Gatti, 2017a , b ; Ferrón-Vílchez et al., 2020 ). Following Delmas and Burbano ( 2011 ), greenwashing results from simultaneous bad environmental performance and positive environmental disclosure. However, in a further step, scholars identified the following three propositions as determinants (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014 ): (1) corporate disclosure is selective, (2) greenwashing is a deliberate behavior (Mitchell & Ramey, 2011 ), which therefore determines an intentional deceit for stakeholders (Nyilasy et al., 2014 ), and (3) greenwashing starts from the willingness of the company that manages this strategy. Subsequently, we identify another crucial determinant of greenwashing: how the stakeholders perceive it (Seele & Gatti, 2017a , b ). This aspect not only allows us to go beyond the company’s behavior, shedding light on the external environment’s active role in identifying the extent of the greenwashing effect, but also, at the same time, in identifying its motivations. According toSeele and Gatti ( 2017a , b ), greenwashing occurs if disclosure is misleading and if stakeholders accuse the company of being deceptive. The above pillars of greenwashing explain a number of crucial aspects to be investigated with a view to managing environment-focused research.
First, disclosure is considered the main tool in realizing greenwashing strategies on which companies deliberate and that they manage. Further, as Seele and Gatti ( 2017 ) highlighted, greenwashing implies two perspectives for observing the phenomenon. The first perspective is related to the information that a company would like to disclose, and to the extent of the disclosure’s potential misleading effect. The second perspective is related to the external perception of this information that could result in an accusation of falsity or omission.
The above considerations deserve further clarification. As highlighted, greenwashing is a strategy based on a company’s relationship with its stakeholders. However, Ferrón-Vílchez et al. ( 2020 ) point out that greenwashing does not in every case stem from a company initiative, and they elucidate the role of the large set of stakeholders that are interested in companies’ environmental responsibility, i.e., in their compliance with the legal obligations or the need to achieve environmental certifications (Sutantoputra, 2022 ). In that perspective, greenwashing can be interpreted not only as a strategy pushed by companies but also as an effect pulled by stakeholders. Consistent with this second view, Ferrón-Vílchez et al. ( 2020 , p. 862) define greenwashing as “a group of symbolic environmental practices born in response to the stakeholders’ pressures.”
Different levels of greenwashing actions stem from the above definition. In a first step, scholars (e.g., Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ) defined two greenwashing levels (Yu et al., 2020 ; Zharfpeykan, 2021 ) and in a further development of the analysis, Torelli et al. ( 2020 ) added two more levels. Company-level greenwashing is grounded in symbolic (Wong et al., 2014 ), selective, or misleading (Torelli et al., 2020 ) environmental disclosure, regarding the company’s mission, its certification, and other corporate-related issues capable of influencing its reputation. When the misleading “green communication” relates to the firms’ intentions for future strategies, the level of greenwashing is defined as strategic and can consist of disclosing the long-to-medium term objectives regarding the environmental aspects of the company’s activities. Some scholars (Torelli et al., 2020 ) also identified a dark level of greenwashing, which occurs when misleading or selective (Marquis et al., 2016 ) environmental disclosure aims to conceal illegal behavior. In our opinion, this form of communication could be applicable in all levels of greenwashing, when the company aims to hide illegal actions that enable several strategic or operational activities. Finally, product-level greenwashing relates to the information that a company discloses to promote its products and their environmental peculiarities. Product-level greenwashing occurs when this information is not fully truthful or complete (Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ).
The above considerations suggest that greenwashing can be viewed as a deliberate strategy (Seele & Schultz, 2022 ) involving different aspects of the companies’ activity. The deliberate strategy is realized through using different kinds of corporate disclosure (selective, misleading, false, and so on) or through actions that aim to enhance symbolic disclosure or to divert attention (Gatti et al., 2021 ). Further, among other things, the deliberate strategy aims to improve or repair the company’s reputation and image as perceived by stakeholders (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014 ; Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ; Ferron-Vilchez et al., 2020 ). The objective is to obscure illegal actions or corporate scandals (Torelli et al., 2020 ) or to foster financial and market performances and companies’ valuations (Yu et al., 2020 ; Montero-Navarro et al., 2021 ) (Fig. 2 ). However, scholars explain that external stakeholders can become aware of greenwashing strategies, thus generating skepticism and undermining the company’s reputation (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014 ).
Greenwashing: a conceptual vision. Source: Author’s own elaboration
An observation of the greenwashing drivers is not fully possible without considering both the theories supporting and explaining these firms’ behaviors and the role of non-financial disclosure as the main tool that companies use to realize the above strategies (Seele & Schultz, 2022 ). In recognizing the main theories that support the greenwashing studies we aim to define a conceptual structuring capable of explaining firms’ motivations and behaviors, and of supporting greenwashing research.
In business economics studies, theories arise from several disciplines belonging to the social sciences. They help us not only to understand particular human and corporate behaviors but also to define the framework for studying such behaviors.
Several scholars (Walker & Wan, 2012 ; Laufer, 2003 ; Zharfpeykan, 2021 ; Seele & Gatti, 2017 ; Uyar et al., 2020 ; Ferrón-Vílchez et al., 2020 ; Dye et al., 2021 ; Mitchel & Ramey, 2011 ) have defined a theoretical framework for understanding greenwashing. These frameworks include, among other things, legitimacy (Oliver, 1991 ), signaling theory, stakeholder theory, competitive altruism theory (Barclay, 2004 ; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006 ), and discretionary disclosure theory (Verrecchia, 1983 ) (Table 3 ).
Legitimacy theory (Deegan et al., 2002 ) is grounded in the concept of legitimacy (Cuganesan et al., 2007 ) that, in a broad definition, can be viewed as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995 , p. 574). Walker and Wan ( 2012 ) explain that legitimacy stems from the assumption that the socially accepted rules or values represent the setting in which corporate behaviors should be considered appropriate (Suchman, 1995 ) from the perspective or judgement of this social setting’s actors (Bitektine, 2011 ). In other words, legitimacy theory, that belongs to the macro‑level theories (Seele & Shultz, 2022 ), defines a contract between the company and its stakeholders (Deegan et al., 2002 ; Deegan & Unerman, 2011 ; Gatti et al., 2021 ). On the one hand, the contract requires companies to behave properly, and, on the other hand, it legitimates those companies that appear to be compliant with formal or informal social rules (Zharfpeykan, 2021 ). In this regard, Roberts ( 1992 ) considers legitimacy not only as a tool to improve financial or social performance (Deephouse, 1999 ) and companies’ value but also as a survival condition. In fact, stakeholders’ legitimation gives companies greater opportunity to obtain resources and financing, and it facilitates the relationships in the competitive system (Walker & Wan, 2012 ; Seele & Gatti, 2017 ).
Since CSR initiatives, including companies’ environmental efforts, should be considered as new legitimacy determinants (Seele & Gatti, 2017 ; Berrone et al., 2017 ; Hahn & Lulfs, 2014 ), the greenwashing strategies can be framed within legitimacy theory as a form of seeking legitimation which they found on misleading disclosure (Velte, 2022 ; Lee & Raschke, 2023 ; Li et al., 2023 ).
Legitimacy studies (Scherer et al., 2013 ; Bitektine, 2011 ; Suchman, 1995 ) identify several types of legitimacy. Among the different interpretations, we briefly mention three possible classifications and aspects that can help to interpret the phenomenon of greenwashing (Bowen, 2019 ; Seele & Gatti, 2017 ). Suchman ( 1995 ) defined cognitive legitimacy, pragmatic legitimacy, and moral legitimacy (Seele & Lock, 2015 ). Cognitive legitimacy occurs when environmental culture is taken for granted. Moral legitimacy stems from normative approval (Zyglidopoulos, 2003 ) and is related to how a society evaluates the company’s behavior (Bitektine, 2011 ). Pragmatic legitimacy is based on self-interest evaluations of the company’s stakeholders and on their perceptions of the advantages they can gain from firm activities (Seele & Gatti, 2017 ; Shuman, 1995).
Further, legitimacy has been classified as internal if it concerns a company’s insiders, or external if it concerns an external audience (Bitektine, 2011 ; Kostova & Roth, 2002 ). In a greenwashing analysis, an external perspective of legitimacy would be more useful than an internal one.
Adopting the legitimacy theory lens to analyze greenwashing as previously defined, implies a focus on pragmatic legitimacy. This is consistent with Seele and Gatti’s ( 2017 ) analytic framework, which links research on pragmatic legitimacy to the intentional misleading scope of green disclosure and adopts a strategic approach (Scherer et al., 2013 ) to legitimacy (Pfeffer, 1981 ). Following the framework given above, Seele and Gatti ( 2017 ) recognized that disclosure regarding green and environmental issues is a strategy aimed at gaining and improving legitimacy (Cho et al., 2022 ) or at reconstituting a compromised legitimacy (Laufer, 2003 ; Deegan et al., 2002 ). The strategic approach considers legitimacy as an operational resource that companies obtain from the cultural setting in which they operate (Suchman, 1995 ). In this theoretical framework, greenwashing consists of a legitimation strategy, adopting environmental disclosure to “legitimate social and environmental values which may or may not be substantiated” (Mahoney et al., 2013 , p. 352).
Legitimacy is also interpreted in institutional studies (Suchman, 1995 ), which consider it as a set of “constitutive beliefs” (Suchman, 1988 ). In this perspective, legitimacy is not regarded as a resource extracted from the social environment but as something that arises from an external institution’s construct (Suchman, 1995 ). As Bowen ( 2019 ) states, an institutional approach suggests that the companies’ behaviors aim to reach social approval. Also, the change observed in the stakeholders’ expectations pushes companies to adapt their strategy and their disclosure to comply with current societal expectations (Cuganesan et al., 2007 ). In that sense, the increased consciousness of environmental issues and the related disclosure can be considered as a form of adapting the company’s behavior to comply with the perceptions and expectations the social system’s actors have (Hahn & Lulfs, 2014 ). Research framed in an institutional theory perspective, sheds light on the relevant role of the social environmental context, such as norms, regulations and cognitive factors, which influence companies’ organizational practices (Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ). The role of the regulatory context as a greenwashing driver should to be seen in association with the other external factors and internal conditions, so that we can define their behavior as an adaptation prompted by all these factors’ pressure. This point of view, which is related to organizational institutionalism, adds a meso-level perspective of investigation to the theoretical background (Seele & Shultz, 2022 ).
In the same way as legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1994 ) is another socio-political theory (Gray et al., 1995 ; Uyar et al., 2020 ) scholars have adopted to explain greenwashing practices (Velte, 2022 ). Stakeholder theory refers to the concept of stakeholder engagement, defined by Sharma and Vrendenburg ( 1998 ) as “the ability to establish trust-based collaborative relationships with a wide variety of stakeholders” (p. 735). Stakeholder theory indicates that the stakeholders’ involvement in the companies’ decisions has a dual purpose. The first is to fulfill the ethical requirements in accordance with the societal norms, and the second is to strategically manage the relational capital (Edvinson & Malone, 1997 ; Stewart, 1997 ). Both these purposes are instrumental in achieving a competitive advantage (Cennamo et al., 2009 ; Seele & Shultz, 2022 ).
The stakeholders’ engagement (Sacconi, 2006 ) assists in overcoming the financial performance’s boundaries to include the achievement of social performance. In that sense, accountability includes both kinds of performance (Guthrie et al., 2004 ), extending the concept of financial value toward that of social value (Dumay, 2016 ).
Corporate environmental performance fits in the perspectives of both the legitimacy theory and the stakeholder theory, because the societal expectations about the “green behavior” of a company increase over time and encourage firms to reach legitimacy and satisfy the stakeholders’ requirements. Environmental efforts may therefore also be considered as a company’s adaptive behavior to fulfill the above-mentioned requirements and toward the stakeholder pressure (Ferrón-Vílchez et al., 2020 ; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008 ). Since external pressure is considered to be the most effective driver of an environmental commitment (Seele & Schultz, 2022 ; Velte, 2022 ), it may be difficult to discern whether the real determinant of companies’ green efforts is a moral attitude or a reaction to the stakeholders’ pressure (Crifo & Sinclair-Desgagné, 2013 ).
The signaling theory, which is widely used to explain greenwashing strategies, also emphasizes the crucial role of disclosure. Drawing on voluntary disclosure theory (Clarkson et al., 2008 ), signaling theory (Mahoney et al., 2013 ) explains that, since corporate disclosure reduces information asymmetries (Berrone et al., 2017 ), it can contribute to increase corporate valuations, considered both in a financial and in a social meaning (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012 ; Dumay, 2016 ). In fact, disclosure regarding environmental responsibility is a signal of companies’ commitment to these issues, which makes stakeholders aware that the company’s behavior is congruent with their expectations. However, in the case of greenwashing, the signaling power of the voluntary disclosure stems from information asymmetries.
Seele and Gatti ( 2017 ) favor signaling theory to explain greenwashing, because signaling theory makes it possible to observe both how the message is sent and how it is received and interpreted, in the presence of information asymmetries. In that perspective, Seele and Gatti motivate why misleading “green disclosure,” formulated to show a commitment to environmental issues, can (falsely) “signal” corporates’ positive social values (Connelly et al., 2011 ). They assume that disclosing positive information regarding green behaviors is convenient for both good and bad environmental performers. In a signaling theory perspective, every company can choose whether to disclose or not disclose truthful information about its “green” performance (Connelly et al., 2011 ; Yekini & Jallow, 2012 ). Taking this into account, that companies are keen to gain legitimacy (Lee & Raschke, 2023 ) represents a strong incentive for bad environmental performers that can use information asymmetries to signal a misleading message in terms of good environmental behaviors, thus acting as greenwashers . According to signaling theory, companies with superior environmental performance show a higher propensity to voluntarily divulge that environmental behavior, when compared to bad performers (Mahoney et al., 2013 ). Signaling theory differs from legitimacy and stakeholders’ theories in this sense, because stakeholders assume that disclosure can be used as a tool to realize greenwashing strategies (Hahn & Lülfs, 2014).
Nevertheless, signaling theory, consistent with a voluntary disclosure perspective (Mahoney et al., 2013 ), is grounded in the reduction of information asymmetries, and scholars believe that external stakeholders do not have the tools to distinguish between true or false information regarding environmental issues (Carlson et al., 1993 ). In such a context, information asymmetries between firms and stakeholders allow greenwashers to signal a positive image of their company (Li et al., 2023 ), thus improving the company’s reputation. Further, legitimacy and stakeholder theories suggest that external stakeholders’ pressure induces bad environmental performers to produce voluntary disclosure regarding “green behaviors” (Patten, 2002 ; Uyar et al., 2020 ).
Other scholars have used the competitive altruism theory to explain greenwashing (Barclay, 2004 ; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006 ; Mitchel & Ramey, 2011 ). According to this theory, companies (as well as individuals) compete to be considered altruistic, because conveying an image of altruism to outsiders strengthens a reputation of trustworthiness.
Additionally, prior literature gives the agency theory perspective (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 ) in attempting to explain the behaviors of individuals at a micro-level (Seele & Shultz, 2022 ). This perspective opens up a space for research that investigates greenwashing as a corporate governance issue.
Following the first perspective of agency theory that focuses on the owner-manager relations, greenwashing can be analyzed as a tool to promote managers’ interests to the detriment of the shareholders and, in this peculiar case, it also harms other social actors. In this sense, greenwashing could be investigated as a management tool for pursuing self-interest objectives. Greenwashing, as mentioned, is a strategy based on information asymmetries (Lee & Raschke, 2023 ), which are capable of generating agency costs (Ashbaugh et al., 2004 ). It draws attention to the need for a higher level of control on managers’ activities.
Following the second perspective of agency theory regarding control of the owner-minority relations, especially in case of a high concentration of shares, it can be studied as an entrenchment effect output (Bennedsen & Nielsen, 2010 ), where shareholders and managers adopt opportunistic behaviors to the detriment of minorities (Claessens et al., 2002 ). In such cases, the assignment to control should be delegated to the so called “external watchdogs” (Seele & Shultze, 2022 ).
Disseminating information regarding green activities is considered a way to enhance corporate reputation (Seele & Gatti, 2017 ; Baum, 2012 ), as well as to enhance revenue and other kinds of financial performance (Deephouse, 1999 ). The search for external legitimacy within a pragmatic approach and stakeholder pressure for compliance with environmental issues (Ferrón-Vílchez et al., 2020 ) could, however, lead companies to use disclosure to gain both legitimacy and stakeholders engagement.
The legitimacy theory perspective (Deegan et al., 2002 ) considers disclosure as a tool for improving the stakeholders’ accountability and reputation (Macias & Farfan-Lievano, 2017 ). Consistently, voluntary “green disclosure” is considered an instrument to engage salient stakeholders by reporting content that is congruent with their values and expectations (Dye et al., 2021 ; Mahoney et al., 2013 ). As Seele and Gatti ( 2017 ) stated, the role of disclosure becomes especially crucial when environmental scandals occur and companies have to repair their image and rebuild trust in corporate behaviors.
The search for pragmatic legitimacy, as well as stakeholder pressure (Gray et al., 1995 ), can bring about strategic uses of disclosure, which impact stakeholders’ perception and generate information asymmetries. This happens with greenwashing, as it is a phenomenon that can be interpreted in a socio-political theoretical perspective, to which legitimacy and stakeholder theories belong (Deegan et al., 2002 ). In fact, legitimacy theory justifies such communication habits, since symbolic, selective, misleading, or false disclosure is useful in concealing events that could threaten corporate legitimacy or in concealing bad environmental events with misleading or symbolic information (Zharfpeykan, 2021 ). Stakeholder theorists (e.g., Ferrón-Vílchez et al., 2020 ) explain the use of misleading disclosure regarding green actions by viewing it as an answer to stakeholders’ need to be involved in and informed about the companies’ activities and, at the same time, as a tool to manage stakeholders as a strategic resource (Cennamo et al., 2009 ).
The motivation to implement greenwashing policies also depends on the features of the institutional context in which companies operate, such as the pollution sensitivity, the sector (De Vries et al., 2015 ; Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ), the legislative measures, and the legal enforcement in the context of a particular country. More stringent regulations regarding environmental behaviors result in stronger pressure on companies (Kim & Lyon, 2015 ). The institutional context, seen both as a set of regulations and as a result of activist groups, is considered a variable capable of impacting greenwashing practices (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010 ; Marquis et al., 2016 ).
In the above-mentioned conceptual framework, Ferrón-Vílchez et al. ( 2020 ) identify both a proactive and a reactive motivation for greenwashing behaviors. These motivations arise from companies wanting legitimation or from a response to external pressure of stakeholders, that aim to generate an external image of the company that is better than the real one, improving the firm’s reputation and ultimately its competitive advantage (Velte, 2022 ; Lyon & Montgomery, 2015 ). This information confirms the pivotal role of disclosure. Disclosure represents an answer to the stakeholders’ need to be informed about corporate activities (Ullmann, 1985 ), with the intent of reducing information asymmetries. At the same time, disclosure represents a legitimation strategy (Deegan et al., 2002 ). In fact, misleading disclosure deliberately generates information asymmetries to induce a positive shareholder perception and to preserve legitimacy (Uyar et al., 2020 ).
The above theories anticipate that stakeholders will punish companies that exhibit bad environmental behavior and, at the same time, they state that disclosing information is costly (Mahoney et al., 2013 ; Uyar et al., 2020 ). In fact, the discretionary disclosure theory (Verrecchia, 1983 ) underscores that, since disclosure comes at a price, managers select the information that should be disclosed. Verrecchia ( 1983 ) also states that the undisclosed information can be interpreted in several ways. This suggests that the external stakeholders are, in any case, not able to attribute a negative connotation to the withheld information and, consequently, cannot discount the company value.
The above considerations explain that the conceptualization of greenwashing that emerges via the theories systematically converges toward a consideration of disclosure, offered through several tools, as a key resource in understanding the greenwashing strategy. This strategy aims to generate an external image of the company that is better than the reality, improving the firm’s reputation and ultimately its competitive advantage (Table 4 ).
Environmental issues are becoming increasingly relevant, therefore companies redefine their behaviors to comply with this crucial matter, also to fulfill an accountability function (Yu et al., 2020 ; Lashitew, 2021 ). However, green behaviors do not follow companies’ ethical values in every instance; they are also consequent to strategic decisions that aim to improve companies’ image and reputation through manipulating the corporate disclosure (Cho et al., 2022 ). We have emphasized the importance, as well as the difficulties, of a greenwashing conceptualization, to develop useful theorization of this issue and to provide tools for operationalizing the phenomenon through designing indicators that can be used in developing academic empirical research. Such indicators are also necessary for monitoring and limiting the greenwashing in which the authorities and regulators engage.
Since various theories have contributed to identify the possible motivations for doing greenwashing, it is now critically important also to observe the consequences of greenwashing behaviors (Berrone et al., 2017 ). This should help companies to rebuild their business model to comply with environmental objectives (Arena et al., 2022 ). This compliance effort would require adequate investments regarding the organizational, structural, and human perspective to accommodate the transversal nature of “greenization.” However, as stated, companies might report on their environmental involvement without really investing in the necessary underlying environmental strategies.
Companies’ commitment to environmental issues is widely recognized as a shareholder value driver and it is also identified as a social value driver (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012 ). As explained above, reporting about companies’ environmental commitment reduces the information asymmetry between firms and stakeholders and contributes to legitimating firms’ behavior, positively affecting the companies’ value (e.g., Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012 ), in both its financial and social dimensions (Dumay, 2016 ). Greenwashing aims to pursue this objective unethically by disseminating misleading disclosure.
Thus far, the absence of an effective mandatory ESG reporting framework left room for manipulating the information that was voluntarily disclosed (Zharfpeykan, 2021 ). Manipulating the information generates information asymmetries that mislead the actors in the social and competitive system and help to achieve the above-mentioned goals, without the company acting as a “good citizen” (Mahoney et al., 2013 ). The potential benefits in terms of improvements in relational and reputational capital, in fund-raising, and in financial performance induce companies to show an environmental responsibility even if they are not environmentally committed (Siano et al., 2017 ).
Misleading disclosure enables legitimating corporate actions that are not good practice and do not truthfully reflect reality. Disclosure therefore assumes the two-fold role of seeking transparency to involve stakeholders in the company’s activities and of being a communication strategy aimed at establishing intangible resources, both useful in creating economic value.
Recent literature (e.g., Rabaya & Saleh, 2022 ) informs that reputational and relational capital are crucial economic drivers of a company’s value, especially in the current era where invisible assets become distinctive resources. In this sense, environmental disclosure is viewed as a useful instrument in building reputational and relational capital and, therefore, financial performance and competitive advantage (Cantele & Zardini, 2018 ). The link between disclosure, competitive advantage, and value becomes manifest in disclosure that has the ability to nourish invisible assets that, as mentioned, are often effective economic value drivers. Companies’ legitimation and stakeholders’ engagement facilitate the generation of reputational capital. Bitektine ( 2011 , p. 160), in proposing a theoretical correlation between legitimacy and reputation, emphasizes a distinction between the two concepts: “This theorized correlation, however, should not be regarded as a lack of discriminant validity between the measures of the two concepts but, rather, as the effect of an overlap in criteria that evaluators use to make two fundamentally different forms of judgment.” Dollinger et al. ( 1997 ) concur with this view, identifying community and green responsibility as key dimensions of reputation.
Environmental disclosure, by strengthening the relational capital, is instrumental in ensuring legitimation. Nowadays, reporting environmentally responsible behaviors is considered a crucial determinant of improving the relations with stakeholders, the corporate reputation, and gaining a competitive advantage (Uyar et al., 2020 ; Rabaya & Saleh, 2022 ).
As Rabaya and Saleh ( 2022 ) explain, environmental commitment entails an improvement of financial performance, a reduction in cost of equity, and an improved credit rating (La Rosa et al., 2018 ). Both the improvement of financial performance and the reduction in cost of equity are value drivers that contribute positively to improve economic value for shareholders, which is the basis of expected future income and risk (Rappaport, 1986 ; Stewart, 1991 ). However, the above effects on corporate value can become concrete if stakeholders are aware of the poor environmental commitment. In this sense, environmental disclosure contributes to creating the relational capital strictly linked to the company’s reputation (De Castro et al., 2004 ) and, therefore, to a sustainable competitive advantage. Certain scholars (Cantele & Zardini, 2018 ) consider reputation to be a first intermediate objective and they view competitive advantage as a second intermediate goal of companies that are willing to ultimately increase financial performance through enhancing environmental responsibility. In other words, the link between accomplishing sustainability and improving financial performance is mediated, first, by reputation, among other determinants, and second, by the achievement of cost or revenue advantages.
Fombrun ( 1996 , p. 11) defines reputational capital as “a form of intangible wealth that is closely related to what accountants call ‘goodwill’ and marketers term ‘brand equity.’” Reputation derives from stakeholders’ perception of a company that becomes clear in their reactions (Deephouse, 1999 ). Among the several drivers of reputation, social responsibility is considered not only one of those drivers, but in fact a prerequisite to reputation (Rettab et al., 2009 ; Cantele & Zardini, 2018 ). Since, as we previously reported, reputation assumes the strategic role of gaining a competitive advantage (De Castro et al., 2004 ), it represents one of the greatest opportunities for creating economic value. However, reputation is a fragile and scarce resource and it is highly dependent on the relation between the company and its external environment (Gatti et al., 2021 ): without credibility there is no reputational capital (Worden, 2003 ). This normative dimension of reputation, which relies on credibility, confirms its link with relational capital and recognizes the role of greenwashing as a value creation strategy. This viewpoint is consistent with the results of Cho et al. ( 2022 ) who highlight that reporting bad news also helps to generate the impression of company transparency and strengthens company credibility.
Even if environmental disclosure is considered an important tool for preventing reputational damage (Reber et al., 2022 ; Cooper et al., 2018 ), deceptively manipulating disclosure, a practice that characterizes the greenwashing strategies, can impact the reputational risk and generate reputational damage. Siano et al. ( 2017 ) proposed a concrete example of reputational damage arising from misleading reporting. This is illustrated in the so-called “Dieselgate” case (Gatzert, 2015 ), which suffered a significant reputational loss as a result of fraudulent behavior fostered by misleading corporate disclosure. Referring to this, Siano et al. ( 2017 ) clarify the key role of reputational capital in research that aims to investigate the greenwashing phenomenon. In fact, firm reputation can be seen as a “protection” against the possible market valuation of real environmental performance but, in a different perspective, reputational damage, depending on stakeholders’ awareness of the gap between the positive image that greenwashing generates and the real, less favorable, environmental commitment, may have a value destroying effect (Cooper et al., 2018 ).
Reputational capital is important, also to improve a company’s competitiveness in the financial markets, thereby boosting its capacity to gain access to financing resources, bearing lower costs than competing companies. As Mazzola et al. ( 2006 ) stated, a good reputation contributes to companies being considered an “investment choice.” In recent years, this possible impact of environmental responsibility on companies’ capacity to attract financing is demonstrated by the issuing of “green bonds” that, as the London Stock Exchange ( 2021 , p. 2) states, are “any type of bond instrument where the proceeds will be exclusively applied to finance or re-finance in part or in full new and/or existing eligible ‘green’ projects.” As Dye et al. ( 2021 ) argue, nowadays environmental issues are variables with the ability to influence financing decisions, which obliges financial institutions to disclose information about their environmental impact. However, when reporting is unclear, the emerging information asymmetries can prejudice the decision process of a potential investor (Rabaya & Saleh, 2022 ). and if investors become aware of a firm’s misleading disclosure, the market responds to such greenwashing by producing negative abnormal returns and negative impacts on corporate financial performances (Testa et al., 2018a ). Also, the market can detect whether a company is an “environmental wrongdoer” because environmental performance scores can reveal the gap between what is said and what has been done. Then, the market has the ability to punish such a trespassing firm (Du, 2015 ).
Further, a good reputation helps reduce market volatility and helps foster the management of potential corporate or environmental crises (Mazzola et al., 2006 ). For these reasons, reputational capital, among other things, should be considered an important value driver.
Reputational capital is related to various essential elements, such as relationships with stakeholders and communication, which influence people’s perceptions. Relational capital is a component of intellectual capital (Stewart, 1997 ). The concept of relational capital, theoretically supported by a resource-based view (Barney, 1991 ; Wernerfelt, 1984 ), stems from the value added by the relations between a company and the relevant environmental actors. Communication is a fundamental asset of relational capital, which – within the company – aims to manage and strengthen relationships with all stakeholders (Velte, 2022 ).
Value is a broad concept that goes beyond the boundaries of its financial dimension, involving a social perspective too (Dumay, 2016 ). In November 2020, the International Valuation Standard Council (IVSC, 2020 , p. 4) stated that “‘Social Value’ includes the social benefits that flow to asset users (social investment) and the wider financial and non-financial impacts including the wellbeing of individuals and communities, social capital and the environment, that flow to non-asset users.” From the IVSC’s viewpoint, value is a wide concept, which includes three dimensions: the monetary benefit to the asset owner, the social benefit to asset users, and the social benefit to non-asset users (IVSC, 2022 ). The first component could be more strictly linked to a financial concept of value, while the second and the third components are included in the concept of social value.
The social benefit to asset users is defined as “social investments,” while the social benefit to non-asset users are defined as “the benefits derived from the asset that flow to the non-asset users including the wellbeing of individuals and communities, social capital and the environment” (IVSC, 2020 , p. 4).
The conceptual framework proposed by the IVSC can include the companies’ environmental responsibility. Further, green strategies can foster not only an increase in shareholders’ value but also an improvement of the social value. Green strategies, in fact, could also generate benefits for asset users, e.g., health benefits deriving from the use of natural products, or for non-asset users, e.g., in terms of reducing pollution or creating green urban spaces. In addition, the IVSC deepens the possibility of generating social value, introducing the concept of “social asset,” i.e., an asset held “with the primary objective of providing social benefits to asset users and non-asset users” (p. 9), which can generate value not solely for the owners but also for other stakeholders.
Following the above conceptualization, companies’ greenization or environmental efforts, in general, should be considered as positive value drivers for improving both the economic value for shareholders and the social value for stakeholders. In fact, both shareholder value and social value can be improved through green strategies. However, if the value creation process is not based on a redefinition of the business model but only on a misleading communication strategy, different considerations arise. This view is consistent with Cho et al.’s ( 2022 ) evidence showing that a self-referential sustainability disclosure could be effective as a reputation protection tool.
In Fig. 3 we propose a conceptual framework representing the background we suggest for future empirical testing of the research questions that stem from the analysis of greenwashing in a business economic perspective.
Greenwashing conceptual framework. Source: Author’s own elaboration
Greenwashing aims to increase shareholders’ value by improving reputational capital without really acting responsibly. The lack of real actions underlying disclosed information, as well as the inclination to conceal illegal or unsustainable behaviors (Marquis et al., 2016 ; Seele & Schultz, 2022 ) that can generate the onset of environmental problems, cannot be considered a positive value driver in the broader social-capital-related perspective, although it can potentially increase the economic value. If external stakeholders are not aware of the misleading intent of the company’s disclosure, the company’s credibility is not damaged. Even so, the social capital which can be decreased or threatened, cannot be improved by implementing greenwashing strategies. In this situation, managers should not adopt a short-sighted strategy without evaluating the possible long-term negative impacts of processes that destroy social value, relating also to the shareholders’ financial and strategic value.
Since credibility and loyalty represent crucial invisible assets that, in turn, are a fundamental prerequisite to achieving reputational results (Worden, 2003 ), the value creation process cannot be virtuous if stakeholders become aware that the disclosure of the environmental practices lacks clarity. Other research corroborates this consideration (Zharfpeykan, 2021 ; Karaman et al., 2020 ), finding that reputational capital can generate a competitive advantage if companies provide honest disclosure regarding challenging issues. Consequently, investigating the circumstances in which greenwashing produces a value-destroying process or constrains the value creation process. could be important. If a firm is accused of being a greenwasher , investors and other stakeholders reinforce the opinion that the company is not environmentally compliant or that it is dishonest, thus formulating a negative valuation (Du, 2015 ). Further, the strategy of disclosing only matters related to symbolic involvement in environmental responsibility will be not effective in achieving long term financial and social benefits, because symbolic actions cannot improve critical environmental situations, such as pollution, waste reduction, and so on (Walker & Wan, 2012 ). In the field of business ethics, research shows that if firms “don’t walk the talk” (Berrone et al., 2017 ) they are subjected to reputational damage and their intent to legitimize themselves is penalized. Further, it has to be noted that the extent of these negative consequences, observed in terms of reputation and value, also depends on some characteristics of the institutional setting in which companies operate. The regulations that impact the quality of the disclosure, the strength of legal enforcement, and the presence of vigilant organizations constitute such value determining features (Velte, 2022 ; Berrone et al., 2017 ; Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ).
The growing importance of environmental issues directs researchers to deepen the investigation of companies’ sustainable behavior, especially if they are clearly not ethical. Within the proposed theoretical framework, disclosure is considered a key driver in generating stakeholder awareness about companies’ environmental commitment. This helps to improve the stakeholders’ engagement in the strategies that companies choose to signal and legitimate their behavior.
The scarcity of mandatory disclosure, creates space for a more effective role of voluntary disclosure regarding greenwashing (Guix et al., 2022 ). Although the institutional context where research is developed has more and less disclosure regulation, there are opportunities for research development on the possibility that seeking legitimation and greater stakeholder engagement could be grounded in information asymmetries rather than in real environmental strategies.
The links between environmental commitment, relational and reputational capital, and economic and social values are conditioned by an underlying business model devoted to the environmental strategies that underpin a company’s “ green talk. ” In fact, if substantive actions do not support disclosure, companies’ credibility can be threatened (Gatti et al., 2021 ). All this is important, also to understand the possible consequences of greenwashing, both for companies and for stakeholders. Greenwashing, as the literature analysis demonstrates, is a multifaceted phenomenon (Pizzetti et al., 2021 ). Consequently, greenwashing strategies should be considered in their various manifestations and nuances, as this will identify several intermediate positions that lie between the two extreme situations captured as “true or false environmental responsibility,” as Fig. 3 shows. Greenwashing can be a successful strategy only if the company’s credibility is not questioned. Otherwise, greenwashing can produce a negative effect on companies’ relational and reputational capital generation and, in turn, on their value creation (Cho et al., 2022 ; Gatti et al., 2021 ; Du, 2015 ).
Considering social value in its dimension of social benefits for asset users and for non-asset users or, instead, considering the economic value for shareholders, we can come up with distinct pointers for developing hypotheses. While social value can derive from a real environmental commitment, researchers should investigate whether economic value can also be improved by implementing greenwashing strategies that are not supported by substantive or lawful actions, but that are grounded in misleading disclosure.
We assume that greenwashing could produce a twofold effect. If the stakeholders do not perceive the greenwashers’ misleading intent, scholars might hypothesize that greenwashing can produce a positive effect on the firms’ reputation and on its relational capital, as well as on the economic value for the shareholders. Otherwise, greenwashing can produce negative effects both on the economic value for the shareholders and on the social dimensions of value.
Our study aimed to investigate the issue of greenwashing from a theoretical point of view, identifying greenwashing is a multifaceted concept that engages scholars in several disciplines (Pizzetti et al. 2021 ). In fact, greenwashing can generate impact relevant to several themes and fields of study, such as the role of corporate disclosure, possible impacts on financial performance (Testa et al., 2018a ), strategy and marketing, sociology, psychology, and law (considering, e.g., legality, rulings, corruption, and so on). This paper is interested in the main business economic theories in which delineating the role of disclosure as a key tool in greenwashing strategies, is in focus. Also, we have highlighted the potential link between greenwashing and a broad concept of value that includes its social dimension.
In this wide context, we first introduced issues on corporate governance and the institutional context that should be taken in account to best define the greenwashing concept. The extent of reporting-based strategies, such as greenwashing, should be considered in the light of corporate governance features, such as the remunerations related to sustainability, as ESA ( 2022 , p. 5) has articulated in stating that “(g)reenwashing is a complex phenomenon which can involve or impact a multitude of financial market participants and potentially affects all sectors in the sustainable value chain.” Further, the institutional context in which companies operate, that is a crucial determinant of greenwashing (Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ; Marquis et al., 2016 ), needs attention. Analysis of both corporate governance and social environmental issues should be given scholarly attention by those fervent about sustainability reporting.
Both scholars (e.g., Dye et al., 2021 ; Kinderman, 2019 ; Jamali & Karam, 2018 ) and practitioners recognize an urgent need for a mandatory environmental disclosure improvement. On the one hand, regulations could indirectly involve companies in a self-regulation process regarding environmental behavior (Webster, 2020 ). On the other hand, a regulated level of reporting quality, harmonization, and transparency has been presented as the “end of the ‘self-regulation’ era” (Khan et al., 2021). Further, considering the increasing importance of environmental issues in investment decisions, wider regulation could be seen as a fundamental mechanism to protect investors, since sustainability disclosure is a tool for communicating the company’s commitment to green issues to potential stockholders or lenders (Dye et al., 2021 ).
Additionally, after conducting our literature review, we found a number of research directions that need attention, which helped us develop an inclusive perspective on the different interpretations of the greenwashing concept.
In fact, at this stage, we aim for our research to contribute to satisfying the need for a clear conceptualization of greenwashing. Therefore, we propose a comprehensive structuring of greenwashing-related features and of what motivates greenwashing. We have clarified the role of the main theories that could be used or adapted to explain greenwashing behaviors and motivations and to support research devoted to greenwashing (Delmas & Burbano, 2011 ).
By extensively conceptualizing greenwashing we offer scholars a theoretical framework, and we have clarified the issue they investigate. By doing this we provide a background for operationalizing greenwashing through the design of indicators that can be used by researchers in developing empirical studies or by authorities and regulators in monitoring the phenomenon. We propose a conceptualization that organizes the several definitions of greenwashing into some “orienting pillars.” Our literature analysis considers the numerous greenwashing definitions in order to recognize certain recurring features.
Greenwashing can be seen as a deliberate strategy (Seele & Shultz, 2022 ) realized through the use of different kinds of corporate disclosure (selective, misleading, false, and so on) or through actions that aim to either enhance symbolic disclosure or divert attention (Gatti et al., 2021 ). In this sense, greenwashing depends on a company-related factor, identified by the level of misleading information that the firm provides, and on a relational factor, represented by the accusation that results from stakeholders’ recognition of the misleading intention.
This background to greenwashing suggests relevant research questions for future studies that should investigate the risk attached to the inconsistency of voluntary non-financial reporting, as well as the ways in which green communication involves unethical or illegal behaviors (Siano et al., 2017 ).
Additionally, many authorities signal that greenwashing is a complex phenomenon and indicate that currently a unitary definition of its drivers and a description of its characterizing features are lacking (ESA, 2022 ). In such scant information, we recognize possible research contributions as well as the implications of our framework. First we propose an analytic perspective for researchers, and second a representative scheme of greenwashing which controlling authorities could usefully apply (ESA, 2022 ).
Our framework sheds light on the nature of the relations between the environmental efforts of companies, their impact on relational and reputational capital, and ultimately on a broad concept of value, which includes a social dimension. These relations depend on the support that companies’ green talk achieves by redefining their business model since this is required to foster a shared value creation process (Arena et al., 2022 ).
Also, since greenwashing can be effective for companies only if their credibility is not in question, the multifaceted nature of greenwashing suggests scholars should also focus on the several middle positions that lie between the two extreme conditions represented by dichotomy of true or false environmental commitment. Our framework demonstrates that while greenwashing is not a social value creation strategy, its role as a shareholders’ value driver could have different effects depending on whether stakeholders suspect the real intent of the company (De Vries et al., 2015 ; Gatti et al., 2021 ). Further, Gatti et al. ( 2021 ) state that the effects of greenwashing vary in relation to the greenwashing typology. Within the framework we designed, this means that the impacts of greenwashing on the relational and reputational capital and, in turn, on companies’ value, should be considered in the light of the accusation that follows the type of strategy a company has chosen. For example, a manipulation strategy could result in worse stakeholders’ reaction than just an attention diversion.
Taking this into consideration, scholars should investigate the possible impact an increase or a decrease of the social dimensions of value might, in turn, produce on the economic value creation. Another research implication involves the scholars interested in greenwashing issues and stems from the need to improve research on the development of methodological issues aimed at defining a way of measuring greenwashing.
This study is particularly contextualized in the current period, due to the increasing attention global and domestic institutions invest in improving mandatory environmental disclosure and also due to the increasing attention governments invest in companies’ environmental responsibility and ‘greenization’.
Our research has three main scientific contributions: First, we elaborate a conceptual scheme for orienting scholars regarding the multifaceted features of greenwashing. Second, we describe a theoretical background, which gives evidence of pertinent relations between the main theories that support greenwashing studies, aiming to define a conceptual organization capable of explaining firms’ motivations and behaviors and of supporting greenwashing research. Third, we propose our conceptual framework while also highlighting the potential emerging research issues. Since greenwashing is a strategy, the framework that we built might be valuable as a tool to foster managers’ strategic decision making processes. This would allow them to define their strategies from a value creation perspective and to evaluate the possible effect of such strategies.
We also identify relevant practical implications and contributions of this study, especially referring to the actors of the social environment and to their policies. Our first practical contribution is related to authorities’ declared need of a clear definition and framework for investigating greenwashing as a phenomenon, its features, and the related risks (ESA, 2022 ) in the current context. The contemporary setting is characterized by a rapid evolution of regulatory regimes and by the increasing importance attached to environmental issues. Particularly, authorities’ need for a clear definition is due to supervisors being called to investigate, prevent, and constrain greenwashing. Considering our study’s objectives, it contributes to fulfill this need of authorities. Further, the role of the so-called social watchdogs, such as Consob, other authorities, or NGOs in constraining misleading strategies such as greenwashing emerges (Berrone et al., 2017 ; Li et al., 2023 ). In fact, a conceptualization of greenwashing, which represents the first step of our research, has also been requested by practitioners and not only by researchers.
We further contribute by highlighting relevant needs to actors in the institutional setting, such as government, local authorities, or supervisors. Such needs include those of rapidly enforcing stronger regulations and effective legal enforcement, of improving mandatory environmental disclosure, as well as introducing a process of auditing the reporting process (De Simone et al., 2021 ). As Du ( 2015 ) states, self-regulation is not effective in reducing the gap between substantive and symbolic behaviors, considering also the relevant impact the environmental disclosure may have on financial markets’ products such as green bonds. In fact, our analysis demonstrates that voluntary unaudited disclosure is the main tool for companies to engage in greenwashing. Since greenwashing is a strategy, the study addresses the characteristics of such a strategy and, therefore, highlights some crucial features that could serve authorities in better defining and implementing their policies.
Finally, the importance of analyzing the ESG impact on value is growing (IVSC), even if the related literature is still new, as the world of regulators emphasizes. Greenwashing is a strategy related to sustainability, therefore it is an aspect to be included in the development of the ESG reflection of business valuation.
Our analysis also offers a suggestion for future research. Considering the crucial role of disclosure in the theoretical framework we defined, future research could investigate the legitimacy theory perspective focusing on mandatory disclosure as well. Our conceptual framework sheds light on the importance of studies devoted to analyzing the impact social value destruction, due to wrong greenwashing strategies, might have on economic value. Further, it could be interesting to overcome any of the limitations our paper has, by empirically testing the theories to which we have drawn attention, which motivates greenwashing strategies and their potential impacts on companies’ value.
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Bernini, F., La Rosa, F. Research in the greenwashing field: concepts, theories, and potential impacts on economic and social value. J Manag Gov 28 , 405–444 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-023-09686-5
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August 15, 2024
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by Andres Eberhard, University of Zurich
Companies like to act "green" by publishing thick environmental sustainability reports replete with photography of pristine landscapes, but precious few of them keep their promises. Finance professor Markus Leippold is using AI-based tools to fight greenwashing.
Wherever the Terminator goes in the eponymous movie, the cyborg from the future wreaks havoc. "I'll be back," he says at a police station before barreling a car into the precinct and killing the police on duty there. The mission of the Terminator, embodied by actor Arnold Schwarzenegger, is nothing less than the destruction of humanity.
The "Climinator" gets down to work with much more benevolent intentions. It is an AI tool whose mission is to put the climate debate on a more factual basis, which is a necessity in the battle against global warming . The Climinator was developed by a group of UZH researchers led by Markus Leippold, a professor of financial engineering. Its artificial intelligence enables counterfactual statements on climate-related issues to be exposed and debunked within minutes.
The Climinator deals with false and fake climate facts just as destructively as the Terminator treats its adversaries. It stamps a verdict of "incorrect" on Swiss People's Party President Marcel Dettling's statement that no one can halt climate change, and it calls his assertion that a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions will hardly arrest warming "misleading."
However, the Climinator doesn't stay as sparing with words as the original played by Arnold Schwarzenegger does. The AI-based tool appends to its verdict a multi-page argument complete with a list of sources, which it takes just under two minutes to compose. The sources it draws on are research papers that reflect the scientific consensus , particularly reports published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
"It works kind of like the way things did with the ancient Greek philosophers," Leippold explains during a meeting in his office in Zurich. The fact-checking tool, he says, verifies the accuracy of statements by enlisting an array of large language models to interact with each other in a kind of debate. To prevent blind spots, the researchers even deliberately incorporated the perspective of climate denialists.
"It's like a Socratic debate where, in the end, scientific arguments determine the verdict," Leippold says.
Leippold stood on the world stage for 15 minutes when he recently delivered a TED talk in Paris. The nonprofit organization TED provides a platform for experts whose ideas it deems are worthy of consideration and posts recordings of TED talks on the internet.
The YouTube video of Leippold's TED appearance has racked up around a half-million views to date. Leippold leveraged the attention to hammer home his main message. "Global warming, at its root, is an economic problem," he said. Emissions ultimately are caused by human economic activity, and that activity is coordinated by financial markets, he explains.
Leippold's point is that in order to halt global warming, businesses need to invest in sustainable technologies. And in order to steer investment in desired directions through laws or incentives, for example, policymakers need transparency. But that's in short supply at present.
Although every self-respecting large company publishes a sustainability report these days, hardly anyone really reads them carefully. So, there is a huge risk of greenwashing. Take Shell, for example. The oil company's latest sustainability report is 98 densely worded pages long. Photos adorning the pages show workers conferring in front of a solar panel array and managers being guided though lush fields by local natives.
Shell, though, is one of the world's largest emitters of CO 2 and has been reprimanded repeatedly for greenwashing. The problem is that companies use words that sound good, but they commit to as little as possible. That's why Leippold and his team have developed an additional AI-based tool capable of telling tangibly measurable climate pledges from vaguely worded intentions. Or as Leippold put it in his TED talk, "We separate the walkers from the talkers."
That works very well by now. However, the finding revealed by the research conducted thus far with the software is dismaying: roughly every second company has a Cheap Talk Index score above 50%. In other words, every second promise in sustainability reports is worthless.
One example of nice-sounding but essentially vague wording is the intention to become "climate-neutral by 2050." This frequently uttered vow can mean anything. It can mean, for instance, that the company pledging it will cease emitting greenhouse gases altogether. But it can also mean that said company will actually even produce more carbon dioxide , an action made possible through the trading of carbon credits that promise to make a contribution to combating climate change by, for example, funding the protection of ancient woodlands in Africa or Latin America.
Although there is a great deal of dispute about the effectiveness of carbon credits trading, companies deduct the saved emissions from their CO 2 output and become "climate-neutral" that way. Leippold likens this to the "old days of the Catholic Church, when one could buy absolution from sins by purchasing an indulgence."
But deception takes place more than just linguistically. Actual CO 2 and methane emissions are also susceptible to manipulation because the companies themselves are the only ones able to supply reliable data on them.
Leippold thus has his mind set on finding out the true magnitude of those emissions and how big an impact companies have on biodiversity in their vicinity. Satellites that deliver data in real time could make that possible. Smart image analysis software could then analyze the data. The researchers led by Leippold are currently working on developing a solution of that kind.
In order to bring the trickery to light, the researchers' findings need to make their way out of the ivory tower. To ensure that happens, Leippold promises that all of the tools developed will be released to the public as open-source software. Some policymakers and international institutions already use these tools today to detect corporate greenwashing.
Another tool developed by the researchers can already be used by anyone today: on ChatClimate, users can input questions on global warming and receive answers to them powered by artificial intelligence. The large language model behind ChatClimate sources its information from the scientific findings in IPCC reports.
Leippold sees a lot of potential in this kind of platform. It's getting harder and harder, he says, to sift trustworthy information from the vast wilderness of data on the internet. "When Google was brought into existence 25 years ago, 25 million webpages were indexed. Today the Google Search index contains hundreds of billions of webpages."
Although googling is convenient, the results aren't always entirely reliable. A search engine, for example, trained on scientific evidence would be better suited to answer the question of whether a person should buy an electric car.
Combating greenwashing is also a personal matter for Leippold. During his TED talk, he mentioned that the birth of his children was what prompted him to engage in the fight against global warming in his capacity as a finance mathematician.
Asked about that during our conversation in his office, he clasps his hands together and reflects for a while before answering. Then he says, "I'm picturing the moment when I ask my grandchildren what they would like to do in the future when they grow up. What if they retort: 'What future?'"
The chances are good that Leippold's descendants will have nothing to reproach him for someday. After all, he is leaving nothing untried. Recently he even sent an e-mail to "Terminator" Arnold Schwarzenegger.
Leippold is hoping for a cooperation arrangement with the original, which of course would give a boost to public awareness of the Climinator fact-checking tool. A team-up isn't entirely unrealistic considering that the former governor of California hosts annual climate conferences in his native country of Austria. Leippold hasn't received a reply from Schwarzenegger yet, but will persevere with his efforts anyway, whatever the outcome.
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Ekaterina Aristova Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, Bonavero Institute of Human Rights, University of Oxford
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Greenwashing litigation is happening in different forums. In some jurisdictions, for instance, in Germany, as seen above, greenwashing cases are primarily filed with the domestic courts. At the same time, in other countries, greenwashing is subject to increasing regulatory activity of the local authorities. In Australia, both the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) have been particularly active in detecting and enforcing greenwashing conduct. In March 2023, the ACCC announced that it would be investigating several companies for potential greenwashing following an internet sweep which commenced in October 2022. The initial survey of 247 businesses revealed that 57% had promoted concerning claims about environmental credentials.
In the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and the ASA tightened up their position about problematic ad claims in recent years. In January 2022, the CMA commenced a review of environmental claims in the fashion retail sector. Later, in July, it announced an investigation into three brands—ASOS, Boohoo and ASDA—to scrutinise their green claims. In January 2023, the CMA further announced a review of environmental claims made by brands in relation to fast-moving consumer goods (food, toiletries, cleaning products, and personal care items). The ASA is also actively enforcing the advertising rules concerning environmental claims.
Aside from actions in the domestic judicial and non-judicial bodies, complaints have also been filed with the National Contact Points (NCP) established under the OECD for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct (Guidelines). ClientEarth filed a complaint against BP with the UK NCP that BP’s global corporate advertising misled the public in the way that it presented BP’s low-carbon energy activities, including their scale relative to the company’s fossil fuel extraction business. The ad campaign in question was eventually withdrawn, and the UK NCP rejected the complaint. Another complaint filed at the UK NCP against power generator Drax Group plc alleges that the company is misleading consumers by portraying itself as generating carbon-neutral electricity while actively damaging the climate and forests. In 2022, the complaint was accepted for further consideration.
In June 2023, the Guidelines were updated, and climate change is now explicitly addressed in the text. Paragraph 97 in the chapter about consumer interests asserts that ‘environmental or social claims that enterprises make should be based on adequate evidence and, as applicable, proper tests and verification’. Following the Guidelines’ update, the number of climate-related complaints referred to NCPs is likely to increase, and we might see new types of allegations within the scope of the expanded Guidelines, including about greenwashing tactics.
Who are the claimants?
A vast majority of greenwashing claims are brought by civil society organisations, which is hardly surprising because environmental activists generally initiate or support much climate-related litigation in the Global North and Global South. Other actors are, nevertheless, present. In Australia, a legal complaint against Glencore was launched with the ACCA and ASIC on behalf of The Plains Clan of the Wonnarua People and Lock the Gate Alliance. The allegations concern the company’s misleading claims about climate impact and its behaviour towards Traditional Owners. Another interesting case in Australia was commenced by the charity representing Australian parents , who sued EnergyAustralia for falsely claiming its products primarily generated by burning fossil fuels are carbon neutral. Notably, greenwashing claims are also pursued by the competitor companies (see, for instance, examples from Italy , Germany and the UK ).
Who are the defendants?
Greenwashing cases target companies in an increasingly diverse range of sectors. Historically, the so-called Carbon Majors—major carbon emitters in the energy, utilities, and mining sectors—faced the biggest hit from climate change litigation. By contrast, allegations of greenwashing span various industries, including agriculture, transport, fast fashion, finances and investment, cosmetics, plastic, renewable energy, and automotive industries. In June 2023, the Swiss advertising regulator ruled that FIFA misled consumers by claiming the Qatar World Cup in 2022 was the first ‘fully carbon neutral’ such event. Five similar complaints have been filed by a coalition of civil society organisations in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and Switzerland later announced it would examine all of them. Claimants alleged that the carbon neutrality claims made by FIFA were based on a considerable underestimation of the GHG emissions generated by the organisation of the World Cup, and the carbon footprint of the event was ‘greened’ by using ‘carbon offsetting’ mechanisms that are not in line with international standards.
Two trends are apparent. The first one is a growing number of complaints targeting the aviation industry (see, for instance, judicial proceedings in the Netherlands against KLM over its ‘Fly Responsibly’ campaign; investigation by ASA in the UK of Ryanair’s claims to be Europe’s ‘lowest emissions airline’; and a complaint to the Competition Bureau of Canada challenging the Pathways Alliance’s ‘Let’s clear the air’ advertising campaign). One of the most recent examples is an ASA ruling against Etihad Airways , concluding that the company’s absolute green claim about ‘sustainable aviation’ was not adequately substantiated.
Another trend is the emergence of greenwashing complaints against a wide range of financial services providers, including banks, investment funds and insurance companies. Earlier this year, the European Banking Authority flagged greenwashing risks for banks . In October 2023, RepRisk, the world’s largest ESG data science company, published the results of the study, finding that the banking and financial services sectors saw a 70% increase in the number of climate-related greenwashing incidents in the last twelve months. Some examples are proceedings commenced by the ASIC against corporate pension fund Mercer Superannuation and investment management firm Vanguard Investments Australia Ltd ; a claim in Germany against an investment fund, Commerz Real Fund Management S.à.r.l. ; and complaints filed against HSBC in Australia and the UK .
This is the second blog post in a three-part series about greenwashing litigation (see Part 1 here and Part 3 here ).
Dr Ekaterina Aristova is the Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the Bonavero Institute of Human Rights, University of Oxford.
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5 June 2024
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Companies will no longer be able to make misleading green claims under a draft EU law to be proposed in March, but there are concerns the metrics are weighted too heavily toward CO2 emissions.
“Carbon neutral” is a claim we are used to seeing on products these days, whether it be everyday goods or airline tickets with carbon offsets, but the European Consumers Organisation (BEUC) says this is almost always a lie. It has been working with the European Commission on a new greenwashing law that would rein in these kinds of claims. It wants to end the free-for-all of companies claiming products are “green”, “eco” or “environmentally friendly” with no factual basis.
“Carbon neutral is never true,” Dimitri Vergne, BEUC’s sustainability team leader tells Energy Monitor . “We feel even if you use a reliable and trustworthy mechanism [to prove carbon neutrality], which is often not the case, you can never guarantee to someone the product you are buying will be carbon neutral.”
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The Commission is putting the finishing touches on an EU ‘anti-greenwashing law’ that has been a long time coming. It was first previewed at the end of 2019 in the EU Green Deal put out by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen shortly after she took office. The goal was to make companies “substantiate green claims against a standard methodology to assess their impact on the environment”. However, since then the proposal has been repeatedly delayed because of controversy over what standard methodology should be used.
The plan now is to use an EU methodology called Product Environmental Footprint (PEF) , which has been in use since 2010 but continually revised over time. This uses a life cycle analysis to measure the environmental performance of a product throughout the value chain, from the extraction of raw materials to end-of-life, across 16 environmental impact categories. It can also measure the footprint of an organisation that claims to be green or to be reducing its emissions. PEF was designed to replace the myriad methodologies on the market that are confusing at best and misleading at worst.
The PEF approach has been welcomed by BEUC and also ECOS, an environmental NGO focused on standards, which has long complained of a ‘Wild West’ of green claims. There are more than 200 environmental labels in use in the EU and a 2021 study by the Commission found that 40% of these green claims are exaggerated, false or deceptive.
However, not everyone is a fan of PEF. Life cycle analysis is a complicated and developing science, and there are concerns it is still heavily weighted towards the thing that is easiest to measure: direct [CO2] emissions. This, some argue, could ignore other environmentally important factors such as recyclability and toxicity. For instance, textiles could score well for being mass-produced in a way that lowers production emissions but could be using toxic chemicals that harm the earth. FEVE, the European federation of glass packaging makers, has argued that recyclable and reusable products like glass are unfairly penalised by PEF because they are energy-intensive to make but can be infinitely recycled. That infinite reuse is not considered by PEF’s metrics on recyclability, which just looks at whether the product can be recycled or not.
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Vergne says BEUC is sympathetic to these concerns, and it has been working with the Commission to find a balanced way to measure claims. “We like PEF, but we know it has some limitations. With something like textiles, it fails to capture hazardous substances or the release of microplastics. We have been discussing this with the Commission a lot and... [it] has said this PEF method would be the basis, but where it fails to capture the environmental impact of a certain sector it would need to be complemented.”
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According to a leaked draft circulated in January 2023, the law would try to get around this particular issue by banning any green claim on a product containing hazardous substances, even if it has very low CO2 emissions. The draft also says that the Commission will refine specific PEF methodologies for textiles and packaging, among other product categories. Once these sector-specific PEF methodologies and corresponding labelling schemes are approved by expert groups made up of national representatives, they will become legally binding across the EU through delegated acts that follow adoption of the primary greenwashing law. According to the draft, businesses will be given some flexibility in choosing which PEF methodology they wish to use.
It will be up to national governments to monitor and assess green claims, and to issue penalties to companies violating the law. Each government will have to set up a “system of verification for the substantiation of environmental claims” and inspections will have to be carried out by “independent verifiers”. The level of penalties for non-compliance can be determined by each government, but they should be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”, and take into account the gravity of the infraction and “the economic benefits derived” from the misleading claim, according to the draft.
The draft proposal could still change significantly between now and when it is expected to be published, in March, and it will change further as it works its way through the legislative process in the European Parliament and Council . Consumer advocates will be watching the process to make sure the ambitious plans in the draft are not watered down by national governments that do not want the burden of enforcing it.
At the same time, these advocates are watching a parallel piece of legislation already working its way through the Parliament and Council – a green-minded revision of the EU’s unfair commercial practices law.
Vergne says it is this legislation BEUC hopes can be used to crack down on carbon offsetting schemes, as widely used by airlines. “One of the biggest problems we see is the claims which are based on [carbon] offsets,” he says. “This revision of consumer law is to make it more fit to take on the rise in greenwashing. It is an uphill battle, but we are trying to [convince lawmakers] to ban claims such as ‘climate positive’ or ‘carbon neutral’. The European Parliament is discussing this at the moment.” BEUC's goal is to have the final text forbid a company from giving a consumer the impression that a carbon offset, for a flight or a product, makes that purchase climate neutral.
However, airlines have insisted that offsetting programmes really can make a flight carbon neutral. Austrian Airlines , for instance, says the two ways it offers to offset flight emissions, which it calculates during the booking process, "make your flight carbon-neutral". Customers can either pay a donation to "climate protection projects" like solar photovoltaic installations or they can pay to fund the use of sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) . "With the use of SAF you can fly completely carbon-neutral with us using the quantity of SAF required to achieve full carbon reduction," the company promises. For the moment, these kinds of claims are not independently verified. If the EU greenwashing law passes, the claims would have to pass muster with the EU PEF.
BEUC is also lobbying for stricter controls on claims related to future environmental performance. “These are things like an airline promising you they will be carbon neutral in 2050, or a water company saying they will reduce their carbon footprint by 90% by 2035. We are saying if you engage in these kinds of claims you need to set up and disclose a full implementation process to show you are really serious about this, with milestones – not just relying only on carbon offsets,” Vergne says.
The hope is that the new EU anti-greenwashing law and revised commercial practices law will work hand-in-hand to curb the explosion of greenwashing claims currently seen on the market. Vergne says both are needed to achieve this; the former to set the overall aim and the latter to lay out many of the practicalities and bring the concept into line with general EU consumer law.
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A view of asia pacific companies' progress on net zero targets, scope 3 emissions reporting, and their strategic, voluntary, and compliance efforts..
The climate crisis is intensifying, but so too is the movement to decarbonize. The past two decades have seen a concerted push by governments, investors and consumers to hold companies accountable for their carbon footprint with corresponding efforts in the business community to track and report their Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions.
More recently, there has been increased scrutiny on Scope 3 emissions, the indirect emissions that are produced by a company’s supply chain.
Measuring and reporting on Scope 3 emissions is critical to any climate or decarbonization goal as they typically make up 70–90 percent of a company’s total carbon footprint. Yet, they can be extremely challenging to accurately measure and report as they lie beyond the company’s formal span of control.
In this report, we examine the current equilibrium between strategic and voluntary initiatives at companies in Asia Pacific and compliance efforts in disclosing such emissions. The report assesses the progress and challenges faced by businesses as they strive to meet net zero targets in the coming years. It provides an analytical overview of the Scope 3 emissions reporting landscape in the region, delivering insights into one of the defining corporate themes of our time, and a look at how companies in Asia Pacific are responding.
The report is based on research led and compiled by Professor Neale O’Connor, La Trobe University Business School and the Pacific Basin Economic Council. This includes analysis of the published ESG reports of 338 companies listed on six major stock exchanges in Asia Pacific. The organizations can be categorized into eight broad areas of business: construction and industrial; utilities and energy; minerals and mining; automotive; healthcare and biochemical sciences; retail and F&B; electronics; others (including information & media services, transportation and logistics, and conglomerates).
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The majority of Scope 3 emissions are international in origin, so Asia Pacific companies play a significant role in providing accurate global supply chain emissions data due to their widespread geographic presence. The Scope 3 emissions of large US companies are often linked to manufacturing operations in regions like China, India, North and Southeast Asia. This indicates that more resources and expertise will be required in this area. An emphasis on corporate governance, executive incentives, and partnerships with NGOs while sharing responsibility for reporting will likely increase in the coming decades.
Michael Walsh CEO & Executive Director, Pacific Basin
The transition from spend-based to supplier- and product-based carbon measurement strategies underscores the importance of robust supplier relationships. Such partnerships are essential for fostering transparent information sharing, ensuring accurate reporting, and facilitating collective action to reduce environmental impact. Ultimately, improved emissions measurement drives strategic value and supports the shift from greenwashing to genuine sustainability efforts.
Neale G O’Connor Associate Professor, Forensic & Sustainable Accounting La Trobe Business School, La Trobe University
Reporting on Scope 3 emissions presents an opportunity for companies in Asia Pacific to drive sustainable business practices throughout their supply chains. By accounting for direct and indirect emissions, companies can identify areas for improvement, promote transparency, and foster collaboration with suppliers and customers. It is a crucial step towards achieving regional sustainability goals.
Dong-Seok Derek Lee Head of ESG in Asia Pacific, KPMG in South Korea
Scope 3 reporting requires Asia Pacific companies to transform their internal operating models, so they can accurately capture and report on their supply chain emissions. They will also need to create new supply chain strategies and adjust their external business models to reduce their emissions and progress towards a Net Zero target.
Peter Liddell Global Operations Center of Excellence Lead & Global Sustainable Supply Chain Lead
Uncovering the Scope 3 opportunity in Asia Pacific
Examining the current equilibrium between strategic and voluntary initiatives at companies in Asia Pacific and compliance efforts in disclosing Scope 3 emissions.
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On June 20, 2024, the Government of Canada passed Bill C-59, amending certain provisions of the Competition Act (the “ Act ”). New provisions were added to target greenwashing in an effort to protect consumers from misleading advertisements related to a product’s or business’ environmental benefits. We recently posted an article in our series on amendments to the Act , titled: Amendments to the Competition Act – Bill C-59 and its impact on “Greenwashing” .
On July 22, 2024, the Competition Bureau (the “ Bureau ”) released a public consultation regarding the Act’s new Greenwashing provisions. The Bureau also published Volume 7 of its Deceptive Marketing Practices Digest (the “ Digest ”), which outlines its interpretation of certain greenwashing provisions. The stated goal of the public consultation is to provide enforcement guidance in consultation with Canadians to ensure transparency and predictability. The Bureau is seeking a wide range of perspectives and will carefully consider the feedback to provide better guidance to businesses and Canadians. Interested parties are invited to submit comments by September 27, 2024 .
DIGEST AND GUIDELINES:
A. ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS DEFINED
Within the Digest, the Bureau defines an environmental claim as “any representation related to the environment that has been made for the purposes of promoting a product or business interest.” These claims may include promoting a positive environmental quality or attribute of a product, service, or business, or downplaying a negative one. They can encompass various aspects of a product’s environmental impact, such as the sourcing of its materials, production, packaging, and distribution. These claims also extend to services, processes, and business practices.
B. TYPES OF CLAIMS RECEIVED BY THE BUREAU
The Bureau receives a wide array of claims relating to greenwashing, which are summarized below:
I. COMPOSITION CLAIMS:
These involve claims made to the public regarding the composition of products or their packaging. For example, a business claiming that its packaging is made from 100% recycled paper or recycled bottles must be able to substantiate those claims.
II. PRODUCTION PROCESS OF PRODUCTS:
These involve claims made regarding the steps involved in producing a product, including claims about the resources, energy, or materials used in the process. Examples include claims that a product was made with renewable energy or is carbon neutral.
III. DISPOSAL OF PRODUCTS AFTER USE:
These claims relate to the green disposal of products, such as claims that a product is fully compostable or recyclable.
IV. COMPARISON CLAIMS:
These claims relate to comparative environmental claims. For example, comparing a product or service to its previous version or to those of a competitor.
V. VAGUE CLAIMS:
Vague claims are often made by businesses and can be misleading to consumers. These claims do not explicitly set out the environmental benefits of a product or service but instead allude to them. Common examples include claims that a product is eco-friendly without specifying its actual environmental benefits.
VI. CLAIMS ABOUT THE FUTURE:
Among the more common complaints received by the Bureau are claims related to the environmental improvements that a business will accomplish in the future, such as achieving carbon neutrality by a specific date.
C. ASSESSING A CLAIM
When assessing a claim, the Bureau must consider both the “general impression” conveyed by the claim and its literal meaning. The general impression is determined by considering the entire advertisement, including the words, graphic elements, and overall layout of the representations. [1]
Provisions Seeking Feedback
With regards to section 74.01(1)(b.1) of the Act, which enforces claims about a product’s environmental benefits, the Bureau is particularly interested in hearing about:
With regards to section 74.01(1)(b.2) of the Act, which enforces claims about a business or a business’ practices related to environmental benefits, the Bureau is particularly interested in hearing about:
Tips for Businesses When Making Environmental Claims
The Digest also explains that the Bureau encourages environmental claims that provide truthful and accurate representations to consumers, as they enable consumers to make informed decisions. To better protect both businesses and consumers, the Bureau has provided the following tips for businesses to consider when making environmental claims:
1. BE TRUTHFUL, AND NOT FALSE OR MISLEADING:
Environmental claims must be true, both in their literal meaning and in the general impression they convey. The general impression is determined by examining the entirety of the representation, including the words or phrases being used, the manner in which the text is displayed, and any visual elements and their context. A claim can be literally true, but still create a false or misleading general impression about an environmental benefit.
2. ENSURE CLAIMS ARE PROPERLY AND ADEQUATELY TESTED:
Many environmental claims are performance claims regarding the efficacy, performance, or length of life of a product. For performance claims to be in compliance with the Act, the business must be able to demonstrate that the claim is based on adequate and proper testing . The testing required will depend on the claim and must be completed prior to the claim being public. The Bureau will provide further guidance regarding the new provision.
3. BE SPECIFIC ABOUT WHAT IS BEING COMPARED:
Many environmental claims state or imply some comparison. When a comparison is made, businesses should be specific about what is being compared and the extent of the difference between the comparisons. Otherwise, claims can become vague, exaggerated, or misleading.
4. AVOID EXAGGERATION:
Businesses should look at all claims very carefully, as it is common for environmental claims to exaggerate an environmental benefit.
5. AVOID VAGUE ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS IN FAVOUR OF CLEAR AND SPECIFIC ONES:
The more that an environmental claim is vague, the more likely it is that it will convey a general impression that the environmental benefit is broad. Claims about environmental benefits should be supported by adequate and proper testing, and representations about these benefits should hold true for a product throughout its entire life cycle. More broadly, if the environmental claim pertains to the business as a whole, the environmental impact of all business activities must be taken into consideration when making the claim. Be clear about whether the benefit applies to part of or the entire product, service, or business.
6. AVOID ASPIRATIONAL CLAIMS ABOUT THE FUTURE:
Businesses should be careful about forward-looking claims, goals, or aspirations to ensure they are factual rather than merely aspirational. Before making these claims, businesses should:
The Bureau highlights that even if a business has a clear plan to accomplish its environmental benefits, care must be taken to ensure that the claim is not misleading. [3]
Key Takeaways
Environmental claims by businesses regarding their products, service, or practices can run the risk of being considered greenwashing. To avoid such risks, businesses should always be clear, specific, and truthful in their environmental claims and assess them both in their literal meaning and general impression.
Businesses seeking clarification on the amendments to the Act related to greenwashing are encouraged to submit their questions and feedback to the Government of Canada.
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IMAGES
COMMENTS
The interest in greenwashing has grown in recent decades. However, comprehensive, and systematic research concentrating on the evolution of this phenomenon, specifically regarding its impacts on stakeholders, is still needed. The main purpose of this study is to provide an overview and synthesis of the existing body of knowledge on greenwashing, through a bibliometric study of articles ...
As public concern over greenwashing has grown in the last two decades, academic research has increased correspondingly, and there is now a substantial body of research addressing issues related to greenwashing. In this paper, we therefore review and analyze greenwashing research, to provide an evaluation of trends and progress in the field and a synthesis of the empirical and conceptual ...
Research using a greenwashing lens has only begun to explore the performance of ESG investing. Early research in this space by Boiral and Henri (2017) , sampling ESG reports rated A and A+ by the Global Reporting Initiative, has found that firms re-use the same language for their future commitments again and again over the years in order to ...
The article presents the state of research on the greenwashing. Greenwashing is a popular research trend; recently (especially, 2020-2023), more and more systematic reviews have been published. However, unlike other reviews, the article presents the broadest possible research perspective, without highlighting any research trends.
The greenwashing phenomenon, which implies the misalignment between environmental disclosure and performance, has received significant scholarly attention. We review the diverse literature on corporate greenwashing to develop an integrative framework that examines its antecedents and consequences from the perspective of corporate governance. Specifically, we identify theoretical perspectives ...
This research has followed the proceedings of a systematic review of the literature, based on the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). ... Gao P (2014) The research on greenwashing brands' rebuilding strategies and mechanism of brand trust after biochemical and other pollutions. Biotechnology 10(9):3270 ...
Most of the research on greenwashing has been limited to business studies and marketing, in outlets such as the Journal of Business Ethics (Jones, 2019). It is important, therefore, to develop more critical/radical understanding of the processes of greenwashing. Most people agree that greenwashing is a bad thing.
In this section, we provide a brief review of how scholars from various research fields define greenwashing and its impact. Recent research argues that environmental, social and governance factors are essential to firm valuation and risk management (Lyon et al., 2013; Marquis et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2018). In particular ...
Greenwashing is a popular research trend; recently (especially, 2020-2023), more and more systematic reviews have been published. However, unlike other reviews, the article presents the broadest possible research perspective, without highlighting any research trends. The original approach is expressed in the article as a review of literature ...
Some companies mislead their stakeholders through a phenomenon called. greenwashing. Results: This paper aims to explore the phenomenon of greenwashing through a systematic literature review in ...
Research carried out in Europe found that 42% of green claims were exaggerated, false, or deceptive, which points to greenwashing on an industrial scale. This is dangerous ground for companies.
show that greenwashing is happening but also to consider the key reasons behind it and gure out how we can reduce its adverse impacts (Montgomery et al. 2023). This review aims to focus the research scope on rm-level and provide a governance-centric overview of greenwashing research. We seek to answer the following interrelated questions:
In early research on greenwashing, the concept was considered to be more or less straightforward. Greenwashing was seen as intentional communicative behavior aimed at deceiving stakeholders. Both Lauffer (2003) and Ramus and Montiel (2005), for instance, labeled greenwashing as "corporate disinformation."
Greater levels of research into greenwashing and corporate climate-related disclosures is important for both regulators and policy makers, in order to establish regulations and environmental policies that positively contribute to the prevention of greenwashing practices on the part of organizations (Delmas and Burbano, 2011); for investors, in ...
Abstract Greenwashing is a fraudulent environmental, social and governance (ESG) behavior. ... high analyst coverage, low financing constraints, and executives with overseas backgrounds. Overall, our research provides empirical evidence that OPIs improve capital market efficiency by inhibiting greenwashing. REFERENCES (). -, , & (). ...
Research to date in the area of greenwashing has mainly focused on describing deceptive or questionable green marketing practices (Peattie and Crane, 2005), providing recommendations for companies on decreasing greenwashing or avoiding ambiguous green advertising (Davis, 1993, Delmas and Cuerel Burbano, 2011), naming different types of ...
Studying greenwashing will help to reduce its frequency and, therefore, heal the planet.,Some previous studies have provided systematic reviews of the literature using different approaches, but they did not untangle the intellectual structure and the evolution of the body of research about greenwashing.
As noted in the Grantham Research Institute's 2022 snapshot, the recent wave of greenwashing-related litigation can be divided into three types of case, namely cases challenging misrepresentation, omissions, misleading evidence and mislabelling in respect of organisations' claims regarding "(1) corporate and governmental commitments, (2 ...
Recent research reveals a troubling trend: apex firms in Business Groups often promote sustainability without substantial action. Analyzing data from 515 companies in 35 countries, the authors ...
Greenwashing is the act of making false or misleading statements about the environmental benefits of a product or practice. It can be a way for companies to continue or expand their polluting as ...
The respondents comprised of individuals across different age group and. professions in Delhi NCR. Research findings showed that the most rampant sectors where. greenwashing is prevalent are ...
This paper aims to define a theoretical background for investigating greenwashing from a business economic perspective. We consider possible research questions in the relevant field of study, which is business economics studies. The first research step proposes a path that will orient scholars to the multifaceted perspectives of greenwashing. The second step analyzes the main theories that can ...
Greenwashing is a relatively new area of research within psychology, and there needs to be more consensus among studies on how greenwashing affects consumers and stakeholders. Because of the variance in country and geography in recently published studies, the discrepancy between consumer behavior in studies could be attributed to cultural or ...
(H1): AI will inhibit greenwashing. 3. Research design 3.1. Data and sample. A-share public firms in China from 2012 to 2022 are adopted as the sample. To quantify greenwashing, we manually collect data on ESG ratings released by Bloomberg and the Huazheng Index. The financial data of public firms are obtained from CSMAR.
Finance professor Markus Leippold is using AI-based tools to fight greenwashing. ... However, the finding revealed by the research conducted thus far with the software is dismaying: roughly every ...
Our research aims to test whether and how the 'potential greenwashing', which is defined as the greenwashing without public accusation (Seele & Gatti, 2017), affects CFP. In this regard, this study is expected to fill an existing research gap and provide a better understanding of the greenwashing-CFP relationship.
Greenwashing litigation is happening in different forums. In some jurisdictions, for instance, in Germany, as seen above, greenwashing cases are primarily filed with the domestic courts. At the same time, in other countries, greenwashing is subject to increasing regulatory activity of the local authorities.
Protestors demonstrate in Frankfurt, Germany. (Alex Kraus/Bloomberg via Getty Images) The Commission is putting the finishing touches on an EU 'anti-greenwashing law' that has been a long time coming. It was first previewed at the end of 2019 in the EU Green Deal put out by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen shortly after she took office. The goal was to make companies ...
The report is based on research led and compiled by Professor Neale O'Connor, La Trobe University Business School and the Pacific Basin Economic Council. ... Ultimately, improved emissions measurement drives strategic value and supports the shift from greenwashing to genuine sustainability efforts. Neale G O'Connor Associate Professor, ...
Overview. On June 20, 2024, the Government of Canada passed Bill C-59, amending certain provisions of the Competition Act (the "Act").New provisions were added to target greenwashing in an ...