research proposal on corruption in pakistan

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Corruption Accusations and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from Pakistan

This study assesses the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies of Pakistan by relating the corruption of government officials to the actual and perceived bureaucratic hurdles faced by formal businesses. It offers a unique perspective by focusing on cases in which the accused officers voluntarily disclosed the misuse of public money (or gains acquired through corruption) in order to avail the option of plea-bargaining. The empirical analysis estimates the effect of these policies on the responses of the managers of business firms in Enterprise Surveys. The number of accusations seems to reduce the incidence of bureaucratic corruption. While the amount that is being offered in bargaining has a negative effect overall, it switches sign overtime suggesting the possibility that it may increase corruption in the long run. The core results are robust across various measures of firm-level corruption. The instrumental variable estimates produce similar results.

1 Introduction

A potent cause behind the misallocation of resources in developing countries is the misuse of authority and public funds by government officials. Particularly, at the microeconomic level, bureaucratic holdups and delays are not only ethically inappropriate but also cause a significant drag on private businesses. Unsurprisingly, the efforts to conquer corruption are not confined to regulatory reforms and incentive mechanisms but also include harsh punishments like even the death penalty. [1] Ultimately, a society’s tolerance for corruption, and the choice and effectiveness of anti-corruption measures are context specific and require careful analysis (Graaf, 2007 ).

The fight against corruption is usually operationalized through independent anti-corruption agencies. However, it is difficult to separate the good from bad intentions in these campaigns as those in public offices have every incentive to belittle the political statures and reputations of their rivals through fabricated cases.

In recent decades, aggressive anti-corruption campaigns have been a feature of many developing countries. Thus, a number of high-profile politicians and ex-public officials were convicted in South Korea. [2] In China, there was a drive to purge the ruling Communist Party of corrupt officials. Corruption has been cited as one of the main factors in the decline and fall of the Indian National Congress, the political party that ruled India for most of its post-independence history. [3]

In Pakistan too the issue has been a source of political uncertainty since 1990s when elected governments were dismissed in quick succession on grounds of corruption. In 1997, the Bureau of Accountability (called Ehtisab Bureau at that time) was established to formally investigate political corruption. In 2002, through various legal amendments, Ehtisab Bureau was replaced by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). In the 11th Five-Year Plan (2013–2018) formulated by the Pakistan Planning Commission, corruption free governance is set as a national goal.

The efforts of NAB against corruption are highly debated in Pakistan and have caused political polarization. During the period of this study (i.e. 2002–2013), NAB maintained a conviction rate of 51% and has decided 1,762 cases. Perhaps the most controversial aspect in the NAB’s fight against corruption is the use of procedures like plea-bargaining and voluntary disclosure. These are accepted legal procedures in many other countries like Canada, the UK, the USA, and India. [4] At least theoretically, these procedures cannot be dismissed as ineffective in the context of a developing country where judicial processes are painfully slow and replete with all types of inertia that favor the culprit. However, in the case of NAB the main criticism is that its policy allows easy escape to those involved in corruption by surrendering a proportion of the embezzled funds (currently 80%). Thus, without empirical analysis, the net benefits of the policy are unclear.

Using the case of Pakistan, this study gathers unique data about all the corruption cases involving government servants (GS) where the accused volunteered to return embezzled funds and was granted the option of plea bargaining by the court. With below potential rate of economic growth, and a slow but consistent adoption of democratic norms, the emerging political parties of Pakistan are sensitive to the administrative weaknesses and bureaucratic excesses of past regimes and have vowed to strengthen accountability mechanisms.

The empirical enquiry in this study focuses on the corruption cases involving GS and bureaucrats from all the four provinces of Pakistan. This data set is merged with the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (ES) data to see the effect of the number of plea-bargained cases and the amount used in the plea bargaining on the relevant responses of business managers. The responses of business managers to corruption-specific questions in the ES data set are interpreted here as a proxy for business–government relations. The study, therefore, helps us to understand the efficacy of the measures to curb corruption and how they affect the perceptions of firm managers.

It contributes by assessing the efficacy of anti-corruption policies by using both the perceptions and experiences of firm managers as indicators of business–government relations. This adds to the existing studies that rely mostly on the public perception-based measures of corruption (e.g., Donchev & Ujhelyi, 2014 ).

Using information about actual corruption cases involving GS, it provides evidence that a tradeoff exists between recovering looted funds and the long-term objective of eliminating corruption. Thus, the strategies or incentives that promise easy and quick recovery of looted funds may increase corruption in the long term.

Using multiple questions related to bribery incidents in the ES data set, we discovered a negative correlation between the number of plea-bargained cases and the perception and experience of bureaucratic corruption of business firms. Interestingly, the effect of the size of the bargained amount is insignificant in baseline analysis. This finding is interpreted here as the relative importance of the punishment effect (of conviction) vis-á-vis the disincentive caused by surrendering of the gains. However, incorporating the possibility of time dependence of the effect, we find that the coefficient of the bargained-amount switches sign thus supporting the view that the availability of the plea-bargaining option may actually encourage, rather than discourage, corruption over time. This is in line with the existing finding that the policy of plea bargaining is bound to be abused (Aniche, Alumona, & Obiwulu, 2020 ).

Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. In Sections 3 and 4 , we present data and empirical results. Section 5 concludes and notes the limitations of the research.

2 Related Literature

The economic approach to crime relies on the framework first formalized by Becker ( 1968 ). In this framework, rational agents prefer illegal exchanges if the expected net benefits from such transactions are positive. This elegant cost–benefit framework is extended to understand the underlying logic of white-collar crimes (Draca & Machin, 2015 ; Rose-Ackerman, 2010 ). Accordingly, a firm is more inclined to pay bribes if there are net benefits in avoiding complex and strict procedures, the unscrupulous court system and incompetent government service (Huang & Rice, 2012 ; Jiang & Nie, 2014 ; Wu, 2009 ). Thus, bribing and lobbying is an important way to avoid regulatory delays and competitive pressures (Oh, 2009 ; Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib, & Perlitz, 2010 ; Zhou & Peng, 2012 ). In developing countries, formal sector firms view corrupt practices as “the ways things are done” (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998 ; Hallward-Driemeier & Pritchett, 2015 ).

The link between corruption and firm performance is influenced by the strategic activities managed by a firm in response to corruption (Galang, 2012 ). In the presence of regulations replete with bureaucratic hold ups, corruption may help businesses by greasing up the process of starting a new business (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013 ; Jiang & Nie, 2014 ; Wang & You, 2012 )and by reducing delays in public service availability (Van Vu, Tran, Van Nguyen, & Lim, 2018 ; Zhou, Han, & Wang, 2013 ). Bribes, by winning political favors, can also serve as an instrument to increase company value (Faccio, 2006 ). In contrast, corruption has a negative impact on firm growth if it hurts competitiveness (Fisman & Svensson, 2007 ; Gaviria, 2002 ).

The negative effects of corruption on a firm’s productivity are more prevalent in those countries where the legal framework is weak (De Rosa, Gooroochurn, & Görg, 2015 ). In contrast, Bai, Jayachandran, Malesky, and Olken ( 2017 ) have estimated a reverse effect, i.e., corruption reducing the effect of growth especially for firms who can easily relocate.

The characteristics of firms also play a role in determining their preference for informal payments. For instance, bigger firms are more likely to pay bribes to get government contracts and preferential tax benefits (Delavallade, 2012 ; Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010 ; Rand & Tarp, 2012 ). However, the cost of corruption is higher for small firms if it taxes a large proportion of their resources (Zhou & Peng, 2012 ). Paunov ( 2016 ) argues that small firms are negatively affected by corruption if they are adhering to international quality standards. Dutta and Sobel ( 2016 ) suggest that bribery is not a “cost of doing business,” rather corruption impairs entrepreneurship.

If corruption is a way to avoid complex administrative procedures, then voluntary disclosure and plea bargaining can also be interpreted as possible means to avoid complex and time-consuming legal procedures (Feeley, 1982 ). However, it is important to see how the legal option of plea-bargaining changes the usual calculus of crime by eliminating the possibility of punishment (or at least harsh punishment). For instance, Reingnaum ( 1993 ) argues that plea bargaining reduces the defender’s expected cost and induces crime. Thus, plea bargaining dilutes the deterrence effect (Miceli, 1996 ).

There are studies supporting the deterrence effect associated with apprehension and detection risk (e.g., Barnum, Nagin, & Pogarsky, 2020 ; Becker & Stigler, 1974 ; Rose-Ackerman, 1978 ). On the other side, there exist evidence that a high risk of detection has a deterrence effect but kills the intrinsic motivation for honesty (Schulze & Frank, 2003 ). The net effect on overall corruption is undetermined.

Another factor is the impact of public perception on corruption control, as it shows how much people are willing to support anti-corruption policies (Li, Gong, & Xiao, 2015 ). Thus, any state seeking a positive outcome of an anti-corruption instrument should gain public support for strongly backing it up with policy enforcement.

By contrast, corruption in law enforcement limits the deterrence effect (Polinsky & Shavell, 2001 ). In a weak institutional environment, public officials misuse their power and distort institutions by reducing detection and punishment to facilitate their own embezzlements (Boly & Gillanders, 2018 ).

This strategy (of voluntary disclosure and plea bargaining) is known for its mixed implications (Aniche et al., 2020 ). Theoretically, it increases welfare by motivating the truly guilty to self-select themselves and contributes to the accuracy of the legal procedure (Grossman & Katz, 1983 ). On the negative side, it may help institutionalize corruption and in Pakistan it is heavily criticized on this aspect. Thus, it is necessary to see whether this strategy offers any benefits to society other than having a cost-effective route to recovering embezzled funds.

Framing the discussion in the context of Pakistan we find only limited scholarship on the causes and cures for corruption in Pakistan. For instance, Farooq, Shahbaz, Arouri, and Teulon ( 2013 ) argue that corruption hinders economic growth in the case of Pakistan. In contrast, the policies and strategies adopted by the NAB, the country’s foremost anti-corruption agency, are not welcomed and debated extensively. For many, the drive against corruption is ineffective and good only for political ends (Ali, 2018 ). However, in the absence of scientific evidence such accusations are mere perceptions. Given the huge amount of resources at stake, it is necessary to check the extent to which the nabbing of corrupt officials temper economic outcomes.

Considering the above discussion, this inquiry intends to add two novel angles to the existing literature: (i) the study focuses on the variation in the responses of business managers to questions related to bureaucratic corruption. In particular, it estimates the effect of the number of past plea-bargained cases on the responses of business managers. It thus provides a broader assessment of the efficacy of the anti-corruption campaign; (ii) it also estimates the effect of funds recovered through plea bargaining on the outcome. Thus, by comparing the effect of recovered funds over time, it checks for the long-term consequences of the policies aimed at easy-recovery of looted public funds.

Benefiting from the above discussion we can formulate the following two hypotheses:

H1 Nab effect hypothesis: A higher number of plea-bargaining cases in the past reduce the government official’s incentive to indulge in corrupt transactions, ceteris paribus .

H2 Bargain effect hypothesis: (H2.1) The possibility that one can bargain one’s way out of corruption related charges by surrendering a part of the illicit gains may encourage corruption; (H2.2) the probability that one may have to surrender misappropriated funds in case of conviction may reduce the net expected gains from such transactions and thus reduce corruption.

This study relies on two sources of information. The number of corruption cases involving government officials in each province of Pakistan is extracted from the NAB’s annual reports. The second source is the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (ES) which provides information on business firms operating in the formal sector of Pakistan in its four provinces. The following paragraphs explain these data sets in detail ( Tables 1 – 2 ).

Variable definitions and sources

Notes: [1] National Accountability Bureau operations data. http://nab.gov.pk/nab_ops.asp (accessed 23 August 2019).

[2] World Bank Enterprise Surveys. https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ .

[3] United Nations national human development report 2017: Pakistan. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/national-human-development-report-2017-pakistan (accessed 23 August 2019).

[4] Chaudhry and Mazhar ( 2019 ) index of political competition in Pakistan.

Summary statistics (baseline complete case sample)

3.1 NAB Data Set

This data set comprises corruption cases involving GS where, under some agreed conditions, the accused has voluntarily returned a percentage of the embezzled funds to the government. The information is gathered from the annual reports and documents available on the website of the NAB ( http://nab.gov.pk/ ). ( Table 3 at the end provides the distribution of cases involving government bureaucrats over the years in Pakistan.)

National Accountability Bureau annual number of cases

Notes: Total number of cases are those that are formally initiated and are decided through the court of justice. The information is available at http://nab.gov.pk/nab_ops.asp (accessed 4 January 2020).

A corruption case, in the context of this study, is defined as an instance of wrongdoing in which a government official is convicted for misappropriation of government resources for personal gains and the case is settled through the procedure of plea bargaining or voluntary disclosure. The process of plea bargaining allows the convict to deposit an agreed upon amount in the government exchequer to avoid a jail term. The cases with pending status or with doubtful convictions (e.g., those involving political leaders) are not considered. Similarly, the cases where the individual availed the option of plea bargaining before the start of the enquiry are also ignored.

The information is collected separately for all provinces for the period 2002–2013. Thus, in our data set, the province of Punjab has the largest number, i.e., 118, of plea-bargained cases. It means an average of 13 plea-bargained cases per year. In terms of bargained amount, the largest amount offered by a convicted GS is PKR 853,000,000 in sector EOBI (the pension, old age benefits, and social insurance institution of the Government of Pakistan) of the province of Sindh in the year 2003.

Importantly, the total value of the funds voluntarily surrendered or plea bargained is worth a total of PKR 2,270,717,484 over our sample period. If we scale this amount by the annual per capita income of an average Pakistani in the year 2013 (which was $1386 or PKR 145,530), the amount equals the annual income of around 15,600 Pakistanis! It highlights the importance of the problem.

3.2 ES Data Set

The ES data set is an authentic source of information on various actual constraints that formal sector business firms face. The ES data set covers 146,000 firms in 143 countries. The surveys are conducted using similar questionnaire and instruments which make the analysis of this study comparable and replicable in different contexts. The manager responses cover a broad array of questions relating to a firm’s operations including financial issues, dealings with government regulators, quality of infrastructure, workforce characteristics, and performance. The analysis in this study uses ES data set from the survey waves of 2007 and 2013 in Pakistan. Given our focus, we exploit the variation in the responses of the managers of business firms to questions asking them about government regulators and other aspects of corrupt dealings. The questions used in the empirical analysis are given in Appendix II at the end of the study.

3.3 Empirical Model

The empirical model relies on Becker’s ( 1968 ) model of crime as extending by Rose-Ackerman ( 1978 ). In the context of this study, the theoretical model predicts that a self-interested government officer demands bribe adjusting the returns with the probability of being sentenced. The recent history of corruption accusations and convictions involving government officials will serve as the subjective probability of being accused and raises the risk of demanding a bribe. This deterrent effect would reduce incidents of corruption, ceteris paribus .

In contrast, the option of plea bargaining may have a positive or negative effect on corrupt transactions. If it reduces the net return from misappropriation, then it can have a depressing effect. But the possibility of avoiding prison by surrendering a part of the illegal gains, if convicted, may reduce or completely overpower its deterrent effect. Ultimately the consequence of such a provision is an empirical question.

To determine the impact of arresting corrupt officials due to incidents of corruption, we developed a pooled least squares model with time and spatial fixed effects. We follow the recommendation of Wooldridge ( 2010 ) in estimating the model with sector, time, and province effects and employ standard errors that are robust against the effects of clustering due to the stratified random sample in the ES data:

i = 1, 2, 3, …, 1585

k = 1, 2,…, 4

t = 2007, 2013

j = Bribe1, RegTime, Bribe2, Bribe3

Baseline Controls = (Firm Age; SME; HDI; Sector Effects; Year Effects; Province Effects)

Additional Controls = (ManExp; Exporter; ISOCertificate) ,

where Corruption is the indicator of corruption. In the baseline analysis, it is the perception of business firm managers of the likelihood of encountering a corrupt official. In addition to this perception-based measure, we have also used alternative indicators. Two of these indicators ( RegTime and Bribe3 ) are experience based and the other ( Bribe2 ) is perception based. Thus, our results contribute to the literature dealing with perceptions as well as the experience of corruption as both aspects offer distinct insights. [5]

The No. of Accused GS denotes the average number of corrupt GS being accused and plea-bargained in the last 4 years in the given province. In estimations, the value of the No. of Accused GS for each province-year is relative to the total number of accusations by the NAB.

The location is denoted by k , and t denotes time. The baseline model assumes that the arrest of corrupt officials has a linear effect on corruption. We relax this assumption by conditioning our analysis separately on the survey year. Moreover, the baseline model also includes the average bargained amount ( Plea Bargain Amount ) to estimate its effect separately, as is required by Hypothesis 2.

Among the control variables we include various firm-level determinants that can make it more or less attractive to bribe-seeking bureaucrats like its age, size, exporting status, and its sector and location. Additional controls are added to take account of the managerial capital ( ManExp ) and firm productivity ( ISOCertificate ); the effect of the level of economic development is captured through the human development index (HDI) of the province

Table 4 reports the baseline estimates and extensions that include additional controls. All the models employ standard errors that are robust against the clustering effects at the level of a province. The dependent variable is dichotomous which explains the use of the logit estimator. The diagnostics reported toward the end of Table 4 suggests that each of the models is highly significant overall.

Number of corruption accusations and firm-level corruption incidence

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and province specific clustering effects; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Constant is included but not reported.

In terms of the primary relationship of interest, our results suggest a strong and significant effect the number of (past) plea bargained cases has on the likelihood of corruption. [6] The coefficient of interest (i.e., No. of Accused GS ) is negative and statistically significant. More importantly, the estimated effect in the baseline regression (Column 1) amounts to an 80% reduction in the odds of a corrupt encounter with each 1 standard deviation (SD) increase in the number of accusations. Importantly, the coefficient of Plea Bargain Amount is negative but insignificant in all cases.

Among the controls we find a significant negative effect of SME on corruption likelihood. The same holds true for HDI which is a proxy for the level of development of a province. Our results also suggest a positive effect of the firm’s age on corruption likelihood although the coefficient has no statistical support. Among the sector effects we find a significantly greater likelihood of corruption across industries broadly categorized as leather products, machinery and electronics, motor vehicles, and non-metallic minerals. These sectors are prone to corrupt encounters compared to the benchmark “textiles-garments” sector.

Among the additional controls, we can see the insignificant effect of the top manager’s sector specific experience with corruption likelihood. The likelihood of corruption is significantly higher if a firm is earning at least more than 10% of its sales from exports ( Exporter ) or is having an international quality certification ( ISO Certificate ). It may suggest the greater interaction of exporting firms and those having superior quality products that make them easy targets of corrupt government officials.

The location and time effects are also significant. In the case of the former, the probability of corruption is higher in relatively developed provinces like Punjab, Sindh, and KPK compared to the base category represented by Baluchistan (the least developed province in Pakistan). While in the case of time effects, the binary variable representing 2013 suggests that the likelihood of corruption has decreased relative to the earlier time period.

4.1 Robustness

In this section, we first check our findings using alternative measures of corruption (both perception and experience based). Second, we check the time dependence of the effect of anti-corruption strategy (of plea bargaining) by splitting our sample into two time periods for which firm surveys were available. Finally, we address endogeneity issues using an instrumental variable (IV) estimator.

In Table 5 , we change the dependent variable to estimate the effect of accusations on the other dimensions of corruption. In Column 1 of the table, the dependent variable measures the percentage of the senior management’s time spent in dealing with government regulations ( RegTime ). Unlike the perception-based indicator in the baseline analysis, RegTime captures the manager’s actual corruption experience. Moreover, if government bureaucrats were abusing their regulatory powers to extract bribes from the firms, then this indicator is likely to capture any changes in this behavior due to the anti-corruption policy of the NAB.

Baseline results with alternative measures of firm-level corruption or with restricted sample

Given that ES data do not provide separate indicators on the different aspects of regulation, the RegTime is an overall indicator of taxes, customs, labor regulations, licensing, and registration. Therefore, these results allow us to detect whether there is any improvement in efficiency in the overall regulatory machinery due to anti-corruption policies. Unlike our baseline model this variable is not dichotomous and so we use Ordinary Least Squares to estimate the model.

The results in Column 1 ( Table 5 ) suggest a strong negative effect of the nabbing of government bureaucrats on firm managers’ time. In other words, the greater is the number of plea-bargained corruption cases in the past, the lesser is the time private businesses have to spend in dealing with government regulations. In quantitative terms, a typical firm’s management needs 5% less time per week to deal with GS with each one SD increase in the number of plea-bargained cases in the province where the firm is located. Unlike baseline results, the bargaining effect is significant and negative in this case. Thus, an increase of one SD in the amount of plea-bargaining saves only 0.3% of the weekly time managements spent in dealing with bureaucrats. This result also suggests that corruption is the cause of inefficiency in Pakistan and that the anti-corruption policy of plea-bargaining helps improve the regulatory apparatus of the government. [7]

In Column 2 ( Table 5 ), the dependent variable ( Bribe2 ) is again dichotomous measuring the incidents of bribery if a firm experiences at least one bribe payment across six different types of public transactions dealing with access to public utilities, building permits, operating licenses, and taxes. The effect of detection is again negative and significant. In specific terms, the result suggests that the odds of corrupt dealings decline by 92% with each single SD increase in the cases of plea-bargaining involving government officials. The bargaining effect is again insignificant.

The dependent variable in Column 3 of Table 5 measures corruption perceptions rather than experience. More specifically, the variable labelled Bribe3 assumes a value of 1 if a formal payment is expected to secure a government contract. The coefficient of interest is again negative and significant although only at 10% level, whereas the bargaining effect is negative and significant.

In the last two columns of Table 5 , we estimate our baseline model separately for business firms surveyed in 2007 and 2013. Although the results still suggest the negative influence of the number of plea-bargained cases, the effect of the plea bargained amount is negative for the firms surveyed in 2007 and becomes positive in the case of 2013. This suggests a change in the effect of the plea bargaining option on corruption over time. However, we refrain from inferring much from this result because of the non-experimental nature of our data. Nonetheless, this novel finding provides an interesting avenue for future research.

4.2 Endogeneity

Table 6 addresses the issue of endogeneity. Admittedly, the demand and supply of “corrupt transactions” is simultaneous which makes it difficult to establish causality. To handle the issue of endogeneity we used two-stage least squares (2SLS) which uses the IV estimator to capture the exogenous impact of endogenous regressor. We instrument No. of Accused GS using a measure of political will.

Endogeneity issues (2SLS estimates)

Notes: In column (1) PopVote is used as an instrument for No. of Accused GS . In column (2) PopVote and its square serve as the instruments.

Null hypothesis of endogeneity test states that No. of Accused GS can be treated as exogenous.

Overidentifying restrictions test reports the value of Sargan score test. The null hypothesis is that overidentifying restrictions are valid. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

The rationale behind the use of political will is not difficult to discern. It can be argued that the strength and independence with which anti-corruption agencies pursued corruption in the government’s ranks reflect the government’s resolve and will to get rid of this menace (Ankamah & Manzoor E Khoda, 2018 ). One possible determinant of the government’s resolve to avoid anti-growth practices is the number of popular votes that the ruling party receives in the last elections. As Besley, Persson, and Sturm ( 2010 ) show, the lack of political competition is associated with anti-growth policies. Therefore, greater popular support provides greater political will to the ruling party to take strong measures to prevent the misuse of public authority. Thus, we use the provincial level share of the ruling party’s vote in the election as a proxy for its will to fight administrative corruption in government departments. This variable is denoted as PopVote and it comes from Chaudhry and Mazhar ( 2019 ) data set constructed specifically for Pakistan. We use this variable and its squared form to instrument the grabbing variable.

The 2SLS results using PopVote as instrument for No. of Accused GS are reported in Table 6 . Both the columns include location, time, and sector effects in line with the baseline specification. In Column 1 we report only the PopVote as an instrument, while in Column 2 we also include its square, i.e., PopVoteSq . It is important to check whether our instruments are satisfying the statistical requirements necessary for a valid inference in the 2SLS procedure. To this end, we have reported a number of diagnostic tests toward the bottom of the table. For instance, first-stage F-statistics in both the regressions exceed the benchmark value of 10, suggesting a strong correlation between the No. of Accused GS and the PopVote . The Hausman test of endogeneity of the No. of Accused GS provides strong evidence that we cannot treat it as exogenous. Finally, the over identifying restrictions imposed by our instruments (in Column 2) are not valid as the value of the Sargan test suggests.

The coefficient of the No. of Accused GS in 2SLS estimates in both columns in Table 6 is significant beyond 1%. Because of the dichotomous nature of the original dependent variable we avoid interpreting the 2SLS coefficients. The results on control variables follow the earlier pattern. Thus, the firm being of small or medium size decreases the probability that it will be asked to pay a bribe by a government official. The age of the firm is insignificant and the overall level of development of a province is negatively correlated with corruption occurrence.

In sum, the results as per various specifications and after using the different forms of corruption as dependent variable clearly show that the nabbing of corrupt officials reduces incidents of corruption at the level of the business firm. Its weaknesses aside, the evidence from 2SLS regressions overcome the endogeneity in the hypothesized link between nabbing and corruption incidents and give support to our baseline results. In sum, we can claim that different statistical procedures yield consistent results.

5 Conclusion

An important issue in the literature on corruption involves the best way to deal with it. Huge monetary resources, besides time and effort, are devoted to designing effective institutions to get rid of this menace. Gathering scientific evidence on the efficacy of such measures directly informs the policy makers and is no less instructive for academicians.

This study tests the efficacy of anti-corruption measures in the context of Pakistan. Using theoretical insights, e.g., Becker ( 1968 ) and Rose-Ackerman ( 2010 ), it derives two hypotheses to test the impact of the plea-bargaining policy on corruption perceptions and corruption experiences of formal business firms.

The study gathers a unique data set on the number of accused government officials who availed the option of plea-bargain and voluntary disclosure of illicit gains. So unlike other corruption cases, these cases are unique in attracting public attention (and ire). The risk of detection and scrutiny by the NAB with the positive probability of surrendering the ill-gotten wealth influence the cost–benefit ratio of potential bribe seekers. Two waves of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2007 and 2013) provide a firm-level data set of more than 2,000 firms covering the four main provinces of Pakistan to empirically test these hypotheses.

Although the econometric results support the hypotheses, the effect of the number of accusations (H1) on reducing corruption is more consistent. The results are robust against various specifications and hold as well if we divide our sample into individual surveys. With some qualifications, the results hold for the 2SLS estimator as well. Importantly, the independent effect of the amount of plea-bargaining on firm-level corruption although negative overall comes out positive if we restrict the sample to focus only on the latter half of the sample period, thus supporting hypothesis H2.1.

In terms of good effect the practice of plea-bargaining has on the perceptions and experiences of business firms and the value of resources recovered over the period under consideration, this policy may offer net social benefits. But the positive effect it exercises on corruption in the second time period suggests that it may increase corruption in the long term. Thus, it is likely that long-term expected costs exceed short-term gains.

This research is not without limitations. First, it focuses specifically on Pakistan. Although governance issues in Pakistan are not very different from other developing countries, it is difficult to tease out many generalizations. Second, the empirical analysis relies on a data set that is pooled crosssectional and is observational in nature. This reduces the reliability of the causality analysis. Nevertheless, the study serves as a motivation for future researchers to go beyond this simple analysis and add refinements to gather more reliable insights about this important area of public administration.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Emmanuelle Auriol and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. All the remaining errors belong to the authors.

Conflict of interest: Authors state no conflict of interest.

Data availability statement: Data use in this research is available upon request from the authors.

Appendix I Questions Related to Bribe in World Enterprise Surveys Considered in this Study

Bribe1. This variable is based on ES survey questions J7a and J7b. The precise statement of the question is as follows: It is said that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percentage of total annual sales, or estimated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal payments or gifts to public officials for this purpose?

RegTime. This variable is created from ES survey question J2. The precise statement of the question runs as follows: In a typical week over the last year, what percentage of total senior management’s time was spent on dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations? [By senior management I mean managers, directors, and officers above direct supervisors of production or sales workers. Some examples of government regulations are taxes, customs, labor regulations, licensing and registration, including dealings with officials and completing forms].

Bribe2. This variable is generated from questions asking about informal payment/gift expected when apply for permit, public utilities connection, license or during inspection. The general form of the question is as follows: In reference to that application for an [name of the utility, permit, license, inspection], was an informal gift or payment expected or requested?

Bribe3. The indicator is created from the variable J6 and J6a. The questions are as follows: (J6) Over the last year, has this establishment secured or attempted to secure a government contract?

(J6a) When establishments like this one do business with the government, what percent of the contract value would be typically paid in informal payments or gifts to secure the contract?

Appendix II Voluntary Return and Plea Bargain Law

Section 25 of National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) (at http://nab.gov.pk/Downloads/nao.asp#Voluntary_28 ) is as follows:

[25. (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 15 or in any other law for the time being in force, where a holder of public office or any other person, prior to the authorization of investigation against him, voluntarily comes forward and offers to return the assets or gains acquired or made by him in the course, or as the consequence, of any offence under this Ordinance, the Chairman NAB may accept such offer and after determination of the amount due from such person and its deposit with the NAB discharge such person from all his liability in respect of the matter or transaction in issue:

Provided that the matter is not sub judice in any court of law.

(b) Where at any time after the authorization of investigation, before or after the commencement of the trial or during the pendency of an appeal, the accused offers to return to the NAB the assets or gains acquired or made by him in the course, or as a consequence, of any offence under this Ordinance, the Chairman, NAB, may, in his discretion, after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, accept the offer on such terms and conditions as he may consider necessary, and if the accused agrees to return to the NAB the amount determined by the Chairman, NAB, the Chairman, NAB, shall refer the case for the approval of the Court, or as the case may be, the Appellate Court and for the release of the accused.

(c) The amount deposited by the accused with the NAB shall be transferred to the Federal Government or, as the case may be, a Provincial Government or the concerned bank or financial institution, company, body corporate, co-operative society, statutory body, or authority concerned within 1 month from the date of such deposit]. [8]

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Introduction, methodology, conceptualizing corruption, discussion and conclusions.

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A Study of Economic, Cultural, and Political Causes of Police Corruption in Pakistan

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Nadeem Malik, Tariq Abbas Qureshi, A Study of Economic, Cultural, and Political Causes of Police Corruption in Pakistan, Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice , Volume 15, Issue 2, June 2021, Pages 1446–1462, https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa016

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There is a dearth of studies on police corruption that have analysed the correlation of economic, cultural, and political causes of police corruption in Pakistan; therefore, the existing studies fail to provide such a holistic picture of the phenomenon. This article aims to fill the gap. It is claimed that police corruption in Pakistan is a politicized, institutionalized, and a legitimized phenomenon. The police force entrenched in a kinship-based patron–client social and political culture benefits the political elite to use the police force for controlling the electorate and political opponents. The policy reforms for curbing police corruption have failed and cannot be successful without a strong political will of the political elite. This is a qualitative study using a purposive sampling method. The article will be a useful reference for readers, including police officials who are interested in understanding why corruption could not be effectively prevented and may have some broader relevance to other South Asian countries.

Corruption is a global phenomenon. However, in Pakistan, it is endemic and remains a systemic problem entrenched at all levels of society and government ( Dogar, 2017 ). According to the most recent estimates available, there was Rs 852 billion (the US$ 8,192,307,692) worth of corruption in public sector enterprises only in 2016 ( Sajid, 2016 ). The Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) identifies Pakistan as 117th out of 180 most corrupt countries ( TI, 2019 ). While CPI alerts policymakers about corruption, it is ‘not a sufficient indicator of the level of corruption in developing countries because the perception of corruption does not always reflect the reality or complexity of the actual level of corruption within a country’ ( Madichie, 2005 , p. 320). Such observation is relevant to Pakistan, where corruption has become a way of life in society, and the evaluation of perceptions of corruption fails to explain a holistic picture. Of all government departments, corruption within the police is of utmost concern because Pakistan represents a case where religious intolerance, sectarian, ethnic, and gender-based violence, as well as growing poverty, inequality, and crime, have led to significant deterioration of the rule of law. Deteriorating law and order also have grave consequences for economic growth and attracting foreign investment in the country ( Raza et al ., 2015 ). The police are incapable of dealing with such challenges because of corrupt practices ( TI, 2013 ). It is, therefore, imperative to understand the holistic nature of police corruption and its causes in Pakistan.

Despite the gravity of the issue, there is a dearth of studies on police corruption in Pakistan. One of the reasons is that the discipline of Criminology is rarely studied in the country. Out of 133 universities, only 3 offer Criminology to their students ( Fasihuddin, 2013 ). Except Jackson et al. (2014) , few studies on police have mainly concentrated on other aspects of police organization such as administrative reforms for police efficiency, lack of training, inadequate salaries, lack of accountability, lack of robust requirement, and lack of police legitimacy (see Chattha and Ivkovic, 2004 ; Abbas, 2011 ; Ahmed and Ahmed, 2012 ). These studies have recommended an increase in salaries, improvement in training and curriculum, increasing public awareness, changing organizational culture, provision of modern technology for investigation, reform of the criminal justice system for police accountability.

Jackson et al. (2014) , however, focused on examining the empirical links between people’s perceptions of police corruption and their perceptions of the fairness and effectiveness, and their beliefs about the legitimacy of the police. Their findings suggest that in Pakistan’s context where ‘minimal effectiveness and integrity is yet to be established, police legitimacy may rest not just on the procedural fairness of officers, but also on their demonstrated ability to control crime and avoid corruption’ ( Jackson et al. , 2014 , p. 2). The main emphasis of their research is, nevertheless, on police legitimacy and not adequately studying the causes of police corruption.

This article will bridge the gap by focusing on multiple causes of police corruption.

The issue of police corruption in Pakistan is complex, and its several permutations and characteristics cannot be addressed adequately in a single article. It is, therefore, beyond the scope of this article to analyse police reforms, systems of police management and accountability or attempts made to curb police corruption. The article instead focuses on examining the economic, cultural, and political causes of police corruption in Pakistan that have emerged from our field research. It is demonstrated that police corruption in Pakistan is a politicized, institutionalized, and a legitimized phenomenon. Since the independence of Pakistan in 1947, there have been 21 reports on recommendations for police reform that were rarely implemented and the Police Act of 1861, which was introduced by the British colonial powers to quell political uprisings or opposition remained operative ( Babakhel, 2018; , Sadiq, 2014) . It, therefore, becomes imperative to analyse multiple causes of police corruption in Pakistan, which may have some broader relevance to other developing countries in South Asia.

As will be demonstrated, with some variations, Singh’s (2019 , p. 24), six-fold typology on police corruption in Afghanistan seems relevant to Pakistan:

Patronage and loyalty (recruitment is based on connections and a patrimonial bureaucracy);

Unprofessionalism (not performing duties correctly and treason) and lack of motivation (no noble cause or sense of mission);

Bribery and extortion (the alleged cause is low pay to supplement income which is culturally accepted, but this is also due to the lack of police oversight and high solidarity);

Violence and protection rackets (demanding payments for vendors to continue selling produce or operating businesses);

Direct involvement and protection of drug-related activities (involves kickbacks paid to senior officers to continue working in high drug-producing areas); and

Payment for posts (internal payoffs to secure positions).

This article proceeds as follows. The next section is on methodology. ‘Conceptualising corruption’ section conceptualizes police corruption. ‘Findings’ section presents research findings, and ‘Discussion and conclusions’ section is on overall discussion and conclusions.

The study is qualitative. The fieldwork for this study was conducted from December 2017 to February 2018. However, the co-author conducted an initial study, as part of his Master’s thesis in Criminology at the University of Melbourne in 2005. This research builds on the earlier study in terms of some initial ideas. However, the data used in this article are the one collected in 2017–18. The analysis is, therefore, based on significantly extended field research and literature surveyed. The research tools employed were semi-structured interviews, focus group meetings, and observations. The study follows an interpretive research paradigm. The interpretative paradigm focuses on the meanings from the perspective of the participants involved in the social phenomenon, in contrast to statistical techniques that are employed heavily in positivist research ( Noon, 2018 ).

The study adopted a purposive sampling method to ensure that the participants selected fitted best for the phenomenon of police corruption being studies. Data analysis can become difficult and time exhaustive without proper screening of respondents. Measuring credentials method was used to remove unwanted participants ( Fluid Survey, 2013 ). The primary credentials considered were whether the participants possessed certain credentials (e.g. significant work experience) that made them suited for the study or whether they had in-depth knowledge or experience of encountering police corruption. Existing contacts and snowball technique were used, in the beginning. The snowball technique is consistent with purposive sampling, as groups of people recommend potential participants for the study ( Naderifar et al. , 2017 ).

Following Chadwick et al. (1984) , we triangulated the data. Triangulation involves the collection of data using different methods from different sources. In this case, the secondary sources included academic books and articles, newspaper articles, government documents, and primary data were collected through police officers (eight senior officers (deputy superintendents of police, superintendents of police (SPs), and deputy inspector general of police (DIGs)), six mid-level officers (i.e. station house officers (SHOs), investigating officers, and sub-inspectors), and six junior officers (police constables) participated in the research). Moreover, other policing stakeholders such as policy analysts (seven), criminal lawyers (seven), and members of the public (48 in 6 focus group meetings (each focus meeting comprised of eight participants)) participated. After completing interviewing 82 participants, the researchers reached a consensus that saturation was obtained in this study. Generally, 10–25 interviews are recommended to obtain saturation ( Creswell, 2013 ). The citation style of participants’ comments followed is consistent with Reynolds et al . (2018) study on police. In other words, we have followed the citation style of participants’ comments used by Reynolds et al.

Though there is no research regulatory body in Pakistan, the authors researched in compliance with the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2018) . The participants were provided with the plain language state for their consent explaining the aims of the research and what was required of participants during interviews and focus meetings. All participants had signed informed consent to participate in the research. All interviews were taped and typed verbatim. The transcripts were later coded to protect the identities of participants. The names of participants; police stations in which they work; and the cities, villages, or districts in which their police stations are located are not mentioned to maintain confidentiality and anonymity. Also, to ensure confidentiality and anonymity, the roles of the participants are not revealed in the analysis that follows. Following the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2007) , the data are stored in password-protected computer files for 5 years.

Upon completion of the interviews, transcripts were produced and compared with the audio recordings to ensure accuracy. The data obtained were thematically categorized at the stage of data analysis. 1 The categories identified were compared, and the relationships existed between and among them were examined. While doing this, personal notes, comments, or memos were made. These memos assisted in the reflection and discussion of research findings.

Having its epistemological roots in the West, and considered universally applicable, a widely accepted legal definition of corruption is ‘the abuse of public office for private gains’ ( Rose-Ackerman, 1996 ; Zakiuddin and Haque, 1998 ; Kaufmann and Vicente, 2011 ). Following this definition, the National Accountability Bureau of Pakistan (NAB Pakistan) defines corruption as a phenomenon that:

Involves behaviour on the part of officeholders in the public and private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are placed. More simply, it comprises the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit. (NAB Pakistan, 2002, p. 5)

Concerning the legal definition of police corruption, Punch (2009 , p. 18) suggested that it ‘refers to an officer knowingly doing or not doing something that is against his or her duty for some form of financial or material gain or promise of such gain’. Corrupt activities typically include bribery, extortion, perjury, and embezzlement ( Newburn, 1999 ). Roebuck and Barker (1974 ; but also see Sayed and Bruce, 1998 ) have provided the best known typology of corruption. They identified eight types of police corruption, i.e. corruption of authority (material gain without violating the law per se ); ‘Kickbacks’; opportunistic theft stealing from arrestees; ‘Shakedowns’ (acceptance of a bribe for not making an arrest, filing a complaint, etc.); illegal police protection of those engaged in illegal activities; ‘The fix’ (undermining of criminal investigations or proceedings, etc.); Direct criminal activities; internal payoffs (where holidays, shift allocations, promotion are bought, bartered, and sold). Punch (1985) added the 9th type, i.e. ‘Flaking’ or ‘padding’ (planting of or adding to evidence). This typology represents a hierarchy from the least to the most ‘serious’ corruption practices. The implicit argument in such a typology is that officers who become corrupt tend to start at the bottom with the least serious offences and then gradually progress to the other end of the spectrum. Kleinig (1996) referred to such an argument as the ‘slippery slope argument’. Singh (2015) added nepotism as corruption in the context of Afghanistan and argued that the system of patronage undermines the rule of law. All nine types of corruption and nepotistic activities in the Afghan context can be applicable to define police corruption in Pakistan.

While the typology of corruption helps define the phenomenon, to understand the complex causes of corruption, one needs to go beyond definitions ( Porter and Warrender, 2009 ). It becomes imperative to understand what it entails and who it implicates ( Porter and Warrender, 2009 ). Various theories of police corruption have conceptualized the causes differently. A brief analysis of a few specific theories of public sector corruption that talk about its causes equally relevant to police corruption is, therefore, in order. For our purposes, six theories, i.e. Public Choice Theory, Rotten Apple Theory, Organizational Culture Theory, Cultural Constraint theory, The Ethos of Public Administration Theory, and Correlation Theory can be identified.

The Public Choice Theory puts the onus of corrupt practices on rational individuals who choose the corrupt transaction by weighing the cost and benefits of such a transaction. Klitgaard (1988 , p. 70) in this context states, ‘if the benefits of corruption minus the probability of being caught times its penalties are greater than the benefits of not being caught, then an individual will rationally choose to be corrupt.’ Overall, the Public Choice Theory focuses on the specific situation of an agent (a corrupt official) instead of a larger social context that can be a general determining factor for corruption.

The Rotten Apple Theory locates the cause of corruption in the existence of people with faulty moral character, the so-called ‘rotten apples’ ( Jancsics, 2014 ). The theory professes that only a few corrupt officers are problematic instead of overall police institutions ( Newburn, 1999 ). It conceives corruption as an issue related to individual pathology leading to propensities of individuals to be corrupt ( Sherman, 1978 ; Tankebe, 2010 ). Consequently, the solution to the problem lies in ‘carefully screening applications for police positions, pursuing defective officers aggressively, and removing them from their police position before their behaviour spread through the agency’ ( Klockars, 1999 , p. 208).

However, several studies have demonstrated that police corruption is a systemic phenomenon ( Smith, 2010 ). The explanations based on individual pathology or deviances of police officers are, therefore, theoretically unsatisfying ( Tankebe, 2010 ). Several known examples of police corruption defy the ‘rotten apple’ theory, the classic one being the hearings of the Knapp Commission in New York that ‘destroyed the police unions argument that police corruption was confined to a few “rotten apples” in another health barrel’, as the Commission argued that the task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples ( Sherman, 1978 , p. xxviii).

Those who advocate ‘examining the barrel’ proposition propose the institutional theory of corruption. This theory provides organizational perspective to police corruption. Such theory emphasizes on the culture and structure of the organization in which the agent works, instead of the background or motives of the corrupt officials ( Punch, 2000 ). Accordingly, the theory argues that proper management with clearly defined organizational goals and objectives, effective division of labour, and hierarchy of authority are essential to prevent officials from being corrupt. Moreover, a robust system of command and control, an ongoing process of accountability, effective communication, and mechanism of information within organizations are considered important to prevent corruption ( Dias and Vaughn, 2006 ). The breakdown of such organizational attributes, on the contrary, can lead to individual officials to be corrupt. The solution, therefore, is successful recruitment, screening, effective policy implementations, constant training, supervision, and discipline during the entire tenure of the officers’ service ( Lee et al. , 2013 ).

The Cultural Constraint Theory of Corruption goes even beyond organizational culture as corruption is considered at the level of society. According to this theory, certain cultural values and norms of society directly influence the values and norms of police officials, making them corrupt ( Waddington, 1999 ; Buttle et al. , 2016;  , Hurbert, 2002 ). The culturalist view of corruption provides an alternative to the legalistic view. The legalistic view of corruption has been challenged by this school of thought that believes that like other social terms, there is no single set of words to define corruption because it depends on the social construction, customs, and norms of the community ( Gupta, 1995 ; Sissener, 2001 ). For example, Bardhan (1997 , p. 1330) noted that unlike the West:

It is widely recognised that in developing countries, gift-exchange is a major social norm in business transactions, and allegiance to kinship-based or clan-based loyalties often takes precedence over public duties even for salaried public officers.

give birth to what Gupta (1995) calls the blurring of boundaries between the state and society. Using the case study of Sharmaji, the lowest irrigation official involved in corrupt practices in India, he argued that Sharmaji poses, ‘an interesting challenge to Western notions of the boundary between “state” and “society” in some obvious ways’ ( Gupta 1995 , p. 384). The reason, he continues, is perhaps because ‘those categories are descriptively inadequate to the lived realities that they purport to represent’ (Gupta, 1995, p. 384). In the case of India, he opines, therefore, that the discourse of corruption gives birth to people’s discursive construction of the state (and helps the state’s functioning; Gupta, 1995 ).

Explaining the cultural aspects of corruption, Olivier de Sardan (1999 , p. 2) used the expression ‘moral economy’ referring to ‘the value systems and cultural codes, which allow a justification of corruption by those who practice it (and who do not necessarily consider, quite the contrary, it to be such) and an anchorage of corruption as banal everyday practice.’ In such a situation, public employees find themselves in a schizophrenic situation. Their ‘administrative and professional legitimacy is derived from their training in modern European administration (which is now a worldwide standard) and therefore in its values concerning the public service’ ( Olivier de Sardan, 1999 , p. 20). However, the social legitimacy of government officials implies, on the contrary, that they act in conformity with more or less contradictory ‘socio-cultural’ logics. The apparent adherence to the so-called rational official norms of European origin accompanied by the concept of neutral State working for public interest coexists comfortably ‘with an equally prevalent pattern of behaviour in conformity with social norms in favour of the pre-eminence of private and partisan interests’ ( Olivier de Sardan, 1999 , p. 20). Such a scenario creates a situation of blurring of boundaries between the state and society.

Overall, the proponents of the cultural view argue that different societies will have to deal with the issue differently, keeping in view the specific nature, characteristics, patterns, and organizational structure of the phenomenon ( Sissener, 2001 ).

The Ethos of Public Administration Theories argues that corruption is a result of culture within public management and society in general ( Gregory, 1999 ). The theories are related to Organizational Culture Theories but also vary because the concern is not merely the organizational culture. The main argument is that the structure of the state, which is influenced by societies’ social structures influences the way a certain ethos is maintained in favour or against corrupt practices at the organizational and individual levels. Following Heywood (1997) , Graaf (2007) argued that the Ethos of Public Administration Theory shares close synergies with the ‘structural approach’ to political corruption.

The Correlational Theory literature put forward a view that corruption can be understood at all levels, i.e. social, political, organizational, and individual levels. The variables considered are on all possible levels: individual, organizational, societal, and structural (governance; Graaf, 2007 ). As mentioned earlier, the economic, cultural, and political causes of police corruption in Pakistan that have emerged from our research findings, we, therefore, find Correlation Theory of Corruption most relevant to contextualize our research. However, though it will be demonstrated in the next section that an overarching factor is political, that is, police corruption exists primarily as the ruling elite benefit from it in Pakistan.

This section analyses three prime causes of police corruption in Pakistan, i.e. (1) economic, (2) cultural, and (3) the politicization of the police.

Khan (2006) argued that political stabilization in advanced countries could typically be achieved through transparent redistributions through the fiscal process, whereas political stabilization in the context of underdevelopment in developing countries involves political corruption. At the level of the economy, greater tax revenues in advanced countries mean that political stabilization can be achieved with in the form of transparent fiscal transfers. At the same time, the productive sector generates enough of a surplus to pay taxes for the effective protection of property rights, limiting the possibility of expropriation. On the contrary, in developing countries, the tax base is low, and the distribution of resources is not transparent. In the case of Pakistan, the tax regime is regressive, where the poor pay more taxes, enhancing poverty further. The distribution of resources is non-transparent, and politicians in power prefer to spend more on projects that have more visibility and better optics to fetch votes, compared to spending more on citizens’ security and development. Resultantly, the police officers are paid low wages, and police operations are not adequately resourced. The combination of both leads to police corruption. An analysis of both is given below.

Rose-Ackerman (1999 , p. 72) noted that in countries where police officials are not provided with adequate wages, the police force engages in corrupt transactions for survival. Her observation neatly fits the case of Pakistan. In a country where 4 out of 10 Pakistanis live in multidimensional poverty, there are numerous incentives for corruption ( UNDP, 2016 ). The discretionary powers of police officers are plenty. There is no risk involved in corruption since the entire system is corrupt ( Khan et al., 2012 ). The salary package of police officers is in extreme contrast to the powers entrusted to them. The monthly salary of a police constable is around US$ 83 per month, a head constable US$ 89, a sub-inspector US$ 107, an inspector US$ 122, a SP US$ 288, a DIG of police US$ 576, an inspector general of police $ 577 (GoP, 2017–18). Some officers get extra allowances because of their specific assignments, but the overall picture is not different from the one painted above.

The average cost of living is extremely high, i.e. PKR 119,927.81 (US$ 776.726 per month) ( TransferWise, 2017 ). It, therefore, becomes difficult even for senior police officers to make both ends meet. According to all police officers, there are very few government residences available for the low-ranking officers. In big urban centres, accommodation is often not available for high-ranking police officers either. Since there is no ‘provision of health insurance by the government, the police personnel have to bear the cost of healthcare from their small pay package’ (Senior officer 1). The annual inflation rate is in double digits, and ‘the increase in salary other than yearly increments is announced after five to seven years’ (Senior officer 2). Junior officers (90%) complained that there is no formal leave system and they spend never-ending hours. They blamed their senior colleagues for not providing them breathing space to relax and maintain work–leisure balance. The police officers ‘are supposed to be on duty for 16–18 hours without any extra remuneration, seven days a week, and there are no regular duty rosters in operation’ (Junior officer 3). The prolonged work hours and low salaries ‘cause enormous stress and depression among officers’ (Junior officer 4). The rest of the 10% junior officers were of the view that the shortage of adequate police officers is a significant cause of their overwork. This view was shared by all senior and mid-level police officers too.

The lack of provision of adequate wages, therefore, deteriorates the quality of work, productivity, and morale. Economists argue that low wages negatively impact the morale and productivity of the workforce (Paul and Du, 2018). If this is accompanied by long working hours, the effect on morale and productivity can be extreme and become a disincentive for clean behaviour. It is because of these reasons that the lack of adequate investment in human resources was considered to be the cause of frustration and corruption within the police force.

Lack of police operational resources

Apart from the above, there are other structural causes of police corruption in Pakistan. As mentioned before, the police stations are not provided with any funds to run their everyday official business. As Chino points out, ‘police mandates are still unfunded, with the average budget for a police station per year being a mere PKR 8,000 (US$120)’ ( Chino, 2001 , p. 42). The ‘increase in the budget is still not significant’ (Senior officer 4). The recent report (2017–18) from the office of the Inspector General of Police Punjab reveals that only 12% of the total budget is allocated for police operations. The rest of the amount is spent on salaries and allowances (GoP, 2017–18). However, even for salaries and allowance, 88% of the budget of PKR 1,970 billion (US$ 12.76 million) is meagre for a police force responsible for maintaining law and order for a population of 110,012,442 in Punjab. Despite such a meagre budget, there has been hardly any pay reform process introduced by the government.

Senior police officers stated that police stations are defaulters of hundreds of thousands of rupees regarding payment of utility bills. Police are not made accountable because ‘the officers in different utility departments do not bother police stations for defaults due to the coercive powers of the police’ (Senior official 3). The fuel is rationed per police station. However, ‘police station vehicles are provided with six litres of diesel per day in rural areas. In some police stations, fuel for vehicles is not provided at all’ (Mid-level officer 6). According to another mid-level police officer:

In practice, both in rural and urban areas, it is an unofficial responsibility of police stations to mobilise their resources to bear all operating costs ranging from the investigation of a crime, arranging vehicles and fuel for raids, expenses of forensic tests and serologist, chemical examiners and firearms expert reports to utility bills, and even stationary for office use. Such a practice forces police to mobilise the required resources through unofficial means (Mid-level officer 3).

The resources are mobilized through kickbacks; taking bribes for not registering First Investigation Report, protecting criminals, undermining criminal investigations, and adding or removing evidence against or in favour of someone convicted and getting bribes from arrestees (Criminal Lawyer 1). Moreover, police stations are bought and sold and bribery for promotions is given to senior officers (Criminal Lawyer 1). Such corrupt activities testify the typology of corruption identified by Roebuck and Baker (1974).

Also, a police station arranges resources to fulfil the demands made by the senior officers. Most of these demands are made by officers known to be corrupt. For example, ‘if a senior police officer wants to buy a computer for his son or a daughter, all he has to do is to call officer-in-charge of a police station, and the demand would be fulfilled’ (Mid-level officer 5). The term used for the demands made by senior officers is known as; fatik , an Urdu version of ‘fatigue’ which is a military term meaning excessive labour. It is important to note that even honest police officers fail to control corruption.

Once, police officers were instructed by a Superintendent of Police to abstain from corruption. The same evening when he asked the positions of patrolling vehicles of police stations, he found that some of them were parked in police stations instead of patrolling. He asked the SHOs furiously to tell the reason, and they replied that the diesel provided by the government had finished and since they were instructed to abstain from corruption, the vehicles were parked in police stations. Next morning, the SP called the meeting again and said to SHOs to carry on with the past practices but refrain from taking money in investigations (Mid-level officer 4).

The above example illustrates that due to resource constraints, it is impossible for even an honest officer to avoid corruption to run the official business while doing their duties. They mobilize such resources through enormous powers entrusted to them. Such a situation signifies that corruption exists at the individual level because of the institutional structures, which force police officers to indulge in corrupt transactions to run their offices, leaving no moral justification not to do so at a personal level. For police officers, corruption, therefore, becomes a kind of noble cause to run police stations because they consider that ‘bribery is valid as it leads to the cause of protecting citizens and maintaining law and order in society’ (Senior officer 3).

The members of the public shared interesting views about the above situation. Though they showed reluctance to approach police even to report a crime because of the fear of extortion, they were sympathetic concerning the current state of police officers’ well-being and thought that police often do not have options to survive without corruption. For example, one of them opined that:

Although people are fearful of visiting police stations because of their corruption and brutal attitudes, and I do not justify corruption in any form, but what can a police officer do if he is unable to meet the basic needs of his family through the salary offered to him. Nevertheless, they should not take bribes from poor citizens and not be brutal with ordinary citizens. They should avoid abusive language and use of violence to harass people.

The above views signify the legitimacy of police corruption in people’s eyes, but they oppose any act of violence by police officers.

The causes of corruption also have cultural dimensions. The expression of ‘moral economy’ used by Olivier de Sardan (1999) , in African context, explains the ‘cultural embeddedness of corruption’ . Cultural embeddedness of corruption, however, does not refer to a backward, monolithic, or determinist theory of culture. It rather pinpoints to ‘certain social norms widely represented in today’s Africa, which “communicate” with or influence the practices of corruption’ ( Olivier de Sardan, 1999 , p. 2). Inherent in the ‘moral economy’ is the logics of redistributive accumulation, i.e. a government official when acquires a position of authority (small or big) not only benefits his/her family but also works for the benefit of his/her extended family, acquaintances, and the village in a kinship-/clan-based societies.

Such an aspect of the ‘moral economy’ is relevant to police corruption in the Pakistani context. Pakistani society is based on a strong kinship-based culture ( Lyon, 2004 ), where individuals do not exist as individuals but in relation to others. In most cases, the financial burden of meeting family, and many a time, the extended family members fall on the heads of the family. An example of a junior police officer is instructive:

I have the responsibility to feed my family and my brother’s family, which includes my six children and his wife, along with the three children and a wife of my deceased brother. My conscience, as well as the fear of being stigmatised by my extended family for not supporting my late brother’s family, forces me to take care of them too. In the absence of adequate salary and social services available to me, I have no choice but to earn money from illegal means. (Junior officer 3)

Though it might be difficult to generalize the above case, there is a trend of having large families 2 in Pakistan, and the responsibility of one person (mostly male) to feed these families is a huge burden (since the dependence is on one person, there is hardly a rotation strategy within families). Gift exchange and meeting other expectations of extended family members are also common. The public, in general, is aware of such a reality and as mentioned in the previous section, they are sympathetic to police taking bribes for survival. Referring to societal norms, a member of the public opined that:

In our culture, we have a biradari 3 system, and we have to meet the expectations of our biradari. Police officials are also human beings like us. They also have responsibilities to their families and their biradari. We have to be collegial and generous enough to help each other, especially in difficult times to maintain relationships within our biradari and friends. All this requires resources. If the income is not enough what other choices we have. In such circumstances and given an opportunity, anyone would take a bribe.

The nature of the social fabric and the economic hardship faced by police officers even to run their official business are critical factors contributing to widespread police corruption. However, as noted by a senior police officer, ‘bribers often exploit the prevalent social norm of gift exchange and present the government officers with expensive gifts to obtain favours’ (Senior police officer 6). The above is in line with what Chattha and Ivkovic (2004 , p. 167) following Roebuck and Baker (1974) called ‘corruption of authority’ and suggested that ‘the leadership of the police department considers this to be a system of informal rewards provided that the officers receiving such gifts are acceptable to the department and that the corruptors belong to the respectable class of citizens’. Such a situation leads to a complex spectrum of corruption where the legalistic and cultural conceptions of corruption overlap and create a room to what Olivier de Sardan (1999) called the moral economy of corruption.

Politicization of policing

Political influence on police is widespread in South Asia. For example, Lamani and Venumadhava (2013 , p. 234) noted that ‘it has been commonplace in India for transfers and postings of officers to be used as a kind of reward and punishment, as a result of which, many chiefs of police have had allegiances to political parties.’ In Bangladesh also, political influence contributes to police corruption (see Kashem, 2005 ). In Afghanistan, the influence of political elites affiliated with drug traffickers on police has resulted in bribery, extortion, and ethnic favouritism ( Singh, 2014 ).

In Pakistan, the police station is the axis institution around which the politics of the country revolve, and ‘the worth of a politician in his/her constituency is judged in terms of his ability to influence the police’ (Policy analyst 1). The police investigation officers ‘are expected to oblige politicians because the politicians take offence if the police fail to do so’ (Policy analyst 5). The transfer and postings of police officers are, therefore, a politicized activity. At the provincial level, ‘the transfers of District Police Officers (DPOs) are entirely at the disposal of Chief Ministers (CM) of the provinces’ (Policy analyst 3). During various regimes, ‘the heads of police in different provinces have long been asking for the executive powers to post the district Superintendents of Police, but not many of them have succeeded’ (Policy analyst 2).

Political influence on the transfer and postings of police officers is a powerful instrument for controlling the police department. A policy analyst in this context noted that:

It is not considered corruption if a police officer asks a politician 4 to get him a posting of his choice. But then such favours come at a price such as favouring the politician in police investigations, posting SHOs of their choice to establish the authority of a politician in his constituency, irrespective of any considerations of efficiency and integrity. Very rarely, an officer gets a good posting without political patronage. The workplace procedures are seldom followed (Policy analyst 6)

He further said that the concept of ‘good postings’ refers to field assignments where a police officer is in charge of a jurisdiction exercising significant influence on people’s lives and liberties and provides them with opportunities for embezzlement and corruption. In this context, police officers, either lacking political contacts or not willing to serve politicians, suffer. Another policy analyst noted that:

The police officers with no access to political support mostly end up as Officer on Special Duty (OSD). The post of OSD is considered no less than punishment to officers who do not serve the interests of politicians because they are hardly assigned any work or offices, and are never given field postings (Policy analyst 7).

The powerful landowners dominate politics in Pakistan. All members of the public were of the view that there is an overwhelming representation of the landowning class in the politics of Pakistan. In the urban centre, they opined, the paradigm is shifting towards industrialists and business people. These distinctions are also blurring since the business class is also acquiring land holdings to assume political power and landowners are investing in industries and business enterprises to accumulate wealth—a key, to participating in politics. A member of the public opined that ‘politicians’ wealth and power becomes instrumental in politicising police and benefits them and police officials alike’.

Another member of the public argued that ‘the control of the police force is the dream of every Pakistani politician, for it means the power to harass, hound and make life miserable for their opponents’. They were highly fretful about the abuse and politicization of police by politicians. They held politicians responsible for police corruption and brutality. A member of the public stated that ‘the police is corrupt and acts rudely and violently with citizens because the ruling elite has given them unlimited authority and they know they are not accountable to anyone’.

The legislative aspect of providing police with unbridled legal authority is a horrific phenomenon. A criminal lawyer noted that:

The draconian colonial laws to subvert political uprising are still not only present on paper but are frequently practised in spirit. The legislative aspect of providing police with unbridled legal authority to crush political opposition is a horrific phenomenon (Criminal lawyer 1).

The above observation is affirmed by Section 16 of the notorious Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) Act that allows police to detain any person found guilty of disrupting public peace to prison up to 6 months. Once the person is prosecuted under 16 MPO, the judicial function is superseded by the executive function, and the appeals have to be made to the Home Office to withdraw the order (see Maintenance of Police Order (MPO, 1960) . Section 144 of the criminal procedure code, if enforced in a district, bans any form of an assembly of four or more people, and they can be booked in violation of Section 144 (MPO, 1960 ).

None of the successive governments ever thought of abolishing these laws, ‘as they were often found very useful to maintain control’ (Criminal lawyer 2). Another criminal lawyer stated that:

The Criminal Procedure Code and other numerous Acts, having their roots in the colonial period, empower police to play havoc with civil liberties and with the fundamental human rights of people. Politicians and police have abused human rights and civil liberties with impunity (Criminal lawyer 4).

According to all criminal lawyers, when police are used to further the political ends of politicians, a culture of collusion is developed. Such a culture erodes the concept of accountability, and whatever mechanism of institutional or public accountability is present, it is rendered toothless. A comment by a criminal lawyer is instructive:

If an honest police officer, therefore, wants to initiate departmental action against a corrupt subordinate, he can do little, because of the pressure from politicians to drop the proceedings. If the officer decides to go ahead with the action, the corrupt officer would use his political link to influence the superior officer and would either get the punishment withdrawn or converted into a minor sanction bearing no effect on the career of the corrupt officer, making a mockery of the accountability system (Criminal lawyer 3).

Such situation is not likely to change overnight, and the influence of politicians and influential people on police remains in most provinces because as mentioned earlier, the police stations are the hub of electoral politics and are used for intimidating politicians from opposition parties, rigging elections, and maintain patron–client political relations. The political will to free the police force from political pressures and manipulation, therefore, does not seem to be visible. Without the political will of the ruling elite, it is highly unlikely that the current state of police practices would change.

The study findings explicitly demonstrate that a comprehensive account of police corruption in Pakistan is inconceivable without analysing the correlation of corruption at the economic, cultural, and political levels. Two economic causes for the individual as well as institutional corruption have been identified. One, low wages, and, two, lack of adequate operational budget. Low wages lead to corruption at an individual level because police officers make rational choices in the absence of any risks of being caught as proposed by the Public Choice Theory. A few rotten apples might also have been recruited. Lack of adequate resources for day-to-day police operations forces police officials for corrupt transactions, as without such transactions they can hardly run their official business, validating the Institutional Theory of police corruption. The Public Choice Theory and the Institutional Theory of police corruption are thus interlinked as the predicament of generating institutional resources through corrupt transactions leaves no moral justification not to get bribes for personal gains. Corruption for personal gains to mitigate the effects of the low wage for survival as well as extravagant living in some cases at the senior level, and as an operational necessity, therefore, cannot be separated in the case of police corruption in Pakistan.

It is important to mention that in the above context, Khalid (2016 , p. 256) study on three traffic police departments in three cities such as Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Attock in Pakistan, argues that provision of more resources for paying better salaries does not seem to limit integrity violations. However, the argument does not seem to hold grounds because as mentioned in our research findings the raise in salaries is given after 5–7 years, which does not seem to be adequate to limit integrity violations in the police force.

The Cultural Constraint Theory is also present in Pakistani policing because of the nature of the social fabric and the blurring of the boundary between the state and society. The biradari liabilities with a large family and a huge dependency burden on one person who is not paid enough to live a decent life forces him/her to be corrupt. The corrupt transaction that the officer is involved in not only benefit his/her family but the extended family as well according to the logics of redistributive accumulation inherent within ‘moral economy’ ( Olivier de Sardan, 1999 ).

The research findings indicate that the Ethos of Public Administration Theory is also relevant to policing in Pakistan, as the structure of the state is dominated by the moral economy linked to patron–client politics where police officials facing economic hardship are patronized by politicians to quell the opposition and control people in their constituencies. Following Graaf (2007) such a situation does allude to the ‘structural approach’ to political corruption having synergies with the Ethos of Public Administration Theory.

Overall, the Correlational Theory of police corruption that encompasses all relevant theories (discussed above and relevant to our research findings) explains the pervasive presence of police corruption in Pakistan. However, since the patron–client structure of the state determines the very field of action of police officers by trading off adequate budget for policing with that of more popular projects leading to more visible optics to fetch more votes, the ethos of public administration theory within the Correlational Theory explains the primary cause of corruption—i.e. the structure of the state governance and politics in Pakistan.

argued that in advanced liberalized industrial countries living standards of citizens largely depend on the productive capitalist sector resulting from direct taxation and the purchasing power of the capitalist sector resulting into more democratic and transparent redistribution creating stability in society. As mentioned in ‘Conceptualising corruption’ section, in developing countries, the productive capitalist sector is small, and the direct tax base is low. In Pakistan, the direct tax base is so narrow that only 1% of people in Pakistan pay taxes ( The News, 2019 ), which makes the state poor due to highly unregulated economy. Unlike advanced Western countries, stability in Pakistan is, therefore, not maintained through transparent redistribution of resources but the chain of patronage right from the parliamentarians down to the people. As noted by Uberti (2016 , p. 330) in such societies, ‘true participants in corrupt exchange frame their interactions through culturally specific scripts and norms.’

Moreover, unlike advanced industrial countries, the primary logic of patronage in post-colonial agrarian societies is that the distribution of economic resources is not open to all citizens, state departments, and sections of society on an equal basis ( North et al. , 2009 ). Such logic is relevant to Pakistan, especially in the case of the police force, which receives meagre resources compared to some other state institutions. Such seems to be the case of police in other countries in South Asia as well. For example, meagre resources provided to the police leading to low wages, extended work hours, and the problems of accommodation are some of the factors responsible for the police corruption in India ( Verma, 1999 ). Similarly, according to Singh (2014) , poor wages lead to bribery and extortion within the Afghan police force. Moreover, Singh’s (2019 , p. 24) six-fold typology, excluding treason, is relevant to police corruption in Pakistan. Though, as mentioned by Singh with reference to Afghanistan, there is a high level of unprofessionalism in Pakistan too, no police officer has ever been reported to commit treason. Moreover, the lack of motivation in the police force is demonstrated in our research findings, the corrupt transactions, in the eyes of police officials and community members, seems to lead to a noble cause of running their official business in the absence of adequate resources provided to them. Without corruption, they think, they would not be able to run their police stations.

Consequently, as demonstrated in this article, police corruption, becomes an institutionalized and legitimized phenomenon. For example, it is not considered corruption if a police officer asks a politician to get him a posting of his choice or to mobilize resources to run the day-to-day police operations through informal/illegitimate means. With low salaries and the provision of inadequate means for their well-being, when police officers mobilize resources for police operations, they mobilize resources for themselves too. Corruption, therefore, gains certain legitimacy. Such a situation further gains currency because of kinship responsibilities of police officers to meet the demands of their immediate as well as extended family members. It is, therefore, that corruption (or exchanges considered corrupt in Western societies) may not be legal but ‘like patronage and clientelism have its own morality, at least in the eye of the local public’ ( Shore and Haller, 2005 , p.12). As a result, even a few honest officials who abstain from corrupt transactions are not in a position to control institutional corruption.

Rijckeghem and Weder (2001 , p. 324) cross-country analysis of 31 developing countries suggest that in a corrupt system, increase in wages does not significantly reduce corruption unless there is a political will for strong anti-corruption efforts and policies to reform the society. Similarly, Quah (2006 ; 2010) noted that Singapore and Hong Kong have significantly overcome police corruption in the post-colonial period through a significant increase in salaries and better training and recruitment, etc. However, the most important factor behind police reforms in these countries was the political will of the ruling elite to curb police corruption. In Singapore, reforms became powerful since the People’s Action Party government came to power. The amendment of the Prevention of Corruption Act in 1960 defined corruption explicitly and gave the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) wider powers. Indeed, ‘the greater vigilance of the CPIB in recent years has also made it difficult for Singaporeans in general and members of the Singapore Police Force (SPF) in particular to indulge in corrupt behaviour’ Quah (2006 , p. 65). Similarly, in Hong Kong, right from its inception, the Independent Commission Against Corruption heavily resourced by the government adopted a three-pronged strategy of focusing on investigating and preventing corruption, and educating the public and obtaining their support in curbing corruption ( Quah, 2010 ).

To conclude, it is because of the inadequate provision of sources to the police force, and patron–client social and political culture that the political-elite benefits from corrupt police in Pakistan. Consequently, due to the lack of political will at the highest level (as the ruling elite spends more resources of projects that have better optics compared to citizens security), the unscrupulous politicians and even less scrupulous senior police officers systematically undermine the efforts of the few relatively honest and competent officers. Pakistan can follow the examples of Singapore and Hong Kong to curb police corruption.

The research findings and analysis will surely add to the understanding of police audience in Pakistan and South Asia generally on multifaceted causes of police corruption. Moreover, while the article adds to the literature on police corruption in Pakistan, much remains to be done at the research level. Lack of research also hampers efforts; both the government and police leadership must encourage research. This study has focused on the causes of police corruption. It is imperative to conduct more studies which would likely to facilitate the availability of further information and analysis, multiple policy options, frameworks for reforms, and programmes for improvement in training and curriculum; increasing public awareness; changing organizational culture; provision of modern technology for investigation and reform of the criminal justice system for police accountability.

Broader themes were developed through codes. For example, codes such as low wages, work–leisure balance, and inadequate operational funds led to themes such as ‘Survival (Individual and Institutional)’; codes such as ‘large families’, ‘kinship obligations’ led to themes such as ‘cultural constraints’ and ‘political patronage’ led to themes such as ‘politicisation’.

Average household size in rural areas is 6.3 persons and in urban areas it is 7.2 persons in Punjab ( Government of the Punjab 2018 . Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2017–18, Bureau of Statistics).

Biradari is an Urdu language word, which means ‘extended family’, clan or tribe.

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Overview of corruption in pakistan.

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Chêne, M. (2008) Overview of corruption in Pakistan. Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer Helpdesk)

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