father of experimental psychology

Wilhelm Wundt: Father of Psychology

Saul McLeod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul McLeod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

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Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

Wilhelm Wundt opened the Institute for Experimental Psychology at the University of Leipzig in Germany in 1879.  This was the first laboratory dedicated to psychology, and its opening is usually thought of as the beginning of modern psychology. Indeed, Wundt is often regarded as the father of psychology.

Wundt was important because he separated psychology from philosophy by analyzing the workings of the mind in a more structured way, with the emphasis being on objective measurement and control.

This laboratory became a focus for those with a serious interest in psychology, first for German philosophers and psychology students, then for American and British students as well.  All subsequent psychological laboratories were closely modeled in their early years on the Wundt model.

Wundt’s background was in physiology, and this was reflected in the topics with which the Institute was concerned, such as the study of reaction times and sensory processes and attention. For example, participants would be exposed to a standard stimulus (e.g. a light or the sound of a metronome) and asked to report their sensations.

Wundt’s aim was to record thoughts and sensations, and to analyze them into their constituent elements, in much the same way as a chemist analyses chemical compounds, in order to get at the underlying structure. The school of psychology founded by Wundt is known as voluntarism, the process of organizing the mind.

During his academic career Wundt trained 186 graduate students (116 in psychology). This is significant as it helped disseminate his work. Indeed, parts of Wundt’s theory were developed and promoted by his one-time student, Edward Titchener, who described his system as Structuralism , or the analysis of the basic elements that constitute the mind.

Wundt wanted to study the structure of the human mind (using introspection). Wundt believed in reductionism. That is, he believed consciousness could be broken down (or reduced) to its basic elements without sacrificing any of the properties of the whole.

Wundt argued that conscious mental states could be scientifically studied using introspection. Wundt’s introspection was not a casual affair, but a highly practiced form of self-examination. He trained psychology students to make observations that were biased by personal interpretation or previous experience, and used the results to develop a theory of conscious thought.

Highly trained assistants would be given a stimulus such as a ticking metronome and would reflect on the experience. They would report what the stimulus made them think and feel. The same stimulus, physical surroundings and instructions were given to each person.

Wundt’s method of introspection did not remain a fundamental tool of psychological experimentation past the early 1920″s.  His greatest contribution was to show that psychology could be a valid experimental science .

Therefore, one way Wundt contributed to the development of psychology was to do his research in carefully controlled conditions, i.e. experimental methods. This encouraged other researchers such as the behaviorists to follow the same experimental approach and be more scientific. However, today psychologists (e.g. Skinner ) argue that introspection was not really scientific even if the methods used to introspect were.  Skinner claims the results of introspection are subjective and cannot be verified because only observable behavior can be objectively measured.

Wundt concentrated on three areas of mental functioning; thoughts, images and feelings. some of these areas are still studied in cognitive psychology today. This means that the study of perceptual processes can be traced back to Wundt.  Wundt’s work stimulated interest in cognitive psychology.

On the basis of his work, and the influence it had on psychologists who were to follow him, Wundt can be regarded as the founder of experimental psychology, so securing his place in the history of psychology.  At the same time, Wundt himself believed that the experimental approach was limited in scope, and that other methods would be necessary if all aspects of human psychology were to be investigated.

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Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt

Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt (1832–1920) is known to posterity as the “father of experimental psychology” and the founder of the first psychology laboratory (Boring 1950: 317, 322, 344–5), [ 1 ] whence he exerted enormous influence on the development of psychology as a discipline, especially in the United States. Reserved and shy in public (cf. Kusch 1995: 249, f.), Wundt aggressively dominated his chosen arenas, the lecture hall and the pages of books, with a witty and sardonic persona (cf., e.g., Wundt 1911a: 61; Boring 1950: 317). His scope was vast, his output incredible. His writings, totaling an estimated 53,000 pages, include: articles on animal and human physiology, poisons, vision, spiritualism, hypnotism, history, and politics; text- and handbooks of “medical physics” and human physiology; encyclopedic tomes on linguistics, logic, ethics, religion, a “system of philosophy;” not to mention his magna opera , the Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie and the Völkerpsychologie (in ten volumes). [ 2 ] Although his work spans several disciplines—physiology, psychology, and philosophy—Wundt would not have considered himself an “interdisciplinary” or “pluralistic” thinker: he was to the core a foundationalist, whose great ambition was establishing a philosophico-scientific system of knowledge, practice, and politics (see Section 7 , below) (Boring 1950: 327). Despite his intentions, however, the sheer length of his career (some 65 years) and the volume of his output make it hard to speak of a coherent Wundtian doctrine. [ 3 ] His corpus is riven by tensions and ambiguities, and though his work has undergone periodic scholarly reconsiderations, Wundt’s lasting importance for the field of psychology remains the topic of lively debate among psychologists. [ 4 ]

For philosophers, Wundt is worth studying for two reasons. First, the arguments he made more than a century ago for the legitimacy of a non-reductionist account of consciousness offer both challenges and resources to contemporary psychology and philosophy of mind alike. Should those arguments be found lacking, there remains a second, perhaps more important reason to read him: not understanding Wundt is to tolerate a lacuna at a crucial nexus of the recent history of philosophy. Not only was he a powerful influence (albeit mostly by repulsion) upon the founders of Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and neo-Kantianism, it was also Wundt and his pioneering students who developed the empirical methodologies that first granted psychology a disciplinary identity distinct from philosophy. It is these philosophically germane aspects of his thought that this article describes.

1. Biographical Timeline

2. life & times, 4.1 sensation, 4.2 consciousness, 5. the theoretical framework of experimental psychology, 6. völkerpsychologie, 7.1 psychology in its relation to the sciences, 7.2 psychology and logic, 8. conclusion, wundt: selected publications, wundt’s works in english, secondary sources concerning wundt, related or cited works, other internet resources, related entries.

Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt was born on August 16, 1832, in the German town of Neckarau, outside of Mannheim, the son of a Lutheran minister (Titchener 1921b: 161). The family moved when Wilhelm was six to the town of Heidenheim, in central Baden (Boring 1950: 316). By all accounts, he was a precocious, peculiar boy, schooled mainly by his father’s assistant, the vicar, Friedrich Müller; young Wilhelm was so attached to Müller that he moved in with him when the latter got a post in a neighboring village (Boring 1950: 316). Wundt studied at the Gymnasien at Bruchsal and Heidelberg and entered the University of Tübingen at 19, in 1851 (Boring 1950: 317). After one year he transferred to the University of Heidelberg, where he majored in medicine. By his third year, his intense work ethic yielded his first publication (Boring 1950: 318). Nevertheless, doctoring was not Wundt’s vocation and he turned instead to physiology, which he studied for a semester under Johannes Müller (the “father of experimental physiology”) at Berlin (Boring 1950: 318). In 1856, at the age of 24, Wundt took his doctorate in medicine at Heidelberg, and habilitated as a Dozent in physiology. Two years later, the physicist, physiologist, and psychologist, Hermann von Helmholtz, [ 6 ] received the call to Heidelberg as a professor of physiology, a decisive moment for Wundt’s career, with Wundt working as Helmholtz’s assistant from 1858 until 1865 (Boring 1950: 300, 319; Araujo 2014: 55).

When Helmholtz moved to Berlin in 1871, Wundt was passed over as Helmholtz’s replacement; three years later he took the chair in “inductive philosophy” at the University of Zürich. He remained at Zürich for only one year before receiving an appointment to “a first-class chair of philosophy at Leipzig in 1875” (Ben-David and Collins 1966: 462). Leipzig’s philosophy department, dominated by Herbartians, provided the ideal environment for his intellectual flowering, the soil having been prepared by Fechner, Weber, and Lotze (Littman 1979: 74; cf. Kim 2009). Wundt became famous at Leipzig. It was here, in 1879, that the university formally recognized his little room of equipment as a bona fide laboratory, the world’s first devoted to psychology. [ 7 ] Students flocked to Wundt, [ 8 ] and while he set the tone and direction of research, it was largely they who constructed apparatus, performed experiments, and published results.

Enrollment in his courses doubled about every 15 years, reaching a peak of 620 students in the summer of 1912. Wundt ended up sponsoring 186 Ph.D. dissertations, about a third of which apparently involved purely philosophical topics (Tinker, 1932). (Quote—including reference to Tinker–from Hearst 1979b: 22)

Though Wundt participated actively in labor politics in his early years at Heidelberg, even being elected to the Baden parliament, he steadily drifted rightwards, eventually being persuaded by his “virulently anti-Semitic” [ 9 ] son, Max, a historian of philosophy, to join the ultranationalist Deutsche Philosophische Gesellschaft , after 1917. [ 10 ] It is hard to ignore Wundt’s unattractive “application” of his late social and cultural psychology to the tendentious critique of Germany’s enemies (Kusch 1995: 220–1). Nevertheless, his drive and unflagging intellectual advocacy will arouse admiration in some: even at age 80, he remained involved in academic controversy. [ 11 ] But let us consider the man through his work.

To understand Wundt’s philosophical importance one must know something of his intellectual context. Early nineteenth-century German psychology labored under the looming shadow of Kant and his arguments that a science of psychology is in principle impossible. This fact by itself illustrates the oddity of the situation, from our point of view: why would a psychologist care what a philosopher thought about his practice? The answer is that since ancient times, psychology had been a basic part of philosophical speculation, though after Kant’s criticisms many considered it a dying branch, dangerously close to breaking off. Psychologists were philosophers on the defensive (cf. L III: 163).

Psychology, as a part of philosophy, had already several times changed the way it defined its object: as “soul”, “mental substance”, “mind”, etc. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many regarded psychology to be the account of consciousness or “inner experience”, distinct from the natural scientific accounts of external, sensible reality. After having dealt the coup de grâce to the speculative, rational, a priori psychology of the soul epitomized by Christian Wolff, however, Kant tried to cut off any retreat into the empirical study of consciousness, as well. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science , he argued that empirical psychology cannot be an exact science because the phenomena it seeks to explain are not mathematically expressible (Kitcher 1990: 11). Moreover, it can never become an experimental science “because it is not possible to isolate different thoughts” (Kitcher 1990: 11). Finally, and most fatally, the only access to the phenomena of inner experience, introspection, ipso facto alters those phenomena: if I try, by introspection, to study what it’s like to be tristful, the phenomena of my sadness are now something different, namely, phenomena of my sadness-being-studied-by-me (Kitcher 1990: 11). Thus psychologists found their object declared beyond the limit of possible investigation and their methods vain. While such arguments did not persuade all of Kant’s successors of the hopelessness of their enterprise, their attempts were unpromising. On the one hand, the German Idealists’ fanciful speculation about Geist collapsed upon itself. On the other hand, the efforts of J.F. Herbart to devise a mathematical mental mechanics suggested a possible way forward although in the end it proved equally fruitless. Thus, for those mid-nineteenth-century enthusiasts of mental phenomena, the future of a genuine psychology seemed blocked.

At the same time, however, progress was being made in human physiology, especially of the sensory systems. In 1834, the physiologist, E.H. Weber, published a startling discovery in his De tactu . His experiments on the sensation of weight had led him to find that there obtains a constant ratio between, on the one hand, a given stimulus and, on the other hand, a second stimulus sufficiently larger for the difference between the two stimuli to be just noticeable, no matter the magnitude of the first stimulus. [ 12 ] In other words, if the first stimulus is of intensity \(I\), then \(\Delta I\) is the amount by which it must be increased for the difference to be just noticeable; the ratio of \(I\) and \(\Delta I\) is constant (\(k\)): \(\Delta I / I = k\) (cf. L III: 186). This equation, which later came to be known as Weber’s Law, [ 13 ] was crucial to the development of psychology because it apparently demonstrated that where Herbart had failed in his aprioristic construction of mathematical regularities of mind, experimentation could succeed. The situation nevertheless remained murky as interpretations of Weber’s Law multiplied. Fechner, for example, elaborated Weber’s experiments but took his results as the basis for an arcane panpsychic monism (Wundt’s own “psychological” interpretation is treated in Section 4 ) (cf., e.g., Boring 1950: 286).

In founding the experimental science of psychology, Wundt in effect “triangulated” a media via between the available options: he rejected Fechner’s mysticism while maintaining his experimental approach; at the same time, Wundt went beyond the purely physical interpretation of physiological experiments à la Helmholtz, arguing that at least in humans experimentation could reveal law-like regularities of inner (psychological) reality. Thus, to use the phrase of Ben-David and Collins, he established the “hybrid science” whose dual provenance is expressed in Wundt’s name for it, “physiological psychology” (Ben-David and Collins 1966: 459; Kusch 1995: 122, ff.). [ 14 ] Wundt’s interest, both to scholars of the history of philosophy and to contemporary philosophers of mind, flows ultimately from the definition, methodology, and “metaphysics” of this physiological psychology. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to a description of its definition, method, and doctrine, while Section 5 is concerned with its theoretical underpinnings. The practical and theoretical limits of experimental psychology will be treated in Section 6 , on Völkerpsychologie .

3. Experimental psychology: object and method

“The exact description of consciousness [ Bewusstsein ] is the sole aim of experimental psychology” (cited by Titchener 1921b: 164). Wundt identifies “physiological” with “experimental” psychology. [ 15 ] Thus, for Wundt, experimental psychology is the unmediated study of consciousness, aided by the experimental protocols of the natural sciences. Yet this definition involves two contestable assumptions: first, that “consciousness” is susceptible to experiment (rejected by Kant); second, that psychology, even if conceived as experimental, has for its object consciousness or “the mental” (later rejected by the Behaviorists) (cf. Hearst 1979b: 10). Let us focus on the first assumption, since it is one Wundt addresses.

Wundt defines consciousness as “inner experience;” it is only the “immediately real” [ 16 ] phenomena constituting this experience, and nothing behind or beyond it, that is the object of psychological , as opposed to physiological or psychophysical investigation ( PP II: 636). Wundt’s project is not only a “psychology without a soul”, in F.A. Lange’s phrase, but also a science without a substrate tout court . [ 17 ] Wundt therefore presents himself as a radical empiricist. The subject of psychology “is itself determined wholly and exclusively by its predicates”, and these predicates derive solely from direct, internal observation (on which below). The basic domain of inquiry, accordingly, is that of “individual psychology” (cf. e.g. L III: 160, ff), i.e. of the concrete mental contents appearing to particular human beings, and not some mental substance or bundle of faculties. [ 18 ] In Wundt’s declaration that individual psychology must become a science via the experimental manipulation of inner phenomena, we see a pragmatic attitude perhaps peculiar to the working scientist: the future science as doctrine takes shape in and through the present practice of experimentation, its essays, assays, trials, and errors. Instead of simply submitting to Kant’s injunctions against the very possibility of a scientific psychology, Wundt finds that certain aspects of our inner experience can be, and in fact have been, made susceptible to experiment and mathematical representation: Weber and Fechner did this.

Nevertheless, Wundt repeatedly addresses the objections raised against the very possibility of psychological, as opposed to physiological or psychophysical, experimentation. How are we to subject the mind-body complex to physiological stimulation such that the reactions may be given a purely psychological interpretation? From the physiological point of view, experimentation with stimulus and response are not experiments of sensation, but of externally observable excitations and reactions of nerve and muscle tissue. For example, a nerve fiber or a skin surface may be given an electric shock or brought into contact with acid, and twitches of muscle fiber are observed to follow. It is obvious, especially when the nerve-tissue in question belongs to a dead frog (Wundt describes such an experiment in PP ), that these experiments say nothing about the “inner” experience or consciousness of sensation. Wundt’s innovation is the attempt to project the experimental rigor of physiology into the domain of inner experience by supplementing these experiments with a purely psychological set of procedures. These procedures constitute Wundt’s well-known yet misunderstood method of Selbstbeobachtung , i.e. “introspection” or, better, “self-observation”.

Because “inner” distinguishes itself from “external” experience by virtue of its immediacy, all psychology must begin with self-observation, so that physiological experiment is given an ancillary function (Boring 1950: 320–21). Now Wundt is well aware of the common criticism that self-observation seems inescapably to involve the paradoxical identity (described in the previous section) of the observing subject and observed object. Indeed, he takes pains to distinguish his notion of self-observation from that of “most advocates of the so-called empirical psychology”, which he calls “a fount of self-delusions [ Selbsttäuschungen ]”:

Since in this case the observing subject coincides with the observed object, it is obvious that the direction of attention upon these phenomena alters them. Now since our consciousness has less room for many simultaneous activities the more intense these activities are, the alteration in question as a rule consists in this: the phenomena that one wishes to observe are altogether suppressed [i.e., by the activity of focused attention upon them]. ( L III: 162)

Wundt believes that one can experimentally correct for this problem by

using, as much as possible, unexpected processes, processes not intentionally adduced, but rather such as involuntarily present themselves [ sich darbieten ]. ( L III: 162) [ 19 ]

In other words, it is in the controlled conditions of a laboratory that one can, by means of experimenter, experimental subject, and various apparatus, arbitrarily and repeatedly call forth precisely predetermined phenomena of consciousness. The psychologist is not then interested in the psychophysical connections between the somatic or nervous sense-mechanisms and the elicited “inner” phenomena, but solely in describing, “and where possible measuring”, the psychological regularities that such experiments can reveal, viz., regular causal links within the domain of the psychic alone ( L III: 165). According to Wundt, psychological experiments thus conceived accomplish in the realm of consciousness precisely what natural-scientific experiments do in nature: they do not leave consciousness to itself, but force it to answer the experimenter’s questions, by placing it under regulated conditions. Only in this way is

a [psychological] observation [as opposed to a mere perception { Wahrnehmung }] at all possible in the scientific sense, i.e., the attentive, regulated pursuit of the phenomena. ( L III: 165) [ 20 ]

A detailed account of these experiments themselves, however, lies far beyond the scope of this article. [ 21 ]

4. Wundt’s “individual psychology”

Wundt, like most early experimental psychologists, [ 22 ] concentrated his investigations upon sensation and perception; of all psychic phenomena, sensation is the most obviously connected to the body and the physical world (Hearst 1979b: 33). For Wundt, sensations and our somatic sensory apparatus are especially important for the project of physiological psychology for the simple reason that sensations are the “contact points” between the physical and the psychological ( PP I: 1). Sensations ( Empfindungen ), as the medium between the physical and psychic, are uniquely susceptible to a double-sided inquiry, [ 23 ] viz. from the “external” physical side of stimulus, and the “internal” psychological side of corresponding mental representation ( Vorstellung ). [ 24 ] The Wundtian psychologist therefore controls the external, physiological side experimentally, in order to generate diverse internal representations that can only “appear” to the introspective observer. According to Wundt, the representations ( Vorstellungen ) that constitute the contents ( Inhalt ) of consciousness all have their elemental basis in sensations ( Empfindungen ) ( PP I: 281). [ 25 ] Sensations are never given to us as elemental, however; we never apperceive them “purely”, but always already “combined” ( verbunden ) in the representation of a synthesized perception ( PP I: 281). Yet, the manifestly composite nature of our representations forces us to abstract such elementary components ( PP I: 281) (cf. PP II: 256). Pure sensations, according to Wundt, display three differentiae: quality, intensity, and “feeling-tone” ( Gefühlston ) ( PP I: 282–3). [ 26 ]

His treatment of quality and intensity are especially important for getting a clearer notion of his notion of psychological experimentation. It is a “fact of inner experience” that “every sensation possesses a certain intensity with respect to which it may be compared to other sensations, especially those of similar quality” ( PP I: 332). The outer sensory stimuli may be measured by physical methods, whereas psychology is given the corresponding

task of determining to what degree our immediate estimation [ Schätzung ] [of the strength of sensory stimuli] that we make aided by our sensations—to what degree this estimation corresponds to or deviates from the stimuli’s real strength. ( PP I: 332–3)

There are two possible tasks for psychophysical measurement of sense-stimuli: the “determination of limit-values between which stimulus-changes are accompanied by changes in sensation”; and “the investigation of the lawful relations between stimulus-change and change in sensation” ( PP I: 333). Sensation can thus be measured with respect to changes in intensity corresponding to changes in strength of stimuli ( PP I: 335–6).

Weber’s Law (WL) is the most striking example of such a relation, and Wundt’s interpretation of WL sheds much light on what he means by “physiological psychology”. Wundt writes:

We can formulate [this law] as follows: A difference between any two stimuli is estimated [ geschätzt ] to be equal if the relationship between the stimuli is equal. Or: If in our apprehension [ Auffassung ] the intensity of the sensation is to increase by equal amounts, then the relative stimulus-increase must remain constant. This latter statement may also be expressed as follows: The strength of a stimulus must increase geometrically if the strength of the apperceived sensation is to increase arithmetically. ( PP I: 359)

Now these various formulations [ 27 ] of WL admit, as Wundt says, of three different, and indeed incompatible interpretations; that is, there are three different conceptions of what WL is a law of . First, the physiological interpretation takes it as a manifestation of the “peculiar laws of excitation of the neural matter;” [ 28 ] second, the psychophysical (Fechnerian) interpretation takes WL as governing the interrelation between somatic and psychic activity ( PP I: 392). Wundt rejects both of these in favor of a third, the psychological interpretation; his arguments are instructive. Against the physiological interpretation Wundt raises the following main point, viz. that

the estimation of the intensity of sensation ( Empfindungsintensität ) is a complicated process, upon which—in addition to the central sensory excitation—the effectiveness of the center of apperception will exert considerable influence. We can obviously say nothing immediate about how the central sense-excitations would be sensed independently of the latter; thus Weber’s Law, too, concerns only apperceived sensations, and therefore can just as well have its basis in the processes of the apperceptive comparison of sensation as in the original constitution of the central sensory excitations. ( PP I: 391–2)

Now apperception (see below) is a purely psychological act in consciousness—and it is solely as a law of the psychological processes involved in the “measuring comparison of sensations” that Wundt understands WL ( PP I: 393). In other words, WL

does not apply to sensations in and for themselves, but to processes of apperception, without which a quantitative estimation of sensations could never take place. ( PP I: 393; cf. PP II: 269)

Wundt sees WL as simply a mathematical description of the more general experience that

we possess in our consciousness no absolute, but merely a relative measure of the intensity of the conditions [ Zustände ] obtaining in it, and that we therefore measure in each case one condition against another, with which we are obliged in the first place to compare it. ( PP I: 393)

For this reason Wundt’s “psychological interpretation” makes WL into a special case of a more general law of consciousness, viz. “of the relation or relativity of our inner conditions [ Zustände ]” ( PP I: 393). WL is therefore not a law of sensation so much as of apperception.

This solution typifies Wundt’s general view that the domains of psychic and physical phenomena do not stand in conflict, but rather constitute separate spheres of (causal) explanation. His interpretation of WL nicely illustrates how, on his view, physiological experiments can yield mathematically expressible results, not about the physical, somatic processes involved in sensation, but about the relationships among these sensations as apperceived , i.e., as psychological elements and objects of consciousness. He writes that “the psychological interpretation offers the advantage of not excluding a simultaneous [i.e. parallel] physiological explanation” (presumably once the neurophysiological facts of the matter have been better elucidated — cf. PP I: 391); by contrast, the two competing interpretations “only permit a one-sided explanation” of WL ( PP I: 393).

Psychology finds consciousness to be constituted of three major act-categories: representation, willing, and feeling; our discussion is limited to the first two. Now while Wundt is forced to speak of representations and representational acts as distinct, he is nevertheless clear that they are merely different aspects of a single flowing process. This is his so-called theory of actuality ( Aktualitätstheorie ) (1911a: 145). Representations are representational acts , never the “objects with constant properties” propounded by adherents of a so-called theory of substantiality ( Substantialitätstheorie ) (1911a: 145). This identity of representation and representational act typifies what we may call Wundt’s “monistic perspectivism”. [ 29 ] Everywhere he insists that the “psychic processes form a unitary flow of events [ einheitliches Geschehen [ 30 ] ]”, the constituents of which—“representing, feeling, willing, etc.”—are “only differentiated through psychological analysis and abstraction” (1911a: 145). Keeping in mind the underlying active unity of the psychic, let us examine some of Wundt’s “analyses and abstractions”.

As discussed in the previous section, all consciousness originates in sensations. These, however, are never given to consciousness in a “pure” state as individual sensory atoms, but are always perceived as already compounded [ 31 ] into representations ( Vorstellungen ), that is, into “images of an object or of a process in the external world” ( PP II: 3; 1). Representations may be either perceptions ( Wahrnehmungen ) or intuitions ( Anschauungen ): the same representation is called a “perception” if considered as the presentation of objective reality, and an “intuition” if considered in terms of the accompanying conscious, subjective activity ( PP II: 1). If the representation’s object is not real (cf. PP II: 479) but merely thought, then it is a so-called reproduced representation. [ 32 ]

Now the formative process , by which sensations are connected into representations either through temporal sequencing or spatial ordering ( PP II: 3), constitutes a main aspect of the activity we call consciousness; the other is the “coming and going of [these] representations” ( PP II: 256). On the evidence of “innumerable psychological facts”, [ 33 ] Wundt claims that all representations are formed through “psychological synthesis of sensations”, and that this synthesis accompanies every representational act ( PP II: 256). We are therefore entitled to take the act of representational synthesis as a “characteristic feature of consciousness itself” ( PP II: 256). Although consciousness consists in the formation of representations, on the one hand, and of the coming and going of such representations, on the other hand—i.e., although its contents are a continuous streaming of fusing and diffusing representations—yet it is not merely this ( PP II: 256). We are also aware within our consciousness of another activity operating upon our representations, namely of paying them attention ( PP II: 266).

Attention may be understood in terms of the differing degrees to which representations are present ( gegenwärtig ) in consciousness. These varying degrees of presence correspond to the varying degrees to which consciousness is “turned towards [ zugewandt ]” them ( PP II: 267). Wundt appeals to an analogy:

This feature of consciousness can be clarified by that common image we use in calling consciousness an inner vision. If we say that the representations present [ gegenwärtig ] at a particular moment are in consciousness’s field of vision [ Blickfeld ], then that part of the field upon which our attention is turned may be called the inner focal point of vision [ Blickpunkt ]. The entry of a representation into the field of inner vision we call “perception”, and its entry into the focal point of vision we call “apperception”. ( PP II: 267)

Thus consciousness is a function of the scope of attention, which may be broader (as perception) or narrower (as apperception [ 34 ] ). Apperception, in turn, may either actively select and focus upon a perceived representation, or it may passively find certain representations suddenly thrusting themselves into the center of attention ( PP II: 267; 562). There is no distinct boundary between the perceived and the apperceived, and Wundt’s analogy may be misleading (cf. esp. PP II: 268) to the extent that it gives the impression of two separable forms of attention able in principle to subsist together simultaneously (that is, apperception focusing upon a point in the perceptual field while that field continues to be perceived). No: perceptive attention becomes apperceptive attention just as it focuses more strenuously, constricting the perceptive field. The more it contracts, the “brighter” the representation appears, now becoming the focal point of apperception as the fringes of the perceptual field retreat into “darkness” ( PP II: 268). For Wundt, the distinguishing feature of the apperceptive focus is that it “always forms a unitary representation”, so that a narrower focal point (or rather, the focal “field” [ PP II: 268; 477]) results in a correspondingly higher intensity of attention ( PP II: 269). Hence

the degree of apperception is not to be measured according to the strength of the external impression [i.e. physically or physiologically], but solely according to the subjective activity through which consciousness turns to a particular sense-stimulus. ( PP II: 269)

Thus, apperception [ 35 ] is closely akin to the will, indeed is a primordial expression of will: “the act of apperception in every case consists in an inner act of will [ Willenshandlung ]” ( L I: 34). By contrast, Wundt argues that the processes by which the representations are themselves formed, fused, synthesized, and “delivered” into the perceptual field, are associative processes “independent of apperception” ( PP II: 278–9; 437, ff). Passive apperception may be characterized simply by saying that here the associative form of representational connection is predominant (cf. L I: 34), whereas when “the active apperception successively raises representations into the focal field of consciousness”, this active passage of representations obeys the special laws of what Wundt calls “apperceptive connection” ( PP II: 279). He does not consider the types of association to be genuine psychological laws, i.e. laws governing the “succession of representations”, because they merely generate the possible kinds of representational compounds. It is apperception, in accordance with its own laws, that “decides” which of these possible connections are realized in consciousness ( L I: 34). We see here the important role played by his so-called voluntarism: [ 36 ] associationist psychologists, according to Wundt, cannot give an account of the (subjective) activity that immediately characterizes consciousness (cf. Wundt 1911b: 721, ff.; Lipps 1903: 202, ff.; cf. esp. L I: 33). Yet this is not to deny association of sensations altogether. Rather, it is to conceive of association as merely a subliminal process, the products of which, representations, then become the actual objects of consciousness. Thus the “apperceptive connections of representations presuppose the various types of association”, especially the associative fusion [ 37 ] of sensations into representations. [ 38 ]

Apperception operates according to its own peculiar laws ( PP II: 470). These laws, like those of association, govern acts of combination ( Verbindung ) and separation ( Zerlegung ). How do apperceptive laws differ from those of association? Wundt writes:

Association everywhere gives the first impetus to [apperceptive] combinations. Through association we combine, e.g., the representations of a tower and of a church. [ 39 ] But no matter how familiar the coexistence of these representations may be, mere association does not help us form the representation of a church-tower. For this latter representation does not contain the two constitutive representations in a merely external coexistence; rather, in the [representation of the church-tower], the representation of the church has come to adhere [ anhaften ] to the representation of the tower, more closely determining the latter. In this way, the agglutination of representations forms the first level of apperceptive combination. ( PP II: 476; on “agglutination of representations”, see also L I: 38, f.)

It is on the basis of such “agglutinative” representations, exhibiting characteristics essentially different from their constituents, that apperception continues to synthesize ever more representations, a process resulting in their compression ( Verdichtung ) or displacement ( Verschiebung ) ( PP II: 476–7; cf. L I: 43). The more the original associative or agglutinated representations are compressed or displaced, the more they disappear altogether from consciousness, leaving in their stead a single representation whose original composite structure has disappeared. This process, which Wundt calls “representational synthesis” proper, is reiterated at ever higher levels until even the sensory foundation vanishes, as in the case of abstract and symbolic concepts ( L I: 39).

Apperception is not only a synthetic process; it is also governed by rules of separation. Apperceptive separation operates only upon the representations already synthesized out of the “associative stock [ Assoziationsvorrath ]”, but does not necessarily decompose them into their original parts ( PP II: 478). Wundt’s notion of apperceptive separation is one of the most philosophically original, consequential, and ambiguous of his theories. He argues that it is usually the case that

the original representational totality [ ursprüngliche Gesammtvorstellung ] is present to our consciousness at first as an indistinct complex of individual representations. These individual parts and the manner of their connection become distinct only through the separative activity of apperception. ( PP II: 478)

Thus, conscious thought and judgment (on judgment, see SP I: 34, ff., esp. 37, ff.) (separating and combining subject and predicate) is not, as may seem at first blush, an act of

gathering together [representational] components and then fitting them together in the successive articulation of the total representation [ Gesammtvorstellung ]. ( PP II: 478)

Rather, “the whole, albeit in an indistinct form, must have been apperceived prior to its parts” ( PP II: 478). Only in this way can one explain the

well-known fact that we can easily and without trouble finish [composing] a complicated sentence-structure. This would be impossible if the whole had not been represented at the outset. The accomplishment of the judgment-function therefore consists, from the psychological point of view, only in our successively making clearer the obscure outlines of the total picture [ Gesammtbild ], so that at the end of the composite thought-act the whole, too, stands more clearly before our consciousness. ( PP II: 478)

Because according to Wundt’s principle of “actuality [ Aktualität ]” consciousness is purely an activity, it is impossible to render his theory in terms of “structures”. It consists in constantly interacting processes : on the one hand, there are associative processes that fuse sensations into elemental representations. These stream into and thereby constitute a fluctuating field of attention: flowing and broad, it is called “perception;” ebbing and concentrate, “apperception”. As an activity, attention is an expression of will; since consciousness just is attention in its shifting forms, it is the activity of will manifested in the selection, combination, and separation of disposable representations ( PP II: 564). These representations are constantly “worked over” by apperception, which through its synthetic and diaeretic activity constructs them into ever “higher developmental forms of consciousness”, such that in the end their origins in sensation and perception might be completely erased. In other words, as the apperceptive activity becomes increasingly intense it seems as it were to rise above the field of perception, above the field of its own constructs, becoming aware of itself as pure activity, as pure self -consciousness:

rooted in the constant activity [ Wirksamkeit ] of apperception, [self-consciousness] … retreats completely into apperception alone, so that, after the completion of the development of consciousness, the will appears as the only content of self-consciousness…. ( PP II: 564) [ 40 ]

Thus the self as will appears to itself as independent from and opposed to an external world of both sensation and culture, though Wundt hastens to add that this is but an illusion; in reality, “the abstract self-consciousness maintains constantly the full sensible background of the empirical self-consciousness” ( PP II: 564). [ 41 ]

As we have seen ( Section 3.2 ), for Wundt the possibility of a physiological psychology (as opposed to a purely physiological inquiry into sensation, behavior, learning, etc.) depends on the possibility of self-observation. Self-observation, in turn, is of scientific use only if the sequence of “inner” phenomena of consciousness is assumed to fall under an independent principle of psychic causality. For if it does not, then these phenomena could never be more than a chaotic muddle, of which there could be no science. Alternatively, if the “inner” phenomena could be shown to fall under the physical causality of the natural sciences, then there would be no need for a special psychological method, such as self-observation (cf. Natorp 1912). In fact, however, a system of psychic causality can be determined, Wundt argues, one that at no point is reducible to physical causality: “no connection of physical processes can ever teach us anything about the manner of connection between psychological elements” (Wundt 1894: 43, quoted in Kusch 1995: 134). This “fact”, which Wundt thinks is given in the psycho-physiological experiments described above, leads him to his so-called principle of psychophysical parallelism (PPP).

The PPP has caused a great deal of confusion in the secondary literature, which persists in characterizing it as a metaphysical [ 42 ] doctrine somehow derived from Leibniz (e.g., Wellek 1967: 350; Thompson and Robinson 1979: 412) or Spinoza (cf. L I: 77). Wundt however is crystal-clear that the PPP is not a metaphysical “hypothesis”. It is merely an admittedly misleading name for an “empirical postulate” necessary to explain the phenomenal “fact” of consciousness of which we are immediately aware (Wundt 1911a: 22; cf. esp. 28). By denying any metaphysical interpretation of his principle, Wundt insists that the “physical” and the “psychic” do not name two ontologically distinct realms whose events unfold on separate yet parallel causal tracks. He is therefore not an epiphenomenalist, as some commentators have claimed. Rather, the “physical” and “psychic” name two mutually irreducible perspectives from which one and the same world or Being ( Sein ) may be observed: “nothing occurs in our consciousness that does not find its sensible foundation in certain physical processes”, he writes, and all psychological acts (association, apperception, willing) “are accompanied by physiological nerve-actions” ( PP II: 644). In distinguishing the empirical from the metaphysical PPP, Wundt contrasts his own view against Spinoza’s, which, according to Wundt, makes the realm of material substance exist separately from, though parallel to that of mental substance (Wundt 1911a: 22, 44–5; cf. esp. Wundt 1911a: 143, ff.).

The investigator of psychological phenomena, therefore, must assume, solely for heuristic reasons, two “parallel” and irreducible causal chains by which two distinct types of phenomena may be accounted for (Wundt 1911a: 143; cf. Van Rappard 1979: 109). Wundt compares the distinction between psychological and physiological explanation to the different viewpoints taken by chemistry and physics of the same object, a crystal. The chemical and physical accounts are not of two different entities; rather, they describe and explain the same entity from two distinct points of view, and in this sense the two accounts are “parallel”. Similarly, (neuro-) physiology and psychology do not describe different processes, one neural and one mental, but the same process seen from the outside and the inside, respectively. As Wundt writes,

“inner” and “outer” experience merely designate distinct perspectives that we can apply in our grasp and scientific investigation of what is, in itself, a unitary experience. (Wundt 1896a; quoted at Natorp 1912: 264).

Whereas experimental psychology focuses in the first place on the effects of the physical (outer) upon the psychic (inner), the willing consciousness is characterized by intervening in the external world, that is, by expressing the internal ( PP I: 2). This latter feature of consciousness lies beyond the scope of experiment, because the origins of conscious expression cannot be controlled. Moreover, psychological development is obviously not determined merely by sensation, but also by the meaningful influences of the individual’s “spiritual [ geistig ] environment”—his culture—influences again not obviously susceptible to experimentation. [ 43 ] Hence, just as Wundt reserved for physiology an ancillary role in experimental psychology, so too he now argues for the utility of a distinct methodological approach to analyze and explain the

psychic processes that are bound, in virtue of their genetic and developmental conditions, to spiritual communities [ geistige Gemeinschaften ]. ( L III: 224)

It is the inquiry into “cultural products [ Erzeugnisse ]” of the “totality of spiritual life [ geistiges Gesammtleben ] in which certain psychological laws have embodied themselves”, specifically, language, art, myth, and customs ( Sitten ) ( PP I: 5; L III: 230). These objects cannot be investigated in the same way as those of individual “inner” experience, but require a mode of explanation appropriate to their external, yet non-physical phenomenology. This inquiry, which complements and together with experimental psychology completes the discipline of psychology, Wundt calls “ Völkerpsychologie ” (hereafter abbreviated: VP ) ( L III: 225). [ 44 ]

While Wundt had already discussed the role of a VP necessary for the completion of psychology in his early writings, it was not until old age that he committed himself to its realization. The result was his ten-volume work, entitled Völkerpsychologie . While an examination of the contents of these tomes lies beyond the scope of this article, his justification and clarification of the völkerpsychologisch project as such are of interest for those interested in truth and method in the social and human sciences. Wundt stresses that although VP shares object-domains with such sciences as history, philology, linguistics, [ 45 ] ethnology, [ 46 ] or anthropology ( L III: 226), yet it is only interested in these domains insofar as they “are determined by general psychological laws, and not just by historical conditions” ( PP I: 5). In other words, VP is not interested in the unique and specific facts of this nation’s history or that tribe’s language as such, but only insofar as these reveal “the general psychological developments that arise from the connection of individual [developments]” ( L III: 226). This quotation is important. While VP does not concern itself with historical or linguistic facts as such, this does not mean that it is not concerned with individuality. Indeed, it is through the study of the psychological motives only apparent in history or language—i.e., in communal existence—that our understanding of the individual is completed (cf. L III: 224, 228). This view is typical of Wundt’s perspectivism. Just as psychology is an alternative perspective to that of physiology, so too ( within psychology) VP provides an alternative perspective to that of experimental psychology. Wundt considers none of these various perspectives dispensable, since each one is a complement necessary for total science. But while each of these perspectives reveals a (phenomenologically) irreducible (“parallel”) network of causal chains, the process so explained, Wundt holds, is in every case one and the same. There is just one empirical world and reality, but many irreducible varieties of experience. Thus, in the case of VP , too, he claims that there is no “general law of spiritual events [ geistiges Geschehen ] that is not already completely contained in the laws of the individual consciousness” ( L III: 225).

7. The order of knowledge

As we have seen, Wundt was concerned not only with expanding the set of known psychological facts, but also with interpreting them within an appropriate explanatory framework. Of course, the necessity of establishing such a closed framework distinct from physiology amounted to distinguishing psychological causality from physical causality in general, and hence psychology from the natural sciences altogether. But psychology has to be defined against two other areas of “scientific” ( wissenschaftlich ) inquiry; first, in its völkerpsychologisch dimension, against the Geisteswissenschaften or “human sciences”, and second, against the non-psychological domains of philosophy. As these relationships are laid out below, it must always be remembered that although these four areas—psychology, philosophy, natural science, human science—are irreducible, this irreducibility is not a metaphysical or ontological one, but merely one of explanatory function (and commensurate methodology). They do not have distinct objects, but again merely represent ways of describing irreducible perspectives upon the same object, namely experience. Wundt writes:

Objects of science do not in and of themselves yield starting points for a classification of the sciences. Rather, it is only regarding the concepts that these objects call for that we can undertake this classification. Therefore, the same object [ Gegenstand ] can become the object [ Objekt ] of several sciences: geometry, epistemology, and psychology each deals with space, but space is approached in each discipline from a different angle. … The tasks of the sciences are therefore never determined by the objects in themselves, but are predominantly dependent upon the logical points of view from which they are considered. ( SP I: 12–3; cf. L III: 228)

Wundt’s monism has serious consequences for the sort of claim philosophy (and thus psychology) can make to be scientific. The most obvious is that neither can lay claim to synthetic knowledge that is not founded in or (also) describable in terms of the natural or human sciences.

For Wundt, it is only the sciences that have methodologies by which to synthesize our representations, sensible as well as “processed”, into “facts” or “pieces of” knowledge ( Erkenntnisse ). Hence, while strictly speaking he is committed to considering psychology (i.e., physiological psychology and VP ) a part of philosophy, he usually speaks of them as distinct enterprises. This is because psychology is hybrid, adapting scientific methodologies to its particular aims; in this sense psychology, although part of philosophy, synthesizes facts, just like the sciences. [ 47 ] By contrast, philosophy’s pure task is universal, operating over all scientific domains; it is, he writes, “the general science whose task it is to unify the general pieces of knowledge yielded by the particular sciences into a system free of contradiction” ( SP I: 9). Philosophy’s positive role, therefore, is not to provide the foundations of science, nor can it ever “step into the role of a particular science” (cf. Kusch 1995: 129); rather it is “to take in every case the already secured results of those sciences as its foundation”, and organize them into a single, overarching system by determining their points of connection ( PP I: 8; 6). Wundt calls this side of philosophy Prinzipienlehre or “doctrine of principles”. By contrast, its negative or critical role is to regulate the sciences in accord with the imperative of consistent systematicity. In short, it has no constitutive but merely a regulative role vis-à-vis the sciences. Thus, when we return to the philosophical as opposed to the scientific aspect of psychology’s hybrid structure, we see that this aspect consists in its aim (as opposed to its method) of explaining rules of genesis, connection, and separation of those mental representations with an epistemic character. Wundt calls this psychological contribution to philosophy Erkenntnislehre or “doctrine of knowledge” (i.e., the theory of the coming-to-be of knowledge). This explanation then provides to philosophy the scientific foundation for its pure task. [ 48 ]

Wundt divides up the sciences into two large families, the “formal” sciences and the “real” sciences. The former include mathematics; the latter study the natural and spiritual aspects of reality, [ 49 ] and correspondingly are divided into the natural and the human sciences. The human sciences in turn are divided into two genera, one of which deals with spiritual processes ( geistige Vorgänge ), the other with spiritual products ( geistige Erzeugnisse ). The former just is the science of psychology; the latter includes the general study of these products as such (e.g., philology, political science, law, religion, etc.), as well as the parallel historical study of these products as they have in fact been created (This taxonomy is given in SP I: 19–20). Since the process precedes the product (cf. Kusch 1995: 132), psychology as “the doctrine of spiritual [ geistig ] processes as such” is the foundation of all the other human sciences ( SP I: 20). [ 50 ] Philosophy, in turn, takes psychology ’s results and again abstracts from them the normative rules governing the organization of the human and natural sciences, something the latter cannot do themselves. In this way psychology as a science mediates between the sciences and philosophy.

One aspect of Wundt’s hierarchy of method and knowledge deserves special attention, namely the place of logic in the sciences. Like almost all the similarly titled tomes produced by the German mandarins, Wundt’s Logik (in two, later three 600-page volumes in four editions) molders away in research libraries. Its contents are for the most part unrecognizable as “logic” in any contemporary sense. What most philosophers meant by “ Logik ” in Wundt’s day was the rules and procedure of inference governing the sciences, where this often included lengthy treatments of the actual scientific application of these rules. What we would expect to find in a book called “ Logik ” today, viz., symbolic or mathematical logic, was called at that time “ Logistik ”, and was considered by some a mathematical (that is, merely formal) game unworthy of philosophy’s scientific (that is, substantive) role (cf., e.g., Natorp 1910: 4–10). Thus we should not be surprised to read Wundt, too, declare logic’s task to be the justifying and accounting for “those laws of thinking active in scientific knowledge” ( L I: 1).

For Wundt, however, this task involves psychology, and indeed much of his Logik is devoted to this topic. As he reasonably points out, logic comprises the rules of correct thinking, and the principles of logic are known to us as conscious representations ( L I: 76; 13; cf. Wundt 1920: 267); thinking and consciousness are objects of psychological inquiry; therefore any account of logic must include a psychological description of the genesis of logical principles ( L I: 13). Even the normative character of logic had, in his view, to be given a psychological interpretation (cf. L I: 76). Inevitably Wundt was accused of logical psychologism —the all-purpose term of abuse flung about in fin-de-siècle German philosophical debate. Husserl, for example, condemned him for expounding an “extreme” form of psychologism (Husserl 1901: 124–5; cf. Farber 1943: 123, 208, ff.; cf. Wundt 1910b: 511, ff.), viz. “species-relativism”, the notion that “truth varies with different species” of animal (Kusch 1995: 49). Yet Wundt himself calls his Logik the “most rigorous rejection of the psychologism that reigned at the time [i.e., 1880]” (Wundt 1920: 264), and held that “logical thinking is universally binding for every thinker” (Wundt 1920: 266). How can we reconcile these statements?

Wundt’s view of logic is unusual, but fully in line with his rigorously anti-metaphysical monistic perspectivism. That is, there is no logical “third realm”, but merely a single process called “thinking [ Denken ]” ( L I: 6); it is an immediately given fact of thinking that there are logical laws that stand over against all our other thoughts and representations as norms ( L I: 76). Their psychological immediacy does not, Wundt thinks, compromise their normativity, since what is given in consciousness precisely is their normative character. [ 51 ] Once this character is taken for granted, the science of logic develops its systems of correct deductions ( Schliessen ) without further worry about the source of that normativity. All that remains is “develop[ing] the foundations and methods of scientific knowledge” ( L I: 8).

According to Wundt, the three features of logical thinking that set it apart from all other types of representational connection are its “spontaneity, evidence, and universal validity [ Spontaneität, Evidenz, Allgemeingültigkeit ]” ( L I: 76). Let us briefly describe these. Wundt’s notion of the spontaneity of logical thinking is perhaps the most psychologistic-sounding of the three. Because, as was described above, thinking is

experienced immediately as an inner activity, … we must regard it as an act of will [ Willenshandlung ], and accordingly regard the logical laws of thought [ Denkgesetze ] as laws of the will. ( L I: 76–7)

In other words, logical thinking is accompanied essentially by a feeling of the thinking subject’s freedom in thinking. But while logical thinking may be accompanied by an especially strong self-awareness of the mind’s own activity, this feeling is not unique to logical thinking, since active apperception more generally is also accompanied by the sense of subjective activity. By contrast, logical evidence and universal validity are characteristics possessed by logical thinking “to a higher degree than by any other psychic function” ( L I: 78). By “evidence”, Wundt means the character of compelling necessity accompanying a logical judgment, what we might call self-evidence ( L I: 78, 79). A thought ( Gedanke ) may exhibit immediate certainty, obvious without any mediating thought-acts; or a thought may be mediately certain, grounded in prior thought-acts. Immediate and mediate evidence have their source and foundation in intuition ( Anschauung ): immediate evidence immediately, mediate evidence mediately ( L I: 82–3). Intuition is not identical with evidence, for evidence only

comes to be at the moment when logical thinking relates the contents of intuition and presupposes the relations of such intuitive contents as objectively given. ( L I: 83)

Wundt thus charts a middle course between, on the one hand, making logical evidence a “transcendent or transcendental” function of thinking (as Kant and “recent speculative philosophy” are alleged to do), and, on the other hand, considering it an “empirical trait of sensible objects” (as do empiricists and positivists) ( L I: 83).

By the standards of such philosophers as Husserl, Natorp, and Frege, Wundt appears committed to a logical psychologism. But it is worth considering his response to this charge, for it again illustrates his monistic perspectivism. While he rejects any interpretation of the origin of logical principles that would impugn their normative character of necessity, he also rejects the opposite extreme, what he calls “ Logizismus ”—the complete divorce of logical thinking from thinking as it actually occurs in minds. For Wundt, the logicist makes a metaphysical leap as suspect as it is unnecessary in conjuring up a “pure”, “absolute”, “transcendental”, but in any case separate source of logical normativity (cf. Wundt 1910b: 515). Instead of solving the puzzle of logical normativity, he exacerbates it by adding the puzzles of the ontological status of a third realm, or of a transcendental ego, or of “pure thinking”, and the influence of all of these on your thinking as you read this. Wundt finds a simpler solution in his perspectivism. The logical may be considered “purely” from a logical point of view, i.e., in terms of its normative character, or “genetically” from a psychological point of view. But there are no logical laws that are not also describable psychologically, just as there is no psychological phenomenon not also describable physiologically. But being “describable” in this sense is not the same as being explicable , and it is this separate task of explanation that falls to logic and psychology, respectively. The logical description saves the phenomenon of normativity, just as the psychological description saves the phenomenon of the interiority of consciousness.

Wundt’s conception of psychology was always controversial. At least in Germany, the struggle over the status and philosophical meaning of “consciousness” resulted, on the one hand, in the exclusion of Wundtian empiricism from philosophy departments, striving to maintain their speculative purity, and, on the other, the institutional establishment of experimental psychology as an independent discipline. This was not the outcome Wundt had desired. He had wished to reform philosophy , not as a synthetic science, but with a direct, indispensable, juridical relation vis-à-vis both the natural and human sciences. He never saw his psychological scientism as a threat to philosophy—on the contrary, he considered his psychology to be a part of philosophy (cf. Boring 1950: 325), one necessary for philosophy to take its proper place in the totality of the sciences. Indeed, philosophy could only assume that position through the mediating position of psychology ( PP I: 3). Yet academic philosophers, denied the possibility of any legislative or executive functions in the sciences, rejected the juridical ones as well, bitterly resisting contamination of their pure pursuit by the empiricism of the new psychology. In Germany, resistance was especially stiff among neo-Kantians, and later the Phenomenologists. In the end, the quarreling parties ineluctably assumed positions similar to their opponents’—though of course in a “purified” way. [ 52 ]

Let us return to James’s mean remark [ 53 ] about Wundt: he has no noeud vital , no central idea, and so this would-be Napoleon-planarian can never be “killed all at once”. Setting aside Wundt’s need to be killed at once or in bits, a fair and attentive reader will respectfully reject such scintillating criticisms. For although Wundt has many ideas—“the theory of actuality”, the “principle of psychophysical parallelism”, “voluntarism”, “creative resultants”, etc., etc.—yet they all do have a single unifying node, namely what I have here called “monistic perspectivism”. If Wundt has a big idea, it is that Being is a single flow of Becoming with many sides and many ways of being described. Consequently we , as part of this Being, have many ways of describing and explaining it. Few have as unblinkingly accepted the consequences of their starting points, or more doggedly pursued them to their various ends as Wundt.

Boring 1950 has an excellent annotated bibliography (344, ff.). Wundt’s entire oeuvre was compiled by his daughter, Eleonore Wundt (1927; cf. esp. Wong 2009: 230–3). An excellent select bibliography organized by theme has been compiled by S. Araujo for Oxford Bibliographies (subscription required). It includes volumes on Wundt’s correspondence, his estate, international library collections and archives, and his global influence.

• Araujo, S.F., 2003, “A obra inicial de Wundt: Um capitulo esquecido nahistoriografia da psicologia”, Revista do Departamento de Psicologia da UFF , 15(2): 63–76.
• –––, 2012, “Why Did Wundt Abandon His Early Theory of the Unconscious?”, History of Psychology , 15(1): 33–49.
• –––, 2014a, “Bringing New Archival Sources to Wundt Scholarship: The case of Wundt’s assistantship with Helmholtz”, History of Psychology , 17(1): 50–9.
• –––, 2014b, “The emergence and development of Bekhterev’s psychoreflexology in relation to Wundt`s experimental psychology”, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences , 50(2): 189–210.
• –––, 2016, Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology: A Reappraisal , Cham: Springer.
• –––, 2019, “ Völkerpsychologie as cultural psychology: The place of culture in Wundt’s psychological program”, in Jovanović, et al.: 75–84.
• –––, 2021, “A useful and reliable guide to Wundt’s entire work”, History of Psychology , 24(2): 188–9.
• Ash, M.G., 1980, “Academic politics in the history of science: experimental psychology in Germany, 1879–1941”, Central European History , 13(3): 255–86.
• Binder, N., 2016, Subjekte im Experiment: Zu Wilhelm Wundts Programm einer objektiven Psychologie , Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
• Blumenthal, A.L., 1975, “A Reappraisal of Wilhelm Wundt”, American Psychologist , 30(11): 1081–8. doi:10.1037/0003–066X.30.11.1081
• –––, 1977, “Wilhelm Wundt and Early American Psychology: A Clash of Two Cultures”, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences , 291: 13–20. doi:10.1111/j.1749–6632.1977.tb53055.x
• –––, 1979, “The Founding Father We Never Knew”, Contemporary Psychology , 24(7): 547–550. doi:10.1037/018836
• Boring, E.G., 1950 [1942], A History of Experimental Psychology , 2 nd ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
• –––, 1965, “On the Subjectivity of Important Historical Dates: Leipzig 1879”, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences , 1(1): 5–9.
• Bringmann, W.G., W.D.G. Balance, and R.B. Evans, 1975, “Wilhelm Wundt 1832–1920: A brief biographical sketch”, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences , 11(3): 287–97.
• Bringmann, W.G., G. Bringmann, and D. Cottrell, 1976, “Helmholtz und Wundt an der Heidelberger Universität 1858–1971”, Heidelberger Jahrbücher , 20: 79–88.
• Bringmann, W.G., N.J. Bringmann, and W.D.G. Balance, 1980, “Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt 1832–1874: The Formative Years”, in Bringmann and Tweney 1980: 13–32.
• Bringmann, W.G. and R.D. Tweney (ed.), 1980, Wundt Studies: A Centennial Collection , Toronto: C.J. Hogrefe.
• Brock, A., 1993, “Something Old, Something New—The ‘Reappraisal’ of Wundt in Textbooks”, Theory and Psychology , 3(2): 235–42. doi:10.1177/0959354393032008
• Calvo, P., and J. Symons (eds.), 2020, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology (2nd ed.), New York: Routledge.
• Danziger, K., 1979, “The Positivist Repudiation of Wundt”, Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences , 15(3): 205–30. doi:10.1002/1520–6696(197907)15:3<205::AID-JHBS2300150303>3.0.CO;2-P
• –––, 1983, “Origins and Basic Principles of Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie ”, British Journal of Social Psychology , 22: 303–13. doi:10.1111/j.2044–8309.1983.tb00597.x
• –––, 1990, Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• De Kock, L., 2018, “On Making Sense: An exploration of Wundt’s apperceptionist account of meaningful speech”, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences , 54(4): 272–92.
• Diamond, Solomon, 1980, “Wundt before Leipzig”, in Rieber 1980: 3–70.
• Eisler, R., 1902, W. Wundts Philosophie und Psychologie , Leipzig: Barth.
• Emmans, D. and A. Laihinen (eds.), 2015, Comparative Neuropsychology and Brain Imaging: Festschrift in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ulrike Halsband , Vienna: LIT Verlag.
• Estes, W.K., 1979, “Experimental Psychology: An Overview”, in Hearst 1979a: 623–67.
• Fahrenberg, J., 2012, “Wilhelm Wundts Wissenschaftstheorie: Ein Rekonstruktionsversuch”, Psychologische Rundschau , 63(4): 228–38.
• –––, 2013, “Zur Kategorienlehre der Psychologie. Komplementaritätsprinzip. Perspektiven und Perspektiven-Wechsel”, Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/689
• –––, 2015a, “Wilhelm Wundts Neuropsychologie”, in Emmans and Laihinen, 2015: 348–74.
• –––, 2015b, “Theoretische Psychologie—Eine Systematik der Kontroversen”, Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/904
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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Mind, Brain, and the Experimental Psychology of Consciousness , an excerpt of pp. 39–44 of Mind and body: René Descartes to William James , by Robert H. Wozniak, National Library of Medicine (U.S.), American Psychological Association, 1992. The full work is available online .

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Wilhelm Wundt’s Contributions to Psychology: Pioneering Experimental Psychology

A pioneer in the field of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt’s groundbreaking work laid the foundation for the scientific study of the human mind, forever changing the way we understand our own thoughts and behaviors. Born in 1832 in a small German village, Wundt’s journey to becoming the “father of experimental psychology” was anything but ordinary. As a young man, he initially pursued medicine, but his insatiable curiosity about the inner workings of the human mind led him down a different path – one that would revolutionize the study of psychology.

Imagine a world where the concept of studying the mind scientifically was as foreign as the idea of traveling to Mars. That was the landscape Wundt stepped into when he began his work. His contributions to psychology were so profound that they still ripple through the field today, influencing everything from how we conduct research to how we understand the complexities of human cognition.

But what exactly were these groundbreaking contributions? How did Wundt manage to transform psychology from a philosophical pursuit into a rigorous scientific discipline? And why does his work continue to matter in our modern world of brain scans and cognitive neuroscience? Buckle up, dear reader, because we’re about to embark on a fascinating journey through the life and work of Wilhelm Wundt.

Wundt’s Experimental Psychology: A Revolutionary Approach

Picture this: It’s 1879, and in a small room at the University of Leipzig, Wundt is setting up what would become the world’s first psychology lab . This wasn’t just any old lab – it was a place where the invisible workings of the mind could be studied with the precision of a science experiment. Can you imagine the excitement and skepticism that must have surrounded this endeavor?

Experimental psychology, as defined by Wundt, was the systematic investigation of conscious experience using controlled methods. It was a radical departure from the armchair philosophizing that had dominated discussions of the mind up until that point. Wundt believed that by breaking down mental processes into their most basic components, we could begin to understand how the mind works as a whole.

But how do you experiment on something as intangible as thoughts and feelings? Wundt’s approach was ingenious in its simplicity. He developed a method called introspection, where trained observers would report their immediate sensations, feelings, and thoughts in response to carefully controlled stimuli. It was like having a play-by-play commentator for your own mind!

One of Wundt’s famous experiments involved a contraption called the “complication clock.” Participants would watch a pendulum swing and report the exact moment when they heard a bell ring. This might sound trivial, but it allowed Wundt to measure reaction times and explore how attention influences perception. It was mind-blowing stuff for its time!

Structuralism: Wundt’s Psychological Framework

Now, let’s dive into the meat and potatoes of Wundt’s psychological theory: structuralism. If experimental psychology was Wundt’s method, structuralism was his madness – or rather, his framework for understanding the mind.

Structuralism, in a nutshell, was the idea that consciousness could be broken down into its basic elements, much like how chemists break down substances into their component parts. Wundt believed that by analyzing these basic building blocks of consciousness, we could understand how more complex mental processes are formed.

Imagine trying to understand a beautiful painting by examining each individual brushstroke. That’s essentially what Wundt was attempting to do with the human mind. He focused on three main elements of consciousness: sensations, feelings, and images. Through careful introspection, Wundt and his students aimed to map out the structure of the mind itself.

Now, you might be thinking, “Hold on a minute, isn’t this all a bit… subjective?” And you’d be right to ask that question. In fact, this subjectivity was one of the main criticisms leveled at structuralism. After all, how can we be sure that someone’s introspective report is accurate?

Despite these limitations, structuralism had a profound impact on the development of psychology. It paved the way for more objective approaches to studying the mind and influenced later theories like functionalism and behaviorism . Even today, when we talk about mental processes or states of consciousness, we’re building on the foundation that Wundt laid with structuralism.

Wundt’s Contributions to Cognitive Psychology: Unraveling the Mind’s Mysteries

While Wundt is often associated with structuralism, his work also laid important groundwork for what we now call cognitive psychology. His studies on attention and perception were particularly groundbreaking, offering insights into how our minds process and make sense of the world around us.

One of Wundt’s key contributions was his exploration of the “span of attention.” He discovered that we can only focus on a limited number of items at once – typically around four. This finding has had far-reaching implications, influencing everything from how we design user interfaces to how we structure educational curricula.

Wundt’s method of introspection, while criticized for its subjectivity, was a crucial stepping stone in the development of more sophisticated techniques for studying mental processes. It encouraged psychologists to think critically about how we can measure and quantify something as elusive as thought.

But perhaps Wundt’s most enduring contribution to cognitive psychology was his insistence that mental processes could be studied scientifically. This might seem obvious to us now, but in Wundt’s time, it was a revolutionary idea. He showed that complex cognitive phenomena like attention, perception, and memory could be broken down into measurable components and studied in a laboratory setting.

Wundt’s work laid the foundation for future cognitive psychologists like Max Wertheimer , who would go on to develop Gestalt psychology, and William Stern , who made significant contributions to the study of intelligence. Even modern neuroscientists like Torsten Wiesel , who studied visual processing in the brain, owe a debt to Wundt’s pioneering efforts to understand human cognition.

Wundt’s Influence on Social and Cultural Psychology: Bridging Minds and Cultures

As if revolutionizing the study of individual minds wasn’t enough, Wundt also made significant contributions to our understanding of how culture shapes human psychology. In his later years, he turned his attention to what he called “Völkerpsychologie,” or cultural psychology.

Wundt recognized that to truly understand the human mind, we needed to look beyond individual experiences and consider the role of language, customs, and social interactions. He believed that higher mental processes, like reasoning and language use, were fundamentally shaped by cultural factors.

This was a radical idea at the time. Most psychologists were focused on universal laws of the mind, but Wundt suggested that culture could profoundly influence how we think and behave. It’s like he was saying, “Hey, folks, we’re not just brains in jars – we’re part of a complex social tapestry!”

Wundt’s work in this area laid the groundwork for modern cross-cultural psychology and influenced later thinkers like Benjamin Lee Whorf , who proposed that language shapes our perception of reality. Wundt’s ideas about the cultural basis of psychology continue to resonate in our increasingly globalized world, reminding us of the importance of considering cultural context in psychological research.

The Lasting Legacy of Wilhelm Wundt: From Leipzig to the Modern Day

It’s hard to overstate the impact that Wilhelm Wundt had on the field of psychology. His influence extended far beyond his own work, shaping the thinking of a whole generation of psychologists who studied under him in Leipzig.

One of Wundt’s most famous students was G. Stanley Hall , who went on to establish the first psychology laboratory in the United States and became a pioneer in the study of child development. Another notable student was Rudolf Wagner , who made significant contributions to the study of brain anatomy and function.

Wundt’s emphasis on experimental methods and rigorous scientific inquiry set the standard for psychological research that continues to this day. Even as psychology has evolved and new methodologies have emerged, the basic principle that mental processes can be studied scientifically remains a cornerstone of the field.

Of course, like any pioneering thinker, Wundt’s work has faced its share of criticisms. His reliance on introspection as a primary research method has been largely abandoned in favor of more objective measures. Some have argued that his structuralist approach was too reductionist, failing to capture the holistic nature of human experience.

Yet even these criticisms underscore Wundt’s importance. After all, you can’t overturn a paradigm that doesn’t exist! Wundt gave psychology something to push against, a starting point from which the field could grow and evolve.

Today, as we use advanced brain imaging techniques to peer into the workings of the mind, or conduct complex statistical analyses of human behavior, we’re building on the foundation that Wundt laid. His insistence that psychology could be a rigorous, experimental science opened the door to all the advances that followed.

From Ivan Pavlov’s studies of classical conditioning to modern cognitive neuroscience, from Margaret Floy Washburn’s groundbreaking work on animal behavior to today’s explorations of artificial intelligence, the echoes of Wundt’s influence can still be heard.

As we wrap up our journey through Wundt’s contributions to psychology, it’s worth taking a moment to marvel at how far the field has come – and how much of that progress we owe to this pioneering thinker. Wilhelm Wundt may have lived in the 19th century, but his ideas continue to shape our understanding of the human mind in the 21st.

So the next time you find yourself pondering the mysteries of your own thoughts and behaviors, spare a thought for Wilhelm Wundt. Without his groundbreaking work, we might still be stuck in the realm of philosophical speculation, rather than enjoying the rich, evidence-based understanding of the mind that we have today.

In the end, Wundt’s greatest contribution may have been to show us that the human mind, in all its complexity and wonder, is not beyond the reach of scientific inquiry. And that, dear reader, is a legacy worth celebrating.

References:

1. Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of experimental psychology (2nd ed.). Appleton-Century-Crofts.

2. Danziger, K. (1980). The history of introspection reconsidered. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 16(3), 241-262.

3. Greenwood, J. D. (2003). Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, and experimental social psychology. History of Psychology, 6(1), 70-88.

4. Rieber, R. W., & Robinson, D. K. (Eds.). (2001). Wilhelm Wundt in history: The making of a scientific psychology. Springer Science & Business Media.

5. Schultz, D. P., & Schultz, S. E. (2015). A history of modern psychology. Cengage Learning.

6. Titchener, E. B. (1921). Wilhelm Wundt. The American Journal of Psychology, 32(2), 161-178.

7. Wong, W. C. (2009). Retracing the footsteps of Wilhelm Wundt: Explorations in the disciplinary frontiers of psychology and in Völkerpsychologie. History of Psychology, 12(4), 229-265.

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Wilhelm Wundt: The Father of Psychology, The Man Who Changed the Field Forever

Wilhelm Wundt, often called the “father of psychology” are one of those who dedicated their lives to understanding the human mind, have significantly contributed to psychology. As we delve into psychology, we must acknowledge the pioneers who laid the groundwork for this fascinating discipline. 

Wundt, a German physiologist, philosopher, and professor, was the first person to distinguish psychology as a science from philosophy and biology. He believed that psychology should focus on objective measurement and control, which led to the development of the first laboratory dedicated to psychology research in 1879. Wundt’s ideas and methods revolutionized how we approach psychology today, and his impact on the field cannot be overstated.

While Wundt is often credited as the father of psychology, it’s important to note that other individuals such as Hermann von Helmholtz, Gustav Fechner, and Ernst Weber were also involved in early scientific psychology research. However, Wundt’s contributions to the field were significant enough to earn him this title. As we continue to explore the fascinating world of psychology, we must pay homage to those who came before us and paved the way for our current understanding of the human mind.

Early Beginnings

When we think of the father of psychology, the name that comes to mind is Wilhelm Wundt. However, the early beginnings of psychology can be traced back to several other influential figures as well. In this section, we will explore the contributions of Wilhelm Wundt, Sigmund Freud, and Ivan Pavlov to psychology.

Wilhelm Wundt

Wilhelm Wundt is often referred to as the father of psychology. He established the first psychology laboratory in Leipzig, Germany, in 1879. Wundt’s approach to psychology was based on the idea that the mind could be studied scientifically. He believed that psychology should focus on learning conscious experience, which he called introspection. Wundt’s work laid the foundation for the development of modern psychology as a scientific discipline.

Sigmund Freud

Sigmund Freud is another influential figure in the history of psychology. He is best known for his theories on the unconscious mind and psychoanalysis. Freud believed that unconscious thoughts and feelings influenced behavior. He developed the technique of psychoanalysis to help patients uncover these unconscious thoughts and feelings. Freud’s work has had a lasting impact on psychology and continues to be studied and debated today.

Ivan Pavlov

Ivan Pavlov was a Russian physiologist best known for his work on classical conditioning. Pavlov’s experiments with dogs showed that behavior could be conditioned through association. He discovered that dogs could be trained to associate a neutral stimulus, such as the sound of a bell, with a reflexive response, such as salivating. Pavlov’s work on classical conditioning has been applied to a wide range of areas, including education, advertising, and therapy.

Behaviorism

Behaviorism is a school of psychology that emphasizes the role of the environment in shaping behavior. This approach focuses on observable behaviors and the conditions that elicit those behaviors. Behaviorists believe that the environment shapes behavior through conditioning.

John B. Watson

John B. Watson is often considered the father of behaviorism. He believed that psychology should be a science that focuses on observable behavior rather than on the mind or consciousness. Watson’s work was heavily influenced by the work of Ivan Pavlov, who had shown that dogs could be conditioned to salivate at the sound of a bell.

Watson’s most famous experiment is the Little Albert experiment, in which he conditioned a young child to fear a white rat by pairing the rat with a loud noise. This experiment demonstrated that emotions could be conditioned, and it significantly impacted the field of psychology.

B.F. Skinner

B.F. Skinner is another influential behaviorist who believed behavior is shaped by its consequences. Skinner developed the concept of operant conditioning, which involves shaping behavior through reinforcement or punishment.

Skinner believed that behavior could be controlled through positive or negative reinforcement. Positive reinforcement involves rewarding desirable behavior, while negative reinforcement involves removing an unpleasant stimulus when desirable behavior is exhibited.

Skinner’s work has significantly impacted the field of psychology, particularly in the area of education. His ideas about reinforcement and punishment have been used to develop effective teaching strategies and behavior management techniques.

Humanistic Psychology

In psychology, humanistic psychology is a perspective that emphasizes the importance of the individual and their unique experiences. This approach often contrasts with more traditional methods focusing on behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Humanistic psychology concerns the whole person, including their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.

Carl Rogers

One of the most influential figures in humanistic psychology is Carl Rogers. Rogers believed individuals have an innate drive towards self-actualization or realizing their full potential. He emphasized the importance of empathy and unconditional positive regard in therapeutic relationships and developed a form of person-centered therapy.

Abraham Maslow

Another key figure in humanistic psychology is Abraham Maslow. Maslow is best known for his hierarchy of needs, which suggests that individuals have a set of basic requirements that must be met before they can move on to higher levels of self-actualization. Maslow’s hierarchy includes physiological, safety, love and belonging, esteem, and self-actualization needs.

Humanistic psychology has had a significant impact on the field of psychology, particularly in the areas of therapy and counseling. This approach emphasizes the importance of the individual and their unique experiences and has helped shift psychology’s focus from pathology to personal growth and development.

Cognitive Revolution

The Cognitive Revolution was a period of significant change in psychology. It began in the 1950s and lasted until the 1970s. During this time, psychologists focused on studying mental processes such as perception, memory, and thinking rather than just behavior. This shift in focus was driven by advances in technology, such as the development of computers, and a growing dissatisfaction with the behaviorist approach to psychology.

Jean Piaget

Jean Piaget was a Swiss psychologist who significantly contributed to our understanding of cognitive development. He believed that children go through four stages of cognitive development, each characterized by a different way of thinking about the world. Piaget’s work has profoundly impacted developmental psychology, and his ideas continue to influence research today.

Noam Chomsky

Noam Chomsky is a linguist and philosopher who has significantly contributed to our understanding of language and the mind. Chomsky argued that humans are born with an innate ability to learn language, which he called the “language acquisition device.” He also criticized behaviorism and argued that language cannot be explained solely regarding stimulus-response associations.

Modern Psychology

As we continue to explore the fascinating world of psychology, we cannot ignore the significant strides made in modern psychology. This section will delve into two sub-fields of contemporary psychology: Evolutionary Psychology and Neuroscience.

Evolutionary Psychology

Evolutionary Psychology is a field that focuses on how evolution has shaped our psychological processes. It is based on the idea that the human mind has evolved to solve adaptive problems faced by our ancestors. For instance, our ancestors had to develop the ability to recognize and avoid predators, find food, and form social connections. These skills were essential for their survival.

Evolutionary psychologists believe these skills are still present in our minds today and influence our behavior and decision-making. For example, research has shown that humans are more attracted to people who have symmetrical facial features. This preference may have evolved because symmetry is a sign of good health, and our ancestors needed healthy mates to produce healthy offspring.

Neuroscience

Neuroscience is a field that focuses on the study of the nervous system, including the brain, spinal cord, and nerves. It is a rapidly growing field that has significantly contributed to our understanding of the brain and its functions.

Thanks to advances in neuroscience, we now know that different parts of the brain are responsible for other functions. For instance, the amygdala processes emotions such as fear and aggression, while the prefrontal cortex is responsible for decision-making and impulse control.

Neuroscience has also helped us understand how the brain responds to experience. For example, studies have shown that meditation can increase the thickness of the prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for decision-making and impulse control.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who is considered the founder of modern psychology.

Sigmund Freud is often referred to as the father of modern psychology. He revolutionized the field by founding psychoanalysis as a way of listening to patients and better understanding how their minds work.

What were Wilhelm Wundt’s contributions to psychology?

Wilhelm Wundt is considered the father of experimental psychology. He established the first psychology laboratory in Leipzig, Germany in 1879. Wundt believed that psychology should be studied as a science, and his research focused on understanding the structure of the mind through the use of introspection.

Who is considered the father of experimental psychology?

What is the difference between psychology and psychiatry.

Psychology is the study of human behavior and mental processes. It focuses on understanding how people think, feel, and behave. Psychiatry, on the other hand, is a branch of medicine that deals with the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of mental illness.

What are the main branches of psychology?

The main branches of psychology are cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, social psychology, personality psychology, and abnormal psychology. Cognitive psychology focuses on the study of mental processes such as perception, attention, and memory. Developmental psychology focuses on the study of how people change and develop over time. Social psychology focuses on the study of how people interact with each other. Personality psychology focuses on the study of individual differences in personality. Abnormal psychology focuses on the study of abnormal behavior and mental illness.

Who are the two fathers of psychology?

Wilhelm Wundt and Sigmund Freud are often referred to as the two fathers of psychology. Wundt is considered the father of experimental psychology, while Freud is considered the father of modern psychology.

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Wilhelm Wundt (Psychologist Biography)

If you are studying psychology, you can thank Wilhelm Wundt. Wundt wrote the first textbook on experimental psychology, established the first laboratory for psychology research, founded the first academic journal for psychology research, and was the first person to refer to himself as a psychologist. He is universally recognized as one of the most eminent and influential people in the history of psychology.

Who Is Wilhelm Wundt?

Wilhelm Wundt was a German philosopher, physiologist, physician, and professor who is widely considered to be the “father of experimental psychology.” He played a major role in establishing psychology as a discipline that is independent of philosophy and was the first person to study the mind using the scientific method. 

Wilhelm Wundt's Childhood

Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt was born on August 16, 1832 in Neckarau, a suburb of Mannheim, Germany. His parents were Maximilian Wundt and Maria Friederike Arnold Wundt. Wundt was his parents’ fourth child. He had two older brothers and an older sister.

Although he had siblings, Wundt grew up much like an only child. One of his three siblings died before he was born and another died when he was very young. Wundt’s surviving older brother, Ludwig, was sent away at the age of ten to live with an aunt in Heidelberg so that he could continue his schooling. Wundt was two years old when Ludwig left home.

Wundt’s father, Maximilian, was a Lutheran minister. However, the occupation was somewhat forced upon him as his older brother did not pursue theology. This left Maximilian with the obligation of carrying on the family’s long history in pastoral life. Interestingly, the Wundts who had previously served as pastors had also been heavily involved in higher education.

Wundt’s mother, Maria, came from a family of modest wealth. When she was a child, she had a governess who taught her French. Wundt recalled that his mother was the person who managed the family’s meagre expenses and took charge of his education. Wundt had a vivid memory of getting disciplined by his mother before being lovingly consoled by his father.

Early Schooling and Setbacks

Despite his family history, Maximilian was described as a man who lacked ambition and was not a high achiever. This is perhaps due to the fact that he never managed to reach the academic and professional heights of his predecessors. However, Maximilian did have many fine qualities that his family appreciated. Wundt remembered his father as a very loving and jovial man who was often generous to a fault.

When Wundt was between the ages of four and six, his family moved to the more rural town of Heidensheim. Wundt attended the local village school for two years before his education was taken over by his father’s vicar, Friedrich Müller.

He became so attached to his tutor that when Müller moved to a nearby village in Münzesheim, Wundt’s distress caused his parents to allow him to live with his teacher so that he could continue his education. Müller taught Wundt until he was thirteen years old.

As a boy, Wundt did not have many friends who were in his age group. He had a timid personality and preferred to spend his free time doing useful tasks around the house rather than playing. The only friend he seemed to have was a young boy who was described as “mentally retarded with a defective speech.” However, Wundt was often surrounded by adult family members, several of whom took an interest in his education and development.

Early Interest in Education

Wundt loved to read and had a voracious appetite for the books in his father’s library. By the time he was ten years old, he was already reading Shakespeare. As Wundt spent much of his time alone, he often engaged in daydreaming. He also developed a keen awareness of his own mental and emotional processes.

At age thirteen Wundt was sent to boarding school at the gymnasium at Bruchsal. While he was there he was extremely homesick, made no friends, and got very poor grades.

One teacher kindly suggested that becoming a postman would be an appropriate career choice for a child of Wundt’s abilities. Wundt felt so overwhelmed that he once ran away from school, but his mother brought him back soon after.

At the end of the school year, Wundt’s parents made the decision to send him to the gymnasium at Heidelberg to study with his more serious-minded older brother Ludwig. Sadly, Wundt’s father passed away roughly one year later. Although Wundt was deeply affected by the death of his father, he managed to make a few friends at school and started participating in extracurricular activities. He enjoyed his years at the gymnasium in Heidelberg and felt as if he had been reborn.

Educational Background

When Wundt left the Heidelberg gymnasium as a nineteen year old, he knew that he needed to decide what type of career he would pursue. Many men in his family had served as pastors, but that career choice was not to his liking. He didn’t want to become a teacher either because he strongly disliked the school environment. He considered a literary career, but he decided against it because he felt that such a career was too uncertain and he would need significant financial aid that his widowed mother could not afford.

Wundt recognized that if he wanted to go to college and eventually pursue a professional career, he would need financial assistance from his mother’s family, the Arnolds. He was also very aware that he had to suggest a university and a career that the Arnold family approved of if he hoped to get their help.

Many of Wundt’s family members attended the University of Heidelberg and a few of them had even served on the faculty. However, Wundt dreaded the idea of going there because he did not want to be compared with his other family members who had also attended that university.

Escaping Heidelberg

Much to Wundt’s delight, there were two occurrences that helped him to escape Heidelberg. The first is that his grades were so mediocre that he did not qualify for state financial aid to attend the local university in Heidelberg. Had he qualified, he would have had little choice but to go. So while his mother may have been disappointed at this seemingly negative outcome, Wundt was secretly overjoyed by it.

The second circumstance that helped Wundt to leave Heidelberg is that his uncle, Freidrich Arnold, was teaching physiology and anatomy at the University of Tübingen. Wundt reasoned that if he chose to study medicine, the Arnolds would approve of his career choice and it would seem natural that he would want to study at the institution where his uncle was already located. He eventually declared his intentions and his family accepted his decision. Unknown to the Arnolds, Wundt had concocted the perfect excuse to get away from them while still receiving their financial assistance.

Freidrich Arnold had a positive influence on Wundt. With his help and guidance, Wundt became a serious student who had a passion for anatomy. After one year, however, Freidrich Arnold accepted a position as director of Heidelberg’s Anatomical Institute. This meant that Wundt had little choice but to follow his uncle to the University of Heidelberg despite his earlier efforts to put some distance between himself and the rest of the Arnold family.

University of Heidelberg

Although Wundt was now a diligent student, he had to make up several courses in science and mathematics when he transferred to the University of Heidelberg. The primary reason for this is that he had neglected these subjects while he was a teenager at the gymnasium. He acquired a private tutor to help him with mathematics while he did lab work and attended lectures in chemistry, anatomy, physiology, and physics.

The arrival of chemistry professor Robert Bunsen (after whom the Bunsen burner was named) increased Wundt’s love for chemistry. He was so enthused by Bunsen that he briefly considered switching his career path from physiology to chemistry. Interestingly, Wundt’s first published paper in 1853 was on the chemistry of urine.

Medical School

Despite the allures of chemistry, Wundt decided to keep his focus on medicine. In 1855, he passed his state exams for admission to the practice of medicine. In addition to the state exams, there were three separate exams in surgery, obstetrics, and internal medicine. Incredibly, Wundt received the highest test score in each examination.

Once Wundt passed his exams, the Arnold family suggested that he should press forward with his medical career and help support his elderly mother. However Wundt doubted his ability to practice medicine long-term. He would have been happy to become a military doctor as it was peace time and he didn’t think he could cause much harm to healthy young soldiers. However, no such positions were available.

Wundt eventually agreed to work at a local hospital in place of a colleague who needed to study for his medical exams. He worked long hours to gain as much practical experience as he could. On one occasion,  a sleep-deprived Wundt mistakenly administered iodine to a patient who needed narcotics. Although the patient was not harmed, the experience haunted Wundt and made him hesitant about entering medical practice full time.

A second event occurred at the hospital that made Wundt question his future as a medical practitioner. It occurred during the hours he spent observing patients who had sensory paralysis due to leg injuries.

Wundt recognized that some of the issues these patients had could not be completely accounted for by a physiological hypothesis. He concluded that a psychological explanation was needed and he wanted to go search for it.

University of Berlin

Before long, Wundt was itching to leave medical practice and become a research physiologist. However, the Arnolds were unwilling to keep paying for his education. Wundt decided to scrape together his own meagre resources and pay for one semester of schooling in Berlin. At the University of Berlin he studied physiology under Johannes Müller, who is considered to be the father of experimental physiology.

In 1856, Wundt earned his doctorate in medicine at the University of Heidelberg. He then joined the faculty in 1857 and became an assistant to renowned physiologist and physicist Hermann von Helmholtz in 1858. Wundt was given the position of associate professor for anthropology and medical psychology in 1864. He continued to work as Helmholtz’s assistant until 1865.

University of Zurich

When Helmholtz moved to Berlin in 1871, Wundt was overlooked as his replacement. So in 1874, Wundt accepted the position as chair of inductive philosophy at the University of Zürich. One year later, he became the first-class chair of philosophy at the University of Leipzig. In 1876, the university provided Wundt with a lab to store equipment he had brought with him from Zurich.

Within three years, Wundt’s little equipment room developed into a bonafide laboratory for psychological research. It was officially recognized by the University of Leipzig in 1879. Soon after, students from all over the world began to flock to Wundt’s  classes. Enrollment in his courses doubled every 15 years and reached a peak of 620 students in 1912.

Between 1885 and 1909, Wundt had up to 15 graduate students serving as his assistants. The lab, now referred to as the Psychological Institute, grew until it encompassed eleven rooms. It was not long before the lab had to be moved to a new building. Wundt spent the rest of his professional career conducting research at the University of Leipzig.

Wundt’s Psychological Model

Wundt wanted to study the human mind in a more structured manner than was offered by philosophy. His focus was on things that he could control and measure. His lab attracted students from Germany, Britain and the United States. As a result, most early psychology labs around the world mimicked Wundt’s original design.

According to Wundt, psychology involved the scientific study of conscious experience. He believed that the field could be separated into two major categories:

Experimental psychology  - which included the study of sensation, perception, attention, feelings, and reaction time

Cultural psychology  - which included the study of customs, language, and myth

Reductionism 

Wundt’s goal was to record sensations and thoughts before dismantling them into smaller elements that could be better understood. He was a believer in reductionism —that a person’s consciousness could be broken down into smaller pieces without losing any features of the whole.

In his research, Wundt distinguished between immediate  and mediate experiences. Immediate experiences are based on pure, unbiased sensory input. An example of an immediate experience is → “I see something that is round and red.”

Mediate experiences rely on an interpretation of sensory input. An example of a mediate experience is → “I see an apple.” (note: the sensory inputs “round” and “red” have been interpreted to mean “apple.”

Importance of Introspection

Just as there is a periodic table of elements in chemistry, Wundt wanted to catalog all the basic immediate experiences that he could. He believed the best way to learn about consciousness was through introspection . Introspection means “to look within” and it involves observing the operations of one’s own mind in order to find out how the mind works.

To collect the data he needed, Wundt observed simple processes under careful conditions that he could replicate. For example, he would expose trained observers to lights, sounds, or other stimuli and ask them to report their sensations, feelings, and thoughts. To determine how complex a certain mental operation was, Wundt measured and tracked the reaction times of his observers. Observers had to make 10,000 observations before they were considered fully trained.

In his model of psychology, Wundt claimed that the basic components of consciousness (the immediate experiences) could be organized into more complex thoughts. The process by which the human mind puts new information in context is called apperception . Apperception involves associating perceptions (information from the eyes or other sense organs) with ideas and experiences you had before. For example, seeing moldy cheese in the fridge is a perception; knowing that moldy cheese will make you throw up if you eat it is an apperception.

Although Wundt reasoned that immediate experiences could be organized into higher-level thoughts, he did not think that this process occurred mechanically. Rather, he claimed that the human will  is vital to the organizing process. According to Wundt, will is the aspect of humans that allows them to direct their attention wherever they wish. As Wundt believed that the process of apperception is an act of will or free choice, his psychological school of thought was referred to as voluntarism .

Applications of Wundt’s Approach

Wundt’s greatest contribution to the field of psychology was his clear demonstration that the human mind could be studied using scientific methods. He also set new standards in research by emphasizing that psychology experiments should be conducted in carefully controlled settings. Wundt’s methods encouraged other researchers—particularly supporters of behaviorism—to take the same scientific approach when conducting their studies. Over time this helped to establish psychology as a valid experimental science.

In his experiments, Wundt focused on three aspects of mental functioning: images, thoughts, and feelings. These three areas are still being investigated by modern day researchers in fields such as cognitive psychology, social psychology, personality psychology, abnormal psychology, economics, and linguistics. Therefore, it can be said that Wundt pioneered scientific exploration into these areas.

Was Wilhelm Wundt a Structuralist?

No, but he built the foundation for structuralism, functionalism, and behaviorism! One of Wundt's famous students, Edward Bradford Titchener, established Structuralism  after he became a professor at Cornell University. According to Titchener, Structuralism was a refined extension of Wundt’s work. Functionalism  soon appeared as a psychological school of thought that was in opposition to Structuralism.

Criticisms of Wundt’s Approach

One of the main criticisms of Wundt’s approach is that he paid little attention to parts of psychology that he did not find appealing. For example, while Wundlt studied consciousness extensively, he largely ignored the unconscious mind. He also showed little interest in other branches of psychology that were coming to the fore such as educational psychology and child psychology.

While Wundt laid the foundation for future researchers by encouraging a scientific approach to the study of psychology, many of his own theories are no longer accepted today. For example, introspection was largely discarded as a tool of psychology experimentation in the 1920s. Behaviorists such as Skinner argued that introspection produced subjective results that cannot be verified as the results changed depending on who was being tested. According to Skinner, behavior must be seen in order for it to be objectively measured.

Titchener (Wundt’s former student) criticized Wundt’s methodology as he felt it was too confusing. Other critics claim that Wundt could have put greater effort into getting more accurate results. Wundt’s belief in reductionism has also been challenged by other researchers. For example, gestalt psychologists argue that the mind cannot be broken down into individual elements.

Wilhelm Wundt's Books, Awards, and Accomplishments

Wundt authored several books on physiology, philosophy, and psychology. Some of his most well-known works are:

• Textbook of Human Physiology, 1864
• Principles of Physiological Psychology, 1874
• System of Philosophy, 1889
• Logic. An investigation into the principles of knowledge and the methods of scientific research, 1886
• Ethics, 1886
• Outline of Psychology, 1896
• Cultural Psychology. An investigation into developmental laws of language, myth, and conduct, 1900

In addition to his doctoral degree from the University of Heidelberg, Wundt received honorary doctorates from the University of Leipzig and the University of Göttingen.

Wundt’s other awards and accomplishments include:

• Pour le Mérite for Science and Arts
• Honorary membership in 12 Scientific Societies
• Membership in 13 Academies in Germany and foreign countries
• The asteroids 635 Vundita and 11040 Wundt are named after Wilhelm Wundt to honor him.

Personal Life

Wilhelm Wundt married Sophie Mau on August 14, 1872. They had three children together—Eleanor, Louise, and Max. Louise died in 1884 when she was only four years old. Eleanor grew up to become an assistant to her father. Max enjoyed a career as a professor of philosophy.

Wundt retired from teaching in 1917 so that he could focus on his scientific writing. Three years later, he commented that he felt as if his vitality was waning. Wilhelm Wundt died on August 3, 1920. He was eighty-eight years old. He is buried alongside his wife Sophie in Südfriedhof, the largest cemetery in Leipzig.

American Psychological Association. (2002). Eminent psychologists of the 20th century.  Retrieved from https://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug02/eminent

Gale, Cengage Learning. (2015). A study guide for psychologists and their theories for students: Wilhelm Wundt . Farmington Hills, MI: Gale.

Kim, A. (2016). Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wilhelm-wundt/

Rieber, R. W., & Robinson, D. K. (Eds.). (2001). Wilhelm Wundt in history: The making of a scientific psychology . New York: Springer Science+Business Media.

Wundt’s Psychological Model. (2006). Retrieved from https://people.bethel.edu/~johluc/history-resource/WundtTheory.html 

Wundt, Wilhelm. (2020). Retrieved from https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-biographies/wilhelm-wundt

Wundt, Wilhelm Max. (2020). Retrieved from https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/medicine/psychology-and-psychiatry-biographies/wilhelm-max-wundt

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